At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART.
32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against ones self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and
unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article,
whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable
from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
It
is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a
sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those
sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and
political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing
the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force
rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that
certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling
power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our
commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to
reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the
will of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a
reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected
by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect
implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the
bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain
residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason
nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs'
complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers
they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done
in the performance of official duties or function In support of said
contention, respondents maintain that —
Respondents
are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty
is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less
provides that the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued
Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing for the
continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The
proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection
rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their
causes of action proceed from respondent General Ver's order to Task
Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist
terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that
this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task
force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against
unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to
silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver
and the named members of the task force should be held liable for
damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against
communist terrorists, respondent members of the armed forces merely
performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners
to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the
exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to
shield respondents as public officers from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v.
Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and
upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and
public functions from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by
private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes,
79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability
arising from the performance of their duties is now a settled
jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102
Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631;
Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98
S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco,
supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants
who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his call for
the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such
immunity from Suit. 3
We
find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from
suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually
involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties
written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco
Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No
one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing
in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do.
Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law to
deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the
deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he
cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power.
Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any
manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise
of the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the
Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the
purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of
this authority.
It may be
that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the
lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such
objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist
terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional
restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of
the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution.
The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public
officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility.
Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are
restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their
mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the
Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from
within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic
institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying
to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional
and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our
faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the
struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The
linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law.
Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that
plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners
cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by
resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry
into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief
they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages
they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same
claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in
the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the
petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result
is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered
by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient
of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners'
contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of
the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas
corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right
and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No.
1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the
following to its text:
However,
when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a
quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any
public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising
from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the
plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners
have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right
of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and
cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the
violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right
to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the
constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos.
2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this
petition. May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior
be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates,
to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been
violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior
has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or
to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No
such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and
their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in
this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of
an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible
for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5
acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a
superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise
his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer
for the transgressions committed by the latter against the
constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of
the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely
held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if
not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits,
it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped
defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando
Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col.
Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo
Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates.
Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept
as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically
mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the
persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence
constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But
such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with
law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for
damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence"
which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as
actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing
any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among
others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a state witness.
The
complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity
and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties
mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by
defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without
search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially
defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts,
of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of
property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search
warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs
at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and
other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of
extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed
recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their
constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those
shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32
of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The
responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply
set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and
jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of
the complaint. 6 To
determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying
this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling,
dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the
defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido
Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants
which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a
cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the
Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court
correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio
Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino,
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the
basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for
reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting
the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside
said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through
counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo,
counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin
Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for
Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for
Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and
Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated
that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must
have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for
when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof,
not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene
Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla
Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon
Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of
November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the
plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority
of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed,
unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party
concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse
on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the
motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the
complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very
language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of
all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a
contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint
had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose
lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted
with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set
aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983,
its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21,
1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent court for further
proceedings. With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.
Padilla, J., took no part.
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