FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 74695,
September 14, 1993 ]
IN THE MATTER OF
THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF THE DECEASED BRIGIDO ALVARADO, CESAR ALVARADO, PETITIONER, VS.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., PRESIDING JUSTICE, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA
AND HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
FIRST DIVISION (CIVIL CASES), AND BAYANI MA. RINO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11
April 1986[1] of the First Civil Cases Division of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
Order dated 27 June 1983[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, admitting to probate the last
will and testament[3] with codicil[4] of the late Brigido Alvarado.
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado
executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a
previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch of the Regional Trial
Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses,
the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the execution,
the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private
respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same
aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective
copies previously furnished them.
Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently
admitted to probate on 9 December 1977.
On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng
Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some
dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye
operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and
revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the
testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it
was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of
the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the
notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.
A petition for the probate
of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3
January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of First
Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna.[5] Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition
on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not executed
and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise
mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to
senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of
fear or threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of
the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud or trick.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate
the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate
Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent
court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the
meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil
attached thereto were executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of
the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate
of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the
decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was
not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming
his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied
with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their
respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that
although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial
compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of
the drafted will was served.
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was
Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of Art. 808 at the time his "Huling
Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading
requirement of said article complied with?
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the
following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will
and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of
"counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which
he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first
consultation with an eye specialist on 14 December 1977.
The point of dispute is whether the foregoing
circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art.
808 which reads:
"Art.
808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by
one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom
the will is acknowledged.”
Petitioner contends that although his father was not
totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered
within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand,
petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr.
Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye
Research institute),[6] the contents of which were interpreted in
layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private
respondent.[7] Dr. Roasa explained that although the
testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read
either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his
first consultation.[8]
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to
the medical testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day the
will and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor
eyesight."[9] Since the testator was still capable of
reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be
complied with.
We agree with petitioner in this respect.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the
testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were
prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that
Brigido did not do so because of his “poor,”[10] “defective,”[11] or “blurred”[12] vision making it necessary for private
respondent to do the actual reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez[13] provides an insight into the scope of
the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:
"The rationale behind the requirement of reading
the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the
will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof
known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance
with his wishes x x x x"
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not
only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
"incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate
occasions of their execution due to his "poor,"
"defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other
course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of
the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were
read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who
drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instructions. Hence,
to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain
whether Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like
Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental
witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the
contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to
object if anything is contrary to his instructions.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond
cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the
lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged
codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not
twice as Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was
substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices for purposes of the
law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance is
a strict compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that
neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the
will and codicil to Brigido, probate of
the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily,
the petition must be denied.
This Court has held in a number of occasions that
substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery
but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege.[14]
In the case at bar, private respondent read the
testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three
instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto,
the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded
with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take
place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the
contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the “Huling
Habilin,” the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had
affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The
uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already
acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes
even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence
precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.[15]
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the
documents on 5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three
instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently.
Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O.
Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician)
asked the testator whether the contents of the documents were of his own free
will. Brigido answered in the affirmative.[16] With four persons following the reading
word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the
testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he
affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually
appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when we
consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to
the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C.
Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter
was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the
formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its
purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's
will.[17]
As a final word to convince petitioner of the
propriety of the trial court's Probate
Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following
pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan,[18] to wit:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded" (underscoring
supplied).
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in
clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil
attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside for the mere reason that
a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed strictly when
such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of
the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the
draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial
compliance suffices where the purpose has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is
AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has remained
pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.
[14] Icasiano v.
Icasiano, No. L-18979, 30 June 1964, 11 SCRA 422, 429-430; Abangan v.
Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919); Rey v. Cartagena, 56 Phil. 282,
284-285 (1931); Rodriguez v. Yap, 68 Phil. 126, 128 (1939); Leynez v.
Leynez, 68 Phil. 745, 750 (1939); Roxas v. De Jesus, Jr., No. L-38338,
28 January 1985, 134 SCRA 245, 249.
Source: Supreme Court
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