FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO, respondents.
Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.
Tomas P. Añonuevo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision of
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the
consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-956 1 and Civil Case No. SC-957. 2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different
ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A
one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land
situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of
the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who
died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in
ten (10) parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the
complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single,
without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de
Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties
above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto
herself the above described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal
Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:
I.
Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo,
he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul
Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio
el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia de
edad sin dejar testamento alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.
IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi
referido hijo Raul Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa,
legitima y universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez
adquiridas por el finado Raul Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto
padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, p. 29)
On December
21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property
described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was
evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The same
property was subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23,
1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its
rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. The documents evidencing these transfers were
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding
certificates of titles were issued. The properties are presently in the
name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the
remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo sold the properties described in the complaint in Civil Case
No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in
turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor
of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are
presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles
covering the above described properties do not contain any annotation of
its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and
Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul
Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo,
surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of
the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to
recover the properties described in the respective complaints which they
claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances but involve the same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs —
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 — the one-third (1/3) interest and ownership, pro-indiviso,
in and over the parcel of land described in paragraph three (3)
sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of this decision;
b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 — the one-seventh (1/7) interest and ownership, pro-indiviso,
in and over the ten (10) parcels of land described in paragraph three
(3), sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3) of this decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real
properties herein ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants with
plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving
one-third (1/3) of the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who
are their uncles:
2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. to account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of
the produce from the properties herein ordered to be returned to the
plaintiffs, said accounting and payment of income being for the period
from January 3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein
ordered:
3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay plaintiffs —
a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.
b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.
4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and 957.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
This petition before Us was filed on November 12,
1984 with the petitioners assigning the following errors allegedly
committed by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for value and in good faith of the properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary
to annotate the reservable interest of the reservee in the properties
covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and
actual damages in favor of the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution
of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo,
which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent
purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they agreed to
buy the properties from the reservor (also called reservista),
Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice
of their family consultant who found that there was no encumbrance nor
any lien annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista,
Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of
self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated
that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as
regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his
maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of
Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said
affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with
the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. In
Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant,
Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who
died leaving properties previously inherited from other ascendants and
which properties were inventoried in the said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles
covering the properties in question show that they were free from any
liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains
however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo
stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable
nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and
this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section
52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496)
which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION.
— Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,
filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province
or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice
to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
When
a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable.
He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would
have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the
law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any
more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the
facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must
be absolute, any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation. . . .
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama,
73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the mere entry of a
document in the day book without noting it on the certificate of title
is not sufficient registration. However, that ruling was superseded by
the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction.
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass,
91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and
involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment,
levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In
cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate
certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass,
in case of voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser
for value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title, the moment he
presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same
is entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders or
presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the land
sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds is duty
bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).
In this
case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was inherited
from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from
another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The
failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of
the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to
Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the
petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable character of the
properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This matter
appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor
of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in
Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and
exclusive owner of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described
parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition
executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10,
1945 and said portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned
was adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I
inherited after his death and this property is entirely free from any
encumbrance of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)
It was
admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case
SC-957, no such admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio
Development on notice of the reservable character of the properties. The
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo and registered with
the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the
petitioners and private respondents were long time acquaintances; that
the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna
Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of
the Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties
litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father
and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo
inherited these properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:
Art.
891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not
agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there
is no need to register the reservable character of the property, if only
for the protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons.
This was suggested as early as the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas,
G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted
for resolution therein was whether the reservation established by
Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for
the benefit of the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line of the descendant from whom the ascendant reservor received the
property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives
within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without
distinction legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the
legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter dictum this Court stated therein:
The
reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the
ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled,
that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives
having the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code),
the property passes, in accordance with this special order of
succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them,
which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now be
determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is
released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of
succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory
condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition
of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing
to do with whether the reservation has been noted or not in the
certificate of title to the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R.
No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that
the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent
purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the
obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable
character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
Since
these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons,
Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor
record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can
he effect the fee simple, which does not belong to him, to the damage of
Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land in good
faith, free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when
Juan Medina was advised not to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he
(Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?" Aside from the fact that
it is not clear whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914,
that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise that he had any
knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone
that Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son, but also from
the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his
mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows,
Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether or
not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the
reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for the reason that
there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question
raised in regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal
where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the
obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable
character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the
ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter
inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and
therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal
in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided
in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that:
"The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already
covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation
is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be
prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding
that the cause of action of the private respondents did not prescribe
yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the
death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the
death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968.
Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property)
is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the
reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the
reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the
reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they
take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are
relatives within the third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo,
G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is
extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right
of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a
reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised
within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the
old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No.
L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under
Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the
reserved property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4,
1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor.
Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
for actual litigation expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for
attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code.
Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover what
rightfully belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the
modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a
property subject of reserva troncal.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
2 Entitled Amado, Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, Plaintiffs, versus Villa Honorio Development Corporation and Laguna Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., Defendants.
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