AUSTRIA VS. REYES
G.R. No.
L-23079, February 27, 1970
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed
with the court a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last
will and testament. The probate was
opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and
Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioners, are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. The probate of the
will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia
was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita
Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had
been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
Petitioners filed in the same
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of
Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact
been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to
the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs were validly
instituted.
RULING:
Before
the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850
of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the
cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the
will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the
will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply,
from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana”, that
the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the
testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the
testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her
will. Surely if she was aware that
succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her
own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on
legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory
scheme. But even this, like the petitioners'
own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix
when she executed her will. One fact
prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a
specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guess work or
uncertain implications.
Were
we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then
the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of
the estate by intestacy -- a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the
decedent.
A probate court has found, by final
judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of
testamentary capacity and her last will
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to
give full expression to her
will.
At
all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix
can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot
be the subject of a collateral attack.
The present petition is denied.
DORONIO V.
DORONIO
G.R. No.
169454, December 27, 2007
FACTS:
Spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan,
Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352. On April 24,
1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed
by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Donation Proper Nuptias
of a Real Property made in Private Instrument valid.
RULING:
Only
laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it
and not the later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect. Accordingly, the
Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter
nuptias was executed in 1919. Under the Old Civil Code, donation propter
nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must
be specifically described.
In
the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become
valid. Neither did it create any right because it was not made in a public
instrument. Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to the
petitioners’ predecessors.
SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION VS. DULAY
GR 164748,
JANUARY 27, 2006
FACTS:
The
spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente were the owners of a parcel of
land located in Rizal, Santiago, Isabela, with an area of 29,002 square meters.
On August 3, 1981, the spouses Dulay
executed a deed of donation over a 10,000-square-meter portion
of their property in favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The deed
provided, among others: That for and in consideration of the benefits that may
be derived from the use of the above described property which is intended for
school purposes, the said DONORS do by by these presents TRANSFER AND CONVEY by
way of DONATION unto the DONEE, its successors and assigns,
the above property to become effective upon the signing of this document.
Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through
its Secretary, started construction of the Rizal National High School building
on a parcel of land it acquired. The school site was about 2 kilometers away
from the land donated by the spouses Dulay.
ISSUES:
ISSUES:
1. Whether
the done failed to comply with the condition imposed in the deed of donation.
2. Whether
the right to seek revocation of donation has already prescribed when respondents
filed their complaint.
RULING:
Petitioners failed to prove that the
donated property was used for school purposes as indicated in the deed of
donation. There is nothing in the records that
could concretely prove that the condition of donation have
been complied with by the defendant-appellants.
The planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be
considered and could not have been the "school purposes" referred to
and intended by the donors when they had donated the land in question. Also,
the posture of the defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as
technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal National High School is
far from being the truth considering that not only is the said school located
two kilometers away from the land donated but also there was not even a single
classroom built on the land donated that would reasonably indicate that,
indeed, classes have been conducted therein. These observations, together with
the unrebutted ocular inspection report made by the trial court which revealed
that the land donated remains idle and without any improvement thereon for more
than a decade since the time of the donation, give us no
other alternative but to conclude that the defendant-appellants have, indeed,
failed to comply with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of
donation
Anent the second issue, we reject
the contention that respondents' cause of action is already barred by
prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four years from the
non-compliance with the condition in the deed of donation.
Since such failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the property for
school purposes became manifest sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another
property for the construction of the school building, the four-year
prescriptive period did not commence on such date. The donation
is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation to
utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New
Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a
contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract.
Since a deed of donation
is considered a written contract, it is governed by Article 1144 of the New
Civil Code, which provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising
from a written contract is ten (10) years from the time the cause of action
accrues. In the case of donation, the accrual of the cause
of action is from the expiration of the time within which the donee must comply
with the conditions or obligations of the donation. In
the instant case, the subject donation fixed no period within
which the donee can comply with the condition of donation. As
such, resort to Article 1197 of the New Civil Code is necessary. Said article
provides that if the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and
the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may
fix the duration thereof. Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the
condition of the subject donation, it can be inferred that a
period was contemplated by the donors. The donors could not have intended their
property to remain idle for a very long period of time
The Petition is DENIED.
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