aliman's digest

1.Ylarde and Doronio vs. Aquino G.R. No. L-33722

Facts:

Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan and Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. Aquino after class gathered his male pupils to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. When the depth was right enough private respondent left to get some rope. Before leaving, private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."

A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately to Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries. Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.

Issue:

Can the School Principal be held liable? Does private respondent Aquino exercise utmost diligence?

Ruling:

I. No, because he is a head of academic school and not a school of arts and trade. According to Amadora vs. CA, “Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices".”

II. The contention that private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.

2.Dadizon vs. Bernadas G.R. No. 172367

Facts:

Petitioners and respondents are the children and representatives of the deceased children of the late Diosdado Bernadas, Sr. who died intestate on February 1, 1977, leaving in co-ownership with his then surviving spouse, Eustaquia Bernadas (who died on May 26, 2000), several parcels of agricultural and residential land situated in Naval, Biliran.

A complaint for partition of the one-half (1/2) conjugal share of the properties left by their late father was filed based on the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 24, 1996, which was opposed by the petitioner contending that such Deed of Extrajudicial partition was revoked by the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 10, 1999.

Respondents contended that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 10, 1999 was a product of malice directed against respondent Socorro Bernadas, for not all of the heirs of their late father participated in the execution of the alleged subsequent deed of partition.

On January 30, 2001, the counsel of respondents filed a Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000. However, the same was not signed by all of the heirs.

RTC issued an Order approving such Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 because petitioners had failed to file any comment on or objection to the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 despite previously being ordered to do so. CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

Issue:

Is the CA correct in affirming the RTC’s decision?

Ruling:

The CA erred in affirming the RTC’s Order because RTC fails to follow the stages required in Rule 69 of The Rules of Court in every partition proceeding which is a procedural step and is not discretionary on the part of the court. 

There are two stages in every action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The first stage is the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.

The second stage commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court.  In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

3.HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA vs. HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA

Facts:

Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He has 14 children. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. In order to reduce inheritance tax Alfonso made it appear that he sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case.

Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.

On April 19, 1989, Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.

After their father's death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.

Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC on November 17, 1995

Issue:

1.      Whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; 2. Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid

Ruling:

The Deed of Sale was void because it is simulated as the parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. As such, it produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. It is only made to avoid tax purposes. The CA also noted that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he remained in possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed their produce until his death.

Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transaction's validity, except that it must yield to the evidence adduced.

2) It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.  It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary.

In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.

4.Jarco Marketing Corp. vs. CA G.R. No. 129792

Facts:

In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure.

ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are liable for the death of Zhieneth.

Ruling:

Petitioners are liable because they failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. They are negligent in maintaining such dangerous counter. It is been a settled rule that a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

5.De leon vs. Del Rosario G.R. No. 152862

Facts:

An action for Partition filed by Pantaleon U. del Rosario and his son, respondent Vicente B. del Rosario, before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 11 of Cebu City. Plaintiffs therein, Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Vicente B. del Rosario, are cousin and nephew, respectively, of the petitioner. Plaintiffs therein claimed that petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario covering all of her shares in the properties sought to be partitioned.

Petitioner claimed that she did not execute any deed of sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario. She further averred that the only portions of her inheritance she ever sold were her shares in the Asinan and Negros properties, which she sold in favor of Pantaleon U. del Rosario, and the late Vicente S. del Rosario.

In December 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Upon the filing of the Complaint for declaration of nullity, petitioner moved for the suspension of the partition proceedings.

Complaint for declaration of nullity was eventually dismissed. The trial court ratiocinated that the issue of ownership should be determined and resolved in the partition case. It also noted that the filing of a separate action to determine the real owner of the properties in issue and sought to be partitioned would result in multiplicity of suits. Petitioner sought the reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue:

Is the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale?

Ruling:

To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and trial for the partition case, or to hold in abeyance the partition case pending resolution of the nullity case would result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower court observed. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice if the partition court hears all the actions and incidents concerning the properties subject of the partition in a single and complete proceeding.

After all, the issue of nullity can be properly ventilated before the partition court.  Thus, even with the dismissal of the action for nullity, petitioner is not without recourse.  She can still dispute the execution of the deed of absolute sale and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said instrument in the partition case.  There is no need for a separate case to resolve the matter.

6.Balaquit vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City G.R. No. L-38429

Facts:

Municipal Board of the City of Butuan passed an ordinance which states “ORDINANCE--640

ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET”

Aggrieved petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of said ordinance being unconstitutional.

Issue:

Is the ordinance valid?

Ruling:

The ordinance is not justified with any necessity of public interest. Moreover, it is detrimental to the public good and the general welfare of society for it encourages children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in school or be in their homes. The court said “How can the municipal authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and children to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children?”

Clearly such ordinance invades the personal and property rights of petitioners because it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights.