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Elias Gallar V. Husain  G.R.NO.L-20954

On January 9,1919,Teodoro Husain owner of a hectare of rice land in Cabanatuan,Iloilo sold the subject land to Serapio Chichirita for P30 with right to repurchase within six years.But after the execution of the deed of sale,that is on January 28,1919,the vendee a retro,Chichirita,transferred his right to Graciana Husain,sister of the vendor a retro.Then she subsequently transferred her rights to the land to appellee Elias Gallar in exchange for one cow.Possession of the land together with the owner’s duplicate Certificate of Title of Teodoro Husain was delivered on the same occasion to appellee who since then has been in possession of the land.On October 19,1960,the appellee filed a suit to compel the heirs of Teodoro Husain to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title.But the heirs denied the sale and contended that the transaction between their father and Serapio Chichirita was that of a mortgage to secure a loan of P30.

Issue:Whether or not the transaction one of sale under Pacto a Retro or a Mortgage?

Ruling: While it is indeed true that the first note written on the reverse side of the deed of sale speaks of the "redemption" of the land, there is no evidence to show that the vendee, Graciana Husain, was acting in behalf of her brother Teodoro Husain, in the exercise the latter's right of redemption. Now, unlike a debt which a third party may satisfy even against the debtor's will² the right of repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the right is recognized by contract³ or by any person to whom the right may have been transferred.⁴ Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle with the appellee. Now, when Teodoro Husain failed to redeem the land within the stipulated period, i.e., January 9, 1925, its ownership became consolidated in the appellee. True the successive sales are in a private instrument, but they are valid just the same.⁵ By the delivery of possession of the land on April 2, 1919 the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the appellee. Indeed, this action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title,⁶to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible.⁷ Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory period of limitation governing such actions.⁸

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

FAJA V.CA  G.R. No. L-45045 February 28, 1977

Levine Frial filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz a complaint for "Recovery of Possession and Damages" of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1496 in the name of Indalecio Frial, father of Levine Frial. The complaint alleged that since 1945 up to the present (the complaint is dated April 15, 1975) the defendant Felipa Faja had been illegally possessing and occupying the above-mentioned property without the knowledge and consent of the registered owner, Indalecio Frial now deceased, nor of his heirs, one of whom is Levine Frial; that when plaintiff Frial came to know that Felipa Faja was occupying the property the former immediately demanded its return but Faja refused,

 Defendant Felipa Faja in her Answer specifically denied under oath the allegations in the complaint as to the ownership of plaintiff Frial, and by way of special and affirmative defenses claimed: that she is the lawful owner and in actual possession of the property. which she inherited from her father, Marcelino Faja, who died in 1925, the latter in turn having inherited the same property from his father, Antonio Faja, who died in 1915; that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely, in the concept of owners, for more than 60 years, the property having been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Marcelino Faja under Tax Declaration No. 4807, revised under Tax Declaration No. 5523 in the year 1921, and presently in the name of Felipa Faja under Tax Declaration No. 5523 and for which the land taxes have been paid since the time Felipa Faja's predecessors have been in possession; that Felipa Faja is actually living on the land in question, and that the same is planted with coconut trees, mangoes, bananas, santol, buri while around 8 hectares are devoted to rice and corn that neither plaintiff Levine Frial nor his father Indalecio Frial ever lived on or possessed said property "even for a single moment", and any Certificate of Title secured by Indalecio Frial was obtained through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, the latter not being the owner thereof and not having occupied or possessed the property in concept of owner;

In his Reply to Felipa Faja's, plaintiff Levine Frial denied that the Certificate of Title of Indalecio Frial was secured through fraud and misrepresentation, and alleged that Faja's right to question the validity of the Title had prescribed. ⁴

Issue:whether  or not Faja’s right to question the validity of the title has been prescribed?

Ruling: The counterclaim of Felipe Faja for reconveyance to her of the litigated property has not prescribed. It is an established rule that an action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is inprescriptible. ¹⁰ Inasmuch as it is alleged in paragraph 3 of Frial's complaint, that Felipa Faja has been in possession of the property since 1945 up the present or for a period of 30 years, her cause of action for reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet her title to the property, falls within that rule. There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to the seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. ¹¹ No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor. The existence of a Certificate of Title in the name of respondent Frial's father is not conclusive on the question of ownership of the land in controversy, because the validity of such a certificate is put in issue by allegations of fraud and misrepresentation by the defendant below, Felipa Faja. Petitioners herein correctly invoked in their Petition for certiorari filed before respondent tribunal.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals and the disputed Order of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of respondent Levine Frial are hereby set aside, and the Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Capiz, is directed to proceed with the trial on the merits of Civil Case No. M-355. With costs against private respondent Levine Frial

CHANLIONCO CASE  A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977

RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimant

The record shows that atty.Chanlionco died intestate and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. . Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased.

Issue:Whether or not the claimants are entitled to the retirement benefits of the deceased?

Ruling: According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium. It appears that the GSIS had already the release the life insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the claimants. Therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer.

Amount of retirement gratuity: P78,140,10

(b) Legal heirs:

1. Fidela B. Chanliongco.	widow
2. Mario B. Chanliongco II.	legitimate son
3. Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura	illegitimate child
4. Mario Chanliongco Jr.	illegitimate child
(c) Distribution
(1) 8/16 share to Mario II	P39,070.050
(2) 4/16 share to the widow, Fidela B. Chanliongco	19,535.025
(3) 2/16 share, or P9,767.5125 each to the two illegitimate children Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura and Mario Chanliongco, Jr.	19 535 25
T O T A L	P78.140.100

It further appears that at the time of his death the late Atty. Chanliongco had an outstanding account with the Supreme Court Savings & Loans Association in the sum of P7,340.42. Deduction this amount plus another sum of P1,400.00, representing withhold tax due from him, or a total of P8,740.42, from above sub-total sum of P22,245.87. WE have at the net sum P13,505.45, available for distribute to the claimants as follows:

1. Fidela B. Chanliongco
	a. As her conjugal share	P 6,752.72
	b. As a legal heir	P 1,688.18
2. Mario Chanliongco II		P 3,376.36
3. Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura		844.10
4. Mario Jr.		844.09
	T O T A L	P13,505.45

It will be seen from the f distribution that the money value of the unused vacation and sick leave, unpaid will and 10% adjustment due to the has been treated as conjugal property. Accordingly, one-half (l/2) goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal hip and the other half P6,752.725 is to be distributed to the deceased's kill him, using the same one WE used in distributing the retirement benefits. This is so because "Vacation with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation for services rendered." (Ramey vs. State, 296 NW 323, 296 Mich. 449).

WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS:

1. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO
A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY	P19,535.025
B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TEAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT:
(1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE	6,752.72
(2) AS A LEGAL HEIR	P1,688.18
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER	P27,975.93
2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II
A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY	P39,070.05
B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT	3,376.36
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM	P42,446.41
3. MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA:
A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY	P9,767.51
B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT	844.10
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER	P10,611.61
4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR. TO BE PAID THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, ANGELINA CRESPO):
A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY	P9,767.51
B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT	844.10
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM	P10,611.61

SO ORDERED.

BALBECINO V. ORTEGA (1962)   G.R. No. L-14231 April 28, 1962

 Paulino Acosta filed a complaint to quiet title and for recovery of possession against Justo Balbecino before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte over a parcel of land.He that he bought the land on August 16, 1926 from Estefania Guerrero and immediately thereafter he constituted Justo Balbecino as his tenant who delivered to him his share in the harvest until the crop year 1941-1942. Balbecino filed his answer alleging that the land was owned and possessed by spouses Raymundo Balbecino and Cipriana Sanchez since they had acquire it from its former owner Estefania Guerrero de Taylan by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 1924. After trial the court rendered decision on August 1, 1956 declaring Acosta the owner of the land and ordering Balbecino to turn over its possession to Acosta besides indemnifying him for his share of the crop from 1942 up to 1955. It was after Balbecino's several attempts to recover possession of the land have failed, which culminated in several contempt proceedings filed against him, that his brothers and sisters commenced this case before the same against Paulino Acosta praying that they be declared answers of the land and that the writ of possession issued in favor of the latter be declared null and void. In complaint, plaintiffs prayed, among others, that a preliminary injunction be issued to restrain Acosta from occupying, cultivating and collecting the produce of the land pending termination of the case on the merits. 

Issue:Whether or not preliminary injunction be issued against Acosta?

Ruling: It appears that Paulino Acosta filed a complaint against Justo Balbecino to quiet title and recover the possession of the land in litigation. In his answer Balbecino claimed that the land belonged to spouses Raymundo Balbecino and Cipriana Sanchez who acquired it from Estefania Guerrero de Taylan by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 1924. In that answer he did not state the interest he had in the land although later he executed an affidavit stating that he is the absolute owner thereof in connection with the motion for reconsideration asking for the setting aside of the judgment rendered against him. This judgment became final and executory, and when the writ of execution was issued, the sheriff placed Acosta in possession of the land. And although several attempts were made by Balbecino to recover possession thereof by defying the writ, the same failed because Acosta filed contempt proceedings against him during which he pleaded to be spared from disciplinary action upon the promise that he will never encroach again upon the land. And it was after these attempts had failed that petitioners, who are the brothers and sisters of Justo Balbecino, commenced the present action. Under the foregoing facts, which appear undisputed in the pleadings, the court a quo found no other alternative than to grant the petition for preliminary injunction filed by respondent Acosta, for it really appears that at the time of the filing of the second action he was in actual possession of the land, and it is but fair that for the time being that possession be respected until the case is decided on the merits.

WHEREFORE petition is denied.

 

PALACIOS V. PALACIOS (1959) [ G. R. NO. L-12207, DECEMBER 24, 1959 ]

 

Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios. On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her legitime. After the presentation of petitioner's evidence relative to the essential requisites and formalities provided by law for the validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956 issued an order admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and, after proper hearing concerning this incident, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime, with costs against petitioner.

Issue:Whether or not the probate court has the power to issue such order?

Ruling: Maria Catimbang does not object to the probate of the will insofar as its due execution is concerned or on the ground that it has not complied with the formalities prescribed by law; rather she objects to its intrinsic validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will. We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.

This is in line with our ruling in Montañanovs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676, wherein we said: "The authentication of the will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated."


On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator it does, not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he, make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance, to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testator's death would be in order" (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 53-54).
The reason for this comment is that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil Code).

It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an acknowledged natural daughter of the testator. This is an extraneous matter which should be threshed out in a separate action.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.


JOAQUIN V. JOAQUIN (2003) [ G.R. NO. 126376, NOVEMBER 20, 2003 ]

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names because-

	a)	Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over the properties in litis;
	b)	Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein;
	c)	Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties (vendors and vendees); and
	d)	Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

Issue:Whether or not the plaintiffs have a valid cause of action against the defendants?

Ruling: Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners' right to their parents' properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents' death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents' estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.

WHEREFORE,the case is DISMISSED.