aprilyn barbaso

 

Gaviba Maglucot Aw, et.al vs. Leopoldo Maglucot, et.al G.R. No. 132518 March 28, 2000

 Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D(subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rentedportions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor.Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rentalamount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs ofRoberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however,said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.Petitioners thus filed the complainta quo .Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physicallysubdivided among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actualexecution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition. Petitioners opine that in1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision ofLot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs ofPascual Olis were not agreeable to the partition. Petitioners further contend thatrespondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that theyare "constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot. Simply put, petitioners vigorouslyassert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot inview of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondentsacquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No.1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present.

Issue:

 Whether or not there has been a valid oral partition

Held:

 Yes. The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained o until this case arose, or about forty (40) years later. From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that said court was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan.It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. It follows that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long time .Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent. The payment of rentals by respondents reveals that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of  lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any change in the possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore ,that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in1946. Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled.   

CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. DR. MANUEL SINGSON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
[ G. R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962 ]

Facts of the Case:

Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one half proindiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dona Leona Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in Special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action. Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and not owner of one half proindiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand partitionthereof.
             It is admitted that Doña Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G. R. No. 3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will her nearest living relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, and her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolacion, all surnamed Florentino.

Issue:

Whether the testamentary disposition above-quoted provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria.

Ruling:

            The last will of the deceased Dña. Leon a Singson established a mere subtitucion vulgar, the substitution of Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

            "ART. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance.
"A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it is to apply, shall include the three mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided."
"ART. 781. Fidei-comissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is charged to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of the inheritance shall be valid and effective, provided they do not go beyond the second degree, or that they are made in favor of persons living at the time of the death of the testator."

            It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino—whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix—the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitucion fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.

EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner,
vs.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondents

G.R. No. 177807 October 11, 2011

Facts of the Case:

            In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA), Quezon City with an area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.

On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof."

An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.

Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side of Santolan Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue, and from one lot before Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line.

The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties located at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary were exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This ordinance was further amended by Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial buildings from Balete Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1 March 1966 meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for buildings along V. Luna Road, Central District, Quezon City.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.

Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Council’s (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002.⁷ The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to "clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions."

On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines (Building Code) in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.

Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the "wing walls," of the ground floor structure. The records of the present case are not entirely clear on the extent of the demolition; nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.

Issue:

Is Ordinance No. 2904 valid?

Ruling:

            The SC upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property.

Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his commercial lot, appellee still retains the beneficial ownership of the said property. Thus, there is no "taking" for public use which must be subject to just compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for providing safety and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same still redounds to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the forefront of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded sidewalks, by their nature, assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat some kind of protection from accidents and other hazards.

Without doubt, this sense of protection can be a boon to the business activity therein engaged.

Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.

G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011

PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI,

Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 159059

VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, INREPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T.COMENDADOR,Petitioner,vs.

VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C.BOMBASI,Respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion’s late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the respondent’s mother for a period of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20 years.

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.

Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984. From then on up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’s permits.

Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.

 The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issuedResolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.Visitacion, filed with a case for damages before the RTC. Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminalcomplaint  against Mayor Comendador, Asilo andAngeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman.Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, finding theaccused Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec.3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019

The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil action. Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES

1. WON the accused is guilty of violating RA 3019

2   WON the actual damages prayed for is unconscionable

DECISION

 The Supreme Court sustain the Sandiganbayanin its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador. The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;(4) OR that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff’s store was carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding are straining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of official DUTIES WHICH apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2)resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiff’s store. The accused public officials were devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision.2.The amount of actual damages prayed for is unconscionable. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. n this case, the Court finds that the only evidence presented to prove the actual damages incurred was the itemized list of damaged and lost items prepared by Engineer Cabrega,an engineer commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to estimate the costs. The amount claimed by the respondent-claimant’s witness as to the actual amount of DAMAGES”

should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence."Whatever claim the respondent witness would allege must be appreciated in consideration of his particular self-interest. There must still be a need for the examination of the documentary evidence presented by the claimants to support its claim with regard to the actual amount of damages. The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an exhibit partakes of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the person who issued them was not presented as a WITNESS.