teresita corporal case digest for finals

De mapa v. hidrosillo (1987)

Facts:

On January 16, 1965, petitioners PazGarcia vda. de Mapa, et al. instituted  before the then Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the estate of the late Ludovico Hidrosollo, then the subject of Special ProceedingsNo. 52229 of the same court, the properties left by the late ConcepcionMapa de Hidrosollo.  They claimed that the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, in her last will and testament dated June 2, 1951 and admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 46015, instituted Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal heir to the residue of her estate with the obligation as trustee to hold the same in trust for petitioners herein who are nephews and nieces of the deceased ConcepcionMapa de Hidrosollo and for respondents Luis, Teodoro, Victorina, Corazon, Violeta***, Rosario and Magdalena, all surnamed Hidrosollo, who are nephews and nieces of LudovicoHidrosollo; that Ludovico, however, died without fulfilling the obligation so that the estate of Concepcion formed part of the estate of Ludovico.  They prayed in the alternative that judgment be rendered either a) declaring a trust to have been created in their favor and their co-beneficiaries over the residue of the estate of ConcepcionMapade Hidrosollo and ordering therein defendants Luis and TeodoroHidrosolloas administrators of the estate of LudovicoHidrosollo, to deliver to them 6/13 of the said properties; or b) declaring the institution of LudovicoHidrosollo as universal heir with a provision for fideicommissarysubstitution in their favor and their co-beneficiaries as null and void, declaring the residue of the estate of ConcepcionMapa de Hidrosollo to have been subject to intestate succession, declaring them to be the sole heirs to said residue and ordering therein defendants Luis and TeodoroHidrosollo to turn over to them the said properties.

Respondents, in their Answer, denied the existence of a trust and alleged that LudovicoHidrosollo, being the surviving spouse of the deceased ConcepcionMapa de Hidrosollo became the latter's universal heir when she died without descendants or ascendants; that as such universal heir, Ludovico stepped into the rights, title and claims of the deceased ConcepcionMapa de Hidrosollo, so that the controverted properties became part of his own estate subject of settlement in Special Proceedings No. 52229.  They further claimed that Civil Case No. 59566 was barred by the order of the same court sitting as a probate court in Special Proceedings No. 52229 which denied petitioners' motion for intervention, and that petitioners, in having instituted Civil Case No. 59566 had forfeited any benefits under the will.

Issue: Whether the will of  ConcepcionMapa de Hidrosillo created a trust in favor of the petitioner, not a fideicommissary substitution.

Ruling:

Although the word "trust" itself does not appear in the Will, the testatrix's intent to create one is nonetheless clearly demonstrated by the stipulations in her Will.  In designating her husband LudovicoHidrosollo as universal and sole heir with the obligation to deliver the properties to petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the legal title should vest in him, and in significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as "beneficiarios", she intended that the beneficial or equitable interest to these properties should reposein them.  To our mind, these designations, coupled with the other provisions for co-ownership and joint administration of the properties, as well as the other conditions imposed by the testatrix effectively created a trust in favor of the parties over the properties adverted to in the Will. "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.

However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as the surviving spouse of the testatrix, Ludovico Hidrosollo was entitled to a legitime of one-half (½) of her hereditary estate.  As that portion is reserved by law for the compulsory heirs, no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever may be imposed upon the legitime by the testator.  (Art. 904, second paragraph, Ibid.) The trust created by Concepcion Mapa should therefore be, as it is hereby declared to be effective only on the free portion of her estate, i. e., that portion not covered by LudovicoHidrosollo's legitime.

There is no fideicommissary substitution because the testatrix did not impose upon her spouse the absolute obligation to deliver the property to said petitioners.  When the testa­trix provided in her will that her husband dispose of in favor of the petitioners his remaining properties it only shows that he was not absolutely obligated to preserve and transmit to the petitioners the properties by him acquired under the will of his deceased wife.  If the testatrix intended to entrust the property to her husband with the obligation to preserve and to transmit the remaining properties to the petitioners, she could have said so in an express manner.  However, even assuming that Clause 9 could be interpreted to be a fideicommissary substitution, such substitution can not be given effect in the face of an opposition and in view of Art. 863 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, requiring that substitution must not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.  It will be noticed that the second heirs instituted are merely 'sobrinos' of the fiduciary or first heir (surviving spouse).  Upon these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the movants for intervention do not have a legal interest in the estate under the present administration."

rabadilla v. ca (2000)

Facts:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix AlejaBelleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

On August 21, 1989, Maria MarlenaCoscolluela y BellezaVillacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late AlejaBelleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late AlejaBelleza.

Issue:

Whether there was a valid substitution of heirs when they are merely referred to as near defendants?

Ruling:

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.

perez v. garchitorena (1930)

Facts:

The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.

And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.

The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction.

Issues:

1.        Whether the amount deposited is the property of the children of the late Ana Maria Alcantara as fideicommissary.

Ruling:

Fideicommissary substitution requires three things:

1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.

2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.

3. A second heir.

The fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the testator.

By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.

Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC, vs.JAC LINER, INC

Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction¹ against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. The salient provisions of the ordinances are:

Ordinance No. 1631²

AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA

Ordinance No. 1778

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995

x x x

SECTION 1. – The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby regulated as follows:

(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers.

(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance.

The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which was given the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.

Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances.

Issue:

whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject ordinances.

Ruling:

As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.

In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.

This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.

Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

TOMAS MONTEVERDE v. SEBASTIAN T. GENEROSO

Facts:

Tomas Monteverde is the owner of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Santa Ana, municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. He possesses a Torrens title to the land obtained in 1921. The parcel of land is bounded on the northwest by the Agdao River. The Tambongon Creek is a branch of the Agdao River and Runs through Monteverde's land. For fishpond purposes, Monteverde constructed two dams across the Agdao River and five dams across the Tambongon Creek. The two dams in the Agdao River were destroyed by order of the district engineer of Davao. The Provincial governor of Davao also threatened to destroy the other dams in the Tambongon Creek. The motive behind the destruction of the dams in the Agdao River and the proposed destruction of the dams in the Tambongon Creek was to safeguard the public health.

Issue:

Is a provincial governor, a district engineer, or a district health officer authorized to destroy private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance?

Ruling:

As to article 24 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, it provides:

"Any person may, upon his own private property, construct artificial ponds of sea water, having communication with the sea, for use as bathing places or vivaries, or for any other commercial or recreation purpose, notice thereof being given to the governor of the province. During two months, the governor shall have power to order the suspension of the work if, after consultation with the naval officer in command and the provincial engineer, it appear that the work might be substantially prejudicial to the public interests. In such an event the interested party may appeal to the Government." But as to the applicability of this article, it necessarily would have to conform to the principles of the existing public law.

Nuisances are of two classes: Nuisances per se and per accidens. As to the first, since they affect the immediate safety of persons and property, they may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. But if the nuisance be of the second class, even the municipal authorities, under their power to declare and abate nuisances, would not have the right to compel the abatement of a particular thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing or act does in law constitute a nuisance.

ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO  vs. MEMORACION

Facts:

The quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 by Gregoria Francisco, who died in 1976. It stands on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority and faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said land was declared for the exclusive use of port facilities.

On 10 January 1989, the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San, surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the quonset for the storage of copra.

On 8 May 1989, Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and. stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." This was followed by another letter of 19 May 1989 of the same tenor.

Since the notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition on 24 May 1989.

Issue:

 Whether Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building.

Ruling:

Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances. Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance it cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.

Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.