CASE DIGESTS

Cortes v. Yu-Tibo

GR No. 911, March 12, 1903

Facts:

The house No.65 Calle Rosario, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has certain windows therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63 of the same street; that these windows have been in existence since the year 1843, and that the defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to raising the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of one of the windows in said house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received through the window. The court practically finds the preceding facts, and further finds that the plaintiff has not proven that he has, by any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63 from making improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the complaint.

The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired by prescription an easement of light in favor of the house No.65, and as a servitude upon house No.63, and, consequently, has acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which might in any manner be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement. He contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other words, applying the doctrine to this case, from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge of the owner of the house No.63, and without opposition on his part. However, the defendant contends that the easement is negative, and that therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the easement.

The court ruled that the easement of light is negative.

Issue:

Whether or not the easement of light in the case of windows opened in one’s own wall is negative.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court said that the case involves windows opened in a wall belonging to the wife of the plaintiff and it is of their opinion that the windows opened in one’s own wall is of negative character, and, as such, can not be acquired by prescription under Art.538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may, by a formal act, have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which it would be lawful for him to do were it not for the easement. That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of house No.63 Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might obstruct the light of house No.65 of the same street, the property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned as error, he has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time might have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house no.65, because the period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.

When a person open windows in his own building he does nothing more than exercise an act of ownership inherent in the right of property with no limitations other than those established by law. By reason of the fact that such an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the property of the one opening the window, it does not in itself establish any easement, because the property is used by its owner in the exercise of dominion, and not as the exercise of an easement. It is that the use if the windows opened in a wall on one’s own property, in the absence of some covenant or express agreement to the contrary, is regarded as an act of mere tolerance on the part of the owner of the abutting property and does not create any right to maintain the windows to the prejudice of the latter. The mere toleration of such an act does not imply on the part of the abutting owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit, nor does it avail the owner of the windows for the effects of possession according to Art.1942 of the Civil Code, because it is a mere possession at will. From all this it follows that the easement of light with respect to the openings made in one’s own edifice does not consist precisely in the fact of opening them or using them. The easement really consists in prohibiting or restraining the adjacent owner from doing anything which may tend to cut off or interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to the obligation of not impeding the light.

Saenz v. Hermanos

13 Phil. 667

Facts:

Plaintiff intends to build a house in his lot for business purposes and had already deposited some lumber in the said lot. Defendants, on the other hand, have constructed a two-story house wherein they use the ground floor for stores and the upper as dwelling. The house was erected at a distance of 71 cm from the dividing line in the fround and 70 cm at the rear. Defendants have opened three windows on the ground floor of their house, in the part that overlooks the lot of the plaintiff, each window being 1 meter and 20 centimeters wide and 2 meters high; on the upper floor they have opened 5 windows, each 2 meters and 11 centimeters high and 1 meter and 60 centimeters wide; they have also constructed a balcony at the front part of the house above the ground floor, opening directly upon the lot of the plaintiff, and another balcony at the rear part of the house, which up to the present time opens directly upon the plaintiff’s lot, although the defendants state that, according to the plan, said part is to be closed with boards. All of said windows and balconies are at a distance of less than one meter from the dividing line of the plaintiff’s lot and that of the defendants, and are looking directly over the same.

Plaintiff was claiming that defendant is prohibited from constructing his house and opening the windows and balconies looking directly upon his property. However, the court ruled in favor of the defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not defendant is entitled to the easement of light and view.

Held:

No. Defendant is not entitled to the easement of light and view which the windows and openings, which he was made in the house in question, give him, and, because of the fact that he has constructed his houses nearer than 2 meters to the dividing line between his property and the property of the plaintiff, he is only entitled to the easement of light and view provided for in article 581. Article 581 provides for the character of the windows or openings in the walls of adjoining property when it its constructed nearer the dividing line contrary to the requirement of 2 meters. In the present case the defendant constructed his house so that the wall looking upon the property of the plaintiff was less than 2 meters from the dividing line. Therefore he can only construct such windows as are provided for in said article. It was the duty of the defendant to construct his house in accordance with the provisions of the law. The plaintiff was not obliged to stand by for the purpose of seeing that the defendant had not violated the law.

Juana Pichay v. Eulalo Querol

G.R. No. L-4452, October 1, 1908

Facts:

The plaintiff, Juan Pichay, in April, 1905, conveyed to the defendants an undivided one-third interest in twenty- five parcels of land situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, as payment of a debt of P1,500 which she owed them. The defendants and appellants claim that their agreement gave plaintiff no right of usufruct in the land, saying that it appears that she only asked for this right and it does not appear that the defendants gave it to her. On the 10th of August, 1905, the owners of the twenty- five parcels of land made a partition thereof among themselves, in which the plaintiff took no part, and in this partition certain specific tracts of land were assigned to the defendants as the third to which they were entitled by reason of the conveyance from the plaintiff to them. They have been in possession of the tracts so assigned to them in partition since the date thereof, and are now in such possession, and have refused to recognized in the plaintiff any right of usufruct therein.

Issue:

Whether or not the usufructuary is bound by the partition made by the owners of the undivided property although he took no part therein.

Held:

The usufructuary shall be bound by the partition made by the owners of the undivided property although he took no part in the partition but the naked owner to whom the part held in usufruct has been alloted must respect the usufruct. The right of the usufructuary is not affected by the division but is limited to the fruits of said part alloted to the co-owner.

Fabie v. Lichauco

G.R. No. L-3598, July 24, 1908

Facts:

Petitioner Miguel Fabie applied for the registration of his property in Manila free from any encumbrances except the easement of right of way in favor of respondents Julita Lichauco and Hijos de Roxas. In addition to the said right of way, respondents also claim that of light and view and drainage. However, the claim was later reduce only to that of the light and view.

Lichauco cliamed that when Juan Bautista Coloma, the original owner of both estates, established not only an easement of right of way but also that of light and view and that when both the properties were alienated, the apparent signs were not removed. The apparent  sign allegedly consists of a gallery with windows through which light is admitted. It was supported on columns erected on the ground belonging to the petitioner and the balcony on Lichauco’s property is supported by uprights erected on the land by petitioner. The parties admitted the existence of such gallery. The house was now a frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of which 16 meters and 60 centimeters correspond to the main part of the same, and 1 meter and 90 centimeters to the gallery in question. It results, therefore, that at the present day, the house has nearly 2 meters more frontage than when it was alienated by Coloma. Therefore, at the present day the house is erected partly on the land belonging to the owner and partly, the gallery, over a lot belonging to another; that is, over that of the petitioner. When it was sold in October, 1848, no portion of the house occupied the lot last mentioned, but the entire building was erected over a lot belonging to the owner as set forth in the instrument of sale.

The lower court  held that the right of way and drainage exist in favor of the respondents’ respective properties. The claim as to the easement of light and view was dismissed by the court.

Issue:

Whether or not Respondents are entitled to the easement of light and view.

Held:

No. The burden is not on the petitioner to prove on what time the gallery in controversy was constructed inasmuch as he limits himself to sustaining nad defending the freedom of his property, denying the easement o flight and view of the respondent pretends to impose over it. A property is assumed to be from all encumbrance unless the contrary is proved. Respondent who claims the said easement is obliged to prove the aforementioned gallery, in which the apparent sign of the easement is made to consist in the present case, existed at the time of ownership of her property and that of the petitioner were separated. And inasmuch as this issue has not been proved, the claim of the respondents as to the easements of the light and view which the petitioner does not admit, must of necessity be dismissed.

Therefore, it does not appear from the agreement of the parties that the respondents has balconies over the land of the petitioner; and as it is, since it has been positively shown that the said balconies exceed the limit of the lot owned by the former, nor less that they invade the atmospheric area of the lot belonging to the latter, it follows that, even in accordance with the theory maintained by the respondents with which on account of its lack of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal herein as to its other aspect, the easement of view, which might result in such case from the existence of the balconies alluded to, would be negative and not a positive one, because the erection of the same would not constitute, according to their own statement, an invasion of the right of another, but the lawful exercise of the right inherent to the dominion of the respondents to construct within their own lot. And as said easement is negative, it cannot have prescribed in favor of the property of the respondents in the absence of any act of opposition, according to the agreement, by which they or their principals would have prohibited the petitioner or his principals to do any work which obstruct the balconies in question, inasmuch as said act of opposition is what constitutes the necessary and indispensable point of departure for computing the time required by law for the prescription of negative easements. Thus, the judgment appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court.

Ferrer v. Bautista

231 SCRA 257

Facts:

Gloria Ferrer claims ownership a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay, La Union by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT T-3280, which is immediately north of the land in question. On the other hand, Balanag and Domondon equally assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title P-168, in the name of Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent 309504 issued on 24 January 1966.

On 23 March 1976, Ferrer filed a complaint with the CFI La Union to “Quiet Title to Real Property” against Balanag and Domondon. On 07 December 1976, Judge Bautista issued an order dismissing Ferrer’s complaint; because it constitutes a collateral or indirect attack on the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Pursuant to the SC’s Resolution, Ferrer was allowed to file the petition for review on certiorari under RA 5440 considering that only questions of law had been raised. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of interest due to the failure of Ferrer’s counsel to submit the requisite memorandum in support of the petition. In a Resolution dated 28 September 1978, however, the Court resolved to reconsider the dismissal and to reinstate the petition.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court, and rendered judgment declaring Ferrer to be the owner of the disputed parcel of land and ordering Balanag and Domondon to reconvey the same to Ferrer; without costs.

Issue:

Whether or not Ferrer the lawful owner of the questioned property.

Held:

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that “to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” Undoubtedly, Ferrer is the lawful owner of the accretion, she being the registered owner of Lot 1980 which adjoins the alluvial property.

Alluvion gives to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion which is gradually received from the effects of the current of waters The rationale for the rule is to provide some kind of compensation to owners of land continually exposed to the destructive force of water and subjected to various easements

The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter’s authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately owned. In the present case, Balanag and Domondon acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain.

Preysler, Jr. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 158141, July 11, 2006

Facts:

Private respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc., owns Tali Beach Subdivision. Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots therein and also two parcels of land adjacent to the subdivision. These two parcels were bounded on the North and West by the China Sea and on the East and South by the subdivision. To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to pass through private respondent’s subdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but private respondent refused it for being grossly inadequate. Private respondent then barricaded the front gate of petitioner’s property to prevent petitioner and his family from using the subdivision roads to access said parcels.

The petitioner filed, with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary prohibitive injunction against private respondent. After due hearing, the trial court, in an Order dated November 5, 1996, held that barricading the property to prevent the petitioner from entering it deprived him of his ownership rights and caused irreparable damage and injuries.

Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued on December 12, 1996.

On July 8, 1998, petitioner used the subdivision road to transport heavy equipment and construction materials to develop his property. Consequently, private respondent moved to dissolve the writ claiming that the petitioner violated its right to peaceful possession and occupation of Tali Beach Subdivision when petitioner brought in heavy equipment and construction materials. Private respondent maintained that the damages that may be caused to it far outweigh the alleged damages sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction and authority in restricting or limiting a passage over the Tali Beach Subdivision roads to ingress and egress of petitioner and members of the latter’s household in violation of the law on legal easement of right of way.

Held:

Under Article 656 of the New Civil Code, if the right of way is indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a building, a temporary easement is granted after payment of indemnity for the damage caused to the servient estate. In our view, however, “indispensable” in this instance is not to be construed literally. Great inconvenience is sufficient. In the present case, the trial court found that irrespective of which route petitioner used in gaining access to his property, he has to pass private respondent’s subdivision. Thus the Court agrees that petitioner may be granted a temporary easement. This temporary easement in the original writ differs from the permanent easement of right of way now being tried in the main case.

The law provides that temporary easement is allowed only after the payment of the proper indemnity. As there are neither sufficient allegations nor established facts in the record to help this Court determine the proper amount of indemnity, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for such determination.

Additionally, the Court finds the installation of electric power lines a permanent easement not covered by Article 656. Article 656 deals only with the temporary easement of passage. Neither casn installation of electric power lines be subject to a preliminary injunction for it is not part of the status quo. Besides, more damage would be done to both parties if the power lines are installed only to be removed later upon a contrary judgment of the court in the main case.

Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals

195 SCRA 72

Facts:

Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a road path measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway. One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked and non was given for the portions constituting the pathway.

Petitioner’s plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the road path and so he approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and Elena Romero Vda. de Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned down by the two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner entitled to additional right of way?

Held:

Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion is hereby declared entitled to an additional easement of right of way of twenty-five (25) meters long by one and one-half (1 1/2) meters wide over the servient estate or a total area of 62.5 square meters after payment of the proper indemnity.

Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.