FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 75017, June 03, 1991 ]
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND MARIA LUISA MADRIGAL VAZQUEZ, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1985 (Annex “A,” Petition) and its resolution dated June 23, 1986 (Annex “C,” Petition) denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it gave due course to the order of respondent Judge[1] dated March 23, 1984 (Annex “E,” Petition) keeping the probate proceedings in Pasay City, Court of First Instance, instead of directing its transfer to the court of origin, i.e., the Court of First Instance, Quezon City, and requiring petitioner Administrator SOLIDBANK to render an accounting.
The issue raised in this petition is whether or not there was waiver of venue by inaction on the part of petitioner.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Don Vicente Madrigal, a resident of 47 Balete Drive, Quezon City, died on June 6, 1972. For the settlement of his estate, Special Proceedings No. Q-916962 was filed with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Quezon City.
Judge Enrique Agana whose place of assignment was in Pasay City was then temporarily detailed in Quezon City and was assigned to the sala where Special Proceedings No. 916962 was pending. After his temporary detail, Judge Agana returned to his place of assignment at Pasay City, bringing with him the records in Special Proceedings No. Q-916962.
Judge Agana was later replaced by Judge Sofronio G. Sayo, upon the reorganization of the Judiciary in 1980.
On April 21, 1982, private respondent Mrs. Vazquez filed with the Probate Court a “Motion for Payment of Lien,” attaching a “First Supplemental Agreement” executed by and among the heirs of the late Vicente Madrigal, dated August 17, 1981, with the following terms and conditions:
“FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
“We, the undersigned, have mutually agreed, as and by way of First Supplement to the ‘Memorandum of Agreement’ dated August 17, 1981, to the following terms and conditions:
“1. That all expenses incurred by Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez in the prosecution/defense of all the cases filed by one against the other, in the United States and in the Philippines, in the agreed amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, shall be reimbursed by the Estate of Vicente Madrigal, or from the proceeds of the settlement of the claim of Madrigal & Co., Inc. against said Estate;
“2. That the heirs shall honor and respect the claim of Madrigal & Co., Inc. filed against the Estate of Vicente Madrigal and immediate steps shall be taken to settle, close and partition said estate;
“3. That we will abide by the majority decision of the heirs of Don Vicente Madrigal in the settlement of the latter’s Estate; and,
“4. That we undertake to execute such documents or papers as may be required and necessary in order to implement our mutual agreement.
“Manila, Philippines, August 17, 1981.
(SGD) ANTONIO P. MADRIGAL (SGD) MA. LUISA MADRIGAL-VAZQUEZ
CONFORME:
(SGD) CONSUELO MADRIGAL (SGD) DR. DANIEL VAZQUEZ
(SGD) MACARIA MADRIGAL DE LEON (SGD) PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES
BY: MACARIO RUFINO (SGD) JOSE P. MADRIGAL
Atty.-in-Fact
(SGD) JOSEFINA MADRIGAL BAYOT
BY: SUSANA BAYOT ORTIGAS
Atty.-in-Fact”
(pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on April 23, 1982. On October 20, 1983, the probate court granted the motion and directed the petitioner to pay Mrs. Vazquez the sum of P5,833,333.33 from the assets of the estate of Vicente Madrigal in its possession as follows:
“O R D E R
“PENDING resolution by this Court is a Motion for payment of lien dated April 19, 1982 filed by one of the heirs, Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez, in the sum of P5,833,333.33.
“During the hearing of said motion on April 23, 1982 at which Dr. Daniel Vazquez testified in support thereof, the parties were all represented by counsel. No one cross-examined Dr. Vazquez; neither did any party present any opposition to the motion.
“WHEREFORE, the Motion for payment of lien is hereby granted and the Administrator is hereby ordered to pay Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez the sum of P5,833,333.33 from the assets of the estate of Vicente Madrigal in its possession.” (p. 26, Rollo)
Petitioner moved to reconsider the said order, based on the following grounds:
“x x x (1) the said Order is null and void for having been issued beyond the limited, special jurisdiction of the Court, it being only a Probate Court; (2) that the same was issued in violation of the due process of law; (3) that the Order has the compelled the petitioner-administrator to violate the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code on the payment of the estate taxes and the rule on preference of credits under the Civil Code x x x.” (p. 26, Rollo)
Mrs. Vazquez countered by pointing out that “the P5,833,333.33 is not a liability of the deceased nor a claim that may be classified under Rule 86 of the Rules of Court to be paid from the assets of the state.” (p. 26, Rollo)
On December 8, 1983, the probate court issued an order amending its order dated October 20, 1983, as follows:
“O R D E R
“A motion for reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated October 20, 1983 was filed by the Administrator, thru counsel based on three grounds, namely:
a. that the order was issued beyond the limited and special jurisdiction of the Court;
b. that the Order was issued in violation of the due process of law; and
c. that the Order is violative of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code on payment of estate taxes.
“With respect to the first ground, while admittedly the amount to be paid Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez is not, strictly speaking, a claim against the estate, nevertheless, all the heirs have agreed on August 17, 1981 that the amount ‘shall be reimbursed by the Estate of Vicente Madrigal, or from the proceeds of the settlement of the claim of Madrigal & Co., Inc. against said Estate.’ The Court has ordered the Administrator to pay the amount out of the assets of the estate in its possession in compliance with the aforesaid agreement among the heirs.
“As regards the second ground, the records reveal that the Administrator was furnished a copy of the motion for payment of lien on April 20, 1982, which motion was set for hearing on April 23, 1982. While the counsel of record for the Administrator may have been out of town on the date of hearing, it should have sent another representative or should have requested for its postponement. For failure to do so, the Administrator may not now complaint (sic) that it was deprived of its day in Court.
“There is merit, however, in the third ground alleged in the motion for reconsideration that the challenged Order has not made provisions for the payment of estate taxes. The court believes that part of the approved amount should be withheld by the Administrator sufficient to answer for the payment of taxes due thereon.
“WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated October 20, 1983 is hereby amended and/or modified in the sense that, of the approved claim of P5,833,333.33 of Ma. Luisa Madrigal Vasquez, the amount of P833,333.33 shall be withheld by the Administrator to answer for any obligations or liabilities due from said claim while the amount of P5,000,000.00 shall be paid forthwith by the Administrator to Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez. The approved claim of P5,833,333.33 shall be chargeable to the approved claim of Madrigal & Co., Inc. (pp. 40-41, id.).” (pp. 27-28, Rollo)
On April 11, 1983, the probate court required the parties to show cause why the case should not be transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court pursuant to the Administrative Order issued by the Supreme Court, limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
Two of the seven heirs, i.e., the heirs of Pacita Madrigal Vazquez and Mrs. Vazquez, manifested their desire that the case be retained by the respondent probate court. Petitioner did not give its conformity, in effect, objecting to the retention by the Pasay City probate court of the case for further proceedings.
On December 27, 1983, petitioner filed an omnibus motion praying for the return of the case to the court of origin, or the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and to strike out the motion for accounting since an accounting had already been rendered by the probate court presided over by the now retired Judge Enrique A. Agana, Sr. The motion was denied in an order dated March 23, 1984 (Annex “E,” Petition).
The Court of Appeals subsequently rendered the disputed decision, upholding due process in the instant case, and waiver of venue since the lapse from the time the case was heard at Pasay City to the present amounted to a waiver on the part of petitioner to raise the question of venue. As regards Mrs. Vazquez’ claim of P5,833,333.33, the Court of Appeals denied the same since payment thereof would, in effect amount to a partial distribution of the estate of the deceased, Don Vicente Madrigal, during the pendency of the intestate proceedings, which may not be allowed prior to the delivery to any beneficiary of his/her distributive share of the estate and before the payment of estate taxes, pursuant to Sec. 107 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Private respondents’ motion for accounting was likewise denied and directed to betaken up in the settlement proceedings before the respondent court.
Before Us, petitioner raises only the issue on improper venue, insisting as a result, on the nullity of the probate proceedings including that taken by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner maintains that the probate proceedings should properly have been retained by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, pursuant to Rule 73, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, as follows:
“SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. -If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other, courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”
Petitioner argues that their failure to object to the proceedings conducted at Pasay City Regional Trial Court, should not be taken as a waiver on their part as to venue because they believed that the proceedings were only temporary and that the case would subsequently be returned to Quezon City for further proceedings.
A perusal of the records of the case, however, reveal that petitioner never objected when then Judge Enrique Agana brought the case to Pasay City, his place of assignment, upon the expiration of his detail in Quezon City.
The following manifestation of private respondent remains unrebutted by petitioner:
“The records will readily show that since the case below was transferred to Pasay City, petitioner itself had filed no less than four (4) motions and pleadings with the court a quo, thereby recognizing its jurisdiction, to wit:
“1. Motion for Declaration of Heirs - February 20, 1982;
2. Amended Inventory - February 20, 1982
3. Urgent Motion for Authority to Pay Estate’s Income Tax Obligations - March 12, 1982; and
4. Motion for Authority to Reimburse Real Estate Tax Payments - May 24, 1982.
(Vide, Comment, Annexes ‘3,’ ‘4,’ ‘5’ and ‘6’).
“It was actually only after the Honorable Court a quo issued the December 8, 1983 Order that petitioner vigorously challenged the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
“As correctly stated by petitioner, on April 11, 1983, the Probate Court a quo ordered all parties to show proof why the case should not be transferred to Quezon City. All the parties, including the private respondent, except the petitioner herein, manifested their willingness to have the case retained by the court a quo. Petitioner did not respond. The court a quo issued an Order on June 14, 1983 stating that it shall continue hearing the case. Petitioner did not then move for a reconsideration of said Order. Its contention that ‘it did not conform thereto’ is not borne by the records. It is an utter falsity. As a matter of fact, it continued attending all subsequent proceedings and its counsel, as earlier stated, was even later to verbally manifest its agreement to have the case retained by the Pasay branch.” (pp. 245-246, Rollo)
Likewise, the heirs indicated their willingness to have the probate court at Pasay City continue with the proceedings. And petitioner’s contention that only two heirs agreed to the retention by the probate court is misplaced. Private respondent has pointed out:
“It is incorrect for petitioner to declare that the other heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal never manifested their willingness to have the probate court continue with the proceedings below. The fact remains that the other heirs of Don Vicente Madrigal were (as they continue to be) represented by the law firm of Bausa, Ampil and Suarez, and this is evident from the Motion for Extension of Time of said firm dated May 24,1983, a copy of which is attached as Annex ‘4’ hereof, wherein said other heirs specifically asked for an extension of fifteen days (from May 25, 1983 - and therefore up to June 10, 1983) within which to file their common desire to have the probate court continue with the proceedings. This is the same law firm that filed the Manifestation (Annex ‘9’ of Comment of private respondent) dated June 10, 1983, precisely expressing the consent of all the other heirs, as well as Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales, that the probate court continue with the proceedings. (pp. 249-250, Rollo)
Petitioner appears unable to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue. Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan lays down the distinction between the two, as follows:
“Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.” (Jesus Dacoycoy v. Hon. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 74854, April 2, 1991, citing Manila Railroad, Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523)
The action in the present case pertains to the probate of the intestate estate of the late Don Vicente Madrigal, in which case a regional trial court properly has jurisdiction over the case, both under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Sec. 44 (e) and under BP 129, Sec. 19(4).
Objection to improper venue should be made in a motion to dismiss. Until this is done, venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid.
We, of course note that petitioner had, in fact, filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, questioning the venue of the probate proceedings at Pasay City. This motion was however, filed quite late in the day, petitioner having already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Moreover, it would appear that petitioner was motivated by some other reasons for belatedly questioning the venue. Thus, private respondent’s observations:
“Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, it never sounded off its vigorous objection that venue was improperly laid nor against the jurisdiction of the probate court until said court issued the order of December 8, 1983. It was only after its receipt of said order, wherein the probate court directed petitioner to pay herein private respondent the total amount of P5,833,333.33 that petitioner commenced its mindless and baseless attack against the jurisdiction of the probate court below claiming now, that venue, which it has for a long time waived, should be with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.” (p. 250, Rollo)
Regrettably, therefore, while We agree with the petitioner that venue in this case should have been laid in Quezon City, petitioner’s inaction has worked against it:
“It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and such waiver may occur by laches. x x x.” (Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occ., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, October 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 252 at p. 261)
Foregoing considered, We agree with the Court of Appeals that indeed, petitioner has waived its right to contest the question of venue.
We quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals:
“x x x.
“Noted is that as per Order of April 11, 1983 (p. 130, id.), this case was brought to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City by the former presiding Judge after his temporary detail with the Quezon City branch, the former Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. When that detail was terminated, it follows that the provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and the Resolution en banc of the Supreme Court dated February 10, 1983 on pending cases as of February 14, 1983, limiting the territorial jurisdiction of Pasay City, Regional Trial Court to Pasay City cases only is operative already and should have been followed. Or, in other words, Special Proceedings No. Q-16962 (sic) should have been sent to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was pointed out by the respondent court earlier but which position was not pursued. And, neither did the petitioner raise this question, to emphasize. The foregoing resolution, however is merely directory. The herein Ponente had come across similar instances where cases were brought along by an incumbent RTC Judge who is re-assigned to another place but within the same district or province, despite the opposition from one litigant. In the case at bar, it can be again said that the lapse of time from the time the case was heard at Pasay City to the present, has amounted to another waiver on the part of the petitioner to contest the question of venue which he has been questioning after the issuance of the questioned Orders of October 20, 1983 and December 8, 1983, apparently adversed (sic) to its liking due to some legal grounds like the non-payment of taxes which will be discussed below. (Underscoring supplied)
“At this juncture, We are not prepared to rule that all the proceedings in the past are null and void because of venue and send back the proceedings to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, try the case anew from the very beginning to where this incident came about which proceedings might take more than five (5) years again. We are not prone to do this, conscious of the fact that one of the primordial objections of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is the speedy administration of justice but within the framework of the rule of law. We are not inclined to give our affirmance to the petitioner’s desire for the said transfer because the procedure will only militate against the interest of all parties considering that everybody is desirous to terminate the proceedings as early as possible and the continuance of the proceedings before the respondent court has not caused any damage against the parties and there is no damage as well against public interest.” (pp. 35-36, Rollo)
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1985 is AFFIRMED in all respects. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman) and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., no part.
Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.
[1] RTC, Br. CXI, Pasay City, acting as a Probate Court, presided over by Judge Sofronio G. Sayo.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994 ]
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs."
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94,[2] in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:
"Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
"For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors xxx are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
"xxx xxx xxx
"While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
"xxx xxx xxx
"As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act xxx. The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.
"In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
"Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein.
"Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate."[3] (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity."[4] It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
"Article 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions."
"Article 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature."
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that wills shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
"(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto."
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
"Article 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto."
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.[5] Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.[6]
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded."
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself,[7] as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed." (Italics supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237, 242 (1984), this Court held:
"Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, xxx the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said ‘la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895.’"[8] (Citations omitted.)
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature,[9] their presence does not invalidate the will itself.[10] The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
"Article 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688."
"Article 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.
"In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.
"If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his signature.
"Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language."
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code -- and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code -- are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will.[11] In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1] Sixteenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Luis L. Victor (ponente), Ricardo J. Francisco (chairman), and Pacita Cañizares-Nye.
[2] Presided by Judge Filemon H. Mendoza.
[3] Rollo, pp. 37-39.
[4] Impugned Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 46.
[5] Person vs. Coronel, 45 Phil. 216 (1923); See 3 EDGARDO L. PARAS, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1989), pp. 145-146.
[6] See Montanaño vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676 (1909).
[7] See Fernando vs. Villalon, 3 Phil. 386 (1904).
[8] See Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720, 725 (1903), citing a Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated April 4, 1895; See also, 3 MANRESA, Commentarios al Codigo Español (Quinta ed.), p. 483; See further, 3 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code (1973), p. 107, citing Castan 341, 5 Valverde 82; 3 AMBROSIO PADILLA, Civil Code Annotated (1987), pp. 157-158; 2 RAMON C. AQUINO and CAROLINA C. GRIÑO-AQUINO (1990), p. 42.
[9] 3 PARAS, op. cit..
[10] It must be noted, however, that in Kalaw, this Court laid down an exception to the general rule, when it invalidated the entire will because of an unauthenticated erasure made by the testator. In that case, the will had only one substantial provision. This was altered by substituting the original heir with another, with such alteration being unauthenticated. This Court held that the whole will was void "for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after (the provision is invalidated) which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But, that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature."
[11] Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 (1985); See Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 (1966); See also Cayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 (1984).
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 62952. October 9, 1985]
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO AND CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leaño, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
"Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully well by them;
"Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;"
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the Will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs."
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al (G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise.
We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:
xxx xxx xxx
"x x x It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise." (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
"The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
"True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution." (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)
xxx xxx xxx
"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. x x x" (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or later proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
"The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
"We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang v. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693)."
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
"This being so, the will is declared validly drawn." (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
"We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution."
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
"The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
"In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
"The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions."
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage."
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:
"First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
"Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.
"In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
"Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife, was already married was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
"Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
"Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the point.
"Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18, 1975).
"Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the inception of the case.
"Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.
"When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be."
xxx xxx xxx
"3' If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully offer the following analysis:
"FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the concealment? Of course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was brought concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)
"SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30 years in-between. During those 30 years, could it be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy, especially so when she was already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.
"THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that she knew that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already two children.
"FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is un-Filipino.
"FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it possible that she would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?
"Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was already married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their younger years."
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuente, and Patajo, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 160530, November 20, 2007 ]
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, PETITIONER, VS. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (DECEASED), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (BRANCH 59), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution[2] dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the Order[3] dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 for the probate of a will.
The facts are as follows.
On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Holographic Will of the petitioner-testator Dr. Werner J. Nittscher executed pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Article 838 of the Civil Code of the Philippines on January 25, 1990 in Manila, Philippines, and proved in accordance with the provision of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby allowed.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the court in its September 29, 1995 Order denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, to wit:
In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The petition for the issuance of Letters Testamentary, being in order, is GRANTED.
Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides “when a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust and gives a bond as required by these rules.” In the case at bar, petitioner Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales of the R.P. Nogales Law Offices has been named executor under the Holographic Will of Dr. Werner J. Nittscher. As prayed for, let Letters Testamentary be issued to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, the executor named in the Will, without a bond.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. On May 9, 1996, Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order is AFFIRMED in toto. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
I.
BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR LETTERS … TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II.
THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT SUIT.
III.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY ISSUED TO THE PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DR. NITTSCHER.
IV.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER COURT.[7]
Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines; neither did he leave real properties in the country. Petitioner claims that the properties listed for disposition in her husband’s will actually belong to her. She insists she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal service the notices of the proceedings.
Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real properties in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified of the probate proceedings. Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in court to oppose the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. Respondent maintains that the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification against forum-shopping as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for the probate of the will.
We resolve to deny the petition.
As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-91[8] and Administrative Circular No. 04-94[9] of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.
Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[10]
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. – …
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.
In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.
As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is conclusive only as to its due execution.[11] The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[12] Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the properties forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 79-93. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Arturo D. Brion concurring.
[2] Id. at 95.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 81-85. Penned by Judge Lucia Violago Isnani.
[4] Rollo, p. 167.
[5] Id. at 79-80.
[6] Id. at 93.
[7] Id. at 459-460.
[8] Additional Requisites for Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and Complaints. Effective April 1, 1994.
[9] Additional Requisites for Civil Complaints, Petitions and Other Initiatory Pleadings Filed in All Courts and Agencies, Other Than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Such Pleadings. Effective April 1, 1994.
[10] Quezon City Government v. Dacara, G.R. No. 150304, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 243, 245.
[11] CIVIL CODE, Article 838.
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
x x x x
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
[12] Maloles II v. Phillips, G.R. Nos. 129505 & 133359, January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 172, 180.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 69757-58, January 29, 1988 ]
CIRCA NILA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TEODORO K. KATIGBAK AND JENNIFER EVIDENTE BAERTGES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SALVADOR J. BAYLEN, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH CXXI, CALOOCAN CITY, INTESTATE ESTATE OF SOLEDAD BALATBAT AND TESTATE ESTATE OF RICARDO BALATBAT, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
SARMIENTO, J.:
The lone issue in these cases is whether or not the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court, may compel performance under a contract it had approved incidental to its office as such a special court.
There is no dispute as to the facts.
On February 21, 1984, the Estates of Soledad and Ricardo Balatbat, subject of a settlement proceeding pending with respondent Judge, entered into a "Property Management and Exchange Contract" with the petitioners Circa Nila Development Corporation, represented by petitioner Teodoro Katigbak, and Jennifer Baertges, both real estate developers. The contract charged the petitioners with the development of two parcels of real property, located in Valenzuela, Bulacan, owned by the Balatbat Estates, and called upon them to pay a total consideration of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,600,000.00) PESOS.
On May 9, 1984, the respondent Judge approved the contract.
Subsequently, the Estates presented an "Omnibus Motion" praying that the petitioners be compelled to pay the sum of P456,100.00 representing the alleged balance of the contract price they had allegedly refused to pay. The petitioners opposed the motion on the ground, in essence, that the respondent Court, as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.
On October 18, 1984, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the petitioners to pay the sum demanded. The petitioners sought a reconsideration. On January 23, 1985 the respondent Judge issued an order denying reconsideration. He likewise ordered the petitioner to pay the additional sum of P500,000.00 on motion of the Estates. The petitioners then came to this Court.
We rule for the petitioners.
A probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never on rights to property arising from contract.[1] It approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court.[2] In that case, judicial approval is necessary for the validity of such contracts. It cannot, however, adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties thereto. Compliance with the terms and conditions thereof may be compelled by specific performance, jurisdiction over which is vested in the Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction.[3]
The fact that the petitioners "participated in the formulation and in the eventual execution”[4] of the "Property Management and Exchange Contract" does not bar them from raising this jurisdictional challenge. The petitioners never contended that the contract cannot be enforced against them nor denied its validity. What they dispute is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to hear the incident in its capacity as a probate court.
Neither does estoppel preclude the petitioners from questioning the respondent Court's assumption of jurisdiction. Estoppel occurs where a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, say, by seeking affirmative relief, and denies it later following an adverse judgment. Here, however, the petitioners never invoked the jurisdiction of the respondent Court. They took part in the preparation of the "Property Management and Exchange Contract," they being parties thereto, but that did not make them parties to the case, or give the respondent Court the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the rights of the parties under that contract. The jurisdiction of a probate court is "merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended beyond."[5]
The respondent Judge's reliance on our ruling in Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[6] is not well-taken. Pio Barreto did not broaden the jurisdiction of a probate court. On the contrary, it underscored the limited character of its jurisdiction[7]("the limited jurisdiction of a probate court prohibits it from determining rights to property left by a decedent which depends on the contract") thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Since the probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540). Though an order of the probate court approving the sale of the decedent's property is final, the respondent may file a complaint in the proper court for the rescission of the sale. (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 72). Likewise, the initial question of respondent regarding the propriety of including the properties in question in the inventory of the probate court as he claims ownership thereof may therein be finally and conclusively settled (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA 202). The respondent has ample protection of his rights for the province of the probate court remains merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended beyond (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, supra).[8]
xxx xxx xxx
In that case, however, we noted that the respondent had "bound himself under an agreement with the court separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent."[9] In other words, what the court had sought to enforce was not the contract executed on behalf of the estate but the respondent's agreement with the court itself to obtain the best terms for the estate, and consequently, his authority to enter into such a contract. But far from repealing the long-standing rule that a probate court is one of limited jurisdiction, Pio Barretto, in fact, reinforced it.
In fine, we hold that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders of October 18, 1984 (Annex "H") and of January 23, 1985 (Annex "P") that warrants the corrective hand of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated October 18, 1984 and January 23, 1985 are declared NULL and VOID. The Temporary Restraining Order given in these cases on February 6, 1985 is hereby made permanent. Costs against the private respondents.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
[1] Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-62431-33, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 606 (1984).
[2] RULES OF COURT, Rule 89.
[3] Batas Blg. 129, sec. 19.
[4] Rollo, 104.
[5] Supra, 623.
[6] Supra.
[7] Supra, at 623.
[8] Supra, at 621.
[9] Supra.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-56504, May 07, 1987 ]
POMPILLO VALERA AND EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, BRANCH I, AND MANUEL R. FABIANA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 59867-68. MAY 7, 1987]
EUMELIA V. CABADO, POMPILLO VALERA AND HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. MANUEL FABIANA, JOSE GARIN, AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.
D E C I S I O N
NARVASA, J.:
Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate of deceased spouses, on the one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and their lessee, on the other, have given rise to the proceedings now docketed in this Court as (1) G.R. No. 56504 and (2) G.R. Nos. 59867-68.
Sp. Proc. No. 2223, CFI, Iloilo
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa[1] -- in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompillo Valera had been appointed administrators[2] -- the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her administration.[3] Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrators an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate;[4] and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included in any inventory of the estate.
The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.[5] It accordingly set said incidents for hearing during which the parties presented evidence in substantiation of their positions.[6] Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980 commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question ** to the Intestate Estate of the Spouses."[7]
The Order was predicated upon the Court's factual findings mainly derived from the testimony of the two administrators that:
1) the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease to Rafael Valera in his lifetime;
2) Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his daughter, Teresa Garin; but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to merely so that she might use the property to provide for her children's support and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of Teresa Garin's children; and
3) with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually purchased from the Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin, collectively named as such in the Original Certificate of Title issued in their favor.
Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating Teresa Garin's heirs to restore the property to the Valera Spouses' Estate, in accordance with Articles 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
"Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit it is contemplated."
"Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary relationship uses trust funds for the purchase of property and causes a conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, a trust is established by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the fund belongs."
The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed, Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to the estate having been filed well within ten (10) years from June 30, 1980, the date on which Teresa Garin's heirs allegedly acquired title over it.[8]
There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement regarding the estate's title to the fishpond was merely provisional in character, made solely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be included in the inventory of estate assets. So it was evidently understood by the administrators who have more than once asserted that "the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the properties."[9] So it was made clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the matter[10] was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be included as part of the estate and whether or not the person holding it should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the estate."[11] And so it was emphasized in another Order, denying reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980, which states that:
"** (i)t is never the intendment of this court to write a finis to the issue of ownership of the fishpond in dispute. The movants may pursue their claim of ownership over the same in an ordinary civil action. Meanwhile, however, it is the finding of this probate court that the fishpond must be delivered to the estate.
"Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the power of this probate court under Section 6 in relation to Section 7, both of Rule 87, and the contention of the movants that the proper forum to settle the issue of ownership should be in a court of general jurisdiction."[12]
Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate.[13] The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee,[14] Fabiana voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.[15]
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor.[16] But Judge AdiI dismissed his complaint on the following grounds, to wit:
1) it was filed out of time because not only had judgment been rendered, but execution as regards transfer of possession had already taken place; and
2) the lease contract had not been registered and hence was not binding as against the estate.[17]
G.R. No. 56504
Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 13742 and assigned to Branch I of the Iloilo CFI, Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto, presiding.[18] Judge Inserto issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the estate administrators from disturbing Fabiana in the possession of the fishpond, as lessee.[19]
The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the temporary restraining order, averring that the action was barred by the Probate Court's prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of the lease, and that the act sought to be restrained had already been accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff.[20] When Judge Inserto failed to act on their motion within what the administrators believed to be a reasonable time, considering the circumstances of the case, the administrators filed with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order, which was docketed as G.R. No. 56504.[21] In their petition, the administrators contented that Branch I of the Iloilo CFI (Judge Inserto, presiding) could not and should not interfere with the Probate Court (Branch II, Judge Adil, presiding) in the legitimate exercise of its jurisdiction over the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the Valera Spouses.
G.R. Nos. 59867-68
In the meantime, Jose Garin -- having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in which he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership of the fishpond,[22] which motion had been denied[23] -- filed a notice of appeal from said Order.[24] But he quickly abandoned the appeal when, as aforestated,[25] Judge Adil authorized execution of the order pending appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (with prayer for preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-1154-R
Fabiana followed suit. He instituted in the same Court of Appeals his own action for certiorari and injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. NO. SP-11577-R; this, notwithstanding the pendency in Judge Inserto's sala of the case he had earlier filed.[26]
These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The Court granted the petitions and ruled in substance that:
1. The Probate Court indeed possessed no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership based merely on evidence adduced at the hearing of a "counter-motion" conducted under Section 6, Rule 87;
2. The original and transfer certificates of title covering the fishpond stand in the names of the Heirs of Teresa Garin as registered owners, and therefore no presumption that the estate owns the fishpond is warranted to justify return of the property on the theory that it had merely been borrowed; and
3. Even assuming the Probate Court's competence to resolve the ownership question, the estate administrators would have to recover possession of the fishpond by separate action, in view of the lessee's claim of right to superior possession, as lessee thereof.
From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken separate appeals to this Court by certiorari[27], docketed as G.R. Nos. 59867 and 59868. They ascribe to the Appellate Court the following errors, viz:
1) in holding that the Probate Court (Judge Adil, presiding) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent spouses;
2) in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a separate action for the recovery of the possession of the fishpond then in the hands of a third person; and
3) in sanctioning the act of a CFI Branch in interfering with and overruling the final judgment of another branch, acting as Probate Court, and otherwise frustrating and inhibiting the enforcement and implementation of said judgment.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction,[28] and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced,[29] the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence a procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.[30]
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action", but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory.[31] This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.[32]
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties’ conflicting claims over the fishpond.[33] The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to turn it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.[34]
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention, after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.
Possession of Fishpond Pending
Determination of Title Thereto
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of inclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.
"In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title."[35]
Primary Jurisdiction over Title Issue in
Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action
Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately determined in a separate action,[36] the actual filing of such a separate action should have been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise of primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the exercise of what may be regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over the same question.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56504 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The petitions in G.R. No. 59867 and G.R. No. 59868 are DENIED, and the judgment of the Appellate Court, subject thereof, is affirmed in toto. The temporary restraining order dated April 1, 1981 is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
[1] Docketed as S.P. No. 2223 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II
[2] Rollo, G.R. NO. L-59867-68, P. 21
[3] Rollo, G.R. NO. L-56504, P. 25
[4] Initially covered by Original Certificate of Title No. S-43 in the name of "the Heirs of Teresa Garin," which was afterwards replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3243 in favor of said heirs, named individually, to wit: Consolacion G. Joven, Santiago Garin, Natividad de Jesus, Jose Garin, Jr., and Teresa Garin: Rollo, G.R. No. 56504, pp. 20-21
[5] Rollo [G.R. No. 56504, p. 25]. The cited rule pertinently provides that "(i)f an executor or administrator ** complains to the court ** that a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased, ** the court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint **."
[6] Rollo, id., pp. 25-27
[7] Id., p. 32
[8] However, the date of issuance of the certificate of title, as appears therefrom, is June 30, 1970.
[9] Rollo [G.R. No. 59867-68], p. 234; [G.R. No. 56504] pp. 1003, 1150
[10] See footnote 1, supra
[11] Rollo [G.R. No. 59867-68], p. 276
[12] Id., pp. 276-277
[13] Rollo (G.R. NO. 456504), p. 44
[14] Id., p. 46
[15] Id., p. 48
[16] Id., pp. 49-60
[17] Id., pp. 38-43
[18] Id., pp. 61-69
[19] Id., p. 70
[20] Id., pp. 71-78
[21] Filed pursuant to Rule 65, Rules of Court; rollo, p. 3
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 59867-68), pp. 274-277
[23] Id., p. 279
[24] Id., pp. 50-63
[25] See footnote 13 and related text, supra
[26] See footnote 18 and related text, supra
[27] Under Rule 45, Rules of Court
[28] Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386; Devesa v. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273; Guzman v. Amog, 37 Phil. 61; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Adapon v. Maralit, 69 Phil. 383; Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 56; Manalac v. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661; Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 368, 371; de la Cruz v. Camon, 16 SCRA 886, 888; cf Franco v. Morte de Piedad & Savings Bank, 7 SCRA 660; City of Manila v. Tarlac Development Corporation, etc., 24 SCRA 467
[29] Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 56; Manalo v. Mariano, 69 SCRA 80, 89-90; see also, Franco v. Monte de Piedad & Savings Bank, 7 SCRA 660; City of Manila v. Tarlac Development Corp., etc., 24 SCRA 467
[30] Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232, supra, cf, Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484
[31] See footnotes 9 to 12, supra
[32] Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353; Guinguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144, 147; Marcelino v. Antonio, et al., 70 Phil. 388; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501, 503; Sebial v. Sebial, 64 SCRA 385, 392; Bolisay v. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213, 220.
[33] See footnote 5, supra
[34] Alafriz v. Mina, 28 SCRA 137, 143; Cui v. Piccio, 91 Phil. 712, 719; Changco v. Madrelojos, 12 Phil. 543, 546; Guangco v. PNB, 54 Phil. 244, 246; Modesto v. Modesto, 57 O.G. 4092, 4094-4095
[35] Bolisay v. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213, 220
[36] See footnotes 9-12, supra
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