jidelle galleposo

UY KIAO ENG, PETITIONER, VS. NIXON LEE, RESPONDENT 

Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother UyKiaoEng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts.

Issue: Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

Ruling:Recognized  in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

            In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here--the production of the original holographic will--is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA, PETITIONER, VS. SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR., RESPONDENT

Facts: Petitioner, who was named as devisee in the will, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, on June 3, 1991, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P[3] for the allowance of the November 18, 1985 holographic will of the decedent. Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989 and another dated September 28, 1989.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant case.

Ruling: The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate, which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed. Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises's estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void. With the above disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss and resolve the other issues raised in the petition.

CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, PETITIONER, VS. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (DECEASED), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (BRANCH 59), RESPONDENTS.

Facts: On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will. On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.

            Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines; neither did he leave real properties in the country.

Issues:

I.                   Whether or not the CA and the lower court erred in not dismissing outright the petition for letters testamentary filed by Atty. Nogales.

II.                Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present suit.

Ruling:

I.                   As to the first issue, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.

II.                As to the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1.Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled in the Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate.

In this instant case, the RTC and CA, based on the evidence on record find that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Thus, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED REV. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS, RAMONA B. VDA. DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF THE LATE RODULFO B. ARANAS, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA, respondents.

Facts: Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church died and executed a Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. The properties of Group C in the last will and testament stated as follows: The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul.The petitioners filed a "Motion for the Declaration of Heirs and Partition; and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente Aranas) and/or for his Permission to Resign, and appointment of His Successor" that the "perpetual inalienability and administration of the portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas, administered by Vicente Aranas, is null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in setting aside its order dated November 17, 1977 and in not applying the provisions on Usufruct of the New Civil Code with respect to the properties referred to as Group "C" in the Last Will and Testament.

Ruling: It is contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent court dated November 17, 1977 was already final and not subject to correction as what was set aside and to be reheard was only regarding the determination of additional heirs. Such contention is not worthy of credence. Respondents in their Memorandum allege and it is not disputed by petitioners that the order of November 17, 1977 has not yet become final because it was received only on January 12, 1978 by the counsel for respondent Vicente Aranas and the Motion for Reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs dated January 17, 1978 was filed by the said respondent within the reglementary period. Besides the validity or invalidity of the usufructuary dispositions would affect the determination of heirs.

It was also proven conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B. Aranas that he was instituted as a remunerative legatee per mandate of the Last Will and Testament by way of usufructuary. Likewise the right of the Roman Catholic Church as the other usufructuary legatee for the duration of the statutory lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50 years from the date of the effectivity of said legacy, was also established. The instant petition is hereby dismissed.

Hemedes v. CA

G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999

Facts: A parcel of land was originally owned by the late Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos with Resolutory Conditions” whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the following resolutory conditions:(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or their heirs, of the Donor expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document conveying the property to the latter; or(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as above provided,the title to the property shall automatically revert to the legal heirs of the Donor in common.Pursuant to the first condition above mentioned, Justa Kausapin executed a “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion” conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property. An OCT was issued in the name of Maxima Hemedes by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, with the annotation that “Justa Kausapin shall have the usufructuary rights over the parcel of land herein described during her lifetime or widowhood.”Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject property in its favor to serve as security for a loan from R& B Insurance. The latter extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even after it became due. The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder and a certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff in its favor. Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a “Kasunduan” whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique Hemedes later sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation (Dominium).  Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who, even before the signing of the contract of lease, constructed two warehouses made of steel and asbestos costing about P10,000,000.00 each. Upon learning of Asia Brewery’s constructions upon the subject property, R & B Insurance sent it a letter informing the former of its ownership of the property and of its right to appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a builder in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not R & B Insurance should be considered an innocent purchaser of theland in question.

Ruling: The annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa Kausapin upon Maxima Hemedes’ OCT does not impose upon R & B Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagor’s title. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance. The usufructuary is entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property and may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title, but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of the usufruct. Clearly, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary. The owner of the property maintains the jus disponendior the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy the same. This right is embodied in the

Civil Code, which provides that the owner of property the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it, although he cannot alter the property’s form or substance, or doanything which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary. There is no doubt that the owner may validly mortgage the property in favor of a third person and the law provides that, in such a case, the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor, and should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof. Based on the foregoing, the annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa Kausapin is not sufficient cause to require R & B Insurance to investigate Maxima Hemedes’ title, contrary to public respondent’s ruling, for the reason that Maxima Hemedes’ ownership over the property remained unimpaired despite such encumbrance. R & B Insurance had a right torely on the certificate of title and was not in bad faith in accepting the property as a security for the loan extended to Maxima Hemedes.

Monteroso vs Monteroso

[G.R. No. 105608, April 30, 2008]

Facts: In 1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of this marriage were born Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol Monteroso passed away.A little over a year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia Pendejito. From this union were born Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr.Don Fabian filed an intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife to avoid disputes over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage. Land: Parcels F-1 to F-8 (First marriage) and Parcels S-1 to S-4 (Second marriage). The partition in SP No. 309 covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don Fabian the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of Parcel F-5, while the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5. The intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso was partitioned and distributed to her four children in equal shares.On October 26, 1948, Don Fabian also passed away.On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin D. Monteroso, filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle, Tirso D.Monteroso. As the heirs of Benjamin alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father. However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same when they demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age. Tirso countered that the portion pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to him; it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to exchange her share in said property for another parcel of land,i.e., Parcel F-7, then being occupied by her. Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages with Receivership,involving 12 parcels of land against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings and/or their representatives:(1) the aforementioned 12 parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first and second marriages contracted by Don Fabian;(2) SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void for the reason that the project of partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-fourth share or legitime over the said three parcels of land; and(3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are not paraphernal properties of Sofia PendejitoVda.

Issue: .Whether the CA committed reversible error in concluding that, “By invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership.

Ruling:

What the appellate court tried to convey is clear and simple: partition is the proper remedy available to Tirso who is a co-owner of the subject properties by virtue of his being a compulsory heir, like siblings Soledad, Reygula, and Benjamin, of Don Fabian. The right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Consequently, acquisitive prescription or laches does not lie in favor of the Cagampang spouses and against Tirso, the general rule being that prescription does not run against a co-owner or co-heir. The only exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, the appellate court ruled that by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription to set in.

The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership.

By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon.

Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian’s intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian.Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso’s right over a share thereof is imprescriptible.

Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that Tirso’s cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation.

Regarding Parcel S-1, the court ruled that it belongs to all the heirs of Don Fabian and not a paraphernal property of Pendejito as it was under a homestead patent application. Sec 105of CA 141 which governs such provides that the applicant shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations by his heirs in law after the latter performs all the requirements therefor.Pendejito shall only be entitled to a usufructuary right over the property equal to the corresponding share of each heirs.