SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981 ]
BEATRIZ L. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDES, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA,
BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA
Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA
Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
RAMON LEGARDA
Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, AND THE ESTATE OF DOÑA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J.:
Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez appealed from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint
for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages
and holding, as not subject to reserva troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Roces inherited in 1943
from Filomena Legarda
(Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as
follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of
Benito Legarda y Tuason,
died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven
children: four daughters named Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named
Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939,
the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda
y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. De Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit
adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda. The
said properties consist of the following:
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New
York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San
Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda,
Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila
Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226,
80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260,
80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT
Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the
Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT
No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles
described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry
of deeds;
1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San
Rafael described in TCT Nos.
50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT
No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
1/21st of the properties described in TCT
Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets and Estero);
2/21st of the property described in TCT
No. 13458 of the registry of deeds of Tayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication,
Filomena Roces succeeded
her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda
as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso
by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten identical
documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her
daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose
(sixteen grandchildren in all). The
document reads:
"A mis hijos:
"Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos, hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria 'La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Valdes Legarda.
"De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un lote de terreno que yo he donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit.
"La casa No. 181 San Rafael, la cedo a mi hijo Mandu, solo la casa; porque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Roces.
"(Sgd.) Filomena Roces Legarda
"6 Marzo 1953"
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six
surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the
one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason
which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De
la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July
16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzalez, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July
30, 1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda
Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to
exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on
the ground that said properties are reservable
properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator,
Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez
filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for
the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda
could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100
Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs.
Gonzalez. In this appeal under Republic
Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court
erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees
in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in
not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of
her daughter Filomena Legarda
in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband
Benito Legarda y
De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzalez waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the
timeliness of Mrs. Gonzalez' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in
its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and
gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be
raised under undisputed facts. Since on
the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of
whether the properties in question are subject to reserva
troncal, that is the only legal issue to be
resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees,
particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this
appeal. As the trial court did not pass
upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code,
formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in her will in favor of her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to
convey mortis causa what she inherited from
her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to
bypass the reservees in the second degree or
should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees
in the second degree, the six children
of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be
shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. It was resolved in Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this
case of the doctrine in the Florentino case
and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the
nature of reserva troncal,
also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o
semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and
energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the
nature of reserva troncal,
which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to
eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which
uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable
property) and to discourage the confinement
of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly
leads to economic oligarchy and is incompatible with the socialization of
ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas
as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reservas,
insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and
inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code
Commission, restored the reserva troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan
Tobeñas, has provoked questions and doubts that are
difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal
is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891,
which reads:
"ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrativo de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservar los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que esten dentro del tercer grado y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden."
"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."
In reserva troncal,
(1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by
another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased
descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the
line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by lucrative title
(inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate
succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant
(causante de la reserva)
in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third transmission of the same property (in consequence
of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios)
or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging
to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant (6 Castan Tobeñas,
Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva.
Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna
died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe,
upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to
the exclusion of his maternal first cousins.
The said lands are not reservable property
within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister
from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus
(propositus) who received the property, (3)
the reservor (reservista),
the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus
by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the line
(linea o tronco)
from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by
the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and
sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31,
1977, 78 SCRA 412).
Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin
vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid "el peligro
de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia
pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras", or "impedir
que, por un azar de la vida, personas extrañas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran
quedado en ella" (6 Castan Tobeñas, Derecho Civil, Part 1, 6th Ed., 1960, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso
vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. In that case, Pedro Sablan
inherited two parcels of land from his father Victoriano. Pedro died in 1902, single and without
issue. His mother, Marcelina
Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable
property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan,
the prepositus. Marcelina could
register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the
land was reservable property in favor of her two
brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot
died intestate in 1906. Her one-half
share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When
Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her
father, Anacleto Mañalac
who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942,
survived by his second wife and their six children. It was held that the said one-half portion
was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of
Maria and maternal aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who
belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot
vs. Mañalac, 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva
and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang
and Gutierrez vs. Balcita, 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon
vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil.
322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo,
58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille,
CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property came and
upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one
Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her
father, Lorenzo Abordo. In his hands, the property was reservable property.
Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest
relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus
are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents
because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more
remote subject to the rule of representation.
But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal
contemplates legitimate relationship.
Illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the
recipient gives nothing in return such as donation and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed.,
1951, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property
came (Sienes vs. Esparcia,
111 Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property but subject to
the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property.
He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of
the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso
vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod
vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared
with that of the vendee a retro in a pacto
de retro sale or to a fideicomiso condicional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory
condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's
death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees
at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's
title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco
vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono
vs. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reservee has
only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reservee.
The reservee cannot impugn any
conveyance made by the reservor but he can require
that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha, 48
Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson,
118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable
property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58
Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's
right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee
survives the reservor (Sienes
vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
"The reservatario receives
the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus),
said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's
lifetime. The authorities are all agreed
that there being reservatarios that survive
the reservista, the latter must be deemed to
have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable
property." (J. J.B.L. Reyes in Cano vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
"Even during the reservista's
lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the
ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the
reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the
annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
"This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by
will, so long as there are reservatarios existing
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
"The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios
are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista."
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited
by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura
vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's
death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by
operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property." (Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at
the time of her death the reservees or relatives
within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in
this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to
the reservees within the third degree (her
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees
in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons.
As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not
convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her
daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo
vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura
cases, the reservees inherit the reservable
properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable
properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus who in this case
are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could
not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition
of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to
ignore the reservees in the second degree
would be a glaring violation of article 891.
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine
of Florentino vs. Florentino,
40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled:
"Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of a reservatario" (reservee).
In the Florentino case, it
appears that Apolonio Florentino
II and his second wife Severina Faz
de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio
III. These two inherited properties from
their father. Upon Apolonio
III’s death in 1891, his properties were inherited by
his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. In her will, she instituted her daughter
Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her
deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio
II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina
de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III, which the
latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and
which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in
favor of Mercedes only. That theory was
sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by
her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes
was entitled, as a reservee, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six-sevenths
portions were adjudicated to the other six
reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et
non quieta movere, we
are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino
case. That doctrine means that as long
as during the reservor' s lifetime and upon his death
there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus,
regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property
retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reservee to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal
when the only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of
the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is
irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein
that the properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal
line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed
the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree
relatives of Filomena Legarda
and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva
troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have
remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino
case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister
of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor
to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's
estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reservee
it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true
that the heiress of the reservor was only one of
the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law
and justice why the other reservees should be
deprived of their shares in the reservable property
(pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in
question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third
degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of article
891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena
Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees
do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees
are the heirs mortis causa subject
to the condition that they must survive the reservor
(Padura vs. Baldovino,
L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of
third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor,
Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda
family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Roces lines.
That holding is erroneous.
The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's
death. Since at the time of her death,
there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the
second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character.
The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
Legarda's estate (Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. 1, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set
aside. It is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces
Vda. de Legarda from her
daughter Filomena Legarda,
with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable
properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and
Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces,
as reservees.
The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda,
who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective
heirs. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.Barredo, (Chairman), Guerrero*, Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
* Justice Guerrero was designated
to sit in the Second Division.
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