felisilda

 

G.R. No. L-23144             January 14, 1926
PEDRO DIZON and SEVERINA DIZON,  plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
VICENTE GALANG, JUAN MEDINA and TEODORO JURADO,  defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Rufina Dizon, who was married to Vicente Galang and by whom she had a son named Francisco, inherited from her parents the three parcels of land described in the complaint. On October 4, 1904, Rufina Dizon and her son Francisco inherited from her the said three parcels of land. Francisco Galang died on December 8, 1904, and his father Vicente Galang, by operation of law, inherited from him the said land. In accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code these three parcels of land are considered as reservable property although they do not appear as such in the registry of deeds. In 1913, Vicente Galang sold the first two parcels to Juan Medina and in 1909 the third to Teodoro Jurado, without informing them that they were reservable property.

The plaintiffs Pedro and Severino Dizon, brother and sister of the deceased Rufina Dizon, being related to her within the third degree, brought this action against Vicente Galang, Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado. The complaint prays that the sales of this land by Vicente Galang to Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado be ordered to return the said parcels of land; that Vicente Galang be compelled to record in the registry of deeds the reservable character of this land and to execute a mortgage to secure its value.

ISSUE:

Whether or not reservation by the widowed spouse constitutes reserve troncal.

HELD:

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.   

[ G.R. No. 94699, January 24, 1992 ]

REV. FR. VICENTE CORONEL, RODOLFO CORONEL, GERARDO CORONEL, SANTOS CORONEL AND DOMINGA CORONEL, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, REV. FR. RUSTICO CUEVAS, PRISCILLANO CUEVAS, LOURDES CUEVAS SEBASTIAN, NATALIA CUEVAS GARCIA AND BRIGIDA CUEVAS JUDI, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

The petitioners are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Gaudencio Coronel; while the respondents are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Querubin Cuevas. In turn, their respective ascendants Gaudencio Coronel and Querubin Cuevas are the legitimate, exclusive and compulsory heirs of Bernarda David Lim who died on June 20, 1934 in Betis, Guagua, Pampanga.

Among the properties left by Bernarda David Lim, subject to a Deed of Partition and Grant dated March 12, 1940, is a parcel of land situated at the Barrio of San Nicolas, Municipality of Guagua, Province of Pampanga, containing an area of 1158 square meters more or less designated.  The father of the respondents was given the right to occupy the whole lot as his house where his family  resides was built and inasmuch as the lot shall remain intact staying as a community property for ten (10) years.

Then on June 24, 1971 Gaudencio Coronel y David filed an application for original registration of title under Act No. 496 swearing among others that he was the owner in fee simple and the only one in occupation of the lot which resulted in Original Certificate of Title No. 5770 dated February 7, 1972. After Gaudencio Coronel died, his heirs, herein petitioners, executed a Deed of Partition among themselves and a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 151931-R was issued in their names on December 7, 1978. Respondents learned of this fraudulent transfer only on February 1984 when Natalia Cuevas-Garcia and her husband were being sued by petitioners for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch II, alleging that on the strength of the aforestated TCT No. 151931-R they now have a right to eject the present occupants Natalia Cuevas-Garcia, her husband and family. So the Cuevas clan sought the help of their barangay court but the Coronel clan refused to give up the lot involved forcing the former to litigate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co- heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

HELD:

The rule regarding prescription cannot be pleaded between them except when one heir openly and adversely occupies the property for a period sufficiently long to entitle him to ownership under the law. In other words, as long as other heirs acknowledge their ownership or do not set up any adverse title to the property, prescription is unavailable.

In this instant case, it is indubitable that Gaudencio Coronel, the late father of the herein petitioners, fraudulently deprived Querubin Cuevas, the late father of the herein respondents, of his lawful share over the land in question when he solely applied for the registration of the whole lot in his name, knowingly fully well that he only owned One Twelve (1/12) share of Lot No. 5697. The fraudulent acts deliberately committed by Gaudencio Coronel directly caused damage to Querubin Cuevas and to his heirs. As such the herein respondents are entitled to recover their share and the damages they suffered.

[G.R. No. L-28032. September 24, 1986]

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

 The parties agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in a case of reserve troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista belong to the line of origin.

HELD:

We rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.ordinary intestate succession

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  [ G.R. NO. 149756, FEBRUARY 11, 2005

MYRNA RAMOS, PETITIONER, VS. SUSANA S. SARAO AND JONAS RAMOS, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

On February 21, 1991, Spouses Jonas Ramos and Myrna Ramos executed a contract over their conjugal house and lot in favor of Susana S. Sarao for and in consideration of P1,310,430. Entitled “DEED OF SALE UNDER PACTO DE RETRO,” the contract, inter alia, granted the Ramos spouses the option to repurchase the property within six months from February 21, 1991, for P1,310,430 plus an interest of 4.5 percent a month. It was further agreed that should the spouses fail to pay the monthly interest or to exercise the right to repurchase within the stipulated period, the conveyance would be deemed an absolute sale.
             On July 30, 1991, Myrna Ramos tendered to Sarao the amount of P1,633,034.20 in the form of two manager’s checks, which the latter refused to accept for being allegedly insufficient. On August 8, 1991, Myrna filed a Complaint for the redemption of the property and moral damages plus attorney’s fees. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2188 and raffled to Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On August 13, 1991, she deposited with the RTC two checks that Sarao refused to accept.
            On December 21, 1991, Sarao filed against the Ramos spouses a Petition “for consolidation of ownership in pacto de retro sale” docketed as Civil Case No. 91-3434 and raffled to Branch 61 of the RTC of Makati City. Civil Case Nos. 91-2188 and 91-3434 were later consolidated and jointly tried before Branch 145 of the said Makati RTC.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro was, and is in reality and under the law an equitable mortgage.

HELD:

In a pacto de retro, ownership of the property sold is immediately transferred to the vendee a retro, subject only to the repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. The vendor a retro’s failure to exercise the right of repurchase within the agreed time vests upon the vendee a retro, by operation of law, absolute title to the property. Such title is not impaired even if the vendee a retro fails to consolidate title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code.
           On the other hand, an equitable mortgage is a contract that although lacking the formality, the form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to burden a piece or pieces of real property as security for a debt. The essential requisites of such a contract are as follows: (1) the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of sale, but (2) their intention is to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. The nonpayment of the debt when due gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the loan obligation.

[ G.R. NO. 146651, JANUARY 17, 2002 ]

RONALDO P. ABILLA AND GERALDA A. DIZON, PETITIONERS, VS. CARLOS ANG GOBONSENG, JR. AND THERESITA MIMIE ONG, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses instituted against respondents an action for specific performance, recovery of sum of money and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 8148 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch XLII, seeking the reimbursement of the expenses they incurred in connection with the preparation and registration of two public instruments, namely a “Deed of Sale” and an “Option to Buy.” In their answer, respondents raised the defense that the transaction covered by the “Deed of Sale” and “Option to Buy,” which appears to be a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase, was in truth, in fact, in law, and in legal construction, a mortgage.
           On October 29, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared that the transaction between the parties was not an equitable mortgage. Citing Villarica v. Court of Appeals,^[6] it ratiocinated that neither was the said transaction embodied in the “Deed ofSale” and “Option to Buy” a pacto de retro sale, but a sale giving respondents until August 31, 1983 within which to buy back the seventeen lots subject of the controversy.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the sale is a pacto de retro.

HELD:

This Court has already had occasion to rule on the proper interpretation of the provision in question. In Adorable v. Inacala, where the proofs established that there could be no honest doubt as to the parties’ intention, that the transaction was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de retro, the Court adjudged the vendor a retro not to be entitled to the benefit of the third paragraph of Article 1606.

In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were of the view that the subject transaction was truly a pacto de retro sale; and that none of the circumstances under Article 1602 of the Civil Code exists to warrant a conclusion that the transaction subject of the “Deed of Sale” and “Option to Buy” was an equitable mortgage. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that if respondents really believed that the transaction was indeed an equitable mortgage, as a sign of good faith, they should have, at the very least, consigned with the trial court the amount of P896,000.00, representing their alleged loan, on or before the expiration of the right to repurchase on August 21, 1983.

CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS and PEDRO P. ROXAS, plaintiffs, vs. THE CITY OF MANILA and ROBERT G. DIECK, as city engineer, defendants. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3144. November 19, 1907.]

FACTS:

1. That on the 15th of January, 1906, the plaintiff, as owner of the property situated on the Escolta, district of Binondo, city of Manila, the eastern boundary of which adjoins the canal of San Jacinto or Sibacon to the extent of 23.50 meters, the total area of the ground being 658.19 square meters, applied to the city engineer, Robert G. Dieck, the defendant herein, for a license to construct a terrace over "the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her"; but the defendant refused to grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace.

2. That a similar petition was addressed to the Municipal Board of the city of Manila on the 30th of said month and year, and it also was denied.

3. That, as the plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason wherefore the license was denied is because "the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and without any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a portion of the ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the plaintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said strip of the property which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years."

4. That the strip in question was occupied by a two-storey building constructed more than seventy years ago.

ISSSUE:

Whether or not a mere act of obstruction in connection with building regulations, suppress the right of ownership without due process of law.

HELD:

When any corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes the plaintiff from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, and the court, on trial, finds the allegations of the complaint to be true, it may, if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law, render a judgment granting a peremptory order against the defendant, commanding him, immediately after the receipt of such order, or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the plaintiff.

Therefore, we hereby command the defendants, the city of Manila, and Robert G. Dieck, as city engineer, or whomsoever may now be acting as such, to immediately issue a license in favor of the plaintiff herein, Doña Carmen Ayala de Roxas, to construct the terrace as aforesaid in accordance with the plan and specification.