limen digest

1.Marcela Rodelas v. Amparo AranzaG.R. No. L-58509; December 7, 1982

Facts:

Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holographic  will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita BonillaFrias and Ephraim Bonilla. The grounds of their opposition are as follows: Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator. The alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect. The original must be presented and not the copy thereof. The deceased did not leave any will. The appellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will. The appellees's motions were denied. They filed a Motion for recon. Motion for Recon was approved. Appellant's motion for recon was denied. Appellant appealed the case to the CA which certified the case to the SC on the ground that the appeal does not involve questions of fact.

Issue:

Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.

Ruling:

Yes. a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs.Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost ordestroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses whohave seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity."But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

2.Abejero vs. Sand  G.R. No. 106720; September 15, 1994

Facts:

The decedent names as devisees Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent ClementeSand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. JoseAjero and their children.The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decendent's holo will.Private Respondnet opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament'sbody nor the signature therein was in decendent's handwriting; it contained alterationsand corrections which were not duly signed by the decedent; and the will was procured bypets through improper pressure and undue influence. Dr. Jose Ajero also opposed thepetition. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran,Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in itsentirety, as she was not its sole owner.The trial court admitted the holo will to probate. On appeal, the said decision was reversedand the pet for probate was dismissed. The CA found that the holo will failed to meet therequirements for its validity. I held that the decedent did not comply with Arts 813 and814.It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated,or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations madethereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

Ruling:

1. Refer to Art. 839.These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petitionto admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether theinstrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will wasexecuted; and,(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of thedecedent.A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects thevalidity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If thetestator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositionscannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 81

 

3.Alfredo vs. Borras

FACTS:

Spouses Armando Borras (“Armando”) and AdeliaLobaton Borras (“Adelia”), filed a complaint for specificperformance against Godofredo and Carmen before theRegional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4.Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint that Godofredoand Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land for P7,000.00 withthe Development Bank of the Philippines (“DBP”). The SubjectLand is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 284 (“OCTNo. 284”) issued to Godofredo Alfredo (“Godofredo”) andCarmen Limon Alfredo (“Carmen”under Homestead Patent No.V-69196.To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold theSubject Land to Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, thebuyers to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, andthe balance to be paid in cash to the sellers.Armando and Adelia subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price of the land and Godofredo and Carmenthen delivered to Adelia the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No.284, with the document of cancellation of mortgage, officialreceipts of realty tax payments, and tax declaration in the name of Godofredo. Godofredo and Carmen introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land, to the Natanawans, the old tenants of the Subject Land. Armando and Adelia then took possession of the Subject Land.Subsequently, Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the Subject Land to several persons.Armando and Adelia

filed an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Bataan.

They discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had secured an owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284 after filing a petition in court for the issuance of a new copy ,claiming in their petition that they lost their owner’s duplicate copy.Then

Armando

and Adelia amended their complaint to include the following persons

as additionaldefendants: the spouses Arnulfo Savellano and Editha B.Savellano, Danton D. Matawaran, the spouses Delfin F.Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu, and Elizabeth Tuazon(“Subsequent Buyers”) who purchased from Godofredo andCarmen the subdivided portions of the Subject Land and towhom the Register of Deeds of Bataan issued transfer certificates of title to the lots they purchased.In their answer, Godofredo and Carmen and theSubsequent Buyers (collectively “petitioners”) argued that theaction is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as there isno written instrument evidencing the alleged contract of saleover the Subject Land in favor of Armando and Adelia.As counterclaim, petitioners sought payment of attorney’s fees and incidental expenses.

Trial then followed. The trial court rendered its decision infavor of Armando and Adelia.

ISSUE:

Whether the action to enforce the alleged oral contract of sale brought after 24 years from its alleged perfection had beenbarred by prescription and by laches.

RULING:

SC ruled that the petition is without merit.

 

In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Courtreviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual findings. In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by thetrial and appellate courts are borne out by the record. Weagree with the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from these facts.

Validity and Enforceability of the Sale

The contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo and Carmen and the spouses Armando and Adelia was a perfected contract. A contract is perfected once there is consent of the contracting parties on the object certain and on the cause of the obligation. In the instant case, the object of the sale is the Subject Land, and the price certain isP15,000.00. The trial and appellate courts found that there was a meeting of the minds on the sale of the Subject Landand on the purchase price of P15,000.00. This is a finding of fact that is binding on this Court. We find no reason to disturb this finding since it is supported by substantial evidence. The contract of sale of the Subject Land has also been consummated because the sellers and buyers have performed their respective obligations under the contract. In the instant case, Godofredo and Carmen delivered the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia, placing the latter in actual physical possession of the Subject Land. Godofredo and Carmen also turned over to Armando and Adelia the documents of ownership to the Subject Land, namely the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, the tax declaration and the receipts of realty tax payments. On the other hand, Armando and Adelia paid the full purchase price as evidenced by the receipt dated 11 March 1970 issued by Carmen.

The trial and appellate courts correctly refused to apply the Statute of Frauds to this case. The Statute of Frauds[provides that a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. The existence of the receipt dated11 March 1970, which is a memorandum of the sale, removes the transaction from the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts either partially or totally performed.[ Thus, where one party has performed one’s obligation, oral evidencewill be admitted to prove the agreement. In the instant case, theparties have consummated the sale of the Subject Land, with both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations under the contract of sale.

ON THE ISSUE THAT THE SALE IS VOID SINCE IT LACKSMARITAL CONSENT:

The Family Code, which took effect on 3 August 1988,provides that any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void. However, when the sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code. Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent isnot void but merely voidable. Following petitioners’ argumentthat Carmen sold the land to Armando and Adelia without the consent of Carmen’s husband, the sale would only be voidable and not void. However, Godofredo can no longer question the sale. Voidable contracts are susceptible of ratification. Godofredo ratified the sale when he introduced Armando and Adelia to his tenants as the new owners of the Subject Land. The trial court noted that Godofredo failed to deny categorically on the witness stand the claim of the complainants’ witnesses thatGodofredo introduced Armando and Adelia as the new landlords of the tenants. That Godofredo and Carmen allowed Armando and Adelia to enjoy possession of the Subject Landfor 24 years is formidable proof of Godofredo’s acquiescenceto the sale. Moreover, Godofredo and Carmen used most of the proceeds of the sale to pay their debt with the DBP. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the sale redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Article 161 of the Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted by the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, even if Carmen sold the land without the consent of her husband, the sale still binds the conjugal partnership.

Petitioners contend that Godofredo and Carmen did not deliver the title of the Subject Land to Armando and Adeliaas shown by this portion of Adelia’s testimony on cross-examination:Q -- No title was delivered to you by Godofredo Alfredo?A -- I got the title from Julie Limon because my sister toldme.[26]Petitioners raise this factual issue for the first time. The Court of Appeals could have passed upon this issue had petitioners raised this earlier. At any rate, the cited testimony of Adelia does not convincingly prove that Godofredo and Carmen did not deliver the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia. Adelia’s cited testimony must be examined in context not only with her entire testimony butalso with the other circumstances. Petitioners invoke the absence of approval of the sale bythe Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources tonullify the sale. Petitioners never raised this issue before  the trial court or the Court of Appeals. Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[

However, we will address this new issue to finally put an end to this case. The sale of the Subject Land cannot be annulled on the ground that the Secretary did not approve the sale, which was made within 25 years from the issuance of the homestead title. The failure to secure the approval of the Secretary does not ipso facto make a sale void. The absence of approval by the Secretary does not nullify a sale made after the expiration of the 5-year period, for in such event the requirement of Section118 of the Public Land Act becomes merely directory or a formality. The approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authorized.

Action Not Barred by Prescription and Laches

Petitioners insist that prescription and laches have set in. SC disagreed The Amended Complaint filed by Armando and Adeliawith the trial court is captioned as one for Specific Performance. In reality, the ultimate relief sought by Armando and Adelia is the reconveyance to them of the Subject Land.An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. The body of the pleading or complaint determines the nature of an action, not its title or heading.

Thus, the present action should be treated as one for reconveyance.

To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff’s possession of the disputed property is material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff isnot in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, asthe real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title andpossession of the property does not run against him. In such acase, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. In this case, the appellate court resolved the issue of prescription by ruling that the action should prescribe four years from discovery of the fraud. We must correct this erroneous application of the four-year prescriptive period.xxx It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods after the right of actionaccrues:3. Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud; In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law(Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner.

The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned fromthe date of the issuance of the certificate of title.

Following Caro, we have consistently held that a naction for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. We went further by specifying the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. Had Armando and Adelia remained in possession of the Subject Land, their action for reconveyance, in effect anaction to quiet title to property, would not be subject toprescription. Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of theadverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. Armando and Adelia lost possession of the Subject Land when the Subsequent Buyers forcibly drove away from the Subject Land the Natanawans, the tenants of Armando and Adelia.[51] This created an actual need for Armando and Adelia to seek reconveyance of the Subject Land. The statute of limitation becomes relevant in this case. The ten-year prescriptive period started to run from the date the Subsequent Buyers registered their deeds of sale with the Register of Deeds. The Subsequent Buyers bought the subdivided portions of the Subject Land on 22 February 1994, the date of execution of their deeds of sale. The Register of Deeds issued the transfer certificates of title to the Subsequent Buyers on 24.

ARTURO NIETO

vs.

BARTOLOME QUINES and MIGUEL P. PIO.

Facts:

 Bartolome Quines filed with the Bureau of Lands a homestead application covering a tract of land situated in the municipality of Abulug, province of Cagayan. Upon the approval of his application in the following year, he began clearing and cultivating the land.Cadastral surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands in the municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for as a homestead by Bartolome Quines was designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. One Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the award, apparently because neither the Director of Lands nor any of his representatives appeared during the hearing to inform the court that it was under homestead application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930, issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name. Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her by the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044.

Issue:

Wether  or not the homestead patent and Original Certificate of Title No. 623 were obtained through fraud and misrepresentations

Ruling:

The appeal is without merit.

As established during the trial and found by the trial court, Bartolome Quines had been in the continuous and peaceful possession of Lot No. 3044 from the time his homestead application was approved in 1918 up to 1953 when he was forcibly ejected there from by Arturo Nieto. As a homestead applicant, he religiously complied with all the requirements of the Public Land Act and, on August 29, 1930, a homestead patent was issued in his favor. Considering the requirement that the final proof must be presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead application (sec. 14, Public Land Act), it is safe to assume that Bartolome Quines submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923 and that the Director of Lands approved the same not long thereafter or before the land became the subject of the cadastral proceedings in 1927. Unfortunately, there was some delay in the ministerial act of issuing the patent and the same was actually issued only after the cadastral court had adjudicated the land to Maria Florentino. Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle him to a patent, Bartolome Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has unquestionably acquired a vested right on the land and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). Under these circumstances and applying by analogy the principles governing sales of immovable property to two different persons by the same vendor, Bartolome Quines’ title must prevail over that of Maria Florentino not only because he had always been in possession of the land but also because he obtained title to the land prior to that of Maria Florentino.

Intestate estate of Bibiana Roxas  L-38338

Facts:

          After the death of the spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special proceeding was instituted by Simeon, brother of Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the estate and consequently he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be holographic will of Bibiana which was then set for hearing. Luz Henson, one of the compulsory heirs filed an opposition to probate assailing  the purported holographic will of Bibiana was not executed in accordance with law. The lower court issued an order allowing the probate which was found to have been duly executed in accordance with law. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that she alleged holographic will was out dated as required by article 810 of the civil code and contending that the law requires that the will should contain the day, month, and year of the executor and that this should be strictly complied. The court then reconsidered its earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on  the ground that the word dated has generally been held  to include the month, day, and year.

Issue:

          Wether or not the date appearing on the holographic will of the deceased Bibiana de Jesus is a valid compliance with article 810 of the civil code?

Ruling;

          As a general rule the date in a holographic will should include the day, month, and year of the execution. Article 810 states that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines and need not be witnessed. In the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence, pressure, and the authenticity of the will is established and the only issue is wether or not the date FEB/16 appearing on th holographic will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

G.R. No. 152809 August 3, 2006

MERCEDES MORALIDAD, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES and ARLENE PERNES, Respondents.

Facts:

In her younger days, petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City and Manila. While teaching in Manila, she had the good fortune of furthering her studies at the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. While schooling, she was offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, which she did for seven (7) years. Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health Department of said University for the next seventeen (17) years.During those years, she would come home to the Philippines to spend her two-month summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being single, she would usually stay in Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario.Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene that Mandug at the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. Shocked and saddened about this development, she immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlene’s older sister, with instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down. This was why she bought the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-123125.Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986.

Issue:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR BEING PREMATURE WHICH DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 448 AND 546 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE ON USUFRUCT INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

Ruling:

The Court rules for the petitioner.Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property. ⁹ It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, ¹⁰ with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. ¹¹

It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right "to build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks "proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties" for the petitioner’s "nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of (sic) in standing." The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also granted them, among the petitioner’s other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof. We have no quarrel, therefore, with the CA’s ruling that usufruct was constituted between petitioner and respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease contract between the parties.

There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:

ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:

(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;

(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;

(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;

(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;

(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;

(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;

(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)

The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another." That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.

From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely, the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.

Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated.

By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:

Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any damage to the same.

Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate the premises without any right of reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as an author pointed out, improve the owner out of his property. ¹⁵ The respondents may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they may have introduced thereon without damaging the petitioner’s property.

.