theory of renvoi

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

x x x           x x x           x x x

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

x x x           x x x           x x x

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

x x x           x x x           x x x

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

x x x           x x x           x x x

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void

G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.¹

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.² So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.³ Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

¹He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the motion.

²San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
³Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

REQUISITES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.³¹ These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.³² We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting³³ when we explained:

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 166738               August 14, 2009
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, Petitioner,
vs.
EDWARD RUMBAUA, Respondent.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO, NOEL ETABAG, DANILO DELA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JASMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN BENJAMIN SEGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN, and REBECCA TULALIAN,                                  Petitioners, - versus - MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT. RAUL BACALSO, M/SGT. BIENVENIDO  BALABA and “JOHN DOES,”                          Respondents.

G.R. No. 166216 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, MENDOZA, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated:        March 14, 2012

x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

 Assailed in this petition is the July 31, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43763 and its November 26, 2004 Resolution[2] reversing and setting aside the February 19, 1993 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City (RTC), in Civil Case No. 37487 entitled “Rogelio Aberca, et al. v. Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al.” for sum of money and damages.

The Facts

          The factual and procedural antecedents were succinctly recited by the CA as follows:

On 25 January 1983, several suspected subversives who were arrested and detained by the military filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Gen. Fabian Ver, then AFP Chief of Staff, and the following subordinate officers: Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Guillermo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson, Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1Lt. Pedro Tango, 1Lt. Romeo Ricardo, 1Lt. Raul Bacalso, M/Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba and “John Does.” The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 37487 and assigned to Branch 95.

In their complaint, the plaintiff-appellees alleged that they were arrested and detained by Task Force Makabansa, a composite group of various intelligence units of the AFP, on the strength of defective search warrants; that while under detention and investigation, they were subjected to physical and psychological harm, torture and other brutalities to extort from them confessions and other information that would incriminate them; and that by reason thereof, they suffered actual and moral damages.

Defendants-appellants, through their counsel, the then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza, filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) since the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was then suspended, the trial court cannot inquire into the circumstances surrounding plaintiffs-appellees’ arrests; (2) the defendants-appellants are immune from liability for the reason that they were then performing their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action.

In an order dated November 8, 1983, the trial court granted defendants-appellants’ motion to dismiss and ordered the case dismissed.

Plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion to reconsider and set aside the order of dismissal. In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court declared the order of November 8, 1983 final.

Plaintiffs-appellees again filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated May 11, 1984. In an order dated September 21, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

On March 15, 1985, plaintiffs-appellees went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul and set aside the orders of the trial court dated November 8, 1983, May 11, 1984 and September 21, 1984. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 69866.

While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the so-called EDSA revolution took place. As a result, the defendants-appellants lost their official positions and were no longer in their respective office addresses as appearing in the record. Also, in the meantime, the case was re-raffled to Branch 107.

On April 15, 1988, the Supreme Court rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the assailed orders and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

However, trial could not proceed immediately because on June 11, 1988, the record of the case was destroyed when fire razed the City Hall of Quezon City. It was only on October 9, 1989 when plaintiffs-appellees sought a reconstitution of the record of the case. The record shows that the petition for reconstitution was set for hearing on October 27, 1989. However, there is nothing in the record to show that defendants-appellants or their counsel were notified. For lack of an opposition, the petition for reconstitution was granted in an order dated March 12, 1990.

On August 15, 1990, plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion praying that defendants-appellants be required to file their answer. However, the record as reconstituted did not show who are the lawyers of the defendants-appellants considering that Estelito Mendoza, who had represented them in his capacity as Solicitor General, was no longer holding that position. Furthermore, defendants-appellants were also no longer occupying the positions they held at the time the complaint was filed. Thus, in an order dated August 17, 1990, plaintiffs-appellees were directed to report to the trial court the addresses and whereabouts of defendants-appellants so that they could be properly notified.

Instead of complying with the order of August 17, 1990, plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion to declare defendants-appellants in default. The trial court deferred resolution of this motion and instead, it issued an order on September 10, 1990 directing that a copy of the order dated August 17, 1990 be furnished to new Solicitor General Francisco Chavez to enable him to take action pursuant to Section 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and to former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza to enable him to give notice as to whether he [would] continue to represent the defendants-appellants in his private capacity. As it said in its order, the trial court took this action “in view of the change in government and corresponding change in the addresses and circumstances of the defendants-appellants who may not even be aware of the decision of the Supreme Court in case G.R. No. L-69866 and of the reconstitution of records in this case xxx.”

On October 1, 1990, former Solicitor General Mendoza filed a manifestation informing the trial court that his appearance as defendants-appellants’ counsel terminated when he ceased to be Solicitor General and that he was not representing them in his private capacity. On his part, Solicitor General Chavez finally filed on December 11, 1990 a notice of withdrawal of appearance, citing Urbano v. Go, where the Supreme Court said that “the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony.” The record does not show that defendants-appellants were furnished a copy of this notice of withdrawal or that they gave their conformity thereto.

In an order dated December 27, 1990, the trial court denied plaintiffs-appellees’ motion to declare defendants-appellants in default, emphatically pointing out that defendants-appellants were not duly notified of the decision of the Supreme Court. In the same order, the trial court directed plaintiffs-appellees to comply with the order of August 17, 1990 within ten (10) days from notice, with a warning that the case [would] be archived and eventually dismissed if plaintiffs-appellees failed to furnish to the court the addresses of defendants-appellants. Plaintiffs-appellees moved to reconsider the order dated December 27, 1990 but in an order dated February 1, 1991, the trial court denied the motion, stating that “without actual notice of the judgment of the Supreme Court xxx the defendants-appellants herein would not be aware that they should file a responsive pleading” and that, therefore, “to consider the defendants-appellants in default would be tantamount to lack of due process xxx.”

For failure of the plaintiffs-appellees to comply with the orders dated August 17, 1990 and December 27, 1990, the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice in its order dated March 7, 1991. Subsequently, however, in an order dated June 4, 1991, the trial court set aside the order of dismissal and reinstated the case. It also approved plaintiffs-appellees’ request to serve the notice to file answer or responsive pleading by publication.

In a compliance dated September 12, 1991, plaintiffs-appellees informed the trial court that the following notice was published in the Tagalog newspaper BALITA in its issues of August 29, 1991 and September 5, 1991:

xxxx

No answer was filed by defendants-appellants within the period stated in the notice. On motion of plaintiffs-appellees, the trial court in its order dated December 5, 1991 declared defendants-appellants in default and directed plaintiffs-appellees to present their evidence ex-parte.[4]

Ruling of the RTC

On February 19, 1993, the RTC handed down a decision in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the following defendants:

1)      Maj. General Fabian Ver

2)     Col. Fidel Singson

3)     Col. Rolando Abadilla

4)     Col. Gerardo Lantoria

5)     Col. Galileo Kintanar

6)     Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson

7)     Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo

8)    1Lt. Pedro Tango

9)     M/Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba

to pay jointly and severally to EACH of the following plaintiffs:

a)     Rodolfo Benosa

b)     Manuel Mario Guzman

c)      Joseph Olayer

d)     Marco Palo

e)     Rolando Salutin

the amounts of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as temperate or moderate damages; ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱150,000.00) as moral damages; and ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱150,000.00) as exemplary damages. Likewise, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS to the plaintiffs’ counsel.

            The claims of the rest of the plaintiffs are denied and thereby dismissed. Likewise, the case against the following defendants: Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1Lt. Romeo Ricardo and 1Lt. Raul Bacalso is DISMISSED, and the said defendants are exonerated from any liability.[5]

Subsequently, respondents Col. Fidel Singson (Col. Singson), Lt. Col. Panfilo M. Lacson (Lt. Col. Lacson), and Col. Rolando Abadilla (Col. Abadilla) filed their Omnibus Motion praying as follows: 1) that the order of default dated December 5, 1991 be reversed and set aside; 2) that the decision dated February 19, 1993 be reversed and set aside; 3) that the entire proceedings be declared null and void; and 4) that they be given fifteen (15) days from notice to file answer to the complaint and present their evidence. Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria (Col. Lantoria) filed his own Motion for Reconsideration.

On his part, respondent Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo (Maj. Aguinaldo) failed to file a timely notice of appeal so he filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment praying that the RTC set aside its decision and proceed to try the case based on the following grounds: 1) the decision was rendered without the benefit of notice in gross violation of his right to due process; 2) the reconstitution of the records of the case and further proceedings taken thereon were effected through fraud; and 3) his failure to move for a new trial or to appeal was due to mistake or excusable negligence.

The Omnibus Motion of Col. Singson, Lt. Col. Lacson and Col. Abadilla; the Motion for Reconsideration of Col. Gerardo Lantoria; and the Petition for Relief from Judgment of Maj. Aguinaldo were denied by the RTC.[6] Aggrieved, the said respondents elevated their case to the CA.

Maj. Aguinaldo argued that he was deliberately deprived of the opportunity to be heard and put up his defense, while Col. Singson, Lt. Col. Lacson and Col. Abadilla presented the following assignment of errors:

                                                 I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL WITHOUT THE REQUIRED NOTICE TO, AND/OR CONSENT/CONFORMITY OF APPELLANTS.

                                                  II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT AND/OR THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT AND GRANTING NEW TRIAL.

                                                 III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OSG’S MISTAKES AND NEGLIGENCE ARE BINDING ON THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

                                                 IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS SINGSON, ABADILLA AND LACSON LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (SIC).[7]

The Ruling of the CA

            On July 31, 2003, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the RTC decision and ordering the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated February 19, 1993 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the record be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing disquisition.

SO ORDERED.[8]

          The CA ruled, among others, that the RTC committed four (4) errors in declaring the respondents in default and proceeding to hear the case. The RTC committed its first error when it abandoned the proper modes of service of notices, orders, resolutions or judgments as the petitioners failed to comply with its order dated August 17, 1990, directing them to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents so that they could be properly notified.

          The second error was the failure of the RTC to avail of substituted service after failing to effect personal service or service by mail. It perpetrated its third error when it authorized service by publication after dismissing the case for failure of the petitioners to furnish the current addresses of the respondents. The CA reasoned out that there was nothing in the rules which would authorize publication of a notice of hearing to file answer and for what was authorized to be published were summons and final orders and judgments. The fourth error was committed when the respondents were declared in default because they were not duly notified and, therefore, were denied due process.

          The CA stated that since the RTC failed to notify the respondents of the proceedings undertaken, the latter were denied the chance to actively participate therein. It explained as follows:

Instead of observing the above precepts by according defendants-appellants every opportunity to ventilate their side of the controversy, the trial court failed not only to notify them of the proceedings undertaken relative to the resolution of the case but the chance as well to actively participate therein. It bears stressing that defendants-appellants were not informed of the reinstatement of the case against them when the High Tribunal set aside the orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1984, September 21, 1984 and November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint instituted by plaintiffs-appellees. Likewise, defendants-appellants were not apprised of the reconstitution of the records of the case which were destroyed by the fire that razed the City Hall of Quezon City. In the same manner, they were not notified of the withdrawal of the OSG as their official counsel of record, much less was their consent thereto sought. Finally and most significantly, defendants-appellants were precluded the chance to file their respective answer or responsive pleadings to the complaint with the issuance of the order dated December 5, 1991 declaring them in default notwithstanding the defective service by publication of the court’s notice requiring them to file such answer or responsive pleading.[9]

          Not satisfied, the petitioners come to this Court praying for the reversal and setting aside of the CA decision anchored on the following arguments:

                                         I

 

IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULINGS DECLARING DEFENDANTS IN DEFAULT AND ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO PRESENT THEIR EVIDENCE EX-PARTE; AND IN NULLIFYING THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT, THE COURT A QUO ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO WARRANT THE EXERCISE BY THIS COURT OF ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION.[10]

                                                    II

IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, THE COURT A QUO ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO WARRANT THE EXERCISE BY THIS COURT OF ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION.[11]

The Petitioners’ Position

          The petitioners claim that the RTC did not err in declaring the respondents in default and in allowing them to present evidence ex- parte; that the respondents were represented by the OSG from 1983 up to December 11, 1990 when the latter withdrew its appearance from the case; that after the respondents had appeared, thru the OSG, by filing a motion to dismiss, the petitioners were under no obligation to track down the respondents’ addresses since the Rules of Court provide that once a litigant is represented by counsel, all notices, motions and pleadings must be sent to him as counsel of record; that it is a matter of record that the OSG was furnished copies of all court orders and the petitioners’ pleadings for the period it remained as the respondents’ counsel of record or from 1983 until the OSG withdrew on December 11, 1990; that as counsel of record, the OSG was duty-bound to file the respondents’ answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice that it was reinstated by this Court and the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; and that despite having received copies of this Court’s decision in G.R. No. 69866 on or about April 20, 1988 and despite having been duly notified of the finality of said decision by means of this Court’s Entry of Judgment, the OSG did not file any answer or seek an extension of time to do so.

The petitioners further argue that as early as May 1988, when this Court’s decision became final and executory and the respondents received notice thereof through their counsel of record, it was incumbent upon them to have answered the complaint within the period provided by the Rules of Court; that the RTC was not hasty in declaring the respondents in default for they were given several chances to file their answers even after their period to do so had already lapsed; that it was the respondents’ failure to exercise ordinary prudence in monitoring the progress of this case that placed the petitioners in a difficult situation; that the respondents in this case cannot seize control of the proceedings or cause them to be suspended indefinitely by the simple expedient of not filing their answers or by feigning ignorance of the status of the proceedings; that the rule on service of summons by means of publication applies to service of summons by publication, not to notices to file answer by publication; that while service of summons by publication entails acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it was already obtained over the respondents in this case by their voluntary appearance through counsel and their act of filing a motion to dismiss on substantive grounds; that substituted service was an exercise in futility because the respondents were no longer holding the positions they were holding at the time the petition was filed and, therefore, could not be reached at the addresses indicated on the complaint; that the only remaining option was to notify the respondents by publication; that the RTC did not err in holding that the respondents failed to establish the fraud, accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence that would warrant the grant of a new trial, or the setting aside of the judgment and/or petition for relief from judgment; that the negligence of the OSG is binding on the respondents in the same manner that its initial success in securing the dismissal of the case was binding on them; and that it would be highly unfair to allow the respondents, who reaped the benefits of the initial dismissal of the case and never complained then about the OSG, to suddenly complain that they were not bound by their counsel’s handling or mishandling of the case.

The Respondents’ Position

          The respondents counter that the CA did not commit a reversible error in reversing and setting aside the default judgment rendered by the RTC; that the petitioners failed to address four (4) errors committed by the RTC cited by the CA; that the respondents were deprived of the opportunity to file their answer or responsive pleadings to the complaint when the RTC issued a default order against them after a defective service of notice to file answer by publication; that the petitioners’ invocation of the jurisprudence that a defaulting party has the burden of showing that he has a meritorious defense does not apply in this case; and that what should apply is the settled rule that once a denial or deprivation of due process is determined, the RTC is ousted of its jurisdiction to proceed and its judgment is null and void.

 

 The Court’s Ruling

The basic question is whether the constitutional right to procedural due process was properly observed or was unacceptably violated in this case when the respondents were declared in default for failing to file their answer within the prescribed period and when the petitioners were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.

Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one's person or property.[12]

Moreover, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,[13] the Court adopted and promulgated the following rules concerning, among others, the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts:

                                    Rule 13

SEC. 5. Modes of service.—Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either personally or by mail.

SEC. 6. Personal service.—Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

SEC. 7. Service by mail.—Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.

SEC. 8. Substituted service.—If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under the two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at the time of such delivery.

The above rules, thus, prescribe the modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers, namely: (1) personal service; (2) service by mail; and (3) substituted service, in case service cannot be effected either personally or by mail.

The Rules of Court has been laid down to insure the orderly conduct of litigation and to protect the substantive rights of all party litigants. It is for this reason that the basic rules on the modes of service provided under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court have been made mandatory and, hence, should be strictly followed. In Marcelino Domingo v. Court of Appeals, [14] the Court wrote:

Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

Section 11 is mandatory. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, the Court held that:

Pursuant x x x to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. x x x

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable."

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.

x x x x

x x x [F]or the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated. [Emphasis supplied]

In the case at bench, the respondents were completely deprived of due process when they were declared in default based on a defective mode of service – service of notice to file answer by publication. The rules on service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers were not strictly followed in declaring the respondents in default. The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed procedural lapses in declaring the respondents in default and in allowing the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte.

A review of the records discloses that after the Court rendered its April 15, 1988 Decision in G.R. No. 69866, annulling the RTC orders dated November 8, 1983, May 11, 1984 and September 21, 1984 and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, the RTC issued an order[15] dated August 17, 1990 directing the petitioners to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents so that they would be properly notified of the proceedings. This directive was issued by the RTC considering that the respondents’ counsel of record, the OSG, could no longer represent them and because the respondents were no longer holding official government positions because of a change in government brought about by the 1986 EDSA Revolution.  This order was likewise made in response to the motion[16] filed by the petitioners praying that the respondents be required to file their answer.

Instead of complying with the RTC’s directive to report the respondents’ addresses and whereabouts, the petitioners filed a motion[17] dated September 4, 1990 to declare the respondents in default. On December 27, 1990, the RTC denied the petitioners’ default motion because the respondents were not duly notified of the April 15, 1988 Decision of this Court and the OSG no longer wanted to represent them. The RTC likewise ordered the petitioners to comply with its August 17, 1990 Order, otherwise, the case would be archived and eventually dismissed. On February 1, 1991, the RTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and on March 7, 1991, it issued an order dismissing the case without prejudice.

Surprisingly, on June 4, 1991, the RTC issued an order[18] setting aside its March 7, 1991 Order and reinstating the case. It directed the petitioners, among others, to cause the publication of a notice on the respondents to file answer or responsive pleading. After the petitioners complied with the publication requirements, the RTC issued the order dated December 5, 1991 declaring the respondents in default and directing the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte.

As correctly observed by the CA, the RTC’s August 17, 1990 Order was an attempt to serve a notice to file answer on the respondents by personal service and/or by mail. These proper and preferred modes of service, however, were never resorted to because the OSG abandoned them when the petitioners failed to comply with the August 17, 1990 RTC order requiring them to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents. Nevertheless, there was still another less preferred but proper mode of service available – substituted service - which is service made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. Unfortunately, this substitute mode of service was not resorted to by the RTC after it failed to effect personal service and service by mail. Instead, the RTC authorized an unrecognized mode of service under the Rules, which was service of notice to file answer by publication.

 Considering the fact that the OSG could no longer represent the respondents, the RTC should have been more patient in notifying the respondents through personal service and/or service by mail. It should not have simply abandoned the preferred modes of service when the petitioners failed to comply with its August 17, 1990 order with the correct addresses of the respondents. More so, it should not have skipped the substituted service prescribed under the Rules and authorized a service of notice on the respondents to file answer by publication.

 In view of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, the RTC should have instead directed the petitioners to exert diligent efforts to notify the respondents either personally or by registered mail. In case the preferred modes were impractical, the Court should have required the petitioners to at least report in writing why efforts exerted towards personal service or service by mail failed. In other words, a convincing proof of an impossibility of personal service or service by mail to the respondents should have been shown first.  The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled that the publication of a notice to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the procedural defect equivalent to lack of due process. The RTC cannot just abandon the basic requirement of personal service and/or service by mail.

At any rate, the Court is of the view that personal service to the respondents was practicable under the circumstances considering that they were well-known persons who used to occupy high government positions.

To stress, the only modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers allowed by the rules are personal service, service by mail and substituted service if either personal service or service by mail cannot be made, as stated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to file answer by publication is mentioned, much less recognized.

 Furthermore, the Court would like to point out that service by publication only applies to service of summons stated under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where the methods of service of summons in civil cases are: (1) personal service;[19] (2) substituted service;[20] and (3) service by publication.[21] Similarly, service by publication can apply to judgments, final orders and resolutions as provided under Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. –Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party. [Emphasis supplied]

As correctly ruled by the CA:

Its third error was when it authorized service by publication after initially dismissing the case for failure of plaintiffs-appellees to furnish the current address of defendants-appellants. There is, however, nothing in the Rules that authorizes publication of a notice of hearing to file answer. What is authorized to be published are: (1) summons, and (2) final orders and judgments.

Xxx                                       xxx                                    xxx

The above-quoted provision cannot be used to justify the trial court’s action in authorizing service by publication. Firstly, what was published was not a final order or judgment but a simple order or notice to file answer. Secondly, even granting that the notice to file answer can be served by publication, it is explicit in the Rule that publication is allowed only if the defendant-appellant was summoned by publication. The record is clear that defendants-appellants were not summoned by publication.

On this point, the petitioners argue that the publication was a valid and justified procedure because following the ruling of the RTC, it was “an extra step to safeguard the interest of the defendants done pursuant to the inherent power of the courts to control its proceedings to make them comfortable to law and justice.” The petitioners further argue that “the defendants in a civil case cannot seize control of the proceedings or cause them to be suspended indefinitely by the simple expedient of not filing their answers or by feigning ignorance of the proceedings. All these could have been avoided had the defendants not been so inexplicably complacent and utterly lacking in ordinary prudence.”

The Court is not convinced.

As already discussed above, the basic rules on modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers are mandatory in nature and, therefore, must be strictly observed. The Court is not unaware of the inherent power of courts to control its proceedings. Nonetheless, the exercise of such inherent power must not violate basic court procedures. More importantly, it must not disregard one’s basic constitutional right to procedural due process.

This was precisely the reason for the RTC’s denial of the petitioner’s default  motion in its August 17, 1990 Order, and for the eventual dismissal of the case in its December 27, 1990 Order.

It must be noted that as the RTC orders stated, the respondents were not notified of the April 15, 1988 Decision of this Court, which ordered the re-opening and remanding of this case to the RTC.  They were neither notified of the reconstitution proceedings that took place pertaining to the burned records of the case.  The RTC further stated that the respondents were no longer holding their official government positions and that they were no longer represented by the OSG on account of the change in government.  In other words, the respondents had no counsel of record and no notice of subsequent proceedings.  In short, due process was absent.

Next, the court records got burned during the June 11, 1988 fire that hit the Quezon City Hall where the records were kept. On March 12, 1990, the RTC granted the petitioners’ petition for reconstitution. Again, the records do not show that the RTC initiated extra efforts to notify the respondents about the reconstitution proceedings. The entire records of this case tend to show that the respondents were completely out of the picture until after the promulgation of the RTC decision.

On countless occasions, the Court ruled that, generally, judgments by default are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary to public policy. An example here would be the case of Regalado P. Samartino v. Leonor B. Raon,[22] where the Court stated:

The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring petitioner in default, considering it had actual notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.

Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We are not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against petitioners. However, being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their claims.

Finally, the Court finds unacceptable the petitioners’ contention that 1) the respondents were well represented by counsel from 1983 up to December 1990 and that the respondents were properly notified of the entire proceedings through their counsel; 2) the respondents’ counsel was negligent for failing to file an answer within the prescribed period; and 3) the negligence of the OSG binds the respondents.

The petitioners do not deny the fact that on May 15, 1985, they filed a petition for certiorari before this Court questioning the RTC orders granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss and denying their motion for reconsideration. They do not question the fact that while their petition was pending in this Court, the 1986 EDSA Revolution took place which resulted in the removal of the respondents from their respective high government offices and the replacement of then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza (Sol. Gen. Mendoza).  There is likewise no dispute that subsequently, on April 15, 1988, this Court rendered its decision annulling the subject RTC orders and remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The case was then re-raffled to another branch.

Clearly from the above circumstances, there was no longer any lawyer-client relationship between the OSG and the respondents at the time the decision of the Court dated April 15, 1988 was promulgated because, admittedly, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the respondents were no longer occupying their respective government positions and Sol. Gen. Mendoza, who represented them, was no longer the Solicitor General.

In fact, in compliance with the RTC’s order dated September 10, 1990,[23] former Solicitor General Mendoza submitted a manifestation[24] that his legal representation for the respondents was deemed terminated when he ceased to be the Solicitor General and that he was not representing the respondents in his private capacity. For his part, on December 11, 1990, the incumbent Solicitor General at that time, Solicitor General Francisco Chavez (Sol. Gen. Chavez), filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance for the respondents citing the case of Urbano  v. Chavez,[25] where the Court ruled that the OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. The records do not show any proof that the respondents were furnished a copy of this notice of withdrawal or whether or not they gave their conformity thereto.

Contrary to the petitioners’ position, while it is true that Sol. Gen. Chavez filed a notice of withdrawal only on December 11, 1990, the respondents were in effect no longer represented by counsel as early as April 15, 1988 when the Court’s decision was rendered, or much earlier, right after the 1986 EDSA Revolution due to the change in government. The Court cannot subscribe to the petitioners’ argument that there was negligence or mistake on the part of the OSG considering that Sol. Gen. Mendoza ceased to hold office due to the EDSA Revolution while Sol. Gen. Chavez withdrew his representation because of the prohibition in Urbano v. Chavez. Definitely, Sol. Gen. Mendoza’s cessation from holding office and Sol. Gen. Chavez’s withdrawal of representation in the unique scenario of this case are not equivalent to professional delinquency or ignorance, incompetency or inexperience or negligence and dereliction of duty. Hence, there is no negligence of counsel in this case. After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the respondents were practically left without counsel.

As a final point, this Court commiserates with the petitioners’ plight and cry for justice. They should not be denied redress of their grievances. The Court, however, finds Itself unable to grant their plea because the fundamental law clearly provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

                                                                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                     ROBERTO A. ABAD

            Associate Justice                                             Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice    

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                         Associate Justice

                                                                 Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

---

[1] Rollo, pp. 52-63 (Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili  and concurred in by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria-Tirona and Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente).

[2] Id. at 67-69.

[3]  Id. at 97-123.

[4] Id. at 52-56.

[5] Id. at 122-123.

[6] Id. at 200-205.

[7] Id. at 58-59.

[8] Id. at 63.

[9]   Id. at 61-62.

[10]  Id. at 31.

[11]  Id. at 35.

[12] Luzon Surety Co., Inc, v. Jesus Panaguiton, G.R. No. L-26054, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 148,153

[13]  Section 5.  The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

                                   x x x    x x x                       x x x

(5)           Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of  constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.  Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.  Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. [Emphases supplied]

[14] Marcelino Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010, 611 SCRA 353, 364-365.

[15] Rollo, p. 127.

[16] Id. at 125-126.

[17] Id. at 129.

[18] Id. at 135-136.

[19] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 6, Rule 14.

[20] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 7, Rule 14.

[21] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Sections 14, 15 &16, Rule 14.

[22] G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664, 672-673.

[23] Rollo, p. 130.

[24] Id. at 132.

[25] G.R. No. 88578, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 347, 358.