estologa digest (compliance for the finals)

AMOR v. FLORENTINO- Easement

FACTS:

Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). The house had and still has, on the north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these windows the house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands. By a will, she transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied.

RULING:

1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two different persons and the “service” (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an easement is established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 624 is acquisition by title.

2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amor’s supposition, the law on easement was already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by Jurisprudence. Therefore, Amor is prohibited from constructing the warehouse above the level of the window.

Beatriz L. GONZALES vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

OF MANILA, et al.

FACTS:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children. The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda executed two hand-written identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). She later died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons.

The lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez.

Mrs. Gonzales appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 and contends that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

ISSUES:

1.      Whether or not the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal?

2.      Whether or not Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of the properties in question in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children?

RULING:

The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.  The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

The reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor.

Sumaya v. IAC (1991) Reserva Troncal

FACTS:

Raul Balantakbo inherited 1/3 interest pro-indiviso of a lot in Liliw from his father, and 1/7 interest pro-indiviso in 10 parcels of land from his maternal grandmother. Raul then died intestate, leaving his mother Consuelo Joaquin Vda. De Balantakbo ashis sole surviving heir.- Consuelo then adjudicated unto herself the properties in an affidavit then subsequently sold the same to Mariquita Sumaya who in turn sold them to Villa Honorio Dev’t Corp. who in turn sold them to Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative (the present possessors of the properties).- Consuelo then died. The brothers in “full blood” of Raul, and his niece and nephews from a dead brother then filed suits to recover the properties which were sold by Consuelo, arguing that the same properties were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor- They claim that since there was no annotation in the title, they should be treated as innocent purchasers in good faith and for value, thus they may not be stripped of the properties.- RTC ruled in favor of Balantakbo clan, and ordered the possessor of the properties to convey the same to the Balantakbos. It said that the registration of an affidavit of the self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited from Raul’s father and maternal grandmother, was in its form, declaration, and substance, a recording in the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties.

ISSUE:

1.      Whether or not the registration of the affidavit of self-adjudication operated as an annotation to the title to the properties

HELD:

It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:

Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION

“Every conveyance, mortgage,lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered landshall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.”

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.

The affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.

HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC

FACTS:

At Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. Clemente Ermac registered the said Lot to his name alone without regards to the other predecessors-in-interests. The respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they as well as their predecessors-in-interests had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.

According to the appellate court, “the fact that petitioners have in their possession certificates of title which apparently bear out that it was Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein has no discrediting effect upon plaintiffs’ claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by succession were effectively disregarded.”

ISSUES:

1.      Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the property in the names of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco.

2.      Whether or not laches has set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666.

RULING:

First Issue:

Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court’s findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.20 Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.

Second Issue:

Petitioners aver that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe. Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio,Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his foursons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by EduardoVelazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.

ISSUE:

1.      For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

HELD:

While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Francisca Tioco DE PAPA, et al. vs.
Dalisay Tongko CAMACHO

FACTS:

The plaintiffs are the grandaunt and granduncles of the defendant, Dalisay. They have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister named Romana Tioco), father of the plaintiffs and great grandfather of Dalisay. During the lifetime of Romana, she gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs). The latter died intestate survived by her husband Estacio Dizon and their two (2) legitimate children, Faustino and Trinidad (mother of Dalisay) and leaving the said four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of the children in equal pro-indiviso shares. Subsequently, Balbino died intestate, survived by his legitimate children and his wife (among the plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren, Faustino and Trinidad. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the inheritance of Toribia but as she had predeceased her father, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children, Faustino and Trinidad in equal pro-inidiviso shares. Faustino died intestate, singled and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land to his father, Eustacio, as his sole intestate heir, who reserved the said property subject to a reserva troncal. When Trinidad died intestate, her rights and interests in the land were inherited by her only child, Dalisay and not long after, Eustacio died intestate survived also by his only legitimate child, Dalisay. Dalisay now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land as her inheritance from Trinidad. Dalisay also claims the other half of the said parcels of land by virtue of reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino but the plaintiffs opposed such claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which was inherited by Eustacio from Faustino, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino. The lower court declared that the parties are entitled to one-half (1/2) of the seven (7) parcels of land in dispute, as reservatarios, in equal proportions. Not satisfied, the defendant appealed.

ISSUES:

1.      Whether or not all the relatives of the propositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.

2.      Whether or not the rights of the plaintiffs are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.

RULING:

The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned, but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on instestate succession, the plaintiffs must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino (the propositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the propositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs would have been excluded by the defendant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because “the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva,” i.e., the property took a “detour” through an ascendant thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.