FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 62952. October 9, 1985]
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO AND CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that
portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate
Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August
10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and
the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died
on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament
duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin
of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina
Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leaño, who in turn, affixed their signatures below
the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will
in the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public.
The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal
by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein
petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno
as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the
Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since
1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living
with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner
herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in
Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice
of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal
wife Rufina Gomez and his
children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to
herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
"Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my
aforementioned legal wife, Rufina
Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and
properly entitled to inherit from me; that while have been estranged from my
above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally married to
her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons and
justifications known fully well by them;
"Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man
and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno,
whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the
things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent,
did comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as
well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of
matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;"
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the
deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of
letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition
alleging inter alia that the execution of
the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was
already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in
integrity and thus letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December
1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an idle exercise because on
the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal
denying the probate of the Will.
The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in
favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation
with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set
aside, the will in question declared valid except the devise in favor of the
appellant which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are
instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without
pronouncement as to costs."
On June 15, 1982, oppositors
Rufina Gomez and her
children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying
that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to
"appellees" so as to
read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal
shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted
by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a resolution
dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the
respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the
last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary
provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other
proceedings because the only purpose of the probate
of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the
mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that
even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made
by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the
specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary
provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was
allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the
last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the
meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact
that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged
ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the
doctrine enunciated in Nuguid
v. Felix Nuguid, et al.
(17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay,
Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al (G.R. No. L-39247, June 27,
1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the
illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality
of the devise.
We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after
declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null
and void.
The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed
thus:
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"x x x It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of
his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid
and enforceable or otherwise." (Fernandez v. Dimagiba,
21 SCRA 428)
"The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the
extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the
only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry
into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or
the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
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"True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal
of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of
the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates
to descent and distribution." (Sumilang
v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
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"To establish conclusively as
against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a
will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power
to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not
decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. x x x" (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid
v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449)
cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal
heir and completely preterited
her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it
may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or later
proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the
Court in Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez
(64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
"The basic issue is whether the probate
court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling
on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
"We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the
motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's
authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established.
The probate of a will might become an
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid,
64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang v. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26,
1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693)."
There appears to be no more dispute
at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are
agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was
executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the
mental capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she
completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the question of
whether or not the probate court
correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
"This being so, the will is declared validly drawn."
(Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in
toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent
court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null
and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated
in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
"We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded
for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1,
Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517,
522). After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution."
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the
nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose
simply because, in the probate of a
will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its
provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
"The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage
at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty
of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his
wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
"In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration
of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee;
and the guilt of the donor and donee may
be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
"The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning
donations inter vivos
shall apply to testamentary provisions."
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968,
or almost six years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina
Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many
years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo
and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate
children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and
wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo
declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He
stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in
fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage."
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior
existing marriage when Martin Jugo
executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital
relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while
the woman was 48. Nepomuceno
now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she
was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith.
As argued by the private respondents:
"First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and
petitioner, the devisee.
"Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator,
which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.
"In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic
validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator
at the start of the proceedings.
"Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife,
was already married was an important and specific issue brought by the parties
before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
"Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity
of the will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged
good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony
of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
"Private respondents, naturally,
presented evidence that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the point.
"Sebastian Jugo,
younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the
meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18, 1975).
"Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the
parties made a decisive issue right at the inception of the case.
"Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a
ruling on the question.
"When the court a quo held that the testator
Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were
deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage',
it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to
be."
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"3' If a review
of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully
offer the following analysis:
"FIRST:
The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town
in Tarlac where neither she
nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to
hide from, why the concealment? Of course, it maybe argued
that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina
Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that
time and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo
were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was
brought concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)
"SECOND:
Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both
single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo
married respondent Rufina
Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh.
3). Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There
was a space of about 30 years in-between. During those 30 years, could it
be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo
did not marry her nor contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts that
should impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy, especially
so when she was already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.
"THIRD:
The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo
in 1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that she knew that the man she
had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already
two children.
"FOURTH:
Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina
Gomez, is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo
whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by
whom? That is un-Filipino.
"FIFTH:
Having often gone to Pasig to
the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it possible that she
would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo
was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering
that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo
(where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent Rufina
Gomez were just a few meters away?
"Such pretentions
of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno
are unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently improbable, for
they are against the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and
promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man
she was going to marry whether or not he was already married to another,
knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would
strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the
irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with
the deceased during their younger years."
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is
against the making of a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage. It is
the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that
the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova, De la Fuente, and Patajo,
JJ., concur.
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