The pivot of inquiry here is: Whether or not the case at bar has survived the death of the private respondent, Pedro V. Garcia.
It is petitioners' theory that the action they
brought below was, among others, for the enforcement of their charging
lien in Civil Case Nos. 14297 and 17713, and Civil Case No. Pq-6596;
which involved a claim over the real properties litigated upon, and
therefore, an action which survived the death of their client, Pedro V.
Garcia.
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 7 provides:
Where claims does not survive — When the action is
for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in this
rules.
To begin with, the
aforequoted provision of law was modified by the enactment of the 1997
Civil Procedure, Section 20, Rule 3 of which, reads:
When the action is for recovery of money arising from
contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before final entry
of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by
the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a
deceased person.
It is a
fundamental rule in legal hermeneutics that "statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of the passage," 8
Considering that the case under scrutiny was passed upon by the lower
courts under the old rule, it follows that the old rule governs.
Under the plain language of Section 21, Rule 3 of
B.P. 129 it is beyond cavil that "if the defendant dies before the Court
of First Instance or the Regional Trial Court has rendered a judgment,
the action is dismissed and the plaintiff is required to file a money
claim against the estate of the deceased. But if the defendant dies
after the said court has rendered a judgment and pending appeal, the
action is not dismissed and the deceased defendant is substituted by his
executor or administrator or legal heirs." 9
To determine whether the action survives or not, the Court ruling in Bonilla vs. Barcena (71 SCRA 491), comes to the fore, thus:
The question as to whether an action survives or not
depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for (Iron Gate
Bank vs. Brady, 184 U.S. 665, 22 SCT, 46 L.ed 739). In the cause of
action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property end
rights of property effected being incidental . . ..
The core of
petitioners' argument is that action should not be dismissed since their
complaint involves not just monetary claim but also real properties as
well.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. While they
maintain that what they are claiming include real properties, their
Complaint is captioned as "For Collection of Money and for Specific
Performance." Obviously, the petitioners themselves, who are lawyers,
believed that the cause of action against the private respondent was in
the nature of actio in personam.
"Actio in personam is a personal action
seeking redress against a particular person. Personal actions are such
whereby a man claims a debt, or personal duty, or damages in lieu
thereof." 10
In the present case petitioners seek to recover attorney's fees from
private respondent for the professional services they rendered to the
latter. Attorney's fee is basically a compensation. 11 In
its ordinary sense, "the term (compensation) applies not only to
salaries, but to compensation by fees for specific services." 12
Viewed
in proper perspective, an action to recover attorney's fees is
basically a monetary claim, which under Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129
is an action that does not survive. Such is the fate of Civil Case No.
6465.
Petitioners theorize that the inclusion of real
properties as part of the attorney's fees private respondent owe them,
converted the action into one that survives or at the very least, split
the action into one that did not survive, with respect to the monetary
obligation, and which survived, with respect to the real properties of
the deceased.
In Harden vs. Harden, 20 SCRA 706, the Court
ruled that an action for the satisfaction of attorney's fees is founded
on a personal obligation which does not survive the death of the
defendant before adjudication. 13
As
enunciated in Bonilla, the litmus test in determining what action
survives and what does not depends on the nature of the action and not
on the object or kind of property sought to be recovered.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 116909 February 25, 1999
VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, EMILIO D. CASTELLANES and BLAS A. MIRANDA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO V, GARCIA as presented by his legal representative, MA. LUISA G. MAGPAYO, respondents.
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO V, GARCIA as presented by his legal representative, MA. LUISA G. MAGPAYO, respondents.
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