the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises from quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28 On the other hand, if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29

We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription.30 (Emphases supplied)

The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.1âwphi1

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.

Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.

Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in

Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.38

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.

However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study and recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.

In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of evidence. This Court’s pronouncement in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

We also turn to the Code Commission’s justification of its recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in these cases:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice – a cause for disillusionment on the part of innumerable persons injured or wronged.40

In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform is of course subject to the policy against double recovery.

 SECOND DIVISION

April 20, 2016

G.R. No. 200302
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.

"Actio in personam is a personal action seeking redress against a particular person. Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, or personal duty, or damages in lieu thereof

The pivot of inquiry here is: Whether or not the case at bar has survived the death of the private respondent, Pedro V. Garcia.

It is petitioners' theory that the action they brought below was, among others, for the enforcement of their charging lien in Civil Case Nos. 14297 and 17713, and Civil Case No. Pq-6596; which involved a claim over the real properties litigated upon, and therefore, an action which survived the death of their client, Pedro V. Garcia.

Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court ⁷ provides:

Where claims does not survive — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in this rules.

To begin with, the aforequoted provision of law was modified by the enactment of the 1997 Civil Procedure, Section 20, Rule 3 of which, reads:

When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before final entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.

It is a fundamental rule in legal hermeneutics that "statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of the passage," ⁸ Considering that the case under scrutiny was passed upon by the lower courts under the old rule, it follows that the old rule governs.

Under the plain language of Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129 it is beyond cavil that "if the defendant dies before the Court of First Instance or the Regional Trial Court has rendered a judgment, the action is dismissed and the plaintiff is required to file a money claim against the estate of the deceased. But if the defendant dies after the said court has rendered a judgment and pending appeal, the action is not dismissed and the deceased defendant is substituted by his executor or administrator or legal heirs." ⁹

To determine whether the action survives or not, the Court ruling in Bonilla vs. Barcena (71 SCRA 491), comes to the fore, thus:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for (Iron Gate Bank vs. Brady, 184 U.S. 665, 22 SCT, 46 L.ed 739). In the cause of action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property end rights of property effected being incidental . . ..

The core of petitioners' argument is that action should not be dismissed since their complaint involves not just monetary claim but also real properties as well.

Petitioners' contention is untenable. While they maintain that what they are claiming include real properties, their Complaint is captioned as "For Collection of Money and for Specific Performance." Obviously, the petitioners themselves, who are lawyers, believed that the cause of action against the private respondent was in the nature of actio in personam.

"Actio in personam is a personal action seeking redress against a particular person. Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, or personal duty, or damages in lieu thereof." ¹⁰ In the present case petitioners seek to recover attorney's fees from private respondent for the professional services they rendered to the latter. Attorney's fee is basically a compensation. ¹¹ In its ordinary sense, "the term (compensation) applies not only to salaries, but to compensation by fees for specific services." ¹²

Viewed in proper perspective, an action to recover attorney's fees is basically a monetary claim, which under Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129 is an action that does not survive. Such is the fate of Civil Case No. 6465.

Petitioners theorize that the inclusion of real properties as part of the attorney's fees private respondent owe them, converted the action into one that survives or at the very least, split the action into one that did not survive, with respect to the monetary obligation, and which survived, with respect to the real properties of the deceased.

In Harden vs. Harden, 20 SCRA 706, the Court ruled that an action for the satisfaction of attorney's fees is founded on a personal obligation which does not survive the death of the defendant before adjudication. ¹³

As enunciated in Bonilla, the litmus test in determining what action survives and what does not depends on the nature of the action and not on the object or kind of property sought to be recovered.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116909 February 25, 1999

VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, EMILIO D. CASTELLANES and BLAS A. MIRANDA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO V, GARCIA as presented by his legal representative, MA. LUISA G. MAGPAYO, respondents.