ebillo, the incoming jail warden

velera v. inserto (1987)

G.R. No. L-56504, May 07, 1987

FACTS:

Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate of deceased spouses, on the one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and their lessee, on the other, have given rise to the proceedings now docketed in this Court as (1) G.R. No. 56504 and (2) G.R. Nos. 59867-68.In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa-- in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompillo Valera had been appointed administrators -- ­the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrators an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate; and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs.  The Court issued an Order commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question ** to the Intestate Estate of the Spouses."

Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating Teresa Garin's heirs to restore the property to the Valera Spouses' Estate, in accordance with Articles 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 56504

Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction.  The administrators filed with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order, which was docketed as G.R. No. 56504. In their petition, the administrators contented that Branch I of the Iloilo CFI (Judge Inserto, presiding) could not and should not interfere with the Probate Court (Branch II, Judge Adil, presiding) in the legitimate exercise of its jurisdiction over the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the Valera Spouses.

G.R. Nos. 59867-68

In the meantime, Jose Garin -- having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), and filed a notice of appeal from said Order. But he quickly abandoned the appeal when, as aforestated, Judge Adil authorized execution of the order pending appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (with prayer for preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-1154-R. Fabiana instituted in the same Court of Appeals his own action forcertiorari and injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. NO. SP­-11577-R; this, notwithstanding the pendency in Judge Inserto's sala of the case he had earlier filed. These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals.  The Court granted the petitions. Hence this petition by certiorari. 

ISSUE: W/N the Appellate Court committed the following errors, viz:

1) in holding that the Probate Court (Judge Adil, presiding) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent spouses;

2) in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a separate action for the recovery of the possession of the fishpond then in the hands of a third person; and

3) in sanctioning the act of a CFI Branch in interfering with and overruling the final judgment of another branch, acting as Probate Court, and otherwise frustrating and inhibiting the enforcement and implementation of said judgment.

RULING:

Jurisdiction of Probate Court

As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence a procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.

Possession of Fishpond Pending

Determination of Title Thereto

These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.

"In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, it was held that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title."

Primary Jurisdiction over Title Issue in

Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action

The court should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction.  Those orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction of the ProbateCourt. 

The petition in G.R. No. 56504 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit.  The petitions in G.R. No. 59867 and G.R. No. 59868 are DENIED, and the judgment of the Appellate Court, subject thereof, is affirmed in toto. 

circa v. baylen (1988)

G.R. Nos. 69757-58, January 29, 1988

FACTS:

On February 21, 1984, the Estates of Soledad and Ricardo Balatbat, subject of a settlement proceeding pending with respondent Judge, entered into a "Property Management and Exchange Contract" with the petitioners Circa Nila Development Corporation, represented by petitioner Teodoro Katigbak, and Jennifer Baertges, both real estate developers.  The contract charged the petitioners with the development of two parcels of real property, located in Valenzuela, Bulacan, owned by the Balatbat Estates, and called upon them to pay a total consideration of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,600,000.00) PESOS.The respondent Judge approved the contract. Subsequently, the Estates presented an "Omnibus Motion" praying that the petitioners be compelled to pay the sum of P456,100.00 representing the alleged balance of the contract price they had allegedly refused to pay.  The petitioners opposed the motion on the ground, in essence, that the respondent Court, as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

On October 18, 1984, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the petitioners to pay the sum demanded.  The petitioners sought a reconsideration.  On January 23, 1985 the respondent Judge issued an order denying reconsideration.  He likewise ordered the petitioner to pay the additional sum of P500,000.00 on motion of the Estates.  The petitioners then came to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court, may compel performance under a contract it had approved incidental to its office as such a special court.

RULING:

A probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction.  It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never on rights to property arising from contract. It approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. In that case, judicial approval is necessary for the validity of such contracts.  It cannot, however, adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties thereto.  Compliance with the terms and conditions thereof may be compelled by specific performance, jurisdiction over which is vested in the Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction. The fact that the petitioners "participated in the formulation and in the eventual execution” of the "Property Management and Exchange Contract" does not bar them from raising this jurisdictional challenge.  The petitioners never contended that the contract cannot be enforced against them nor denied its validity.  What they dispute is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to hear the incident in its capacity as a probatecourt. The jurisdiction of a probate court is "merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended beyond."

The respondent Judge's reliance on our ruling in Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals is not well-taken. The probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540).  The respondent may file a complaint in the proper court for the rescission of the sale.  (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 72).  Likewise, the initial question of respondent regarding the propriety of including the properties in question in the inventory of the probate court as he claims ownership thereof may therein be finally and conclusively settled (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,supra; Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA 202).  The respondent has ample protection of his rights for the province of the probate court remains merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended beyond (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, supra). A probate court is one of limited jurisdiction. The respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders of October 18, 1984 (Annex "H") and of January 23, 1985 (Annex "P") that warrants the corrective hand of certiorari. The petition is GRANTED.  The Orders dated October 18, 1984 and January 23, 1985 are declared NULL and VOID.  The Temporary Restraining Order given in these cases on February 6, 1985 is hereby made permanent

nittscher v. nittscher (2007)

G.R. NO. 160530, November 20, 2007

FACTS:

On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.The appellate court dismissed the appeal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:

BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR LETTERS … TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II.

THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT SUIT.

III.

THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY ISSUED TO THE PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN THEPROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DR. NITTSCHER.

IV.

THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER COURT.

ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds for the petition were valid.

RULING:

As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-91and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.

Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed.
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probateof his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. – …

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.

In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 areAFFIRMED.

nepomuceno v. gomez (1985)

G.R. No. 62952.  October 9, 1985

FACTS:

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal.  He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and LeandroLeaño, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomucenoas his sole and only executor of his estate.  It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife.  In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace.  The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus letters testamentary should not be issued to her. The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.The respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the Will.  The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.  This was denied by the respondent.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the    

                 last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo

            2. Whether or not the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

            3. Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

           

RULING:

The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.  A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise." (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)

In the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions under Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

"The following donations shall be void:

(1)     Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;

(2)     Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;

(3)     Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office."In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: "The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions." The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith.  As argued by the private respondents:

"First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.

"Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.

"In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings. The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage.  It is the donation which becomes void. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. 

ajero v. sand (1994)

G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994

FACTS:

The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.

In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.

The petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.

On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and         testament

     2. Whether or not said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

     3. Whether or not the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and,

     4. Whether or not the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.

RULING:

In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.

We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:

"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus: "A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed." (Italics supplied.)

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237, 242 (1984), this Court held:

"Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, xxx the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

Unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:

"Article 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688."

"Article 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

"In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.

"If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his signature.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.The instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property.

solidbank v. ca (1991)

G.R. No. 75017, June 03, 1991

FACTS:

Don Vicente Madrigal, a resident of 47 Balete Drive, Quezon City, died on June 6, 1972.  For the settlement of his estate, Special Proceedings No. Q-916962 was filed with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Quezon City.

The probate court required the parties to show cause why the case should not be transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court pursuant to the Administrative Order issued by the Supreme Court, limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

Two of the seven heirs, i.e., the heirs of Pacita Madrigal Vazquez and Mrs. Vazquez, manifested their desire that the case be retained by the respondent probate court.  Petitioner did not give its conformity, in effect, objecting to the retention by the Pasay City probate court of the case for further proceedings.The Court of Appeals subsequently rendered the disputed decision, upholding due process in the instant case, and waiver of venue since the lapse from the time the case was heard at Pasay City to the present amounted to a waiver on the part of petitioner to raise the question of venue.  As regards Mrs. Vazquez’ claim of P5,833,333.33, the Court of Appeals denied the same since payment thereof would, in effect amount to a partial distribution of the estate of the deceased, Don Vicente Madrigal, during the pendency of the intestate proceedings, which may not be allowed prior to the delivery to any beneficiary of his/her distributive share of the estate and before the payment of estate taxes, pursuant to Sec. 107 of the National Internal Revenue Code.  Private respondents’ motion for accounting was likewise denied and directed to betaken up in the settlement proceedings before the respondent court. Petitioner maintains that the probate proceedings should properly have been retained by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, pursuant to Rule 73, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court Petitioner argues that their failure to object to the proceedings conducted at Pasay City Regional Trial Court, should not be taken as a waiver on their part as to venue because they believed that the proceedings were only temporary and that the case would subsequently be returned to Quezon City for further proceedings.Likewise, the heirs indicated their willingness to have the probate court at Pasay City continue with the proceedings.  Petitioner’s contention that only two heirs agreed to the retention by the probate court is misplaced.  Private respondent has pointed out: “It is incorrect for petitioner to declare that the other heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal never manifested their willingness to have the probate court continue with the proceedings. 

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there was waiver of venue by inaction on the part of petitioner.

              2.Whether or not the venue, of the probate proceedings including that taken by the Court of Appeals was proper.

RULING:

Petitioner appears unable to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.  Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan lays down the distinction between the two, as follows:“Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court.  It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive.  It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.  Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter.  Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.” (Jesus Dacoycoy v. Hon. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 74854, April 2, 1991, citing Manila Railroad, Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523) The action in the present case pertains to the probate of the intestate estate of the late Don Vicente Madrigal, in which case a regional trial court properly has jurisdiction over the case, both under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Sec. 44 (e) and under BP 129, Sec. 19(4). Objection to improper venue should be made in a motion to dismiss.  Until this is done, venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid. Moreover, it would appear that petitioner was motivated by some other reasons for belatedly questioning the venue.  Thus, private respondent’s observations: “Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, it never sounded off its vigorous objection that venue was improperly laid nor against the jurisdiction of the probate court until said court issued the order of December 8, 1983.  It was only after its receipt of said order, wherein the probate court directed petitioner to pay herein private respondent the total amount of P5,833,333.33 that petitioner commenced its mindless and baseless attack against the jurisdiction of theprobate court below claiming now, that venue, which it has for a long time waived, should be with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.” (p. 250, Rollo) The venue in this case should have been laid in Quezon City, but petitioner’s inaction has worked against it: “It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and such waiver may occur by laches.  x x x.” (Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occ., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, October 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 252 at p. 261) Foregoing considered, SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that indeed, petitioner has waived its right to contest the question of venue. Quoted from the decision of the Court of Appeals: “Special Proceedings No. Q-16962 (sic) should have been sent to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was pointed out by the respondent court earlier but which position was not pursued.  The foregoing resolution, however is merely directory. The Supreme Court was not prepared to rule that all the proceedings in the past are null and void because of venue and send back the proceedings to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, try the case anew from the very beginning to where this incident came about which proceedings might take more than five (5) years again.  Not prone to do this, conscious of the fact that one of the primordial objections of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is the speedy administration of justice but within the framework of the rule of law.  It was stated that they were not inclined to give their affirmance to the petitioner’s desire for the said transfer because the procedure will only militate against the interest of all parties considering that everybody is desirous to terminate the proceedings as early as possible and the continuance of the proceedings before the respondent court has not caused any damage against the parties and there is no damage as well against public interest.” The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1985 is AFFIRMED in all respects.