the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises from quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28 On the other hand, if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29

We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription.30 (Emphases supplied)

The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.1âwphi1

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.

Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.

Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in

Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.38

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.

However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study and recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.

In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of evidence. This Court’s pronouncement in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

We also turn to the Code Commission’s justification of its recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in these cases:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice – a cause for disillusionment on the part of innumerable persons injured or wronged.40

In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform is of course subject to the policy against double recovery.

 SECOND DIVISION

April 20, 2016

G.R. No. 200302
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.

"Actio in personam is a personal action seeking redress against a particular person. Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, or personal duty, or damages in lieu thereof

The pivot of inquiry here is: Whether or not the case at bar has survived the death of the private respondent, Pedro V. Garcia.

It is petitioners' theory that the action they brought below was, among others, for the enforcement of their charging lien in Civil Case Nos. 14297 and 17713, and Civil Case No. Pq-6596; which involved a claim over the real properties litigated upon, and therefore, an action which survived the death of their client, Pedro V. Garcia.

Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court ⁷ provides:

Where claims does not survive — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in this rules.

To begin with, the aforequoted provision of law was modified by the enactment of the 1997 Civil Procedure, Section 20, Rule 3 of which, reads:

When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before final entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.

It is a fundamental rule in legal hermeneutics that "statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of the passage," ⁸ Considering that the case under scrutiny was passed upon by the lower courts under the old rule, it follows that the old rule governs.

Under the plain language of Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129 it is beyond cavil that "if the defendant dies before the Court of First Instance or the Regional Trial Court has rendered a judgment, the action is dismissed and the plaintiff is required to file a money claim against the estate of the deceased. But if the defendant dies after the said court has rendered a judgment and pending appeal, the action is not dismissed and the deceased defendant is substituted by his executor or administrator or legal heirs." ⁹

To determine whether the action survives or not, the Court ruling in Bonilla vs. Barcena (71 SCRA 491), comes to the fore, thus:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for (Iron Gate Bank vs. Brady, 184 U.S. 665, 22 SCT, 46 L.ed 739). In the cause of action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property end rights of property effected being incidental . . ..

The core of petitioners' argument is that action should not be dismissed since their complaint involves not just monetary claim but also real properties as well.

Petitioners' contention is untenable. While they maintain that what they are claiming include real properties, their Complaint is captioned as "For Collection of Money and for Specific Performance." Obviously, the petitioners themselves, who are lawyers, believed that the cause of action against the private respondent was in the nature of actio in personam.

"Actio in personam is a personal action seeking redress against a particular person. Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, or personal duty, or damages in lieu thereof." ¹⁰ In the present case petitioners seek to recover attorney's fees from private respondent for the professional services they rendered to the latter. Attorney's fee is basically a compensation. ¹¹ In its ordinary sense, "the term (compensation) applies not only to salaries, but to compensation by fees for specific services." ¹²

Viewed in proper perspective, an action to recover attorney's fees is basically a monetary claim, which under Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129 is an action that does not survive. Such is the fate of Civil Case No. 6465.

Petitioners theorize that the inclusion of real properties as part of the attorney's fees private respondent owe them, converted the action into one that survives or at the very least, split the action into one that did not survive, with respect to the monetary obligation, and which survived, with respect to the real properties of the deceased.

In Harden vs. Harden, 20 SCRA 706, the Court ruled that an action for the satisfaction of attorney's fees is founded on a personal obligation which does not survive the death of the defendant before adjudication. ¹³

As enunciated in Bonilla, the litmus test in determining what action survives and what does not depends on the nature of the action and not on the object or kind of property sought to be recovered.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116909 February 25, 1999

VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, EMILIO D. CASTELLANES and BLAS A. MIRANDA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO V, GARCIA as presented by his legal representative, MA. LUISA G. MAGPAYO, respondents.

res judicata

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.⁵

The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.⁶

For res judicata to apply, all the above essential requisites must exist.

Since, the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D (declaring the Juntos liable for the damage sustained by petitioners) had become final, there existed a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioners rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. But this was only insofar as Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was concerned.

Civil Case No. 6754 was an entirely different story. The Court agrees with both the trial court (in Civil Case No. 6754) and the appellate court that there was neither identity of parties nor identity of subject matter, much less identity of cause of action between Civil Case No. 97-02055-D and Civil Case No. 6754.

There is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same or there is privity between them or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.⁷

Clearly, there was, in the two cases, no identity of parties. The owner of the Shell tanker truck was never a party in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D. Neither was the private respondent insurance company a party therein. Since private respondent insurance company, whose cause of action was legal subrogation to the rights of the owner of the Shell tanker, was not a party in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, it was not barred from filing Civil Case No. 6754. Res judicata clearly did not apply to it.

On the issue of identity of subject matter, the subject of an action is defined as the matter or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which a wrong has been done.⁸

In Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, the subject matter was the collision between the Isuzu Elf van owned by the Juntos and the Petron tanker truck owned and operated by petitioner Luz Taganas. However, in Civil Case No. 6754, the subject matter was the collision between the Shell tanker truck insured by private respondent insurance company and the Isuzu Elf van of the Juntos which was rear-ended by the Petron tanker truck of petitioner.

Finally, the Rules of Court defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.⁹ Records reveal that Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was filed by the Juntos against petitioners for the damage caused by petitioners’ Petron tanker truck to the Juntos’ Isuzu Elf van. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 6754 was filed by private respondent insurance company against both petitioners and the Juntos arising from the damage suffered by the Shell tanker truck insured by it.

The Court therefore finds no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was conclusive only as between the petitioners and the Juntos, and not as to private respondent. Consequently, the principle of res judicata did not apply.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C-A G.R. SP No. 55500 is AFFIRMED.

LUZ E. TAGANAS and VALENTIN G. TABBAL, petitioners, vs.HON. MELITON G. EMUSLAN AND STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., respondents.THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 146980             September 2, 2003

Sex denotes biological characteristics and exists along a spectrum from male to female. Gender, on the other hand, denotes social and cultural characteristics that are assigned to different sexes. Sex and gender are not always synchronous, meaning they do not always line up in an easy-to-categorize way.

"Sex" refers to physiological differences found among male, female, and various intersex bodies. Sex includes both primary sex characteristics (those related to the reproductive system) and secondary sex characteristics (those that are not directly related to the reproductive system, such as breasts and facial hair). In humans, the biological sex of a child is determined at birth based on several factors, including chromosomes, gonads, hormones, internal reproductive anatomy, and genitalia. Biological sex has traditionally been conceptualized as a binary in Western medicine, typically divided into male and female. However, anywhere from 1.0 to 1.7% of children are born intersex, having a variation in sex characteristics (including chromosomes, gonads, or genitals) that do not allow them to be distinctly identified as male or female. Due to the existence of multiple forms of intersex conditions (which are more prevalent than researchers once thought), many view sex as existing along a spectrum, rather than simply two mutually exclusive categories.

A person's sex, as determined by his or her biology, does not always correspond with their gender; therefore, the terms "sex" and "gender" are not interchangeable. "Gender" is a term that refers to social or cultural distinctions associated with being male, female, or intersex. Typically, babies born with male sex characteristics (sex) are assigned as boys (gender); babies born with female sex characteristics (sex) are assigned as girls (gender). Because our society operates in a binary system when it comes to gender (in other words, seeing gender as only having two options), many children who are born intersex are forcibly assigned as either a boy or a girl and even surgically "corrected" to fit a particular gender. Scholars generally regard gender as a social construct—meaning that it does not exist naturally, but is instead a concept that is created by cultural and societal norms.

Gender identity is a person's sense of self as a member of a particular gender. Individuals who identify with a role that corresponds to the sex assigned to them at birth (for example, they were born with male sex characteristics, were assigned as a boy, and identify today as a boy or man) are cisgender. Those who identify with a role that is different from their biological sex (for example, they were born with male sex characteristics, were assigned as a boy, but identify today as a girl, woman, or some other gender altogether) are often referred to as transgender. The term "transgender" encompasses a wide range of possible identities, including agender, genderfluid, genderqueer, two-spirit (for many indigenous people), androgynous, and many others.

Cultural Variations of Gender

Since the term "sex" refers to biological or physical distinctions, characteristics of sex will not vary significantly between different human societies. For example, persons of the female sex, in general, regardless of culture, will eventually menstruate and develop breasts that can lactate. Characteristics of gender, on the other hand, may vary greatly between different societies. For example, in American culture, it is considered feminine (or a trait of the female gender) to wear a dress or skirt. However, in many Middle Eastern, Asian, and African cultures, dresses or skirts (often referred to as sarongs, robes, or gowns) can be considered masculine. Similarly, the kilt worn by a Scottish male does not make him appear feminine in his culture.

Sexuality

"Human sexuality" refers to people's sexual interest in and attraction to others, as well as their capacity to have erotic experiences and responses. People's sexual orientation is their emotional and sexual attraction to particular sexes or genders, which often shapes their sexuality. Sexuality may be experienced and expressed in a variety of ways, including thoughts, fantasies, desires, beliefs, attitudes, values, behaviors, practices, roles, and relationships. These may manifest themselves in biological, physical, emotional, social, or spiritual aspects. The biological and physical aspects of sexuality largely concern the human reproductive functions, including the human sexual-response cycle and the basic biological drive that exists in all species. Emotional aspects of sexuality include bonds between individuals that are expressed through profound feelings or physical manifestations of love, trust, and care. Social aspects deal with the effects of human society on one's sexuality, while spirituality concerns an individual's spiritual connection with others through sexuality. Sexuality also impacts and is impacted by cultural, political, legal, philosophical, moral, ethical, and religious aspects of life.

The Standard Model of the Terms

The terms "sex" and "gender" have not always been differentiated in the English language, and it was not until the 1950s that they formally began to be distinguished. In an effort to clarify usage of the terms "sex" and "gender," U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in a 1994 briefing, "The word 'gender' has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to male" (J.E.B. v. Alabama, 144 S. Ct. 1436 [1994]).

The standard model of the difference between sex and gender says that one's sex is biologically determined (meaning that when a child is born, doctors classify the child as a particular sex depending on anatomy), while one's gender is socially or culturally determined (meaning that the way in which that child is raised, socialized, and taught determines whether they take on masculine or feminine traits). The standard model has been criticized for saying that humans are sexually dimorphic: this means each and every human being is either male or female, thus leaving out those who are born intersex. The standard model explains that gender is categorized into two separate, opposing sides, being either masculine or feminine, again completely excluding those who are intersex, transgender, androgynous, and so on. Modern scholars such as Anne Fausto-Sterling and Bonnie Spanier criticize the standard binaries of sex and gender, arguing that sex and gender are both fluid concepts that exist along a spectrum, rather than as binaries.

Source: Boundless. “Defining Sex, Gender, and Sexuality.” Boundless Psychology. Boundless, 15 Aug. 2016. Retrieved 19 Nov. 2016 from https://www.boundless.com/psychology/textbooks/boundless-psychology-textbook/gender-and-sexuality-15/introduction-to-gender-and-sexuality-75/defining-sex-gender-and-sexuality-294-12829/

commissioner's fee

Finally, on the issue on commissioners’ fees. We held in Lee v. Land Bank of the Philippines⁴⁷ that while the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to SAC proceedings, it is clear that, unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court, the appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties. Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:

SEC. 58. Appointment of Commissioners. — The Special Agrarian Courts, upon their own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof with the court.

Here, both parties did not object to the appointment of commissioners. Our ruling in Apo Fruits⁴⁸ is instructive:

The relevant law is found in Rule 67, Section 12 of the Rules of Court:

"SEC. 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner."

Rule 141, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

"SEC. 16. Fees of commissioners in eminent domain proceedings. — The commissioners appointed to appraise land sought to be condemned for public uses in accordance with these rules shall each receive a compensation to be fixed by the court of NOT LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS per day for the time actually and necessarily employed in the performance of their duties and in making their report to the court, which fees shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings."

From the afore-quoted provision, the award made by the RTC is way beyond that allowed under Rule 141, Section 16; thus, the award is excessive and without justification. Records show that the commissioners were constituted on 26 May 2000 and they submitted their appraisal report on 21 May 2001, when the old schedule of legal fees was in effect. The amendment in Rule 141 introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which took effect on 16 August 2004, increased the commissioner’s fees from P100.00 to P300.00 per day. Assuming they devoted all the 360 days from the time they were constituted until the time they submitted the appraisal report in the performance of their duties, and applying the old rate for commissioner’s fees, they would only receive P38,000.00. Moreover, even if the new rate is applied, each commissioner would receive only P108,000.00. The rule above-quoted is very clear on the amount of commissioner’s fees. The award made by the RTC in the amount of 2½% of the total amount of just compensation, i.e., 2 1/2% of P1,383,179,000.00, which translates to P34,579,475.00, is certainly unjustified and excessive. x x x⁴⁹

Accordingly, remand of the case for the determination of the proper amount of commissioners’ fees is in order, pursuant to the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. The SAC shall particularly determine the number of days which the Board actually devoted to the performance of its duties. Since the Board in this case was constituted on March 3, 2000, and it rendered its Report on July 28, 2000, or prior to the increase in the rate of commissioner's fees, the old rate of P100.00 per day shall be applied.

x x x x

In sum, we find LBP’s valuation sufficiently substantiated and in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.⁴²

We also cannot subscribe to respondent’s postulation that interest should be imposed in this case.

It is established that in expropriation cases, interest is due the landowner if there was delay in payment. The imposition of interest is in the nature of damages for the delay in payment, which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation.⁴³ Records show that LBP fully paid respondent in the amount of P150,795.51 with dispatch, and he himself acknowledged the receipt thereof. Moreover, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation Company, Incorporated,⁴⁴ we held that the mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the SAC and the CA does not mean that LBP deliberately delayed the payment of just compensation to the landowner. Having only exercised its right to appeal, LBP cannot be penalized by making it pay for interest.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, Respondent.FIRST DIVISION(G.R. No. 185821 , June 13, 2013)

grant of interest in expropriation cases

The Court has allowed the grant of interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment of just compensation.⁵⁵ In fact, the interest imposed in case of delay in payments in agrarian cases is 12% per annum and not 6%⁵⁶ as "the imposition x x x is in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance."⁵⁷

Quoting Republic v. Court of Appeals⁵⁸ this Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera,⁵⁹ held :

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case , the final compensation must include interest on its jus t value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine , between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. ⁶⁰ (Citation omitted, emphasis in the original.)

x x x x

The Court, in Republic, recognized that "the just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State."⁶¹ In fixing the interest rate at 12%, it followed the guidelines on the award of interest that we enumerated in Eastern Shipping Lines, In c. v. Court of Appeals,⁶² to wit:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" o f the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Fur t her more, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at t he discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. N o interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extra judicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the d ate the judgment o f the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages ma y be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.⁶³ (Citations omitted.)

This Court therefore deems it proper to impose a 12% legal interest per annum, computed from the date of the "taking" of the subject property on the just compensation to be determined by the SAC, due to respondent, less whatever he and his co-owners had already received. 

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.EMILIANO R. SANTIAGO, JR., Respondent.G.R. No. 182209    (FIRST DIVISION   October 3, 2012)

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor.[18]

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

x x x x

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment.  In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,  the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.”

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013, GEORGE BONGALON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.



The express irrevocability of the same (“hindi na mababawi”) is the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donationinter vivos.

Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of the donation in the case at bar. In Cuevas v. Cuevas,^[12] we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive. In the Bonsato case, we held that:

(W)hat is most significant [in determining the type of donation] is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art.737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).^[13]

Construing together the provisions  of the deed of donation, we find and so hold that in the case at bar the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same (“hindi na mababawi”) is the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donationinter vivos. 

 

 

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 106755, February 01, 2002 ]

APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORENTINO LUMUBOS, DOMINGO COMIA, TEODORA CARAMPOT, ERNESTO APOLO, SEGUNDA SUMPELO, MAMERTO SUMPELO AND RICARDO SUMPELO, RESPONDENTS.

A VALID DONATION ONCE ACCEPTED BECOMES IRREVOCABLE

A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.<sup>[19]

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Art. 765 The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases: (1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority. (2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority; (3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.

^[22] Article 769. The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year, to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 111904, October 05, 2000 ]

SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA AND ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCEDES DANLAG Y PILAPIL, RESPONDENTS.

gauge to determine whether donation is mortis causa or inter vivos

It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.^[10] In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals,^[11] this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donation mortis causa, to wit:

(1)	It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2)	That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3)	That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

onerous donation:the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.

From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is one the cause of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory donation is one where the donee gives something to reward past or future services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated (Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 11 ed., vol. 11, p. 726).
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa, L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription applies. (Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra.). The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides: 

"Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed."

It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that "violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, x x x, without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court. Upon the happening of the resolutory condition of non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. In the case of University of the Philippines v. de los Angeles, L-28602, September 29, 1970, 35 SCRA 102-107, it was held: 

"x x x There is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof, even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. (Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., L-11897, 31 October 1964, 12 SCRA 276)."

This was reiterated in the case of Angeles v. Calasanz, L-42283, March 18, 1985: 

"Well settled is, however, the rule that a judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions (Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 37 SCRA 327, 334, and cases cited therein). 
"Resort to judicial action for rescission is obviously not contemplated.... The validity of the stipulation can not be seriously disputed. It is in the nature of a facultative resolutory condition which in many cases has been upheld, by this court. (Ponce Enrile v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 504)"

However, in the University of the Philippines v. Angeles case,  (supra), it was held that in cases where one of the parties contests or denies the rescission, "only the final award of the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not". It was held, thus: 

"x x x since in every case, where the extrajudicial resolution is contested, only the final award of the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether the resolution was proper or not. It is in this sense that judicial action will be necessary as without it, the extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable and subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become barred by acquiescence, estoppel or prescription."

It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
The case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra, relied upon by the trial court, is not applicable in the case at bar. While the donation involved therein was also onerous, there was no agreement in the donation providing for automatic rescission, thus, the need for a judicial declaration revoking said donation.
The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint in the case at bar is barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract (Article 1144(1), New Civil Code), counted from April 9, 1976.

[ G.R. No. 57455, January 18, 1990 ]

EVELYN DE LUNA, ROSALINA DE LUNA, PRUDENCIO DE LUNA, JR., WILLARD DE LUNA, ANTONIO DE LUNA AND JOSELITO DE LUNA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SOFRONIO F. ABRIGO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BRANCH IX, AND LUZONIAN UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC., RESPONDENTS.