We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the
different causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises
from quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person
or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to Section
1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28
On the other hand, if the act or omission complained of arises from
contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of
the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as
explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription.30 (Emphases supplied)
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of the accused
after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to
reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. —
The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of
the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under
Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued
against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of
the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.1âwphi1
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended
party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case
shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased.
Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may
now be pursued because appellant’s death on 13 February 2011, before
the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal
liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil
liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both
jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO
as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant]
for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this
case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in
Bayotas,34
require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to
institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the
estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of
obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even
without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence.36
The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate
or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new
provisions of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.38
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found
that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal
case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case
for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present
Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to
obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate
civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to
the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot
recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study and recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate
amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such
similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private offended
party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.
In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39
this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused
from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of evidence. This Court’s pronouncement in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution
is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence
of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
We also turn to the Code Commission’s justification
of its recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in these
cases:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was
due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of
the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking
leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for
the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished."
It is just and proper that, for the purpose of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious
defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice
– a cause for disillusionment on the part of innumerable persons
injured or wronged.40
In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these
cases to be recommended by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as
recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform is of course
subject to the policy against double recovery.
SECOND DIVISION
April 20, 2016
G.R. No. 200302PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.
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