A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.⁶⁰ Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,⁶¹ as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.⁶²

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,⁶³ Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.⁶⁴ Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.⁶⁵

 ECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.²¹ A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15²² and 17²³ of the Civil Code.²⁴ In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26²⁵ of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."²⁶ A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.²⁷

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."²⁸ Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.²⁹ Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void¹⁵ and voidable¹⁶ marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.¹⁷ Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.¹⁸

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,¹⁹ enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.²⁰ and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.²¹ In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.²²

 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

 

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.¹³Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.¹⁴ Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."¹⁵In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.¹⁶ It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.¹⁷ Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.¹⁸ As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.¹⁹

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs.MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013

The following observation of this Court in Golding vs. Balatbat, 4 is applicable to the case before us:

The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case with these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.

It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. 5

Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.

Maintenance of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court would prevent the petitioner from using her accustomed business name and require her to operate in the market under a different name unfamiliar to her customers. This would be unfair under the circumstances. As we have held that the private respondent has not sufficiently shown that she is entitled to this remedy, it is just and equitable that it be lifted until the dispute between the parties is thoroughly threshed out and finally resolved after trial on the merits.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 87913             May 6, 1991
LEONOR A. OLALIA and her husband JESUS G. OLALIA, petitioners,
vs.
LOLITA O HIZON, represented by her Atty. In Fact, ATTY. ABRAHAM P. GOROS

The primary issue posed before the Court, in this appeal by certiorari from a decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, is whether or not the mortgagee or purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession over the mortgaged property despite his failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor or the person entitled thereto. Secondarily, it calls for a resolution of the further consequences of such non-payment of the full amount for which the property was sold to him pursuant to his bid.

Coming now to the main issue in this case, petitioner argues that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption, invoking in support thereof Sections 7 and 8 of Act 3135 which conjointly provide:

Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

Sec. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the Court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.

The governing law thus explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.

No discretion appears to be left to the court. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8, and it cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since, under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte. ⁸ Such recourse is available to a mortgagee, who effects the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, even before the expiration of the period of redemption provided by law and the Rules of Court. ⁹

The rule is, however, not without exception. Under Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act 3135, the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure "unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor." ¹⁰

Thus, in the case of Barican, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
et al., ¹¹ this Court took into account the circumstances that long before the mortgagee bank had sold the disputed property to the respondent therein, it was no longer the judgment debtor who was in possession but the petitioner spouses who had assumed the mortgage, and that there was a pending civil case involving the rights of third parties. Hence, it was ruled therein that under the circumstances, the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of mortgage case ceases to be ministerial.

Now, in forced sales low prices are generally offered and the mere inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff's sale, unless shocking to the conscience, has been held insufficient to set aside a sale. This is because no disadvantage is caused to the mortgagor. On the contrary, a mortgagor stands to gain with a reduced price because he possesses the right of redemption. When there is the right to redeem, inadequacy of price becomes immaterial since the judgment debtor may reacquire the property or sell his right to redeem, and thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the auction sale. ¹²

However, also by way of an exception, in Cometa, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. ¹³ where the properties in question were found to have been sold at an unusually lower price than their true value, that is, properties worth at least P500,000.00 were sold for only P57,396.85, this Court, taking into consideration the factual milieu obtaining therein as well as the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, decided to withhold the issuance of the writ of possession on the ground that it could work injustice because the petitioner might not be entitled to the same.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119247 February 17, 1997
CESAR SULIT, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ILUMINADA CAYCO, respondents.

courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.

The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. (Rivas v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 190 SCRA 295 [1990]; Government Service and Insurance System v. Florendo, 178 SCRA 76 [1989]; and Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 165 [1988]) In the case at bar, if the lower court issued the desired writ to enjoin the sale of the properties premised on the aforementioned justification of the petitioners, the issuance of the writ would be a virtual acceptance of their claim that the foreclosure sale is null and void. (See Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, supra). There would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.²⁴ (Emphasis supplied)

En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

Further to this, the Court’s intent to depart from the broad application of the Almeda ruling to foreclosure proceedings is clear from its issuance on February 20, 2007 of an En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages. The resolution embodies the additional guidelines intended to aid courts in foreclosure proceedings, specifically limiting the instances, and citing the conditions, when a writ against foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued, to wit:

(1) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of payment.

(2) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending.

(3) Where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases involving ten million pesos and above.1âwphi1

(4) All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, such as the posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo order.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs.CASTALLOY TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, ALINSU STEEL FOUNDRY CORPORATION, GLORIA C. NGO and TOMAS C. NGO, JR., Respondents.SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 178367               March 19, 2012

The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement.

In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement. As such therefore, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove such intention.8 Further, in resolving this kind of controversy, the doctrinal teaching of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals9 impels us to give utmost consideration to the intention of the parties in light of the relative situation of each, and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, thus: In determining whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage, the court is not limited to the written memorials of the transaction. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily bythe terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. x x x

There is no single conclusive test to determine whether a deed of sale, absolute on its face, is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage.10 However, Article 1602 in relation to Article 1604 of the Civil Code enumerates several instances whena contract, purporting to be, and in fact styled as, an absolute sale, is presumed to be an equitable mortgage, thus:

Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:

(1) When the price of a sale withright to repurchase is unusually inadequate;

(2) When the vendor remains inpossession as lessee or otherwise;

(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;

(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;

(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;

(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.11 Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.

As evident from Article 1602 itself, the presence of anyof the circumstances set forth therein suffices for a contract to be deemed an equitable mortgage. No concurrence or an overwhelming number is needed.12

grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction

The grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction are enumerated in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

In a line of cases, this Court has explained this rule and emphasized that a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.¹⁴

The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement

In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement. As such therefore, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove such intention.8 Further, in resolving this kind of controversy, the doctrinal teaching of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals9 impels us to give utmost consideration to the intention of the parties in light of the relative situation of each, and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, thus: In determining whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage, the court is not limited to the written memorials of the transaction. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily bythe terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. x x x

There is no single conclusive test to determine whether a deed of sale, absolute on its face, is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage.10 However, Article 1602 in relation to Article 1604 of the Civil Code enumerates several instances whena contract, purporting to be, and in fact styled as, an absolute sale, is presumed to be an equitable mortgage, thus:

Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:

(1) When the price of a sale withright to repurchase is unusually inadequate;

(2) When the vendor remains inpossession as lessee or otherwise;

(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;

(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;

(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;

(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.11 Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.

As evident from Article 1602 itself, the presence of anyof the circumstances set forth therein suffices for a contract to be deemed an equitable mortgage. No concurrence or an overwhelming number is needed.12

SPS. FELIPE SOLITARIOS and JULIA TORDA, Petitioners, vs.SPS. GASTON JAQUE and LILIA JAQUE, Respondents.THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 199852 , November 12, 2014