SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos.
69757-58, January 29, 1988 ]
CIRCA NILA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TEODORO K. KATIGBAK AND JENNIFER EVIDENTE BAERTGES,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SALVADOR J. BAYLEN, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
CXXI, CALOOCAN CITY, INTESTATE ESTATE OF SOLEDAD BALATBAT AND TESTATE ESTATE OF
RICARDO BALATBAT, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
SARMIENTO, J.:
The lone issue in these cases is whether or not the
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate
court, may compel performance under a contract it had approved incidental to
its office as such a special court.
There is no dispute as to the facts.
On February 21, 1984, the Estates of Soledad and
Ricardo Balatbat, subject of a settlement proceeding pending with respondent
Judge, entered into a "Property Management and Exchange Contract"
with the petitioners Circa Nila Development Corporation, represented by
petitioner Teodoro Katigbak, and Jennifer Baertges, both real estate developers.
The contract charged the petitioners with the development of two parcels
of real property, located in Valenzuela, Bulacan, owned by the Balatbat
Estates, and called upon them to pay a total consideration of TWO MILLION SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,600,000.00) PESOS.
On May 9, 1984, the respondent Judge approved the
contract.
Subsequently, the Estates presented an "Omnibus
Motion" praying that the petitioners be compelled to pay the sum of
P456,100.00 representing the alleged balance of the contract price they had
allegedly refused to pay. The petitioners opposed the motion on the
ground, in essence, that the respondent Court, as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.
On October 18, 1984, the respondent Judge issued an
order directing the petitioners to pay the sum demanded. The petitioners
sought a reconsideration. On January 23, 1985 the respondent Judge issued
an order denying reconsideration. He likewise ordered the petitioner to
pay the additional sum of P500,000.00 on motion of the Estates. The
petitioners then came to this Court.
We rule for the petitioners.
A probate court
is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to
the estate but never on rights to property arising from contract.[1] It approves
contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but
this is by fiat of the Rules of Court.[2] In that case,
judicial approval is necessary for the validity of such contracts. It
cannot, however, adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties
thereto. Compliance with the terms and conditions thereof may be
compelled by specific performance, jurisdiction over which is vested in the
Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction.[3]
The fact that the petitioners "participated in
the formulation and in the eventual execution”[4] of
the "Property Management and Exchange Contract" does not bar them
from raising this jurisdictional challenge. The petitioners never
contended that the contract cannot be enforced against them nor denied its
validity. What they dispute is the jurisdiction of the respondent court
to hear the incident in its capacity as a probate
court.
Neither does estoppel preclude the petitioners from
questioning the respondent Court's assumption of jurisdiction. Estoppel
occurs where a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, say, by seeking
affirmative relief, and denies it later following an adverse judgment.
Here, however, the petitioners never invoked the jurisdiction of the respondent
Court. They took part in the preparation of the "Property Management
and Exchange Contract," they being parties thereto, but that did not make
them parties to the case, or give the respondent Court the jurisdiction to
adjudicate on the rights of the parties under that contract. The
jurisdiction of a probate court is
"merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended beyond."[5]
The respondent Judge's reliance on our ruling in Pio
Barretto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[6] is
not well-taken. Pio Barreto did not broaden the
jurisdiction of a probate court.
On the contrary, it underscored the limited character of its jurisdiction[7]("the
limited jurisdiction of a probate court
prohibits it from determining rights to property left by a decedent which
depends on the contract") thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Since the probate
court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the
properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to
question the petitioner's titles and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals, 91 SCRA 540). Though an order of the probate court approving the sale of the decedent's property is
final, the respondent may file a complaint in the proper court for the
rescission of the sale. (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 72).
Likewise, the initial question of respondent regarding the propriety of
including the properties in question in the inventory of the probate court as he claims ownership thereof
may therein be finally and conclusively settled (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA 202). The respondent
has ample protection of his rights for the province of the probate court remains merely the settlement of
the estate and may not be extended beyond (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, supra).[8]
xxx
xxx
xxx
In that case, however, we noted that the respondent
had "bound himself under an agreement with the court separate and distinct
from that which he had with the decedent."[9] In other words,
what the court had sought to enforce was not the contract executed on behalf of
the estate but the respondent's agreement with the court itself to obtain the
best terms for the estate, and consequently, his authority to enter into such a
contract. But far from repealing the long-standing rule that a probate court is one of limited jurisdiction, Pio
Barretto, in fact, reinforced it.
In fine, we hold that the respondent Judge acted
without jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders of October 18, 1984 (Annex
"H") and of January 23, 1985 (Annex "P") that warrants the
corrective hand of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Orders dated October 18, 1984 and January 23, 1985 are
declared NULL and VOID. The Temporary Restraining Order given in these
cases on February 6, 1985 is hereby made permanent. Costs against the
private respondents.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
[1] Pio Barretto
Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-62431-33, August
31, 1984, 131 SCRA 606 (1984).
[2] RULES OF COURT,
Rule 89.
[3] Batas Blg. 129,
sec. 19.
[4] Rollo, 104.
[5] Supra,
623.
[6] Supra.
[7] Supra,
at 623.
[8] Supra,
at 621.
[9] Supra.
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