1.QUILALA V. ALCANTARA
(2001)
FACTS:
On
February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a “Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in
favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
containing an area of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds for Manila.
The deed of donation
was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was
cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala. On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala
died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala
alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. The trial court found
that the deed of donation,
although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary
public only by the donor, Catalina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the
donation made by Catalina to Violeta valid?
Whether or not the
signing on the wrong side of the page of the document invalidates it?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held
that the deed of donation contained
the number of the certificate of title as well as the technical description as
the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in
consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the
DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity." This was sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is
legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Simply put, the specification of
the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the
parties signs on the wrong side of the page, does not invalidate the document.
The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the
above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an
acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null
and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be
considered a private document in part and a public document in another part.
The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the
conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any
event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment
only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized
deed of donation,
was made in a public instrument.
2.DOLAR V. LUBLUB (2005)
FACTS:
Petitioner and Serafin
Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6 hectares,
identified as Lot No. 1, Pcs-06-000744 (Lot No. 1, for brevity), situated in
Brgy. Lublub, Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. Said property forms part of
Lots No. 4181 and 4183 of the Dumangas Cadastre. Then barangay captain Jose
Militar accepted the donation in behalf of Brgy. Lublub. Sometime in June 1989,
petitioner executed another deed [5] donating to Brgy. Lublub, represented
by its incumbent barangay captain, the very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla
had earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of donation contained
exactly the same conditions expressly set forth in the first. On May 6, 1998,
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Iloilo City, petitioner filed against
Brgy. Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession With Damages involving the 4.6-hectare area
he had earlier donated. Basically, petitioner claimed that the donation in
question had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay having failed to comply
with the conditions of the donation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not his action is one for
revocation of donation instead of for quieting of title; whether or not the
action for quieting has prescribed.
2. Whether or not the deed of donation in
question is (a) valid for defective acceptance and/or (b) no longer effective
by reason of the automatic reversion clause therein.
RULING:
The Supreme Court
held that the donation being valid and effective, virtually forecloses any
claim which petitioner may have over the donated property against the donee and
other occupants thereof, and his action to quiet title has no merit. Militar
was clothed with authority to accept the donation for respondent barangay. On
this point, petitioner cites Section 88 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 [16] -
the law then in force - and Sections 91 and 389 the Local Government Code of 1991.
In gist, these provisions empower the punongbarangay to enter into contracts for the
barangay upon authorization of the Sangguniang Barangay,
or, in the alternative, theSanggunian may authorize the barangay head
to enter into contracts for the barangay.
When a deed of
donation expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription
should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said
Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . .
not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion
that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for
that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the
rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court
will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
revocatory act. In the case at bench, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent
barangay denied or challenged the purported revocation of the donation
3.joaquin
v. joaquin(2003)
FACTS:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and
Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and
Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas,
Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined
in this action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and
void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant
parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant
children for the reason that (1) lack of consideration (2) the properties has
more value than the sums appearing therein (3) deeds of sale does not reflect
the true intent of the parties. RTC dismissed the case declaring that the deeds
of sale is for valuable consideration and affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the deed of sale is void for
lack of consideration.
2. Whether the deed of sale is void for gross
inadequacy of price.
RULING:
A contract of sale is a consensual contract and becomes a
binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds as to price. If there
is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale
is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of
payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of
sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds
of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is
simulated, then the contract is void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code states
that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion
or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless
there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further
provides:
Art. 1470. Gross
inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a
donation or some other act or contract. (
Petitioners
failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the
Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Therefore
the contention of the petitioner have no merits.
4.rivera
v. rivera (2003)
FACTS:
The subject of the dispute is a 228-square
meter lot with a two-storey duplex house located in Pasig City. The property
was originally owned by spouses Remigio Rivera, Sr. and Consuelo Rivera. The
spouses had eleven (11) children, two of whom were Remigio, Jr. (petitioners'
father) and respondent Virgilio Rivera. After Remigio, Sr. died in 1992, his
widow Consuelo and their eleven (11) children executed an extrajudicial
settlement where the
children voluntarily waived their hereditary rights to four (4) real properties
owned by their parents, including the lot with the duplex house, in favor of
their mother Consuelo. On April 6, 1999, Consuelo sold the duplex house and lot
to respondent for five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). At the time of the
sale, both Consuelo and respondent were residing in the same house in San Jose,
California. In the Deed of Sale, Consuelo and respondent were represented by
respondent's daughters Ma. Theresa R. Ferreria and Ma. Dolores A. Rivera. Title
to the property was subsequently transferred in the name of respondent. As the
petitioners refused to sign the lease contract or vacate the premises,
respondent, through his daughter Dolores, filed an unlawful detainer case. The
trial court rendered judgment in the ejectment case in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
(a) whether petitioners, being in actual physical possession of the
property since 1974, are entitled to continue in possession of the premises
until the issue of ownership thereof is resolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction;
(b) whether Civil Case No. 7529,
the ejectment case, is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court;
(c) whether respondent holds the subject property in trust for the
legitimate heirs at
the time the ejectment case was filed; and
(d) whether petitioners, who are
in actual physical possession of the premises, exercised the right of a
co-owner in representation of their father, Remigio Rivera, Jr.
RULING:
We cannot
sustain petitioners' contention that as they had actual, physical possession of
the property as co-owners, in representation of their father Remigio, Jr., they
are entitled to remain in the premises. Actual,
prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in
forcible entry cases, not in unlawful detainer cases where the defendant is
necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession
eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to
possess. Thus, the fact that petitioners were in prior physical possession of
the duplex unit does not automatically entitle them to continue in said
possession and does not give them a better right to the property.
It is settled that the sole issue in
an ejectment case is physical or material possession. Neither a claim of
juridical possession nor an assertion of ownership by the defendant can deprive
the court of jurisdiction over the disputed property. Courts in ejectment cases
are mandated to decide questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to
decide the question of possession. They cannot be divested of jurisdiction over
ejectment cases just because the defendants assert ownership over the litigated
property.
Full ownership of
the subject property was surrendered to Consuelo Rivera upon the death of Remigio,
Sr. through an extrajudicial partition signed by all the compulsory heirs. Thus, Consuelo had every
right to dispose of the property as she deemed fit. Moreover, the lower court
correctly ruled that petitioners had no hereditary rights over the property in
representation or substitution of their father as the latter was still alive.
Lastly, respondent
rightfully omitted Remigio, Jr. as party in the illegal detainer case as he was
not the one in actual, physical possession of the subject property, but
petitioners. While petitioners insist that the TCT issued to respondent shows
that the property was part of the inheritance left by Remigio, Sr. which gives
them the right to assert and protect the interest of their father Remigio, Jr.
over his share in the property, this issue, coupled with the alleged fictitious
or fraudulent sale of the property to respondent, must be tried by petitioners
in a separate proceeding only for that purpose as it is settled that an
unlawful detainer case resolves only the issue of physical or material
possession.
5. ventura v. ventura
(1977)
FACTS:
On December 2, 1952, herein appellee Gregoria Ventura filed an action in the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, against the other appellee herein Mercedes Ventura, who later
joined cause with Gregoria, and Gregorio Ventura. Gregoria and Mercedes claimed that they are the
legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wifePaulina Simpliciano,
who died in 1943, and asked that one-half of the properties described in the
complaint be declared as the share of their mother in the conjugal partnership,
with them as the only forced heirs of
their mother Paulina. Gregorio Ventura took
the position that Mercedes and Gregoria are not his children because
they were born out of the adulterous relationship between Paulina who
had left their conjugal home and Teodoro Ventura with whom she lived
for more than ten years.
In Civil Case No. 1064,
Gregorio Ventura filed a counterclaim against Mercedes and her husband,
Pedro Corpuz, seeking the reconveyance from them of properties
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-1102, T-1212, T-1213 and T-1214
of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.
Meanwhile, on December 14, 1953,
Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will and thus gave
rise to herein subject proceeding, Special Proceedings No. 812. In
due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,
1954. This admission became final.
Gregorio died on
September 26, 1955, and on October 17, 1955, pursuant to his will, Maria
Ventura was appointed executrix, in which capacity, she is appellant in this
case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not
the partition of the properties described in the complaint is not yet final and
executory.
2. The lower court
erred in annulling the institution of heirs in the will of Gregoria Ventura.
RULING:
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
are the legitimate children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano,
and as such are entitled to the annulment of the institution of
heirs made in the probated will
of said deceased became final and executory upon
the finality of the order approving the partition directed in the decision in
question.
Acting on appellees'
motion to dismiss appeal, it is Our considered opinion that the decision in
Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 declaring that appellees Mercedes
andGregoria Ventura
are the legitimate children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano,
and as such are entitled to the annulment of the institution of heirs made in the probated will of said
deceased became final and executory upon
the finality of the order approving the partition directed in the decision in
question. There can be no question that the approval by
the trial court in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 of the partition report of
the commissioners appointed for the purpose, one of whom, Emmanuel Mariano, is
the husband of appellant, put a definite end to those cases, leaving nothing
else to be done in the trial court. That
order of approval is an appealable one,
and inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the same, it is beyond dispute
that the decision in controversy has already become final and executory in all respects. Hence, the case at bar has become moot
and academic.
6.IMPERIAL V. VILLALON (1999)
FACTS:
Leoncio Imperial sold his 32,837 sq. meters
parcel of land for P1.00 to his acknowledged son who then acquired title over
the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. 2 years after the
donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale
with the then CFI of Albay alleging that he was deceived by petitioner into
signing the said document. The dispute was however resolved through a
Compromise Agreement. Leoncio died leaving petitioner and an adopted son,
Victor as heirs. Victor thereafter died single and survived only by his natural
father, Ricardo Villalon. When Ricardo died, his 2 children filed a complaint
with the RTC of Legazpi City for annulment of the donation. Petitioner moved
for its dismissal on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the Compromise
Agreement rendered by the CFI of Albay.
ISSUES:
(1) that there was no res judicata, there being
no identity of parties and cause of action between the instant case and Civil
Case No. 1177;
(3) that private respondents’
action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and
RULING:
It is an indispensable requirement in res
judicata that there
be, between the first and second action, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action. A perusal of the records leads us to conclude that there is no identity
of parties and of cause of action as between Civil Case No. 1177 and Civil Case
No. 7646. Moreover, Leoncio’s cause of action as donor of the property was
fraud, purportedly employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of the donation. While the
same circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged in private respondents’
complaint, it also raises the additional ground of inofficiousness of donation.
Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations. As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. 10 year prescriptive period shall reckoned upon the death of the donor-decedent. It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed. A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription set in, private respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be officious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor’s legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor’s legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.
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