jerwin dimpas

[ G.R. No. L-29901, August 31, 1977 ]

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA AND REMEDIOS CHUA, PETITIONERS

VS.

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V AND SUSANA DE LA TORRE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CONSO­LACION DE LA TORRE, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:         It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio, he sired three children, namely:  Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua.  When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanito Frias Chua.  Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue.  Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage.  In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931^[1] adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua' s widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo Frias Chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias Chua, his sons of the first marriage.  By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483)^[2] dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue.  After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indiviso share of Lot No. 399.  In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name.  Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.

ISSUE:           The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisite of reserva troncal - whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father, Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. 

HELD:           As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail."

We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code.  It is.  As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator,^[6] "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. 

But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No. 4816 dated January 15, 1931.  As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous.  It does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20.  This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him.  As far as the deceased Jose Frais Chua is concerned the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous.  This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code.

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G.R. No. L-14652 June 30, 1960

JUAN GARGANTOS, petitioner,

vs.

TAN YANON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:         Juan Gargantos appeals by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Romblon.

he record discloses that the late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the poblacion of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.

On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application.

Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view trough the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building permit to defendant. The case as against the members of the Municipal Council was subsequently dismissed with concurrence of plaintiff's council. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Romblon rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P12,500.00 by way of compensatory, exemplary, moral and moderate damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Romblon and enjoined defendant from constructing his building unless "he erects the same at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line of his property, in conformity with Article 673 of the New Civil Code."

So Juan Gargantos filed this petition for review of the appellate Court's decision. The focal issue herein is whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos.

ISSUE:           Whether or not respondent acquired any easement either by title or by prescription.

RULING:       We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's property. By reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line separating the two estates.

[ G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990 ]

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, PETITIONER

VS.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:         This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.

ISSUE:           Whether or not the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and 

HELD:           On the question of reserva troncal — We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side.

"1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) — the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants. 

"2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios) — relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came. 

"3. The propositus — the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law." (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.

Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

"ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. 

"ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. 

"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that: 

"Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate ‘without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,’ and is entitled to one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate."

[ G.R. No. L-14116, June 30, 1960 ]

[WITH RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 20, 1961]

LAUREANA A. CID, PETITIONER

VS.

IRENE P. JAVIER, MANUEL P. JAVIER, JOSEFINA P. JAVIER, FERNANDO P. JAVIER, JOSE P. JAVIER, GUILLERMO P. JAVIER, ISIDORA P. JAVIER, BENJAMIN P. JAVIER, AND LEONOR CRISOLOGO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:         The windows in question are admittedly in respondents' own building erected on their own lot. The easement, if there is any, is therefore a negative one.^[1] The alleged prohibition having been avowedly made in 1913 or 1914, before the present Civil Code took effect, the applicable legal provision is Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code which provides:

"ART. 538. In order to acquire by prescription the easements referred to in the next preceding article, the time of the possession shall be computed, * * * in negative easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate has, by a formal act, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to perform any act which would be lawful without the easement."

As may be seen, the only question hinges on the interpretation of the phrase "a formal act". The lower court and the Court of Appeals considered any prohibition made by the owner of the dominant estate, be it oral or written, sufficient compliance with the law.

ISSUE:           Whether or not the respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been made upon petitioner's predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by Torrens titles.

HELD:           We are inclined to take the contrary view. The law is explicit. It requires not any form of prohibition, but exacts, in a parenthetical expression, for emphasis, the doing not only of a specific, particular act, but a formal act.

Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the servient estate. They constitute a limitation of the dominical right of the owner of the subjected property. Hence, they can be acquired only by title and by prescription, in the case of positive easement, only as a result of some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous, of the servient estate. By the same token, negative easements can not be acquired by less formal means. Hence, the requirement that the prohibition (the equivalent of the act of invasion) should be by "a formal act", "an instrument acknowledged before a notary public."

Consequently, even conceding arguendo that such an easement has been acquired, it had been cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System (without the easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby reversed; the injunction issued herein dissolved; and the case remanded to the court of origin for adjudication of the damages, if any, occasioned by the issuance of the injunction.

R E S O L U T I O N

The Decision in this case, promulgated on June 30, 1960, provided, among others, for the lifting of the preliminary injunction issued by the lower court directed against petitioner's construction of a building allegedly being made in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 3, series of 1909 of the municipality of Laoag, and in disregard of respondents' right to light and view.

n their motion for reconsideration timely presented, respondents claim that the findings of the lower court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the building under construction violated the aforementioned ordinance (from which no appeal was interposed) having become final, justify the issuance of and making permanent the injunction already issued.

There is no question that respondents' house, as well as that of petitioner, are within their respective properties; that respondents' wall stands only 50 centimeters from the boundary of the 2 lots, whereas, the wall of the petitioner's building was constructed 1 meter from the boundary or 1 meter and 50 centimeters from the wall of the house of respondents. As a result, the lower court found that the eaves of the two houses overlap each other by 24 centimeters. This, the Court of Appeals declared to be violative of Ordinance No. 3, series of 1903, amending Sections 1, 5, 6, and 13 of the Municipal Ordinance of June 3, 1903, which requires a distance of 2 meters, measured from eaves to eaves of adjoining buildings of strong materials.

It must be noted, however, that the Ordinance in question was adopted since 1909 and was, therefore, already in force at the time the house of respondents was reconstructed in 1946 after the building originally erected thereon was burned in 1942. If respondents constructed their house at least one meter from the boundary line, as petitioner has constructed hers, there would be no overlapping of the eaves and there would not be any violation of the ordinance. As things now stand, in view of such construction by the respondents, the overlapping of the eaves and the consequential violation of the ordinance can not entirely be attributed to petitioner, as to require her alone to make the adjustments necessary for the observance of the 2-meter eaves-to-eaves distance from her neighbors. If any compliance with the ordinance would be exacted, the adjustment should be made not only by petitioner, but also by the respondents. There is, therefore, no reason for the continuation of the injunction.

In view of the foregoing, and as the other grounds respondents' motion for reconsideration had been already duly considered in the Decision, the said motion is hereby denied, for lack of merit. So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. L-23818, January 21, 1976 ]

EMILIO PURUGGANAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE

VS.

FELISA PAREDES AND TRANQUILINO BARRERAS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

FACTS:         Plaintiff-appellee Emilio Purugganan is the owner of a piece of a residential lot subdivided as Lot 1 and Lot 2, situated at the poblacion of Bangued, Abra and technically described under Torrens Title No. R-6 in his name, adjacent to and bounded on the North by the lot of defendant-appellant Felisa Paredes. The lots of the plaintiff-appellee are subject to an easement of drainage in favor of the defendants-appellants fully quoted in the Decree of Registration of the Court of First Instance of Abra, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3256.

In or about the month of March 1951, the defendants-appellants constructed a house on their lot adjacent to Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee in such a manner that the southern side of their house is exactly on the brick wall, the southern side of which is the demarcation line between the plaintiff-appellee and the defendants-appellants, demolishing said brick wall and built thereon the southern wall of their house with 3 windows. The house constructed by the defendants-appellants is 2-1/2 meters longer than the length of roofing allowed in the above quoted Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding over the property of the plaintiff-appellee which is .20 meter wider than that allowed in the same Decree of Registration, and the rain water from the GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2 of the plaintiff-appellee. The defendants-appellants also placed 3 windows each on the first and second floors of their house on the side facing Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee. From the time the defendants-appellants started to construct their house, the plaintiff-appellee has repeatedly and continuously been demanding from the defendants-appellants that the construction of their house be in accordance with the easement, but the defendants-appellants refused to observe the easement and to close their windows. They also prohibited the plaintiff-appellee from constructing a party wall between points 1 and 2 of Lot 2 and between points 2 and 3 and 4 of Lot 1.

ISSUE:           Whether or not defendants-appellants acquired an easement of light and view.

HELD:           The easement of drainage was inscribed in the Certificate of Title of plaintiff-appellee in their favor by virtue of an amicable settlement resulting from their opposition to the registration of plaintiff-appellee's property. In this light, their defense of user "since time immemorial" becomes flimsy and is merely being used to simulate a factual issue.

In the case at bar the plaintiff-appellee's right to the reliefs sought is dependent on the existence or non-existence of the easement of drainage and of light and view in favor of the defendants-appellants as well as on the conditions attached to such easements.

There is no dispute that plaintiff-appellee's property was registered in 1951 under the Torrens System and that only the easement of drainage is annotated on his Certificate of Title, subject to prescribed distances. But what defendants-appellants have advanced as factual issues are: (1) that they have not violated the prescribed distances of the easement of drainage; and (2) that the easement of light and view was in existence since time immemorial. The first factual issue was resolved by the report submitted by the commissioner to which defendants-appellants have given their conformity.

The second factual issue is immaterial to the disposition of the case because the servient estate was registered in 1951 without the easement of light and view being annotated on the title. Since the supposed easement of light and view is not annotated on the title, it becomes immaterial whether such easement existed since time immemorial. On this point, there is no need to have a trial on the merits and a summary judgment would appear to be in order. 

[ G.R. No. 90215, March 29, 1996 ]

ERNESTO ZALDARRIAGA, JESUS ZALDARRIAGA, JR. AND GUADALUPE ZALDARRIAGA, PETITIONERS

VS.

COURT OF APPEALS AND BASILIA ZALDARRIAGA; ANTONIA ZALDARRIAGA ON HER BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY, EDGARDO, ROMEO, JESUS, RONALDO; WILLIAM, MIGUEL AND REBECCA, ALL SURNAMED ZALDARRIAGA; NIDA AND JOSE, ALL SURNAMED ZALDARRIAGA; JOSE, JR., ALICIA, PEDRO, MELBA, NELLY AND ALFREDO, ALL SURNAMED ZALDARRIAGA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:         Hacienda Escolastica, consisting of Lots Nos. 936, 937, 940 and 941, originally covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6536, T-6537, T-6538 and T-6539, has an area of 228.54 hectares. It belonged to the conjugal partnership of Pedro Zaldarriaga and Margarita Iforong. During their marriage, the couple begot four sons named Jesus, Jose, Manuel and Julio.

On May 17, 1919, Margarita died leaving one-half (1/2) or four-eighths (4/8) of the hacienda to her husband as his conjugal share and one-eighth (1/8) share to each of her sons. Thereafter, Manuel and Julio died single and without issue.  Their combined two-eighths (2/8) shares therefore passed by legal succession to their father, Pedro, who consequently became the owner of six-eighths (6/8) or three-fourths (3/4) share of the hacienda.

In 1944, Jose died survived by his wife, Basilia, and their seven children, named Carlos,^[2] Jose, Alicia, Melba, Nelly, Pedro and Alfredo. Two years later or in 1946, Jesus also died. He was survived by his wife, Consuelo, and three children: Ernesto, Guadalupe and Jesus, Jr. Hence, Pedro outlived his four children.

On June 5, 1953, Basilia vda. de Zaldarriaga, acting as the judicial administratrix of the estate of Jose, filed Civil Case No. 2705 against the said surviving children of Jesus before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the partition of the hacienda and for accounting of its rents, profits, produce and fruits. During the pendency of the case or on January 14, 1956, Pedro, the Zaldarriaga patriarch, executed a "deed of definite sale" conveying his 6/8 share in the hacienda to his grandchildren by Jesus, the defendants in the case. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-6536, T-6537, T-6538 and T-6539 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-20122, T-19141, T-20143 and T-20124 corresponding to Lots Nos. 936, 937, 940 and 941 were issued to said grandchildren.  This turn of events also resulted in the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2705 in order that the nullification of the said sale would be made an integral part thereof.

ISSUE:           Whether or not the reservation clause is confined only to property subject of reserve troncal.

HELD:           The appellants have misinterpreted the full import and meaning of the reservation clause. The resolution of the Supreme Court does not say that the reservation clause should be confined to only the property subject of reserva troncal. As can be gleaned from the reservation clause, it speaks of the children’s share ‘in the lands in question as part of the estate of the now deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga.’ The entire estate of the deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga was ‘sold’ by him to the appellants (his other grandchildren). To recover their shares in the estate of their grandfather, appellees necessarily have to institute proceedings for the nullification of the simulated ‘deed of sale."