lara mae

Menchavez vs. Teves

Facts:

On February 28, 1986 a Contract of Lease of a Fishpond was executed between the plaintiffs, as lessor and the respondent as lessee. On June 2, 1988 the fishpond dikes constructed by respondent was demolished as ordered by Cebu RTC. As a result, he filed a Complaint for damages alleging that petitioners violated their contract of lease specially the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of property for the entire duration of the contract. The RTC declared the Contract as void and declared both parties in pari delicto. The CA however reversed the decision. Thus the present appeal.

Issue:

Are the parties of the Contract of Lease in Pari delicto?

Ruling:

Under the 1987 Constitution specifically declares that all lands of the public domain, waters, fisheries and other natural resources belong to the State.¹⁸Included here are fishponds, which may not be alienated but only leased, thus making the Contract of Lease void. We apply the maxim NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET’ - meaning ONE CANNOT GIVE WHAT HE DOES NOT HAVE. Petitioners are applicants of the fishponds. Even if the State grants them the lease, the law also prohibits sublease of the fishponds.

The parties are in pari delicto or in equal fault and the law deny them aid for any claims against the other and courts leave them as they are. However Article 1412 of the Civil Code provides the exception.

"Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

"(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;

"(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise."

The petition is GRANTED.

Collado vs Alonzo

Facts:

The petitioner assailed the filing of the respondent on September 13, 1963 was out of time during the election to be held on November 12, 1963. He also alleged excessive or unlawful expenditures, because in his campaign speeches, Alonzo had promised to donate his salary as mayor of the town, for the education of indigent but deserving students.

Issue:

Whether or not the promise constitute a donation as prohibited under Sec. 49 of the election law?

Ruling:

The promise made during the speech of the respondent does not constitute a donation as prohibited under Sec. 49 of the election law. It was not made to one particular person or persons to induce him or them to vote or withhold his or their votes. It could not even be construed to have been made to voters, because indigent "students" might not even be voters. Furthermore, the identity of future beneficiaries was, at the time of the election, unknown. This promise and its long-range effect cannot be distinguished from the election promises of candidates to support this or that law or public project or local improvement, which although favorable to some, may not be classified as among the pledges which candidates for public office are prohibited to make.

The petition is denied.

Aldaba vs Aldaba

Facts:

Belen Aldaba died on February 25, 1955. She left Estanislao Baustista, her surviving spouse and her brother Ceasar Aldaba as presumptive heirs. The petitioner herein was allowed by the deceased to live in the two lots situated at 427 Maganda St.,Sta. Mesa, Manila, the property in  questioned. On June 24, 1955 the heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the properties and the said lots were allotted to Ceasar Aldaba. Aldaba ceded the properties to Emmanuel Bautista. The latter filed an ejectment case against the petitioner. The petitioner in turn filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that they have become the owner of the properties. He alleged that it was donated to them by the deceased for services rendered by them without compensation for more than ten years. The donation was governed by Article 733 which states that donation does not have to be done by virtue of a public document. Petitioner relied on a note which the deceased left which indicated that the latter gave the properties to them.

Issue:

Was there a disposition of properties made by the deceased in favor of the petitioners?

Ruling:

The note indicated only an intention of the deceased to donate the properties to the petitioner. There was no evidence to show that such intention was carried out after the writing of the note. There is also no record that there was a donation for in consideration of the services rendered by the petitioners to the deceased. The conditions to constitute a donation cum causa onerous are not present.

The petition is denied.

Figueroa vs Jimenez

Facts:

The petitioner seeks to reverse the judgment and entitle her and her sisters alike, Teresa and Paz, one-sixth (1/6) of Lots no. 1 and 4 of Sulucan Subdivision , and of the value of the apartment house located at Aguado St. The court rendered its judgment entitling each of them 1/12 of undivided portion of the lots 1 and 4 which appertain to the conjugal estate of Jose Bentaja and Romana Tenorio-Bentaja. The remaining 9/12 is entitled to the estate of Romana Tenorio.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The court required the respondents to to state within ten (10) days from notice whether or not they conform and are agreeable to the prayer in the petition and in petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The respondents submitted their manifestation of conformity.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the estate by virtue of the principle of reserve troncal Article 811 of old Civil Code?

Ruling:

By virtue of the conformity of the interested parties as hereinabove set forth, and respondent court's judgment affecting lots 1 and 4 of the Sulucan Subdivision covered by TCT No. 15743 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila is hereby modified so as to declare that the three (3) surviving daughters Josefa, Paz and Teresa as compulsory heirs are each entitled to a one-sixth (1/6) undivided portion thereof (instead of one-twelfth [1/12] as determined by the trial court) and that the remaining three-sixths (3/6) undivided portion thereof (instead of nine-twelfths [9/12] as determined by the trial court) pertains to the estate of Romana Tenorio Bentaja which is pending settlement in another branch of the lower court.

Maloles vs Phillips

Facts:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will. Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioner’s properties, real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such without a bond.

Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
 the petitioner filed a motion for intervention which was granted. . Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which reversed the lower court. Thus the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not  the nearest next kin can be an heir?

Ruling:

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s -

(1)	Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2)	In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3)	The widow or widower;
(4)	Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5)	Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.[18]

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator’s will.

Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
 The petition is denied.