PROBLEM
NO. 1.A hectare of rice land in Cabatuan, Iloilo, is the subject of
this controversy. On January 9, 1919, Teodoro Husain, the owner, sold this land
to Serapio Chichirita for P30, reserving for himself the right to repurchase it
within six years. The deed of sale, written in the Ilongo dialect, is contained
in a private instrument, the English translation of which reads:
"I,
Teodoro Husain, single, of legal age, native and resident of the Municipality
of Cabatuan, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, because of the amount of
Thirty Pesos (P30.00), Philippine currency, that was paid to me by Serapio
Chichirita, married to Florentina Muyuela, of legal age, native and resident of
this Municipality of Cabatuan, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, hereby
declare that I am selling to the aforementioned vendee Serapio Chichirita, his
heirs, and the heirs of the latter, my one parcel of rice land at Barrio
Salacay of this Municipality of Cabatuan, and its descriptions are as follows:
One parcel of
rice land that has a seedling of one cavan of palay, legal measure, bounded on
the North, land of Juan Alcayaga, on the East, land of Agapito Suero, on the
South, land of Elias Gallar and on the West, land of Juan Mina. The said land
was inherited by me from my father who is now dead, Clemente Husain.
"I also
declare that we have agreed that if the vendor shall have repaid to the vendee
the aforementioned amount of P30.00 within six years from this date, the vendee
or his heirs shall execute a document of repurchase in my favor, but if after
the said term that he cannot return the aforementioned amount, this document
shall be considered absolute and irrevocably consummated and in the meantime
the vendee shall be the one to make use of the aforementioned land in
accordance with the Ley Hipotecaria.
"In truth whereof, I have signed
this document at Cabatuan, 9th day of January, 1919.
(Sgd.)
TEODORO HUSAIN
"Signed in the presence of:
"(Sgd.) TOMAS JILOCA (Sgd.) EUSEBIO JOCANO"
Teodoro Husain did not redeem the land, although
shortly after the execution of the deed of sale, that is, on January 28, 1919,
the vendee a retro, Chichirita, transferred his right to Graciana Husain,
sister of the vendor a retro, in what purports to be a resale of the land. The
following annotation appears on the reverse side of the deed of pacto de retro
sale:
"NOTA: The amount stated above was received by me
from Graciana Husain and on my own voluntary will as redemption (gawad) of the
same land, and because of this, I am transferring my rights as stated above to
Graciana Husain in the presence of her husband Manuel Catalan, and in truth
whereof I have signed at Cabatuan, 28 January, 1919.
Thumb
marked
Serapio Chichirita"
(English
translation)
Graciana Husain subsequently transferred her
rights to the land to appellee Elias Gallar in exchange for one cow. The
transaction is recorded in a second note added on the reverse side of the deed
of sale. The note reads:
"OTRA NOTA:
"The
undersigned Graciana Husain, with the consent end knowledge of her husband
Manuel Catalan, has agreed with Elias Gallar that all the rights that belongs
to her, or she, Graciana Husain, is transferring to the said Elias Gallar in
accordance with that stated in the original with the difference that this
transfer is definite because it is their agreement in exchange of one head of
cow described in the Certificate of Large Cattle existing in the Office or the
Municipal Treasurer of this town. And in truth whereof, Graciana Husain signed
hereunder together with her husband Manuel Catalan.
Cabatuan,
April 2, 1919.
"(Sgd.) MANUEL CATALAN (Sgd.) GRACIANA HUSAIN"
(English
translation)
Possession of the land, together with the owner's
duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered on the
same occasion to appellee who since then has been in possession of the land.
Questions: (1) Teodoro Husain wants to recover
ownership and possession of the land, will his action be successful?(2) He alleges that the sale based on private
documents are not valid, is he correct on this matter?
Answer: ELIAS GALLAR,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERMENEGILDA HUSAIN, ET AL., defendants. BONIFACIO
HUSAIN, defendant-appellant. EN BANC [G.R. No. L-20954. May 29, 1967.] “Now, when Teodoro Husain
failed to redeem the land within the stipulated period, i.e., January 9, 1925,
its ownership became consolidated in the appellee. True the successive sales
are in a private instrument, but they are valid just the same. 5 By the delivery of possession of the land
on April 2, 1919 the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the
appellee. Indeed, this action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is
to quiet title, 6 to remove the cloud
cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize
the sale made by the predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession
of the land, the action is imprescriptible.
7 Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would be correct
if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action
for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory period
of limitation governing such actions. “
PROBLEM
NO. 2 What is remission? What is its essential characteristic? Distinguish it
from dation in payment, novation, and compromise?
ANSWER:As a mode of extinguishing an
obligation,[55] condonation or remission of debt[56] is defined
as:an act of liberality, by virtue of which, without receiving anyequivalent,
the creditor renounces the enforcement of the obligation,which is extinguished
in its entirety or in that part or aspect of the same to which the
remission refers. It is an essential
characteristicof remission
that it be gratuitous, that there is no equivalent
received for the benefit given; once such equivalent exists, the nature of the
act changes. It may become dation in payment when the creditor receives a thing
different from that stipulated; or novation, when the object or principal
conditions of the obligation should be changed; or compromise, when the matter
renounced is in litigation or dispute and in exchange of some concession which
the creditor receives.[57] RAFAEL ARSENIO S. DIZON, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED JOSE P. FERNANDEZ,
PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. No. 140944, April 30, 2008 ]
PROBLEM NO. 3. Sometime
in April 1999, [petitioner] Religious of the Virgin Mary (RVM for brevity),
acting through its local unit and specifically through Sr. Fe Enhenco, local
Superior of the St. Mary’s Academy of Capiz and [respondents] met to discuss
the sale of the latter’s property adjacent to St. Mary’s Academy. Said property
is denominated as Lot 159-B-2 and was still
registered in the name of [respondents’] predecessor-in-interest, Manuel
Laserna.
In May of 1999, [respondent]
Josephine Orola went to Manila
to see the Mother Superior General of the RVM, in the person of Very Reverend
Mother Ma. Clarita Balleque [VRM Balleque] regarding the sale of the property subject
of this instant case.
A contract to sell dated June
2, 1999 made out in the names of herein [petitioner] and [respondents] as
parties to the agreement was presented in evidence pegging the total
consideration of the property at P5,555,000.00 with 10% of the total
consideration payable upon the execution of the contract, and which was already
signed by all the [respondents] and Sr. Ma. Fe Enhenco, R.V.M. [Sr. Enhenco] as
witness.
On June 7, 1999, [respondents]
Josephine Orola and Antonio Orola acknowledged receipt of RCBC Check No.
0005188 dated June 7, 1999 bearing the amount of P555,500.00 as 10% down
payment for Lot 159-B-2 from the RVM Congregation (St. Mary’s Academy of Cadiz
[SMAC]) with the “conforme” signed by Sister Fe Enginco (sic), Mother Superior,
SMAC.
[Respondents] executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Trinidad Andrada Laserna dated June
21, 1999 adjudicating unto themselves, in pro indiviso shares, Lot 159-B-2, and which paved the transfer of said lot
into their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39194 with an entry
date of August 13, 1999.
Thereafter, respondents, armed with an undated Deed of Absolute Sale which they
had signed, forthwith scheduled a meeting with VRM Balleque at the RVM
Headquarters in Quezon City
to finalize the sale, specifically, to obtain payment of the remaining balance
of the purchase price in the amount of P4,999,500.00. However, VRM
Balleque did not meet with respondents. Succeeding attempts by respondents to
schedule an appointment with VRM Balleque in order to conclude the sale were
likewise rebuffed.
In an exchange of
correspondence between the parties’ respective counsels, RVM denied
respondents’ demand for payment because: (1) the purported Contract to Sell was
merely signed by Sr. Enhenco as witness, and not by VRM Balleque, head of the
corporation sole; and (2) as discussed by counsels in their phone
conversations, RVM will only be in a financial position to pay the balance of
the purchase price in two years time. Thus, respondents filed with the
RTC a complaint with alternative causes of action of specific performance or
rescission.
Q:
(1) If you were the judge, will you grant rescission? (2) Or will you grant
specific performance instead? (3) Under the civil code, there are two
provisions concerning rescission, one under Art. 1191 and 1381. Is there a
distinction between the two “rescissions”? State if there is any? (RVM v. Orola GR No. 169790 April 30, 2008)
PROBLEM NO. 4. On March 22, 1985, private
respondent Antonio Palao sold to petitioner Alfonso Iringan, an undivided
portion of Lot No. 992 of the Tuguegarao Cadastre, located at the Poblacion of
Tuguegarao and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5790. The
parties executed a Deed of Sale on the same date with
the purchase price of P295,000.00, payable as follows:
(a) P10,000.00 – upon
the execution of this instrument, and for this purpose, the vendor acknowledges
having received the said amount from the vendee as of this date;
(b) P140,000.00 – on or
before April 30, 1985;
When
the second payment was due, Iringan paid only P40,000. Thus, on July 18,
1985, Palao sent a letter to Iringan stating
that he considered the contract as rescinded and that he would not accept any
further payment considering that Iringan failed to comply with his obligation
to pay the full amount of the second installment.
On August
20, 1985, Iringan through his counsel Atty. Hilarion L. Aquino, replied that they were
not opposing the revocation of the Deed of Sale but asked for the reimbursement
of the following amounts:
(a) P50,000.00 – cash
received by you;
(b) P3,200.00 – geodetic
engineer’s fee;
(c) P500.00 – attorney’s
fee;
In
response, Palao sent a letter dated January 10, 1986, to Atty. Aquino,
stating that he was not amenable to the reimbursements claimed by Iringan.
On
February 21, 1989, Iringan, now represented by a new counsel – Atty. Carmelo Z.
Lasam, proposed that the P50,000 which he had already paid Palao be reimbursed or Palao could sell to
Iringan, an equivalent portion of the land.
Palao
instead wrote Iringan that the latter’s standing obligation had reached
P61,600, representing payment of arrears for rentals from October 1985 up to
March 1989. The parties failed to
arrive at an agreement.
On July
1, 1991, Palao filed a Complaint for Judicial
Confirmation of Rescission of Contract and Damages against Iringan and his
wife.
In
their Answer, the spouses alleged
that the contract of sale was a consummated contract, hence, the remedy of
Palao was for collection of the balance of the purchase price and not
rescission. Besides, they said that they had always been ready and
willing to comply with their obligations in accordance with said contract.
QUESTIONS (1) Is recission proper under the circumstances? (2) IF you
were the court will you award damages?(3) In the case at bar what is the
prescriptive period for rescission? (4) Rule on the contention of the parties. (ALFONSO L.
IRINGAN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURTOF APPEALS and ANTONIO PALAO,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, FELISA P. DELOS SANTOS, respondents. SECOND
DIVISION[G.R. No. 129107. September 26,
2001]
PROBLEM No.
5: “Sometime
in the first half of 1992, representatives from Pryce Properties Corporation
(PPC for brevity) made representations with the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) on the possibility of setting up a casino in Pryce Plaza
Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City. [A] series of negotiations followed.
PAGCOR representatives went to Cagayan de Oro City to determine the pulse of
the people whether the presence of a casino would be welcomed by the
residents. Some local government officials showed keen interest in the
casino operation and expressed the view that possible problems were
surmountable. Their negotiations culminated with PPC’s counter-letter
proposal dated October 14, 1992.
“On
November 11, 1992, the parties executed a Contract of Lease x x x involving the
ballroom of the Hotel for a period of three (3) years starting December 1, 1992
and until November 30, 1995. On November 13, 1992, they executed an
addendum to the contract x x x which included a lease of an additional 1000
square meters of the hotel grounds as living quarters and playground of the
casino personnel. PAGCOR advertised the start of their casino operations
on December 18, 1992.
“Way
back in 1990, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City passed
Resolution No. 2295 x x x dated November 19, 1990 declaring as a matter of
policy to prohibit and/or not to allow the establishment of a gambling casino
in Cagayan de Oro City. Resolution No. 2673 x x x dated October 19, 1992
(or a month before the contract of lease was executed) was subsequently passed
reiterating with vigor and vehemence the policy of the City under Resolution
No. 2295, series of 1990, banning casinos in Cagayan de Oro City. On
December 7, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted
Ordinance No. 3353 x x x prohibiting the issuance of business permits and
canceling existing business permits to any establishment for using, or allowing
to be used, its premises or any portion thereof for the operation of a casino.
“In the
afternoon of December 18, 1992 and just hours before the actual formal opening
of casino operations, a public rally in front of the hotel was staged by some
local officials, residents and religious leaders. Barricades were placed
[which] prevented some casino personnel and hotel guests from entering and
exiting from the Hotel. PAGCOR was constrained to suspend casino
operations because of the rally. An agreement between PPC and PAGCOR, on
one hand, and representatives of the rallyists, on the other, eventually ended
the rally on the 20th of December, 1992.
“On
January 4, 1993, Ordinance No. 3375-93 x x x was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City, prohibiting the operation of casinos and
providing for penalty for violation thereof. On January 7, 1993, PPC
filed a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction x x x against then
public respondent Cagayan de Oro City and/or Mayor Pablo P. Magtajas x x x
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 29851 praying inter
alia, for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Ordinance No.
3353. PAGCOR intervened in said petition and further assailed Ordinance
No. 4475-93 as being violative of the non-impairment of contracts and equal
protection clauses. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision x x x, the dispositive portion of which reads:
‘IN
VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are
hereby DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID and the respondents and all other
persons acting under their authority and in their behalf are PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED from enforcing those ordinances.
‘SO ORDERED.’
“Aggrieved
by the decision, then public respondents Cagayan de Oro City, et al. elevated
the case to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 111097, where, in an En Banc Decision
dated July 20, 1994 x x x, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
“In the meantime, PAGCOR resumed
casino operations on July 15, 1993, against which, however, another public
rally was held. Casino operations continued for some time, but were later
on indefinitely suspended due to the incessant demonstrations. Per verbal
advice x x x from the Office of the President of the Philippines, PAGCOR decided to stop
its casino operations in Cagayan de Oro City. PAGCOR stopped its casino
operations in the hotel prior to September, 1993. In two Statements of
Account dated September 1, 1993 x x x, PPC apprised PAGCOR of its outstanding
account for the quarter September 1 to November 30, 1993. PPC sent PAGCOR
another Letter dated September 3, 1993 x x x as a follow-up to the parties’
earlier conference. PPC sent PAGCOR another Letter dated September 15, 1993
x x x stating its Board of Directors’ decision to collect the full rentals in
case of pre-termination of the lease.
“PAGCOR sent PPC a letter dated
September 20, 1993 x x x [stating] that it was not amenable to the payment of
the full rentals citing as reasons unforeseen legal and other circumstances
which prevented it from complying with its obligations. PAGCOR further
stated that it had no other alternative but to pre-terminate the lease
agreement due to the relentless and vehement opposition to their casino
operations. In a letter dated October 12, 1993 x x x, PAGCOR asked PPC to
refund the total of P1,437,582.25 representing the reimbursable rental
deposits and expenses for the permanent improvement of the Hotel’s parking
lot. In a letter dated November 5, 1993 x x x, PAGCOR formally demanded
from PPC the payment of its claim for reimbursement.
“On
November 15, 1993 x x x, PPC filed a case for sum of money in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 93-68266. On November
19, 1993, PAGCOR also filed a case for sum of money in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 93-68337.
“In a letter dated November 25,
1993, PPC informed PAGCOR that it was terminating the contract of lease due to
PAGCOR’s continuing breach of the contract and further stated that it was
exercising its rights under the contract of lease pursuant to Article 20 (a)
and (c) thereof.
“On
February 2, 1994, PPC filed a supplemental complaint x x x in Civil Case No.
93-68266, which the trial court admitted in an Order dated February 11,
1994. In an Order dated April 27, 1994, Civil Case No. 93-68377 was
ordered consolidated with Civil Case No. 93-68266. These cases were
jointly tried by the court a quo. On August 17, 1995, the court a quo
promulgated its decision. Both parties appealed.”[5]
In its
appeal, PPC faulted the trial court for the following reasons: 1) failure of
the court to award actual and moral damages; 2) the 50 percent reduction of the
amount PPC was claiming; and 3) the court’s ruling that the 2 percent penalty
was to be imposed from the date of the promulgation of the Decision, not from
the date stipulated in the Contract.
On the
other hand, PAGCOR criticized the trial court for the latter’s failure to rule
that the Contract of Lease had already been terminated as early as September
21, 1993, or at the latest, on October 14, 1993, when PPC received PAGCOR’s
letter dated October 12, 1993. The gaming corporation added that the
trial court erred in 1) failing to consider that PPC was entitled to avail
itself of the provisions of Article XX only when PPC was the party terminating
the Contract; 2) not finding that there were valid, justifiable and good
reasons for terminating the Contract; and 3) dismissing the Complaint of PAGCOR
in Civil Case No. 93-68337 for lack of merit, and not finding PPC liable for
the reimbursement of PAGCOR’S cash deposits and of the value of improvements.
QUESTIONS: (1)
Rule on the contentions of the parties. (PRYCE CORPORATION (formerly PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION), petitioner,
vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondent. THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157480.
May 6, 2005])
PROBLEM NO.
6. In a contract to sell on commission basis, which is actually a form of
agency, it there a need for the contract to be in writing?
( ROSA LIM, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 102784. February 28, 1996])
PROBLEM NO. 7. AS a
general rule, what is the form of a contract in order that it will be of
obligatory force? What are the exceptions to the rule? What are the different
kinds of formalities which are prescribed by law for certain contracts? (p. 601
jurado).
PROBLEM NO. 8. C, husband of D,
sold her paraphernal property in her name without her consent. Was such sale
valid, void, voidable, rescissible or unenforceable? Why? (p. 621JUrado)
PROBLEM NO. 9.The Board of
Liquidators of the Postal Savings Bank authorized the sale by public auction of
a parcel of land it owned at Navotas. The Board expressly reserved “the right
to reject any and all bids”.The auction notice also contained such reservation.
Leoquinco offered the highest bid but this was rejected by the Board. He then
sued the bank to compel it to execute and deliver the deed of sale, with
damages. Will the action prosper?
PROBLEM NO. 10.What is it that
“extinguishes the action to annul a voidable contract”?
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