SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122150. March
17, 2003]
George (Culhi) Hambon, petitioner,
vs. Court of Appeals and Valentino U. Carantes, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review
on certiorari, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES
BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE
A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR
OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE
WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE
SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES
OF COURT WHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE
PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is
as follows:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a complaint for damages[2] for
the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent
bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.[3] In answer thereto, respondent contended that
the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8,
1986,[4]
had already been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba,
Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to petitioner’s lack of interest;[5]
and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities
of respondent.[6]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated
December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal
of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant
Valentino Cerantes to pay plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for
hospitalization and medical expenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as
Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary
Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorney’s fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal,[8] the
Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995,[9]
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed
petitioner’s complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not
make any reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages, it was
impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal
case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the
fact that the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had
the effect of an adjudication on the merits. [10]
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave[11]
should be observed, i.e., a civil action for damages may be filed and proceed
independently of the criminal action even without reservation to file the same
has been made;[12]
and that the requirement of reservation, as provided in Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial right.[13]
The petition must be denied.
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,[14] is
the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of
criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
. . .
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability
arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.
Thus, in Maniago v. Court
of Appeals,[15]
the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil
Code must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it should
be dismissed;[16]
and that the reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest
of orderly procedure.[17]
In the Maniago case,
petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by Herminio Andaya
that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by respondent
Alfredo Boado. The petitioner therein
initially sought for the suspension of the civil case for damages filed against
him in view of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries filed against
his driver. The respondent, in the
criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil action
against the petitioner or his driver.
The criminal case was later dismissed for the failure of the prosecution
to prosecute its case. On appeal, the
Court identified the issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil
action for damages despite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the
dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil
action; and (3) whether the reservation requirement is substantive in character
and beyond the rule-making power of the Court.[18]
The Court expounded:
. . . §1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to
institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability,
otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.
… In other words the right of the
injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or
from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise
they will de deemed instituted with the criminal action.
. . .
Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that
before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not
impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their
exercise in the general interest of procedure.
The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by
providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable,
gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one
has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be
brought separately.[19]
While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not
necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule explicitly requires reservation of
the civil action.
x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be
instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or
simultaneous with the criminal action.
. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of
the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":
‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression
and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work
of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense
and vexation to the parties-litigants.’[20]
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to
separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049.
Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by
him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil
action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein
was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[2]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 1761-R.
[3]
Records, pp. 1-4.
[4]
Id., Exhibit “2”, p. 135.
[5]
Id., Exhibit “3”, pp. 136-137.
[6]
Id. p. 14.
[7]
Id. p. 181.
[8]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36991 entitled George (Culhi) Hambon,
Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Valentino U. Cerantes, Defendant-Appellant.
[9]
CA Rollo, p. 88.
[10]
Id., pp. 85-88.
[11]
57 SCRA 106 (1974).
[12]
Rollo, p. 14.
[13]
Id., p. 15.
[14]
Bar Matter No. 375, approved per SC Resolution dated June 17, 1988, and re-affirmed
per SC Resolution dated July 7, 1998 (effective October 1, 1988).
[15]
324 Phil. 34 [1996].
[16]
Id., at 41.
[17]
Id., at 47.
[18]
Id., at 38, 40-41.
[19]
Id., at 41-42, 47.
[20]
San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119771,
April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 568, 574, 578.
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