[ G.R. No. L-24561, June 30, 1970 ]
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, EXECUTRIX-APPELLEE,
VS. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON AND LILIA DIZON, OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS.
D E C I S I O N
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's
project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of
partition.[1]
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina
J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and
was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein
executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon
and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter
named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child
and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate
son of the said decedent. Six of these
seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee)
are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix
left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango
dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will
were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano
Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina
Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano
Tiamzon.
In her will, the
testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60,
household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95
and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company
valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were
in due course commenced[2] and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last
will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate,
and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera
was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond
and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed
her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of
Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to
appraise the properties of the estate.
He filed in due course his report of appraisal, and the same was
approved in toto by the lower court on December
12, 1963 upon joint
petition of the parties.
The real and personal
properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised
value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of
the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.[3] (1/7 of the half of the estate reserved for
the legitime of legitimate children and descendants).[4] In her will, the testatrix "commanded
that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary
disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and
eight grandchildren. The appraised
values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to
the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
“1. Estela Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
P 98,474.80 |
2. Angelina Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
106,307.06 |
3. Bernardita Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
51,968.17 |
4. Josefina Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
52,056.39 |
5. Tomas Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
131,987.41 |
6. Lilia Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
72,182.47 |
7. Marina Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
1,148,063.71 |
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
69,280.00 |
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Fran- cisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
72,540.00 |
T o t a l V a l u e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
P1,801,960.01" |
The executrix filed her
project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as
follows:
"(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (executrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96;
(3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched."
On the other hand, oppositors submitted
their own counter-project of partition
dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following
basis:
"(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (1/2) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (1/2) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced."
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:
“1. Estela Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
P 49,485.56 |
2. Angelina Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
53,421.42 |
3. Bernardita Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
26,115.04 |
4. Josefina Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
26,159.38 |
5. Tomas V. Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
65,874.04 |
6. Lilia Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
36,273.13 |
7. Marina Dizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
576,938. 82 |
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
34,814.50 |
9. Granchildren Gilbert Garcia et al . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
36,452. 80 |
T o t a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
P 905,534.78" |
while
the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the
executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts
of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after
hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that
"(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime
is impaired or prejudiced, the
same shall be completed and satisfied.
While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that
the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to
the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully
restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which
is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil
Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the
limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some
P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will
to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon),
to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court
ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to
meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes
which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in
order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's
orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed
this appeal, and raise anew the following issues:
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which
were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present
a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is
"the life and soul of a will."[5] In consonance therewith, our Civil Code
included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(If) a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in
case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico[6] for violation of these rules of
interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court,[7] the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the
intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the
trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words,
unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."[8]
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain[9]
when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his
executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested
parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's
will. Guided and restricted by these
fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix'
testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by
will. Thus, in the third paragraph of
her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as
the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of
her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with
law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command
that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in
her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs
and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same.
This was a valid partition[10]
of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article
1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould
a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs." This right of a
testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory
heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard
for the right of such compulsory heirs:
“ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
“ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive."
This
was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's
project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants
namely, Estela, Bernardita,
Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively
distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes
of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the
executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by
the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was
recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced
now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code.
The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now
permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition
his estate by act inter vivos."[11]
This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine[12]
that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the
formalities provided by law.
Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment[13]
but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of
partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be
given full validity and effect. Aside
from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appelee's
project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the
counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants
whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by
the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion,
and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes
of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors'
proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro
tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to
Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would
further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that
"(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership
of the property adjudicated to him. "
3. In Habana
vs. Imbo,[14]
the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator
Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor
of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims
of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be
respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil
Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus
partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will, which was being questioned by
the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion
Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner
of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New
Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations
of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civ.
Code).[15]
Concepcion Teves could, as
she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed
partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale
has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs x x
x."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary
dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property,
citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective
heirs. From this erroneous premise, they
proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime
of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the
testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the
estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory
heirs .... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of
institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the
remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion."[16]
Oppositors err in their premises, for
the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly
appears from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix
of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already
noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will.
The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into
devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the
estate. Furthermore, the testatrix'
intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions
were therefore on account of the respective legitimes
of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her
will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third
paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command
that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of
them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time
of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."[17]
Oppositors'
conclusions necessarily are in error.
The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in
favor of compulsory heirs, do
not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended,
for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides
that "(One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors'
own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 of the Civil Code covers
precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who
admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in
providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime
may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of
the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For “diversity of apportionment is
the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well
die intestate."[18]
Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a
partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding
the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar, as they do not prejudice the legitime of the
other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of
the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is
not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided,
but the legitime shall in any case remain
unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some
authorities that " 'not deemed subject to collation' in this article
really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime",
while it may have some plausibility[19]
in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and
partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any
previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left
merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles
1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
The amount of the legitime of the heirs is
here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of
the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants,
the secondary issues are likewise necessarily, resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion
of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code
and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they
can no longer
demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as
bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate
instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the
purpose, as the testatrix had specifically
partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called
upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect, to the intention of
the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of
transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally
the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the
estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in
toto upon joint petition of the parties, and
hence, there cannot be said to be any question -- and none is presented -- as
to fairness of the valuation
thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of
cash has been understated. The, plaint
of oppositors that the purchasing value of the
Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January,
1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and
intent of the testatrix. The
transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value
thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be
settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in
the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior
to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which,
per the parties' manifestation,[20] "does not in any way affect the adjudication
made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere
advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of
partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in
order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the
testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned.[21] That her co-oppositors
would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency
has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of
partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own
decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby
affirmed. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Appeal was direct to this Court, as the value of the estate exceeded P200,000.00, in accordance with the then
subsisting provisions of Sec. 17, third paragraph, subsec.
5, now eliminated by Rep. Act 5440 enacted on Sept. 9, 1968.
[2]
Sp. Proc. No. 1582 of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga.
[3]
These figures are those of oppositors-appellants
which are adopted for purposes of this decision. Per appellee's
brief, p. 3, executrix-appellee sums up the value of the estate at P1,809,569.55,
and therefore the legitime of each of the seven (7)
forced heirs at P129,254.96. While there
is thus a slight difference in the valuation of the estate and legitime of the forced heirs (a difference of P2,126.05 for
the whole estate and of P107.15 in each legitime),
the same is of no importance … because the issue involved in this appeal is not
the value of the estate but the manner it should be distributed among the
heirs." (Notes in parentheses supplied)
[4]
Art. 888, Civil Code.
[7]
"SEC. 59. Instrument construed
so as to give effect to all provisions. -- In the construction of an
instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all."
(now Rule 130, sec. 9)
[8]
Citing In re Estate of Calderon 26
Phil. 333.
[9]
Tribunal Supremo of
Spain, sentencia of 20 Marzo
1918.
[10]
ART. 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation,
division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n)
[11]
Romero vs. Villamor
102 Phil. 641 (1957).
[15]
See Arts. 776 and 777 Phil. Civil Code. The latter article provides that "(T)he
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent."
[20]
Record on Appeal, p. 107.
[21]
See Arts. 955, 1080 and 1104, Civil
Code.
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