SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos.
63253-54, April 27, 1989 ]
PABLO RALLA,
PETITIONER, VS. HON. ROMULO P. UNTALAN, HON. DOMINGO CORONEL REYES, AND LEONIE
RALLA, PETER RALLA AND MARINELLA RALLA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition seeks the nullification of the Order of
respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan,[1] dated July 16,
1981, excluding from the probate
proceedings sixty-three parcels of land, as well as the Orders issued by
respondent Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes,[2] denying the
petitioner's motions for reconsideration of the same Order of Judge Untalan
dated July 16, 1981.
The petition's beginnings are traced to January 27,
1959, when Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his own will in the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, which was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 564. In his will, he left his entire estate to
his son, Pablo (the petitioner herein who, upon his death during the pendency
of this petition, was substituted by his heirs), leaving nothing to his other
son, Pedro.
In the same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the
partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella; this was docketed as
Civil Case No. 2023.
In the course of the hearing of the probate case (Special Proceedings No. 564),
Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the
allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo Ralla, for its probate would no longer be beneficial and
advantageous to him. This motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. (The latter court agreed with the lower court's
conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood to gain if the testate
proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to
submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo Ralla 149
parcels of land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving
income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro Ralla, who was
being deprived of his successional rights over the said properties.) The
denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by this Court (in G.R.
No. L-26253).[3] On
the scheduled hearing on November 3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack
of interest in the probate of the
subject will. Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho,
declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who should share
equally upon the division of the latter's estate, and thereupon converted the
testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to compromise in the
partition case (Civil Case No. 2023). On December 18, 1967, they entered
into a project of partition whereby sixty-three parcels of land, apparently
forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escarella, were amicably
divided between the two of them. This project of partition was approved
on December 19, 1967 by Judge Ezekiel Grageda.
Eleven years later, or on February 28, 1978, Joaquin
Chancoco, brother-in-law of the petitioner (Pablo) filed a petition, docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 1106, for the probate
of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that the decedent owed him
P5,000.00. Pablo Ralla then filed a manifestation stating that he had no
objections to the probate; thereafter,
he filed a "Motion to Intervene as Petitioner for the Probate of the Will." This motion was
heard ex parte and granted despite the written opposition of the heirs of Pedro
Ralla. Likewise, the petition for probate
was granted; Teodorico Alimine, son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed
special administrator, again, over and above the objection of the heirs of
Pedro Ralla. However, in taking possession of the properties belonging to
the estate of Rosendo Ralla. Teodorico Almine also took possession of the
sixty-three parcels of land covered by the project of partition mentioned earlier.
Consequently, the heirs of Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved
to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land.
In an Omnibus Order dated August 3, 1979,[4] respondent Judge
Romulo P. Untalan ruled, inter alia, that the sixty-three parcels of land
should be included in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Rosendo Ralla and that said proceedings (both Special Proceedings No. 564 and
Special Proceedings No. 1106, which were ordered consolidated by this Court)
should proceed as probate proceedings.
About two years later, or on June 11, 1981, the
private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of
The Court The Exclusion Of 67 (sic) Parcels Of Land Subject Of The Project Of
Partition In Civil Case No. 2023."[5] ln his Order of
July 16, 1981, Judge Untalan reconsidered his earlier Order, to wit:
Premises considered, Order is hereby issued
reconsidering the Omnibus Order of this Court dated August 3, 1979, more
particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion thereof. The Project
of Partition should, therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence, the sixty
three (63) parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the probate proceedings and, likewise from the
administration of Special Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing order but the same was denied[7] by respondent
Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes, to whose sala Special Proceedings No. 564 and No.
1106 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for
reconsideration was filed the same, however, was also denied.[8]
In assailing the aforesaid Order of July 16, 1981, the
following arguments are raised in the present special civil action for certiorari.
The first argument is stated as follows:
x x x The extra judicial partition of the 63 parcels
made after the filing of the petition for the probate
of the Will, and before said Will was probated, is a NULLITY, considering that
as already decided by this Court in the case or Ernesto M. Guevara, vs. Rosario
Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid partition among
the heirs till after the Will had been probated. x x x[9]
The above argument is obviously flawed and misleading
for the simple reason that the aforementioned partition was made in the civil
case for partition or the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from, and
independent of, the special proceedings for the probate
of the will of Rosendo Ralla.
Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid
partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of
course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will. Thus, the rule invoked is inapplicable
in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for
partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate
of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively)
comprising dissimilar properties.
In his second and third arguments,[10] the petitioner
claims that the Order of August 3, 1979 mentioned earlier could no longer be
validly reversed by the court two years after it was issued. Thus, it is
alleged that by flip-flopping, Judge Untalan committed a grave abuse of discretion.
An examination of the August 3, 1979 Order would
reveal that the same resolved a number of divergent issues (ten as enumerated)[11] springing from
four separate special proceedings,[12] all of which were
pending in Branch I of the then Court of First Instance of Albay; accordingly,
there are at least nine[13] specific
directives contained therein. However, a distinction must be made between
those directives that partake of final orders and the other directives that are
in the nature of interlocutory orders.
Two closely related orders are the following quoted
portions of the said August 3, 1979 Order of respondent Judge Untalan:
x x x
2. The 149 parcels
referred to in our elucidation on issue No. 2 as well as the 63 lots also
mentioned therein all of which may be summed up to 212 parcels, except those
already validly disposed, conveyed, or transferred to third persons, should be
submitted, at least provisionally, to the probate
or testate proceedings. Hence, the Motion to exclude the 149 parcels
filed on June 2, 1979, by petitioner intervenor Pablo Ralla thru counsel in
Special Proceeding 1106 and the motion for exclusion filed by the heirs of
Pedro Ralla thru counsel in Special Proceedings 564 and 1106 are hereby Denied;
(Emphasis supplied.)
3. The Project of
partition, for purposes of these proceedings, is hereby stripped of its
judicial recognition;[14]
x x x
As regards the abovequoted paragraph 2, this Court
finds that the same is interlocutory in character because it did not decide the
action with finality and left substantial proceedings still to be had.[15] The foregoing
order of inclusion of the subject parcels of land was a mere incident that
arose in the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla. It is elementary
that interlocutory orders, prior to the rendition of the final judgment, are,
at any time, subject to such corrections or amendments as the court may deem
proper. Thus, in issuing the questioned Order dated July 16, 1981, which
reversed the aforementioned interlocutory order and upheld the project of
partition, respondent Judge Untalan acted well within his jurisdiction and
without grave abuse of discretion.
There is, however, a more important reason why we do
not find any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned Order
dated July 16, 1981. Consider the following undisputed facts: the
properties involved in the present petition were the subject of the project of
partition signed by both the petitioner, Pablo Ralla, and Pedro Ralla in Civil
Case No. 2023; the lower court approved the said project of partition on
December 19, 1967; subsequently, Pablo and Pedro Ralla jointly manifested that
they had already received "the ownership and possession of the respective
parcels of land adjudicated to them in the said project of
partition,"[16] and upon their
motion Judge Ezekiel Grageda declared the partition case closed and terminated
in its Order of December 29, 1967; there was no appeal made from this decision
within the reglementary period to do so, consequently, it attained finality.
Furthermore, the Court had occasion to rule that:
Where a partition had not only been approved and thus
become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of
such partition had fully been carried out, and the heirs had received the
property assigned to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity
or any part of it.[17]
Likewise:
Where a piece of land has been included in a partition
and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper
means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control
and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of
the partition ... They can not attack the partition collaterally, as they are
trying to do in this case.[18] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Based on the foregoing pronouncements, the Order of
August 3, 1979 setting aside the project of partition was clearly
erroneous. Realizing this and the fact that it was not yet too late for
him to correct his mistake, respondent Judge Untalan issued the questioned
Order of July 16, 1981.
In fine, the partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid
and binding upon the petitioner and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs,
especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their
respective shares in the inheritance from their mother, the late Paz
Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by
them and embodied in the document of partition.
Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the
exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla. Could it be that the
petitioner's keen interest in including these lands in the estate proceedings
is directly related to the fact that his son-in-law is the administrator of the
said estate of Rosendo Ralla?
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1] Branch I, Court of
First Instance of Albay.
[2] Branch III, Court
of First Instance of Albay.
[3] Rollo, 113
A.
[4] Rollo
22-32.
[5] Rollo,
35-38.
[6] Rollo,
42-45.
[7] Rollo, 52.
[8] Rollo, 57.
[9] Ibid., 7.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Rollo,
22-23.
[12] Spec. Proc. Nos.
564, 1078, 1106, and M-8674.
[13] Rollo,
31-32. Should be ten, as discussed in the body of the Order.
[14] Rollo, 31.
[15] People vs.
Doriquez, Nos. L-24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 163.
[16] Rollo, 129.
163
[17] Torres vs.
Encarnacion and De Borja, No. L-4681, July 31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.
[18] Ibid., 682.
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