Kang JLL kini...je je je

Kang jll kini   je...je.. je..

[ G.R. NO. 123486, AUGUST 12, 1999 ]

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, AND MANUEL RAMONAL, PETITIONERS, VS. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, AND EUFEMIA PATIGAS, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased. There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. Petitioners also ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.  the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.

Issues:  1. Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory

2.  Whether or not the handwriting in the holographic will belongs to the decedent

Held:

1. Yes, Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. "Shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory."
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, it has been held that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will."  However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

2. No. A visual examination of the holographic will convinced the Court that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. Thus, it cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

 

[ G.R. NO. 149017, NOVEMBER 28, 2008 ]

VALENTE RAYMUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA. DE SUAREZ, DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR, EVELYN SUAREZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Facts: Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez' marriage was blessed with both material wealth and progeny in herein respondents, namely, Danilo,Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo, all surnamed Suarez. During their marriage, governed by the conjugal partnership of gains regime, they acquired numerous properties,  After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate,  Curiously, despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties, explicitly identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate as forming part of Marcelo's and Isagon's property regime, remained in the couple's name.  In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 21736 to 21739. Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1, rendered judgment against Teofista.  When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein subject properties were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty.  Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June 21, 1984, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action against petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, for the annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied properties.  Petitioner Valente insists however that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.

Issue:  Whether or not respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file action to annul the judicial sale of what is the conjugal property of teofista and Marcelo, Sr. 

Held:  It is no longer needed.  In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.   Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties only by virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofista's, and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory heirs.

[ G.R. NO. 179859, AUGUST 09, 2010 ]

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO, MA. PILAR SANTIAGO AND CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, PETITIONERS, VS. ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO, RESPONDENTS. FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO, OPPOSITORS.

 

Facts: Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages--the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.  Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago. Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.  After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan^[2] a petition for the probate of Basilio's will, docketed as SP No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.  The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for completion of legitime before the Bulacan RTC against the heirs of the second and third marriages.  In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially maintained that they were partially preterited by Basilio's will because their legitime was reduced. They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of all the incomes of the properties from the time of Basilio's death up to the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90. On October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second marriage filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees. Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilio's will, they alleged that: the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on September 16, 1993.  The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of administration only, granted the motion.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court, hence, the petition

Issue:  1. Whether or not the decision of the appellate in the earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the present petition for review).

2. Whether or not the administration of Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago has expired

Held:

The petition lacks merit.

1.  Petitioners' argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the present petition for review) fails.

Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The first, known as "bar by prior judgment," proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action already settled in a prior action.The second, known as "conclusiveness of judgment," ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.

Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present case. The final judgment regarding oppositors' complaint on the reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition, which solely tackles the propriety of the termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of claim, demand or cause of action between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.

While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors' supposed preterition and reduction oflegitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked, in the present petition.

What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only. The records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision of the appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro forma parties.


2.  Yes.   It is clear from Basilio's will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners' names for administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in common.  But the condition set by the decedent on the property's indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]'s contention, is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 ofthe Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years. 

G.R. No. L-11285 May 16, 1958

VICENTE SAPTO, LAUREANA SAPTO and DORA (BAGONA), plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
APOLONIO FABIANA, defendant-appellee.

Facts: Sapto (Moro), now deceased was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5701 (0-28) of the Register of Deeds of Davao City. When Sapto died, he left his children Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon as heirs of the property in question. Ramon pre-deceased his two brothers, leaving no, other heirs. On June 6, 1931, Samuel and Constancio Sapto executed a deed of sale of a portion of four hectares of the land aforementioned if favor of defendant Apolonio Fabiana, in consideration of the amount of P245.00. The sale was duly approved by the Provincial Governor of Davao, but was never registered. Possession of the land conveyed was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in the possession thereof 1931 up to the present.

Thereafter, Constancio Sapto died without any issue, Samuel Sapto married one Dora (Bagoba) and upon his death was survived by his widow and two children, Laureana and Vicente Sapto. On October 19, 1954, the widow and children of Samuel Sapto filed this action in the Court of First Instance of Davao for the recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to defendant Apolonio Fabiana in 1931. After trial, the lower court held that although the sale between Samuel and Constancio Sapto and defendant in 1931 was never registered, it was valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs, and ordered the plaintiffs to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in defendant's favor and its annotation in the certificate of title. The appellants aver that it was error to require them to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiff, appellee, and argue that the latter's action to obtain it had long prescribed, twenty years having elapsed since the original sale. 

Issue:  1. whether the deed of sale executed by appellants' predecessors in favor of the appellee over the land in question, although never registered, is valid and binding on appellants and operated to convey title and ownership to the appellee.

2. Whether or not the action to require the appellants to execute a deed of conveyance had long prescribed, twenty years having elapsed since the original sale. 

Yes, it is valid.  In a long line of cases already decided by this Court, we have consistently interpreted sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act providing that "no deed . . . shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration" in the sense that as between the parties to a sale registration is not necessary to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is equivalent to registration (Obras Pias vs. Devera Ignacio, 17 Phil., 45; Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; etc.)  "The peculiar force of a title under Act No. 492", the Court said in Medina vs. Imaz and Warner Barnes and Co., 27 Phil., 314 (syllabus), "is exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the conveyance. Generally speaking, as between vendor and vendee, the same rights and remedies exist in relation to land not so registered". No right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the property in question is involved herein. The property has remained and still is in the possession of the vendee of appellants' predecessors, herein appellee. It is, therefore, clear that the conveyance between appellee and his vendors and valid and binding upon the latter, and is equally binding and effective against the heirs of the vendors, herein appellants.

2.  No.  Action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This action accrued only when appellant, initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L. R. A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).

G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY,  defendant-appellee.

Facts: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. There exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant. They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant. The land occupied by the wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Issue:  Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

It can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title and will prevail.    The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.  The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.  It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected. In this case, the record is returned to the court having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

SIMEON A. LEE AND ABUNDIA RAGANAS, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES R. SALDANA, SALVADOR SALDANA, CESAR T. VILLAREAL, EPITASIA TAN AND ALBERTO TABAR TABADA, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: Under review is the CA’s upholding the Cebu court’s order archiving peti­tioners’ pending action before it to quiet title and ordering the parties instead to reopen the long closed intestate proceeding of the deceased Andres Tabar.  What is involved therein is a question of conflicting claims of ownership between petitioners-plaintiffs spouses as vendees of all the rights, interests and participation of the share of the heir Alberto Tabar Tabada in said three parcels of land (which Alberto recognizes) and respondents-spouses Dolores R. Saldana and Salvador Saldana who claim to be the vendees of the same parcels in a second sale allegedly executed by Alberto in their favor (which Alberto repudiates) together with their co-respondents, spouses Cesar T. Villareal and Epitasia Tan as vendees-transferees in turn of the Sal­dana spouses. Thus petitioners-plaintiffs filed their action in the lower court against said respondents as defendants to quiet their title over the three parcels conveyed to them by Alberto Tabar Tabada.

Issues:  Whether or not the probate court has authority and jurisdiction to determine conflict of ownership

Whether or not the decision of the lower court to archive the case to quiet title is correct

Held:

1.      No, The probate court has no jurisdiction.   The conflict of ownership  is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and should properly be determined and adjudicated in the petitioners’ action in the lower court  to quiet title. As already indicated it is well settled that the probate court has no authority to decide in the estate proceedings (even if they were to be reopened) whether property dis­puted between the estate and a third party belongs to one or the other but that such question of ownership has to be resolved in anappropriate separate action.

2.     No, the decision of the lower court to archive the case to quiet title is incorrect.  Since there is no dispute among the heirs of the estate who have no claims and have long disposed of their inherited properties, and the pending action to quiet title was filed precisely for the purpose of determining who among the conflicting parties (who claim either by right of purchase from an heir or from an entirely different source opposed to said heir) has a better legal right and title to the properties, and such conflict of ownership is beyond the probate court’s authority and jurisdiction to determine, the Cebu court is called upon not to archive the case but to hear and determine the issue of ownership properly pertaining to its jurisdiction and submitted to it for adjudication.

[ G.R. NO. 189776, DECEMBER 15, 2010 ]

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, REPRESENTED BY HER DULY APPOINTED GUARDIANS, AGNES P. ARELLANO AND NONA P. ARELLANO, PETITIONER, VS. FRANCISCO PASCUAL AND MIGUEL PASCUAL, RESPONDENTS.

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs only his siblings, namely:  petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner. The probate court ruled that the property donated is subject to collation.  The CA sustained the probate court's ruling. 

Issues:  1.  whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation;

2:  whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.

Held:

1.     No.  The property donated is not subject to collation.   Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs.  He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime - that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs  The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. 
2. Yes. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate.  There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation. The decedent's remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.  (underscoring supplied)

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.  (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

[ G.R. NO. L-24561, JUNE 30, 1970 ]

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, EXECUTRIX-APPELLEE, VS. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON AND LILIA DIZON, OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS. 

FACTS

The testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legi­timate son of the said decedent.  Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppo­sitors-appellants.  In her will, Valdez “commanded that her property be divided” in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific 

realproperties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The executrix filed her project of partition: On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate they prepared.  Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the res­pective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof.  The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. Oppositors invoke Article 1063 "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired"

Issue:  Whether or not Article 1603 of the New Civil Code applies

HELD

NO.  When the testatrix has not made any previous donations during her lifetime,nor left merely some properties by will, collation is not necessary to determine the legitime of each heir.  Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided,but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case.  Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merelysome properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.

[ G.R. NO. 123346, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 ]

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. AND MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 134385]

ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HEIRSOF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSO TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MALABON, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 148767]

STO. NINO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

.

I.      G.R. No. 123346

Petitioners Manotok Corporations mainly contend that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court's Decision which was rendered without conducting trial for the reception of evidence.  It merely relied on the technical report of the commissioners appointed by the court based on the parties' nomination.   They (petitioners) were thus denied due process as they were not able to present evidence in a full-blown trial.  Respondent CLT Realty, on the other hand, maintains that the factual findings of the commissioners are supported by evidence.   The contending parties were accorded due process because they submitted their respective evidence to the commissioners in the course of the proceedings.   The same evidence became the basis of their Majority and Minority Reports.   The two Reports were later heard and passed upon by the trial court.  Respondent CLT Realty adds that the Decision of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, complies with the requirement of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution since it clearly and distinctly expresses the facts and the law upon which it is based.  etitioners Manotok filed with this Court two separate Manifestations stating that a (1) Report of the Fact-Finding Committee dated August 28, 1997 composed of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Land Registration Authority and the Office of the Solicitor General, and (2) Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998 were issued by the DOJ and the Senate.   Both reports conclude that there is only one OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered on May 3, 1917.

II.  G.R. 134385

Petitioner Araneta Institute basically submits that the case of MWSS vs. CA cited in the Decision dated May 30, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present case.   In that case, it upheld TCT No. 15167 of Dimson derived from OCT 994 issued and registered earlier, or on April 19, 1917.   Whereas, the MWSS' title was derived from OCT 994 issued and registered later, or on May 3, 1917. The Appellate Court erred when it relied on MWSS vs. CA. On the other hand, respondents heirs of Dimson counter that the validity of Dimson's title, TCT No. 15167, has been upheld by this Court in MWSS case.

III. G.R. No. 148767

Like petitioner Araneta Institute in G.R. No. 134385 and petitioners Manotok Corporations in G.R. No. 123346, petitioner Sto. Niño Association contends that there are supervening facts and events that transpired after the trial court rendered its Amended Decision that if considered will result in a different conclusion.   These are the two Reports of the DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committees that there is only one OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917.   Thus, with a new trial, and with the presentation of these Reports as evidence, it could be shown that the titles of Jose Dimson and CLT Realty are void.

Issue:  1. Whether TCT No. 15169 issued in the name of Jose B. Dimson and TCT No. 177013 issued in the name of CLT are valid

2. Whether or not the DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committee Reports invoked by petitioners herein.   override the Decisions of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of respondents' titles in these cases

Held:

The present petitions must fail.

1.  Yes. TCT No. 15169 issued in the name of Jose B. Dimson and TCT No. 177013 issued in the name of CLT are valid.   This is a finding of fact by the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal to the Supreme Court.   Such findings are binding and conclusive.  As regards G.R. No. 123346 (Manotok Corporations vs. CLT Realty, involving Lot 26), the trial court acted properly when it adopted the Majority Report of the commissioners as part and parcel of its Decision.   That is allowed in Section 11, Rule 32 of the Revised Rules of Court (now the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.  The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering.   The very reason why commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of the titles in conflict with each other.  Given their background, expertise and experience, these commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the titles is valid.   Thus, the trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions.  It bears stressing that the parties opted to submit the case   for decision on the bases, among others, of their respective objections/comments on the commissioners' reports.  Thus, petitioners Manotok Corporations, under the doctrine of estoppel, cannot now be permitted to assail the Decision of the trial court – which turned out to be adverse to them – and insist that it should have conducted further reception of evidence before rendering its judgment on the case.

2. No.  The court did not consider the alleged newly-discovered evidence consisting of the DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committee Reports invoked by petitioners herein.   Certainly, such committee reports cannot override the Decisions of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of respondents' titles in these cases.   The said Decisions were rendered after the opposing parties have been accorded due process.  It bears stressing that the courts have the constitutional duty to adjudicate legal disputes properly brought before them.  The DOJ and Senate, or any other agencies of the Government for that matter, have clearly distinguishable roles from that of the Judiciary. Just as overlapping of titles of lands is abhorred, so is the overlapping of findings of facts among the different branches and agencies of the Government.