CIVIL LAW BLOG, ANDRES BONIFACIO COLLEGE: ‘The rule regarding prescription cannot be pleaded between them except when one heir openly and adversely occupies the property for a period sufficiently long to entitle him to ownership under the law. In other words, as long as other heirs acknowledge their ownership or do not set up any adverse title to the property, prescription is unavailable.’

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 94699, January 24, 1992 ]

REV. FR. VICENTE CORONEL, RODOLFO CORONEL, GERARDO CORONEL, SANTOS CORONEL AND DOMINGA CORONEL, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, REV. FR. RUSTICO CUEVAS, PRISCILLANO CUEVAS, LOURDES CUEVAS SEBASTIAN, NATALIA CUEVAS GARCIA AND BRIGIDA CUEVAS JUDI, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated July 31, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. 13312 entitled "Rev. Fr. Rustico Cuevas, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Rev. Fr. Vicente Coronel, et al., Defendants-Appellants," which confirmed the decision of the trial court with slight modification.

The facts are as follows: –

The petitioners are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Gaudencio Coronel; while the respondents are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Querubin Cuevas. In turn, their respective ascendants Gaudencio Coronel and Querubin Cuevas are the legitimate, exclusive and compulsory heirs of Bernarda David Lim who died on June 20, 1934 in Betis, Guagua, Pampanga.

Among the properties left by Bernarda David Lim, subject to a Deed of Partition and Grant dated March 12, 1940, is a parcel of land situated at the Barrio of San Nicolas, Municipality of Guagua, Province of Pampanga, containing an area of 1158 square meters more or less designated as Item No. VIII.

In accordance with the aforesaid deed, the lot in question was distributed and adjudicated as follows: –

"(a) 430 square meters to Teodora Henson, in consideration of the services rendered to the late Bernarda Lim;

(b) The remaining portion of said lot clearly remain a community property among the heirs, that is, the party of the first part (Bernarda Sunglao and Rosario Sunglao), the party of the second part (Jose Cuevas, Patricia Cuevas, Cesar Cuevas, Catalina Cuevas and Querubin Cuevas) or the party of the third part, Gaudencio Coronel and Salvador Coronel; and party of the fourth part (Bonifacia David, and Lucia David)." (p. 58, Rollo) (Underscoring supplied).

Further, the father of the respondents was given the right to occupy the whole lot as his house where his family resides was built on lot 5967 and inasmuch as the lot shall remain intact staying as a community property for ten (10) years.

Then on June 24, 1971 Gaudencio Coronel y David filed an application for original registration of title under Act No. 496 swearing among others that he was the owner in fee simple and the only one in occupation of the lot which resulted in Original Certificate of Title No. 5770 dated February 7, 1972. After Gaudencio Coronel died, his heirs, herein petitioners, executed a Deed of Partition among themselves and a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 151931-R was issued in their names on December 7, 1978.

Respondents learned of this fraudulent transfer only on February 1984 when Natalia Cuevas-Garcia and her husband were being sued by petitioners for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch II, alleging that on the strength of the aforestated TCT No. 151931-R they now have a right to eject the present occupants Natalia Cuevas-Garcia, her husband and family. So the Cuevas clan sought the help of their barangay court but the Coronel clan refused to give up the lot involved forcing the former to litigate.

This led to herein respondents’ filing of Civil Case No. G-1533 entitled Rev. Fr. Rustico Cuevas, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rev. Fr. Vicente Coronel, et al., Defendants, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch LIII, culminating in the following dispositive portion of its decision dated July 18, 1986, to wit: –

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants.

(1) Ordering the defendants to reconvey to the plaintiffs one twelve (1/12) portion of the lot in question covered by TCT.

(2) Ordering the defendants to pay litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00, attorney's fee in the amount of P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 appearance fees.

(3) Costs against the defendants." (p. 71, Rollo)

Herein petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision, with the following dispositive portion:

"In view of the foregoing, no reversible error having been found, the appeal is dismissed. The decision is affirmed with the modification that the award of litigation expenses is reduced to Eight Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos."

Hence, this petition with three assigned errors: –

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in not holding that the action for reconveyance based on trust had prescribed and/or is barred by laches, because the action was brought more ten (10) years after the repudiation of the trust;

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in not holding that the present action constitutes a collateral attack on the transfer Certificate of Title which is not allowed by law;

III

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in awarding litigation expenses, attorney's fees and appearance fees, without making express findings of facts and law in violation of the rule that such findings must be made to justify such awards. (p. 14, Rollo)

all of which had previously been correctly answered by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals.

The petition is actually without merit.

This case is governed by Article 494 of the Civil Code, to wit: –

"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

A careful analysis of the instant action actually yields a simple case. Records bear out that herein petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of their late father Gaudencio Coronel who co-owned together with the late father of the respondents and others, the designated community of property adjudicated by their late ancestor and ascendant Bernarda David Lim. When Gaudencio Coronel applied for the Torrens Title of the property, he was merely the designated administrator, and at the same time, one of the co-owners along with those enumerated in the first, second, third, and fourth parts. (pp. 58, 62, Rollo).

In fact, the petitioners’ late father lied upon swearing in the aforesaid application that he was the owner in fee simple and sole occupant of the lot involved, the truth of the matter being that all those years, it was the late Querubin Cuevas and family who were occupying the lot. For his misrepresentation the Torrens Title was issued which act should not be tolerated much less rewarded with the awarding of the whole lot instead of being deservingly punished. Nevertheless, the law is still lenient to petitioners as the only "punishment" meted out to them despite the aforementioned fraud of their late ascendant (Gaudencio Coronel) is the reconveyance of 1/12 of the lot in question plus their being ordered to pay damages in the form of P8,000.00 litigation fees, P5,000.00 attorney's fees, and P2,000.00 appearance fees (all duly proven) instead of suffering a forfeiture of any part of the lot they share in common with respondents (Lopez, et al. vs. Gonzaga, et al., 10 SCRA 167 and Caragay-Layno vs. CA, 133 SCRA 718).

Quoting from the respondents' Memorandum dated August 9, 1991 –

"In the case of Cordova et al., vs. Cordova, et al., L-9966, January 14, 1958 this Honorable Court ruled –

‘The rule regarding prescription cannot be pleaded between them except when one heir openly and adversely occupies the property for a period sufficiently long to entitle him to ownership under the law. In other words, as long as other heirs acknowledge their ownership or do not set up any adverse title to the property, prescription is unavailable.’

Pursuant to the foregoing, it is necessary that who pleads prescription against co-owners or co-heirs, must be in possession and occupying the property openly and adversely to the exclusion of his co-owner or co-heir. But in the instant case, Gaudencio Coronel and his children who are the herein petitioners are never (sic) in possession of the property in question. As a matter of fact, it is being occupied then by Querubin Cuevas and his family, respondents herein, up to the present time. Thus, in the cases of Santos vs. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 342 and Bargayo vs. Commot 40 Phil. 857 this Honorable Court held –

‘The other requirement of prescription in favor of a co‑owner is continuous, open, peaceful, public adverse possession for a period of time required under the law.’

x x x x

In this instant case, it is indubitable that Gaudencio Coronel, the late father of the herein petitioners, fraudulently deprived Querubin Cuevas, the late father of the herein respondents, of his lawful share over the land in question when he solely applied for the registration of the whole lot in his name, knowingly fully well that he only owned One Twelve (1/12) share of Lot No. 5697. The fraudulent acts deliberately committed by Gaudencio Coronel directly caused damage to Querubin Cuevas and to his heirs. As such the herein respondents are entitled to recover their share and the damages they suffered." (pp.162-163, Rollo)

Further, no one should enrich himself at the expense of another. All the co-owners who are the legitimate heirs should be given their due share.

Thus, the appealed decision further states:

"It bears repetition that in registering the lot in question exclusively in his name to the exclusion of the other heirs the late Gaudencio Coronel actually committed fraud and misrepresentation with respect to that remaining portion of 4835 square meters owned by him and the other co-heirs. In the partition and grant the other co-heirs who are entitled to the remaining portion are Bernarda Sunglao, Rosario Sunglao, the plaintiffs heirs of Querubin Cuevas, Jose Cuevas, Patria Cuevas, Cesar Cuevas, Catalina Cuevas, Gaudencio Coronel and Salvador Coronel, Bonifacia David and finally Lucia David, all twelve (12) of them. Each of them owns 1/12 portion of the lot in question." (Decision dated July 18, 1986 of RTC, Br. LIII, Guagua, Pampanga, penned by Judge Abraham Abonas).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Associate Justice Asaali S. Isnani and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Oscar M. Herrera.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: January 14, 2010
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SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000 ]

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, PETITIONER, VS. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 133359. JANUARY 31, 2000]

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-MAKATI, BRANCH 61, AND PACITA PHILLIPS AS THE ALLEGED EXECUTRIX OF THE ALLEGED WILL OF THE LATE DR. ARTURO DE SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.

The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will^[1] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will^[2] was annexed to the petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:

On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 o’clock in the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officer’s Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.

Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in signing it.

Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").

Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioner’s properties, real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such without a bond.

From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially established the material allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and Testament having been executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known and understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of another; that the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator has intended that the instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.

On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.^[3]

Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.

Upon private respondent’s motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santos’s estate.

On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testator’s estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.

On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."

It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner’s motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision^[4] promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioner’s motion for intervention.

Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order reads:

Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this Branch.

There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has become final.

It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).

Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.

Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,^[5] Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:

Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court.

Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner’s motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision^[6] setting aside the trial court’s order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:

Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos
Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same testate estate of the decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61.

First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban^[7] and Tagle v. Manalo,^[8] he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private respondent’s petition for issuance of letters testamentary.

The contention has no merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.^[9]

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.^[10]

However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:

Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:

Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.

The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:

Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testator’s life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the testator’s death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testator’s death would be in order.^[11]

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -

Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latter’s death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.^[12]

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, §1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:^[13]

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.^[14]

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:^[15]

The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.

Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:

The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent’s estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.

. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondent’s opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.^[16]

Rule 79, §1 provides:

Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. - Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.^[17]

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s -

(1)	Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2)	In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3)	The widow or widower;
(4)	Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5)	Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.^[18]

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator’s will.

Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:^[19]

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.^[20] None of these circumstances is present in this case.

Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1] G.R. No. 129505, Rollo, pp. 107-109.

^[2] Id., at 110-111.

^[3] RTC order, dated April 26, 1996. G.R. No. 133359, Rollo, pp. 54-55.

^[4] Per Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Justices Delilah Vidalon-Magtolis (Acting Chairman) and Artemio G. Tuquero. This is the subject of G.R. No. 133359.

^[5] G.R No. 129505, Rollo, p. 83.

^[6] Per Justice Hector L. Hofileña and concurred in by Justices Jainal D. Rasul (Chairman) and Artemio G. Tuquero. This is the subject of G.R. No. 129505.

^[7] 68 Phil. 367 (1939).

^[8] 105 Phil. 1123 (1959).

^[9] Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 207 Phil. 758 (1983); Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676 (1909).

^[10] 79 Am Jur 2d, Wills, §851: It seems clear that in the absence of statute expressly conferring such jurisdiction, a court does not have the power to entertain a suit for the establishment or annulment of the will of a living testator. The ambulatory nature of a will, and the absence of parties in interest, which results from the rule that a living person has neither heirs nor legatees, render impossible the assumption that a court has inherent power to determine the validity of a will prior to the death of the maker. It has been held that a statute providing for the probate of a will before the death of the testator, leaving him at liberty to alter or revoke it, or to escape the effect of any action under it by removal from the jurisdiction, is alleged and void on the ground that such a proceeding is not within the judicial power.

^[11] Report of The Code Commission, pp. 53-54, quoted in 3 A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 149 (1992).

^[12] G.R. No. 129505, Rollo, p. 83.

^[13] 74 SCRA 189, 198 (1976).

^[14] Ella v. Salonga, 146 Phil. 91 (1970).

^[15] 128 Phil. 559, 564-565 (1967).

^[16] G.R. No. 129505, Rollo, pp. 38-39.

^[17] Teotico v. Del Val Chan, 121 Phil. 392 (1965).

^[18] Civil Code, Art. 887.

^[19] 93 Phil. 416, 420 (1953).

^[20] Rules of Court, Rule 78, §6.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: 2009-12-23 10:41:47
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SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 177099, June 08, 2011 ]

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, PETITIONER, VS. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, AND ABELARDO DAGORO, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 177192]

SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, PETITIONER, VS. EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, AND ABELARDO DAGORO, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian) ^[1] and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo), ^[2] assailing the Decision dated November 21, 2006 ^[3] and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007 ^[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73916.

The antecedent facts and proceedings--

On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.

The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia), ^[5] and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three children--Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, ^[6] Joseph, and Teresa ^[7]). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had three children--Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.

Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.

On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its publication.

On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.

Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia's death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong's Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator.

On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquin's estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.

On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention, alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also averred that there is a need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo is not the person best qualified for the task.

After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition, ^[8] with the following disposition--

In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and there being no claim in Court against the estate of the deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently - ripe - for distribution among the heirs minus the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who died on August 25, 1999.

Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs thereunder.

The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting of his administration from his date of assumption up to the year ending December 31, 1996 per Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which was approved by the Court. The accounting report included the income earned and received for the period and the expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of the widow. In accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 - the deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the following:

I LAND:

Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030 Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, described as follows:

TCT NO.	LOT NO.	AREA/SQ.M.	ZONAL VALUE	AMOUNT
38254	745-B-1	1,335 sq. m.	P5,000.00	P6,675,000.00
38255	745-B-2	1,331 sq. m.	P5,000.00	P6,655,000.00
TOTAL------------------------------------------------------------				P13,330,000.00

II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:

BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ----------------------------------------	P350,000.00
BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) ---------------------------------------	320,000.00
Building Improvements ------------------------------------------------	97,500.00
Restaurant ------------------------------------------------------------	80,000.00
TOTAL -------------------------------------------------------------	P847,500.00
TOTAL NET WORTH -----------------------------------------------	P14,177,500.00

WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total value of P14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from bank deposits and all other incomes or increments thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996, after deducting therefrom the compensation of the administrator and other expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as follows:

TOTAL ESTATE - P14,177,500.00

CARIDAD AGTARAP - ½ of the estate as her conjugal share - P7,088,750.00, the other half of P7,088,750.00 - to be divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:

1) JOSE (deceased)	-	P1,181,548.30
2) MILAGROS (deceased)	-	P1,181,548.30
3) MERCEDES (deceased)	-	P1,181,548.30
4) SEBASTIAN	-	P1,181,548.30
5) EDUARDO	-	P1,181,548.30
6) CARIDAD	-	P1,181,548.30

The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of P1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions.

TERESA AGTARAP	-	P236,291.66
JOSEPH AGTARAP	-	P236,291.66
WALTER DE SANTOS	-	P236,291.66
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP	-	P236,291.66
EDUARDO AGTARAP	-	P236,291.66

Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:

COMPULSORY HEIRS:

1)	GLORIA - (deceased) - represented by Walter de Santos --
		- P295,364.57
2)	JOSEPH AGTARAP	- P295,364.57
3)	TERESA AGTARAP	- P295,364.57
4)	PRISCILLA AGTARAP	- P295,364.57

Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P295,364.57.

Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first marriage stand to receive the total amount of:

HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:

1) JOSEPH AGTARAP -	P236,291.66	-share from Milagros Agtarap
	P295,364.57	- as compulsory heir of
	P531,656.23	Jose Agtarap

2) TERESA AGTARAP -	P236,291.66	- share from Milagros Agtarap
	P295,364.57	- as compulsory heir of
	P531,656.23	Jose Agtarap

3) WALTER DE SANTOS -	P236,291.66	- share from Milagros Agtarap
	P295,364.57	- as compulsory heir of
	P531,656.23	Jose Agtarap

HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:

a) CARIDAD AGTARAP			- died on August 25, 1999
	P7,088,750.00		- as conjugal share
	P1,181,458.30		- as compulsory heir
Total of	P8,270,208.30

b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP		- P1,181,458.38	- as compulsory heir
		P 236,291.66	- share from Milagros

c) EDUARDO AGTARAP		- P1,181,458.38	- as compulsory heir
		P 236,291.66	- share from Milagros

d) MERCEDES		- as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
		P1,181,458.38

REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:

1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP

MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)

In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:

SEBASTIAN -	P4,135,104.10	- share from Caridad Garcia
	P1,181,458.30	- as compulsory heir
	P 236,291.66	- share from Milagros
	P5,522,854.06

EDUARDO -	P4,135,104.10	- share from Caridad Garcia
	P1,181,458.30	- as compulsory heir
	P 236,291.66	- share from Milagros
	P5,522,854.06

SO ORDERED. ^[9]

Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for reconsideration.

On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution ^[10] denying the motions for reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.

On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads--

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby partitioned as follows:

The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be distributed among the following:

Lucia Mendietta	-	½ of the property. But since she is deceased, her share shall be inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal shares.

Joaquin Agtarap	-	½ of the property and ¼ of the other half of the property which pertains to Lucia Mendietta's share.

Jesus Agtarap	-	¼ of Lucia Mendietta's share. But since he is already deceased (and died without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn, be acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.

Milagros Agtarap	-	¼ of Lucia Mendietta's share. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros' brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.

Jose Agtarap	-	¼ of Lucia Mendietta's share. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal shares.

Then, Joaquin Agtarap's estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the subject properties and its improvements, shall be distributed as follows:

Caridad Garcia	-	1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share shall be inherited by her children namely Mercedes Agtarap (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Milagros Agtarap	-	1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros' brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.

Jose Agtarap	-	1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal shares.

Mercedes Agtarap	-	1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her inheritance shall be acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile in equal shares.

Sebastian Agtarap	-	1/6 of the estate.

Eduardo Agtarap	-	1/6 of the estate.

SO ORDERED. ^[11]

Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration.

In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence, these petitions ascribing to the appellate court the following errors:

G.R. No. 177192

1. - The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the aforementioned important facts ^[12] which alter its Decision;

2. - The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs;

3. - The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law and in not applying the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata. ^[13]

G.R. No. 177099

THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF. ^[14]

As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of Jose's marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not authenticated and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations therein. He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing.

With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title of real estate properties subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that estoppel applies against the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros' name and of TCT No. 8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is applicable as the court order directing the deletion of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and executory.

In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquin's estate. He states that this violated the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.

Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA gravely erred when it affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.

The Court's Ruling

As to Sebastian's and Eduardo's common issue on the ownership of the subject real properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. ^[15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. ^[16] As held in several cases, ^[17] a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. ^[18] Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. ^[19] Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. ^[20]

We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court's jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.

It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial settlement of Joaquin's estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta). ^[21] When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184) ^[22] issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.

The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which reads--

Ap-4966 - NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal como aparece, tanchando las palabras "con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras "en segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada con el No. 4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. 32184.

Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937. ^[23]

Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridad's name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucia's share in the property covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs - Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.

Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia's spouse. ^[24] Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.

Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a holder's true ownership of property. ^[25] A certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. ^[26] Thus, the fact that the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. ^[27] The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia" in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal properties. ^[28]

Neither can Sebastian's claim that Joaquin's estate could have already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court--

SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965.

As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that Sebastian did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21, 1995 hearing. ^[29] Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision. ^[30]

Also, Sebastian's insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later granted the motion, thereby admitting his answer on October 18, 1995. ^[31] The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose any objection when the intervention was submitted to the RTC for resolution. ^[32]

Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to refute his and Eduardo's admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in representation of the Joaquin's compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively. ^[33]

This Court also differs from Eduardo's asseveration that the CA erred in settling, together with Joaquin's estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of the properties related only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquin's estate, they being his legal heirs.

However, we agree with Eduardo's position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin's estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City. ^[34] While there has been no showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from Joaquin's estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved, prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros' share in Joaquin's estate.

It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate of Death. ^[35] He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).

Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until after the final determination of the probate of her purported will, and that Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the final determination of the probate of her will, and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.

These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 177192), pp. 3-15.

^[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 177099), pp. 44-83.

^[3] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 177192), pp. 16-37; rollo (G.R. No. 177099), pp. 85-106.

^[4] Id. at 38-41, 108-111.

^[5] Also, Lucia Garcia Mendietta.

^[6] Also, Gloria Agtarap-de Santos.

^[7] Also, Maria Teresa Agtarap-Viriña.

^[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 177099), pp. 417-433.

^[9] Id. at 429-433.

^[10] Id. at 434-438.

^[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 177192), pp. 33-36; (G.R. No. 177099), pp. 30-33.

^[12] Sebastian claims that the CA ignored the following facts:

Sebastian's reply, dated October 1, 1996, questioning the legitimacy of oppositors Joseph and Teresa Agtarap and intervenor Abelardo Dagoro as heirs;
Sebastian's motion, dated January 3, 1997, to exclude Joseph, Teresa, and Abelardo Dagoro as heirs;
Sebastian's reply to the opposition to the motion to exclude, with a copy of TCT No. 8026 in the name of Milagros and Jose Agtarap, showing that the latter's wife is Presentacion and not Priscilla as claimed by Joseph and Teresa;
The Order, dated October 23, 2000, denying Sebastian's motion to exclude for his failure to present clear and convincing evidence on his allegations, and without a hearing conducted on the legitimacy issue;
The marriage contracts of Jose Agtarap, submitted by Joseph and Teresa, which are not admissible in evidence;
The brief belatedly filed by Joseph and Teresa was a reply brief; and
The failure of Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose the motion to exclude, which operated as an implied admission of the allegations therein.

^[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 177192), p. 6.

^[14] Rollo (G.R. No. 177099), pp. 57-58.

^[15] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647; Jimenez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367; Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 635.

^[16] Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 541.

^[17] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15; Baybayan v. Aquino, No. L-42678, April 9, 1987, 149 SCRA 186; Morales v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, G.R. No. L-47125, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 373; Cuizon v. Ramolete, L-51291, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 495.

^[18] Coca v. Pizarras Vda. de Pangilinan, G.R. No. L-27082, January 31, 1978, 171 Phil. 246, 252; Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266.

^[19] Coca v. Pizarras Vda. de Pangilinan, supra; Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 (1942); Alvarez v. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 473.

^[20] Regalado, F.D. Remedial Law Compendium. Vol. II, Eighth Revised Edition (2000), p. 11.

^[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 177099), pp. 389-390.

^[22] Id. at 391-393.

^[23] Id. at 391.

^[24] Bernardo, et al. v. CA, et al., L-18148, Feb. 28, 1963, cited in Regalado, F.D. Remedial Law Compendium. Vol. II, Eighth Revised Edition (2000), p. 9.

^[25] Bejoc v. Cabreros, G.R. No. 145849, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 78, 87.

^[26] Joaquino v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA 260, 273.

^[27] Jocson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55322, February 16, 1989, 170 SCRA 333, 345.

^[28] Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December 16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282, 292.

^[29] October 23, 2000 Order of Partition and August 27, 2001 Resolution, rollo (G.R. No. 177099), pp. 422 and 437, respectively.

^[30] Id. at 21.

^[31] Id. at 419-420.

^[32] Id. at 21.

^[33] CIVIL CODE, Art. 970.

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

^[34] Rollo (G.R. No. 177099), pp. 137-165.

^[35] Id. at 490.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: July 22, 2011
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FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990 ]

JACOBA T. PATERNO, TOMAS T. PATERNO, AND MARIA LUCIA PATERNO, PETITIONERS, VS. BEATRIZ PATERNO, BERNARDO PATERNO AND THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, J.:

In the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, now defunct, there was filed by Feliza Orihuela, as guardian ad litem of her children, Beatriz Paterno and Bernardo Paterno, a complaint^[1] praying that the latter be declared illegitimate (adulterous) children of, and consequently entitled to inherit from, the deceased Jose P. Paterno. According to Feliza, Beatriz and Bernardo had been begotten of her illicit liaison with Jose P. Paterno, a married man, and should thus be counted among the latter's compulsory heirs in accordance with Article 887 ^[2] of the Civil Code. Feliza prayed in her complaint for: (1) the invalidation of the extrajudicial partition of Jose Paterno's estate executed by his widow, Jacoba T. Paterno, and his legitimate children, Luis T. Paterno, Vicente T. Paterno, Tomas T. Paterno, Susana T. Paterno and Maria Lucia T. Paterno, said partition having deprived the minor plaintiffs of their legitimes; (2) the extension to Beatriz and Bernardo of support; and (3) the payment to them of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.^[3]

The answer with counterclaim filed for the widow and her children aforenamed inter alia asserted as affirmative defense that the "plaintiffs are guilty of laches as they should have exercised their right of action, if any, against the deceased Dr. Jose P. Paterno during his lifetime in order to give the latter an opportunity to admit or deny the same, death having sealed his lips."^[4]

It appears that "upon defendants' filing their answer, the Honorable N. Almeda-Lopez started reception of plaintiffs' evidence. However, on January 11, 1964, prior to a scheduled continuation of the hearing, the Honorable Judge C. Juliano-Agrava who ** (succeeded Judge Almeda-Lopez) required the parties to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On April 4, 1964, and after both parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the court finally ordered the dismissal of the case, for the reason that where an illegitimate child seeks to participate in the estate of the deceased putative father, the action becomes essentially one for recovery of plaintiff’s supposed share in the estate and the question of paternity becomes merely an incident thereto. As the main issue falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, the incidental question of paternity should also be resolved therein, if the splitting of causes of action is to be avoided.**."^[5]

The plaintiffs perfected an appeal to this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-23060. The appeal resulted in the reversal of the challenged order. In a decision rendered on June 30, 1967, this Court set aside "the order of dismissal appealed from, insofar as it affects the issue of paternity," and returned the case "to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for determination of that particular issue." Said the Court: ^[6]

"** The issue to be determined ** is which of plaintiffs' claim (filiation or participation [in the decedent's estate]) constitutes the main cause and which is merely an incident thereto.

"**

"** Clearly before the claim to participate in the estate may be prosecuted, plaintiffs’ right to succeed must first be established. Differently stated, plaintiffs' main action is that for recognition of their status as illegitimate children of the deceased, upon which the right to share in the hereditary estate of the putative father would rest. (This matter is without doubt within the jurisdiction of the JDRC.)

"**

"In granting to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ‘such incidental powers generally possessed by the court of first instance,’ the law ** (however) could not have intended to confer on this special tribunal jurisdiction over all subject matter cognizable by the ordinary court of first instance. The term 'incidental powers' must refer to the authority to issue such orders or writs and take such measures as might be necessary to carry out the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. (Hence, the matter of the participation in the estate of the decedent is not within its competence; it is within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.)

The above conclusion will not constitute a violation of the rule against splitting of cause of action. The prohibition provided in the Rules of Court is against the institution of more than one suit for a single cause of action. (Sec. 3, Rule 2 ** ). But, as alleged in the complaint, the bases for plaintiffs' various claims would not be the same. By the creation of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, with its exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving paternity and acknowledgment, recognition of children and recovery of hereditary shares can no longer be properly joined as cause of action, since each lies within the jurisdiction of a different tribunal.

The case having been thereafter remanded to and tried by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC), that Court rendered judgment on April 14, 1970 dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription, its view being that the action for compulsory recognition should have been commenced within the lifetime of the alleged father, and on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to present "clear, strong and convincing" evidence of their filiation.^[7] Dismissed as well was the defendants' counterclaim. The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,^[8] where basically, they imputed to the JDRC two (2) errors,^[9] to wit:

1) holding that they (plaintiffs) had lost whatever right of action they might otherwise have had, when they failed to file the corresponding action during the lifetime of their putative parent, Jose P. Paterno; and

2) ruling that plaintiffs' evidence was in part incompetent and in any event did not constitute "clear, strong and convincing proof" of plaintiffs' filiation.

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the JDRC. In a decision promulgated on August 16, 1982,^[10] said Court, after an extensive review of the evidence adduced by the parties before the JDRC -- observing in this connection that as against the plaintiffs' (illegitimate children's) "witnesses and documentary evidence, Mrs. Jacoba Paterno, widow of the decedent, stood alone to deny the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants" -- reached the following conclusions:

"It is true there appear to be certain inconsistencies in plaintiffs' evidence as pointed out by the trial court, but in the final analysis, these inconsistencies are only minor matters which, to Our mind, instead strengthened the entire plaintiffs' evidence. Had these witnesses been very elaborate, thorough and precise, We would have entertain(ed) some doubts. In fact, the evidence is so convincing, clear, positive that We noted that, after trial and assessment of the evidence, the trial court was constrained, perhaps, in consonance with its conscience, to admit that 'in evaluating plaintiffs' evidence ** the court cannot definitely state that their (plaintiffs') claim is false.' The trial court was convinced that plaintiffs-appellants Beatriz and Bernando and Virginia are the children of Dr. Jose P. Paterno, but being of the opinion that spurious children's right of action to compel recognition as such is lost forever upon the demise of the putative father, found against the plaintiffs.

"We hold, after going over the records, that there are sufficient evidence, clear and convincing, establishing the filiation of plaintiffs-appellants Beatriz and Bernardo Paterno as spurious children of Dr. Jose P. Paterno; that Jose P. Paterno died when they were still minors and the present action for the establishment of their filiation to Dr. Jose P. Paterno was filed before they reach(ed) the age of majority and within the period of limitation, within which cases of this nature should be instituted to establish paternity and filiation.^[11]

"WHEREFORE, finding the Court a quo in error, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another one entered, declaring plaintiffs-appellants Beatriz and Bernardo Paterno illegitimate (spurious) children of Dr. Jose P. Paterno, deceased, begotten out of wedlock with Felisa Orihuela (who is herein appointed guardian ad litem) conceived and born when the deceased was cohabiting with the latter, (and) having enjoyed and continued possessing the status as children of the deceased Dr. Jose P. Paterno.

"We are not in a position to pass on, much less, grant the other prayers of the appellants contained in their brief except as to costs, inasmuch as the directive of Our Supreme Court in the case of Paterno, et al. vs. Paterno, et al., L-32060, June 30, 1964, 020 SCRA 585, returning this case to the court of origin, specifically states:

'WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from, insofar as it affects the issue of paternity is hereby set aside, and the case returned to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for determination of that particular issue.'"

Mrs. Jacoba T. Paterno, the widow, and her legitimate children have appealed to this Court on certiorari. In these proceedings, they claim that the Court of Appeals erred in -

1) holding the evidence of the enjoyment by Beatriz and Bernardo Paterno of the status of children of the deceased Jose Paterno, to be strong, clear and convincing;

2) failing to take account of ‑

a) the suspicious nature of the alleged letter of the decedent to Feliza, mother of Beatriz and Bernardo (Exh. G), it being in English although Feliza was "not adequately conversant in English;"

b) the suspect character of Beatriz's alleged baptismal certificate in that it "does not even state the given name" (Exh. B);

c) the lack of specific evidence of cohabitation between the decedent and Feliza during the periods of conception of their alleged children;

d) the "contradictory and conflicting evidence on direct acts by petitioner vis-a-vis the status of private respondents;"

3) failing to apply the doctrine in Clemeña v. Clemeña, 24 SCRA (1968), 720, to the effect that doubts in paternity suits are resolved against the claimant.

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.^[12] Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight -- all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this Court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.^[13] But it is questions of this type which the petitioners have precisely submitted for resolution to this Court. Therefore, in accordance with established rule and practice, those issues will not be considered by this Court, the resolutions thereon by the Court of Appeals being final.^[14]

It may however be noted in passing that, as recapitulated in painstaking detail in the Decision of the Court of Appeals,^[15] the dovetailing and mutually corroborative testimony of the private respondents, their mother Felisa Orihuela, and Teresa Miranda and Anselmo Macapinlac, the late Dr. Jose P. Paterno's retainers to whose care and company he entrusted his illegitimate family, does indeed compel acceptance of the fact that from their birth until Dr. Paterno's death, said respondents were treated as, and enjoyed the status of, his children by blood.

The gist of that testimony is to the effect that Dr. Paterno had borne the expenses of the birth and baptism of said children, who were born in the same year (1938) within eleven months of each other; that in that year, after the birth of the first child, Beatriz, mother and daughter had moved from A. Luna in San Juan, Rizal, to Rubi Street in San Andres Bukid, Manila, where the second child, Bernardo, and a third, Virginia, who died at four, were born; that in 1940, the family moved to a house in A. Lake Street in San Juan, Rizal purchased by Dr. Paterno; that in both places, they had lived with and been maintained by Dr. Paterno in the company of the Miranda and Macapinlac families; that shortly before the outbreak of the war in December 1941, Dr. Paterno left for Hongkong where he stayed until war's end; that in his absence, mother and children received monthly support from Don Vicente Madrigal at the instance of Dr. Paterno who was Madrigal's brother-in-law; that for sometime after Liberation, they lived in the Madrigal compound in Gen. Luna, Paco, Manila; that when Dr. Paterno thereafter returned to the Philippines and until he again left for Hongkong, he lived with mother and children, first in Antipolo, Rizal and later in Marilao, Bulacan; that when Felisa decided to get married -- this while Dr. Paterno was in Hongkong on his second sojourn there -- she sought and received the forgiveness of his wife, Doña Jacoba, who even consented to act as sponsor at her wedding; that when Dr. Paterno returned once more from Hongkong, to be assigned to the Madrigal cement plant in Binangonan, Rizal, he made it a point to see that Beatriz and Bernardo went or were brought to visit him, especially during weekends, and on these occasions, he and the children slept in his room in the same bed, he would tell them to come or send word to him for anything they might need, and would give them money when they left; that Beatriz, then about thirteen or fourteen, was being sent to school in Sta. Isabel College by Dr. Paterno, who did the same for Bernardo, who was enrolled at the University of Santo Tomas; that these reunions continued until he fell ill and had to keep to his house in Mendoza St., Quiapo, Manila, and Doña Jacoba forbade the children to see him on the excuse that he might suffer a relapse; that on the some five occasions that they tried to see Dr. Paterno in his residence while he lay sick, the children were given money by Doña Jacoba upon leaving; and that after his death and burial, Doña Jacoba gave them money for their tuition.

Hence, even if, against all applicable law and precedent, this Court were minded to substitute its own assessment of such testimony, as supported by the documents also presented by the private respondents, for that of the Court of Appeals, it would reach no different conclusion. True, certain inconsistencies may be noted in the testimony given by the witnesses for the private respondents, but it is on the whole unanimous and consistent as to the really crucial fact that Dr. Paterno treated and acted towards said respondents, from their birth onward, in a manner only a real father would and leaving little doubt that he recognized and considered them as in truth his children. The simple denials of the widow, petitioner Jacoba T. Paterno, do not suffice to refute such proof.

The action for recognition (or to establish filiation) having been timely filed -- having been instituted after the demise of the putative parent and before the attainment of the age of majority of the children concerned -- and the ground invoked therefor having been satisfactorily proven,^[16] the Court of Appeals committed no error in declaring and confirming the status of the private respondents as illegitimate children of the late Dr. Jose P. Paterno.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1] Docketed as Case No. 01124, N.B. The action was first instituted in the Manila Court of First Instance, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 33467. It was however "dismissed on the jurisdictional ground that the issue of paternity should be determined by ** (the Juvenile & Domestic Relations) Court" (rollo, p. 16).

^[2] Which specifies, among the compulsory heirs entitled to share in the legitime, “illegitimate children,” i.e., "illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction, having the right of support and "successional rights** granted in this Code" (Art. 287). SEE Castro v. C.A.,et al., G.R. Nos. 50974-75, May 31, 1989 in which it is pointed out that under the Family Code (Exec. Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Exec. Order No. 227, July 17, 1987), there are only two (2) classes of children, legitimate and illegitimate, and the "fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated" (Title VI) and that illegitimate children may establish their filiation "in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children" (ART. 175).

^[3] Rollo, pp. 18-19

^[4] Id., p. 19

^[5] Paterno v. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585,587-588

^[6] Id., pp. 588, 589, 590-591

^[7] Id., p. 21

^[8] Their appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 48067-R

^[9] Eight (8) errors are actually set out in their brief, but these may be synthesized and reduced into two (2).

^[10] Per Zosa, J., with whom concurred Busran and Coquia, JJ.

^[11] ART. 285, Civil Code, provides that an action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents except inter alia if the father died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.

^[12] SEE Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 19 SCRA 289, 292; Sta. Ana v. Hernandez, 18 SCRA 973, 978; Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 100 SCRA 433; Aytona, v. C.A., 113 SCRA 322; Leonardo v. C.A., 120 SCRA 322; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, 135 SCRA 575; Collector of Customs v. I.A.C., 137 SCRA 3; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 66497-98, July 10,1986; Amurao v. C.A., G.R. No. 83942, Dec. 29,1988; Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. CA., G.R. No. 57493, Jan. 7, 1987; Tolentino v. C.A., et al., G.R. No. 56265, May 20, 1987

^[13] Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court

^[14] Sec. 29, RA 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 45, and cases cited in footnote 11, supra; also, Pilar Development Corporation v. I.A.C., G.R. No. 72283, Dec. 12, 1986; Nakpil & Sons, et al. v. C.A., G.R. No. 47851, Oct. 3, 1986; Republic v. I.A.C., G.R. No. 70513, Oct. 13, 1986; Director of Lands, et al. v. Funtillar, G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986

^[15] ROLLO, pp. 28-47

^[16] Art. 283, No. (4), and Art. 285, No. (1) in relation to Art. 289, Civil Code; see footnote 11, supra

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THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 154203, July 08, 2003 ]

REY CARLO A. RIVERA AND GLADYS ABAGA RIVERA, PETITIONERS, VS. VIRGILIO RIVERA, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners assail the March 21, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in connection with an ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 7529, ordering them to vacate the disputed premises and pay rentals.

The subject of the dispute is a 228-square meter lot with a two-storey duplex house located in Pasig City. The property was originally owned by spouses Remigio Rivera, Sr. and Consuelo Rivera. The spouses had eleven (11) children, two of whom were Remigio, Jr. (petitioners' father) and respondent Virgilio Rivera.

In 1974, when the spouses migrated to the United States, they asked their son Remigio, Jr. and his children (two of whom are petitioners Rey Carlo and Gladys Rivera) to occupy one unit of the duplex house without payment of rentals. In 1985, respondent, another son of the spouses, moved into the other unit of the duplex house and likewise occupied it gratuitously.

After Remigio, Sr. died in 1992, his widow Consuelo and their eleven (11) children executed an extrajudicial settlement^[1] where the children voluntarily waived their hereditary rights to four (4) real properties owned by their parents, including the lot with the duplex house, in favor of their mother Consuelo.

In 1993, Remigio, Jr. together with his three (3) sons migrated to the United States, leaving behind petitioners who continued to reside in one of the units of the duplex house. Respondent likewise migrated to the U.S.

On April 6, 1999, Consuelo sold the duplex house and lot to respondent for five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).^[2] At the time of the sale, both Consuelo and respondent were residing in the same house in San Jose, California. In the Deed of Sale, Consuelo and respondent were represented by respondent's daughters Ma. Theresa R. Ferreria and Ma. Dolores A. Rivera. Title to the property was subsequently transferred in the name of respondent.

Respondent, represented by his daughter Dolores, asked petitioners to sign a lease contract over the unit of the duplex house they were occupying, covering the period from April 30, 1999 to June 30, 1999, with a monthly rental of P6,000.00.

As the petitioners refused to sign the lease contract or vacate the premises, respondent,^[3] through his daughter Dolores, filed an unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 7529) against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City. In the complaint,^[4] it was alleged: that respondent is the registered owner of the duplex house; that he merely tolerated petitioners' occupancy of one of the units thereof, conditioned upon the execution of the lease contract between the parties; that petitioners initially agreed thereto as they claimed they would remain in the unit only for a few more months; and that after respondent caused the preparation of the lease contract, petitioners refused to sign it or vacate the property.

In their Answer with counterclaim,^[5] petitioners alleged that the deed of sale between Consuelo and Virgilio Rivera was fictitious. They claimed that their occupancy of the premises was not by mere tolerance as they have a right to occupy it as co-owners. Hence, they averred that they could not be compelled to pay rentals for the use of the property. Petitioners likewise raised the affirmative defense that respondent had no cause of action against them as no title was conferred to him because: the deed of sale was fictitious; the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Remigio, Sr. and Consuelo and after the former's death, all the compulsory heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement transferring all the conjugal properties to Consuelo out of love and respect for her; Consuelo and all the compulsory heirs have migrated to the States; Consuelo was living with respondent in the States; Consuelo and respondent hid from the other heirs the transfer of the subject property to respondent; the deed of sale was executed in the Philippines through a special power of attorney granted by respondent to his daugthers, Ma. Theresa Rivera-Ferreria and Ma. Dolores Rivera; assuming that the sale was legitimate, Consuelo did not notify petitioners thereof, with deliberate intent and bad faith to disinherit her grandchildren, petitioners herein, in violation of their right of first refusal, having resided in the premises since birth, or for more than 20 years; the P500,000 consideration for the sale was clearly inadequate; assuming that the sale was valid, it nonetheless deprived the other compulsory heirs of their share over the subject property; and with the attendant defects in the sale of the property, no right or title was transferred to respondent.

The trial court rendered judgment in the ejectment case in favor of respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Rey Carlo Rivera and Gladys Rivera in the manner following:

Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the subject premises unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff;
Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of unpaid rentals from April to September 1999, without prejudice to collecting the reasonable compensation for occupancy that may be forthcoming until defendants vacate the premises;
Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the grounds that: (a) the respondent had no right over the property as he did not have actual or prior physical possession thereof; (b) the non-existent lease contract was not binding between the parties; and (c) respondent's title was not indefeasible.

On March 16, 2001, the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC and ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held that there was no valid contract of lease between the parties and petitioners occupied the subject property in the concept of a co-owner.^[6]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated March 21, 2002, reversed the RTC's decision and reinstated the original decision of the MeTC.^[7] It held that as registered owner of the land, respondent is entitled to possession thereof.

Hence, this petition for review with petitioners raising the following issues: (a) whether petitioners, being in actual physical possession of the property since 1974, are entitled to continue in possession of the premises until the issue of ownership thereof is resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) whether Civil Case No. 7529, the ejectment case, is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court; (c) whether respondent holds the subject property in trust for the legitimate heirs at the time the ejectment case was filed; and (d) whether petitioners, who are in actual physical possession of the premises, exercised the right of a co-owner in representation of their father, Remigio Rivera, Jr.

We find no merit in the petition.

We cannot sustain petitioners' contention that as they had actual, physical possession of the property as co-owners, in representation of their father Remigio, Jr., they are entitled to remain in the premises. In an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that he shows that he has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases, not in unlawful detainer cases where the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.^[8] Thus, the fact that petitioners were in prior physical possession of the duplex unit does not automatically entitle them to continue in said possession and does not give them a better right to the property.

Petitioners claim that the unlawful detainer suit should have been dismissed as the respondent relied only on his title to the property in bringing the action. They contend that respondent's assertion of ownership in the unlawful detainer case removed it from the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Moreover, they insist that their possession of the property was not merely by tolerance of the original owners and later on by the respondent as they assert their father's right as co-owner of the property.

Again, petitioners' arguments must fail. It is well-settled that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment may be filed against him.^[9] In the case at bar, respondent's allegations in his complaint specifically show that petitioners occupied the subject unit only with the express permission of the spouses as the original owners. Thus, when title to the property passed on to respondent by virtue of a contract of sale, petitioners' refusal to sign the lease contract prepared by the respondent for their use of the duplex unit rendered their continued occupation thereof unlawful.

Although petitioners impugned the validity of respondent's title over the property as they claimed to have the right to occupy it as co-owner, this allegation did not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer suit. It is settled that the sole issue in an ejectment case is physical or material possession. Neither a claim of juridical possession nor an assertion of ownership by the defendant can deprive the court of jurisdiction over the disputed property.^[10] Courts in ejectment cases are mandated to decide questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to decide the question of possession. They cannot be divested of jurisdiction over ejectment cases just because the defendants assert ownership over the litigated property.^[11]

The underlying reason for this ruling is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.^[12]

In the case at bar, the lower court properly adjudicated ownership of the property to respondent in the unlawful detainer case on the basis of his title thereto. Full ownership of the subject property was surrendered to Consuelo Rivera upon the death of Remigio, Sr. through an extrajudicial partition signed by all the compulsory heirs. Thus, Consuelo had every right to dispose of the property as she deemed fit. Moreover, the lower court correctly ruled that petitioners had no hereditary rights over the property in representation or substitution of their father as the latter was still alive.

We stress, however, that this adjudication, is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.^[13]

Lastly, respondent rightfully omitted Remigio, Jr. as party in the illegal detainer case as he was not the one in actual, physical possession of the subject property, but petitioners. While petitioners insist that the TCT issued to respondent shows that the property was part of the inheritance left by Remigio, Sr. which gives them the right to assert and protect the interest of their father Remigio, Jr. over his share in the property, this issue, coupled with the alleged fictitious or fraudulent sale of the property to respondent, must be tried by petitioners in a separate proceeding only for that purpose as it is settled that an unlawful detainer case resolves only the issue of physical or material possession.^[14]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The impugned decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 21, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo at 55-60.

^[2] Deed of Sale, Rollo at 61-62.

^[3] At the time the ejectment case was filed, respondent was still residing in San Jose, California; See ejectment complaint, Rollo at 40.

^[4] Rollo at 40-43.

^[5] CA Rollo at 26-31.

^[6] Rollo at 70-75.

^[7] Id. at 29-36. Penned by then Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria-Tirona.

^[8] Rodil Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 370 SCRA 79 (2001).

^[9] Pengson vs. Ocampo, Jr., 360 SCRA 420 (2001).

^[10] Diu vs. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452 (2000).

^[11] Heirs of Placido Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368 (1996).

^[12] Corpus vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 275 (1997).

^[13] Hilario vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 420 (1996).

^[14] Pengson vs. Ocampo, Jr., supra.

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FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. NO. 152483, July 14, 2006 ]

RURAL BANK OF SIATON, (NEGROS ORIENTAL), INC., PETITIONER, VS. FELIX MACAJILOS AND QUIRICO MACAJILOS, JR., RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 18, 2001 Decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51290, which affirmed the July 12, 1995 Decision^[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 9049, and the November 12, 2001 Resolution^[3] denying petitioner Rural Bank of Siaton, Inc.'s (RBSI) motion for reconsideration.

The controversy arose from the complaint for removal of cloud over title to and/or recovery of real property and damages filed by Felix Macajilos and Quirico Macajilos, Jr. (Macajilos) against RBSI and Fidela Macalipay (Fidela) on July 27, 1987.

In their complaint,^[4] Macajilos alleged that they are the children of the late Gregoria Macalipay Macajilos who during her lifetime owned and possessed a parcel of residential land situated at Poblacion, Siaton, Negros Oriental with an area of 441 square meters; that upon Gregoria's death on July 25, 1959, Macajilos inherited the subject property as compulsory heirs of Gregoria, their father Quirico Macajilos, Sr. having predeceased Gregoria; that in 1975, Macajilos allowed Juanito Macalipay, a nephew of Gregoria to build a house on the subject property where he lived together with his wife Fidela, and their son, Lamberto; that Fidela and Lamberto continued to live in the house even after the death of Juanito; that on February 12, 1975, Fidela executed an "Affidavit of Heirship" before a Notary Public at Dumaguete City falsely claiming to be the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay and adjudicating to herself the subject property; that the tax declaration in the name of Gregoria Macalipay was cancelled and transferred to the name of Fidela under Tax Declaration No. 022478; that Lamberto was the manager of RBSI when Fidela obtained a loan using as collateral the subject property; that Fidela defaulted thus the subject property was foreclosed and sold at public auction with RBSI as the only and highest bidder; that Fidela failed to redeem the property thus RBSI was able to transfer the tax declaration to its name; that Macajilos have always been in actual possession under claim of ownership of the subject property from the time of their mother's death up to the present; that RBSI knew that Fidela did not own the subject property; that Macajilos filed a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document (Criminal Case No. 9096 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Dumaguete City, Branch I) against Fidela and Lamberto immediately upon discovery of the foreclosure sale; that in her counter affidavit in the preliminary investigation of that criminal case, Fidela denied that she signed the "Affidavit of Heirship".

In its answer,^[5] RBSI claimed it considered Fidela to be the owner of the subject property as she was in actual physical possession thereof when she applied for a loan; that Macajilos maliciously built a house on the subject property pretending to be the owners thereof; that, if they owned the subject property, they are already in estoppel since the mortgage document was duly registered with the Register of Deeds and they have constructive notice thereof; that the extrajudicial foreclosure and the public auction proceedings were duly published and that the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale in favor of RBSI and the final deed of sale were registered with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Negros Oriental.

On the other hand, Fidela averred in her answer^[6] that the property belonged to her late husband, Juanito Macalipay; that she lacks formal education and anything she did was the work of her son, Lamberto, who was at the time the manager of RBSI.

After trial, the trial court found in favor of Macajilos, thus:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the foreclosure of the mortgaged property null and void ab initio;

2. Declaring [Macajilos] the rightful owners of the land subject matter of this case;

3. Ordering the Provincial Assessor's Office to cancel Tax Dec. No. 022478 in the name of Fidela Macalipay and issue another Tax Declaration in the name of Felix Macajilos and Quirico Macajilos covering the same property;

4. Ordering the Rural Bank of Siaton, Inc. to immediately release from mortgage the land covered by Tax Dec. 022478 in the name of Fidela Macalipay; and

5. Ordering the Rural Bank of Siaton, Inc. to pay [Macajilos] the following:

a. P10,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
d. costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.^[7]

The trial court noted that RBSI failed to ascertain whether Fidela was the lawful owner of the property being mortgaged. Rather, it relied on the tax declaration in Fidela's name and the "Affidavit of Ownership and Possession" that she executed. No investigator inspected the premises. Thus, the trial court ruled that RBSI must suffer for its failure to investigate and determine the lawful owner of the subject property who turned out to be Macajilos.

The Court of Appeals denied RBSI's appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Hence, this petition.

The assigned errors revolve around four principal issues: (1) who between Macajilos and RBSI has a superior right over the property, (2) assuming the Macajilos brothers have a better right, whether RBSI was a mortgagee-buyer in good faith of the subject property, (3) assuming the Macajilos brothers have a better right, whether they are barred from recovering the subject property due to estoppel and laches, and (4) whether the award of damages in favor of Macajilos was proper.

RBSI principally raises questions of fact that have been settled by the court a quo. As a general rule, questions of fact are not covered by a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because it is limited to a review of errors of law committed by the appellate court especially so in the case at bar where the findings of fact of the trial court and Court of Appeals coincide and are, thus, binding on this Court.^[8] However, RBSI claims that the instant case falls under recognized exceptions to this general rule because the lower courts' conclusions are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures,^[9] and are based on a misapprehension of facts.^[10]

After a review of the records, we rule that RBSI failed to impugn the ruling of the lowers courts on the main issue of ownership over the subject property. However, the award of damages should be modified by deleting the award of exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal bases.

Anent the first issue, RBSI contends that Fidela owned the mortgaged property based on her answer to the complaint where she asserted that she inherited the subject property from her late husband, Juanito Macalipay. It argues that the lower courts should not have given credence to the subsequent repudiation by Fidela of her ownership over the subject property during the pre-trial conference as the same was done allegedly in exchange for her being dropped from the instant case.

The contention lacks merit.

To begin with, Fidela was not dropped from the case. During the hearing on April 18, 1988, the trial court sought to have Fidela dropped from the case considering her admission during the pre-trial conference that Macajilos owned the subject property. However, counsel for Macajilos objected.^[11] Consequently, Atty. Rosalinda Ybañez continued to represent Fidela throughout the trial of this case.

Moreover, RBSI has failed to produce evidence to show that Fidela's admission was not freely and knowingly given. While it is true that Fidela was no longer presented as a witness after the pre-trial conference for reasons not borne out by the records, this does not necessarily mean that her repudiation of ownership over the subject property was prompted by ill-will against RBSI. The pre-trial order dated December 2, 1987 reflected Fidela's admissions during the pre-trial conference:

2. Co-defendant Fidela Macalipay's claims: that the property in question did really belong to plaintiffs [herein respondents Macajilos brothers] by virtue of their rightful succession to the same; that it was her own son, Lamberto Macalipay, who subsequently became an officer-in-charge as manager of co-defendant Rural Bank of Siaton, who so maneuvered her into signing certain documents, in effect making her a debtor of Rural Bank of Siaton, which circumstances were never explained to her by her son Lamberto Macalipay; and that as a consequence of it, said Rural Bank of Siaton did grant a loan to her although the proceeds of said loan only went into the hands of Lamberto Macalipay, her son; that Fidela Macalipay recognizes the fact that she absolutely had nothing, and in fact still has nothing, to do with the property in question, the same property's ownership being always that of plaintiffs, which ownership she recognizes;^[12] (Italics supplied)

Although the records do not contain the transcript during the pre-trial conference, it should be noted that on April 18, 1988, the trial court recalled the events that transpired during the pre-trial conference where Fidela freely and knowingly acknowledged that Macajilos were the rightful owners of the subject property, thus:

COURT:

Then, what happened now[?] Did you convince Fidela that she was just a daughter-in law? In this case, Fidela was a daughter-in-law of...

Logronio:^[13]

The first cousin of the plaintiffs.

COURT:

Fidela Macalipay whom you are representing is merely the daughter...

Ybañez:^[14]

Is the mother of Lamberto...

COURT:

Wait a minute, ... is the wife of the plaintiff's cousin?

Ybañez:

Yes, your honor.

COURT:

And even her husband, the plaintiff's cousin, had nothing to do with this property, right?

Ybañez:

Yes, that is what the defendant...

COURT:

And even your client, the co-defendant Fidela Macalipay, admits that it was only her son, Lamberto, who soon became OIC...

Logronio:

Who was the OIC at the time.

COURT:

Yes, who soon became the OIC of the Rural Bank who did something using Fidela's name. Is that correct?

Logronio:

Yes, your honor.

x x x x

COURT:

But Fidela said, "Yes, the plaintiff really owned this property," admitting it.

Ybañez:

Yes, your honor.

COURT:

What is the problem of this case now?

Logronio:

So, we have no more problem with Fidela, as far as ownership is concerned. Our target now is the Rural Bank of Siaton who appears to have purchased this property and the foreclosure, and have it transferred to their name and even threatening to eject the plaintiffs who are the real owners x x x.^[15] (Emphasis supplied)

As regards Fidela's initial assertion of ownership over the subject property, we agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the same should not be given weight. It bears stressing that only a thumb mark appears on top of her printed name at the last page of her answer and the name of the lawyer who prepared the same was not even indicated. The records also show that Fidela's answer was belatedly filed with the trial court. In her opposition^[16] to the motion to have her declared in default, there was a plea for understanding and a statement that the attached answer was prepared by an unnamed lawyer, without being formally engaged, out of pity and compassion for Fidela who was an indigent. Thus, as between the allegations in the answer which was merely thumbmarked by Fidela and prepared by an unknown lawyer, and her admissions in open court with the assistance of her counsel of record, Atty. Rosalinda Ybañez, during the pre-trial conference of this case, the lower courts correctly gave weight to the latter.

At any rate, the lower courts' finding that the subject property rightly belonged to Macajilos was not principally grounded on Fidela's admission. Rather, this admission merely confirmed the undisputed documentary evidence which showed Gregoria Macalipay as the owner of the subject property and the same passed on to her two sons upon her death. The records show that Tax Declaration No. 858^[17] covering the period prior to the year 1949,^[18] Tax Declaration No. 13895^[19] for the year 1949, Tax Declaration No. 25864^[20] for the year 1969 and Tax Declaration No. 10651^[21] for the year 1974 over the subject property were all in the name of Gregoria Macalipay. It is true that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, however, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property.^[22] Coupled with her uncontested actual possession of the subject property, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership over the subject property by Gregoria Macalipay,^[23] the mother of herein respondents Macajilos.

The tax declarations in the name of Gregoria Macalipay takes on great significance because Fidela tacked her claim of ownership to that of Gregoria Macalipay. In 1975, Fidela had Tax Declaration No. 10651 in the name of Gregoria Macalipay cancelled through the execution of an "Affidavit of Heirship" where she claimed to be the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay. Yet, she was merely the wife of Juanito who was a nephew of Gregoria. Neither she nor Juanito could inherit from Gregoria whose compulsory heirs are respondents Macajilos. Clearly, the "Affidavit of Heirship" was fraudulent and could never be Fidela's source of ownership over the subject property. Neither could Tax Declaration No. 022478 in the name of Fidela and the "Affidavit of Ownership and Possession" be the source of any derivative right of ownership of RBSI over the subject property considering that these documents were the products of the aforementioned fraudulent scheme. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the mortgage over the subject property and the foreclosure proceedings were a nullity, and that respondents Macajilos brothers should be declared the lawful owners of the subject property.

We note that in its Memorandum,^[24] RBSI contended, among others, that should this Court rule in favor of Macajilos, the mortgage should be declared valid insofar as the one-half portion of the subject property is concerned, based on the alleged admission by respondent Quirico Macajilos, Jr. on cross-examination that there was an oral settlement of the estate of Gregoria Macalipay where respondents Macajilos brothers agreed that the subject property should be apportioned between respondent Quirico Macajilos, Jr. and Fidela Macalipay.

This issue is being raised by RBSI for the first time on appeal and only belatedly in its memorandum before this Court. Well-settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.^[25] An issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.^[26] Thus, we cannot bend backwards to examine this issue raised by RBSI at this late stage in the proceedings.

Be that as it may, even if we were to consider RBSI's new theory and, thus, assume that the aforementioned oral settlement did take place, the relinquishment of respondent Felix Macajilos' one-half share in the subject property in favor of Fidela would amount to an oral donation of real property which, under Article 749^[27] of the Civil Code, is null and void.^[28] This void donation to Fidela did not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription because, as will be discussed in detail shortly, RBSI was a mortgagee-buyer in bad faith. Only six years had elapsed from the auction sale to the filing of the instant case, which is less than the required 30-year-period for extraordinary acquisitive prescription^[29] to set in.

Anent the second issue, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that RBSI was a mortgagee-buyer in bad faith. The subject property was mortgaged three times by Fidela to RBSI, to wit: in 1975 for P2,000.00, in 1976 for 10,000.00, and in 1978 for P12,300.00. After fully paying the first two mortgage debts, Fidela failed to pay the third thus the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction with RBSI as the only and highest bidder. However, in contracting the aforesaid mortgages, RBSI failed to exercise the proper diligence in verifying the true owners of the subject property. Certainly, a mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagor's title but RBSI, especially because it is a banking institution, must have at least exercised due diligence before entering into said contract. Banks are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest.^[30]

It is a standard practice for banks before approving a loan to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral and to investigate who are the real owners thereof.^[31] However, in the case at bar, no investigator was sent to the location of the subject property to verify the real owners thereof. Instead, RBSI relied solely on Tax Declaration No. 022478 in the name of Fidela as well as the "Affidavit of Possession and Ownership" that RBSI required her to execute.^[32] Atty. Teodoro Singson, a witness for RBSI, explained that when RBSI was established in 1974, there was so much money coming from the Central Bank that the bank was in a hurry to grant loans and was not strict with the documents presented by prospective borrowers as collateral.^[33]

What is more, Atty. Singson admitted that RBSI was aware that Tax Declaration No. 022478 in the name of Fidela was previously in the name of Gregoria Macalipay and that the tax declaration was transferred to the name of Fidela through the "Affidavit of Heirship" she executed naming her as the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay.^[34] However, it did not take steps to ascertain whether Fidela was, indeed, the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay. Rather, it placed full faith on the false representation of Fidela that her husband, Juanito Macalipay, was the son of Gregoria Macalipay.^[35] To make matters worse, neither did it inquire from Lamberto, son of Fidela, who was then the manager of the bank when the first loan was granted to her in 1975, as to whether his father, Juanito Macalipay, was the son of Gregoria Macalipay.^[36]

As its defense, RBSI dwells on the alleged error of the trial court in finding Lamberto as the manager of RBSI when the mortgage debts were contracted when in fact Lamberto was a mere clerk-typist. However, the records show that RBSI categorically admitted during the pre-trial conference that Lamberto was the manager of the bank when the loan transactions took place.^[37] Even in its Reply^[38] dated June 21, 2002 filed before this Court, RBSI admitted that Lamberto was the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the bank prior to 1978 or when the first two mortgage debts were contracted by his mother, Fidela, and that Lamberto was demoted to the rank of a clerk-typist only in 1978.^[39]

At any rate, we need not belabor this point because whether Lamberto was an OIC or a mere clerk-typist of the bank when the mortgage debts were contracted will not excuse RBSI from exercising prudence in verifying the true owners of the subject property. The fact that Lamberto was the son of its prospective debtor, Fidela, should have prompted RBSI to be more cautious in granting the loan.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that RBSI chose to close its eyes to facts which should have put a reasonable man on his guard.^[40] Far from being prudent, RBSI hastily granted the loan without investigation, and placed full faith on the false documents submitted by Fidela. Consequently, it cannot now claim that it acted in good faith on the belief that there was no defect in the title of Fidela.

While the findings of the lower courts that RBSI was a mortgagee-buyer in bad faith is in accord with the evidence on record, we must point out, however, that they overlooked the fact that the subject property is an unregistered piece of land. As we ruled in David v. Bandin,^[41] which was reiterated in Sales v. Court of Appeals,^[42] "the issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the property is an unregistered land. One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril. His claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e., without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property, would not protect him if it turns out that the seller does not actually own the property." Nevertheless, the application of this doctrine will not affect the outcome of this case. RBSI bought the property during the auction sale at its own peril and must suffer the consequences of its failure to investigate the true owners of the subject property who turned out to be respondents Macajilos brothers. Although the discussion on RBSI's bad faith would now seem superfluous given the application of this doctrine, the finding of bad faith is still relevant in the resolution of the last issue with respect to the award of damages.

Anent the third issue, we likewise agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondent Macajilos brothers are not barred by laches or estoppel from recovering the ownership of the subject property. They are not estopped from denying the representations of Fidela that she owns the subject property because they were never privy to the loan agreements between the bank and Fidela. The fact that the mortgages and subsequent foreclosure proceedings were duly registered with the register of deeds will not cure their nullity because Fidela never owned the subject property.

Neither can respondent Macajilos brothers be said to have slept on their rights. Essentially, laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.^[43]

In the case at bar, respondents Macajilos brothers performed acts which showed their intent to assert their rightful ownership over the subject property. Specifically, in 1980, respondent Quirico Macajilos, Jr. came across the notice of public auction of the subject property in the public market.^[44] Upon investigation with the provincial assessor's office, he discovered that Fidela had mortgaged the subject property to RBSI by transferring the tax declaration to her name after falsely claiming in the "Affidavit of Heirship" that she was the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay.

Consequently, in 1981 or within a year from the discovery of the fraudulent scheme perpetuated by Fidela, respondents Macajilos brothers filed a criminal case against Fidela and Lamberto for estafa through falsification of public document.^[45] After knowing about the foreclosure of the subject property, respondent Quirico Macajilos, Jr. took possession of the subject property^[46] and demanded Fidela to vacate. In 1987, the instant case to remove cloud over the title and/or recovery of real property and damages was filed by respondents Macajilos brothers against RBSI as an off-shoot of the latter's demand on respondent Quirico Macajilos to vacate the subject property. All in all, these acts show that respondents Macajilos brothers did not sleep on their rights but reasonably took steps to assert their ownership over the subject property.

Anent the fourth issue, we note that the task of fixing the amount of damages primarily rests with the trial court as the circumstances of each case may warrant provided that the bases therefor are fully established.^[47] In the case at bar, the trial court awarded moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees in view of its finding that RBSI acted in bad faith.^[48] As previously discussed, this finding of bad faith by the trial court is sufficiently supported by the evidence on record. However, the award of exemplary damages should be deleted since there is no clear and convincing proof that RBSI acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner to warrant the imposition of the same.^[49]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The April 18, 2001 Decision and November 12, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51290 which affirmed the July 12, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 9049 declaring respondents Felix Macajilos and Quirico Macajilos, Jr. the rightful owners of the subject property, are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 30-39. Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.

^[2] Records, pp. 146-153. Penned by Judge Teopisto L. Calumpang.

^[3] Rollo, p. 29. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Alicia L. Santos.

^[4] Records, pp. 1-5.

^[5] Id. at 9-11.

^[6] Id. at 20-21.

^[7] Id. at 153.

^[8] First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280, 340 (1996).

^[9] Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257, 270 (1953).

^[10] De la Cruz v. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26, 28 (1953).

^[11] TSN, April 13, 1988, pp. 6-7.

^[12] Records, p. 33.

^[13] Counsel for Macajilos.

^[14] Counsel for Macalipay.

^[15] TSN, April 13, 1988, pp. 2-3.

^[16] Records, pp. 16-17.

^[17] Exhibit "H," records, p. 63.

^[18] The records are not clear as to what period Tax Declaration No. 858 covers but it can be reasonably presumed that it covers the period prior to 1949 since this tax declaration contained an annotation that it was canceled by Tax Declaration No. 13895 which covered the period starting 1949. Both tax declarations are in the name of Gregoria Macalipay.

^[19] Exhibit "H-4," records, p. 66.

^[20] Exhibit "H-2," id. at 64.

^[21] Exhibit "H-3," id. at 65.

^[22] Tan v. Mueco, 420 Phil. 497, 503 (2001).

^[23] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 283, 297 (2000).

^[24] Rollo, pp. 111-130.

^[25] Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93640, January 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 151, 165.

^[26] Gevero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 77029, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 201, 208.

^[27] In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

^[28] Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530, 534 (1953).

^[29] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

^[30] Tomas v. Tomas, G.R. No. L-36897, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 280, 286.

^[31] Id. at 285-286.

^[32] TSN, April 19, 1991, p. 15.

^[33] Id.

^[34] Id. at 11-12.

^[35] Id.

^[36] Id. at 14.

^[37] Records, p. 34. The pre-trial order dated December 2, 1987 relevantly states:
3. Co-defendant Rural Bank of Siaton Incorporated's claims. That the property in question was legitimately collateraled by loan applicant Fidela Macalipay; that a loan agreement indeed materialized with the same property as collateral therefor; that indeed Lamberto Macalipay, son of co-defendant Fidela Macalipay, when these transactions were undertaken, had served as OIC manager of said Rural bank; that per documents introduced to the bank, the bank had no way of determining the veracity of the claim of plaintiffs because it was only relying on the documents presented to it by then loan applicant Fidela Macalipay. (Italics supplied)

^[38] Rollo, pp. 81-90.

^[39] Id. at 82.

^[40] Embrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51457, June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 335, 344-345.

^[41] G.R. Nos. L-48322, L-49712, L-49716 & L-49687, April 8, 1987, 149 SCRA 140, 150.

^[42] G.R. No. 40145, July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 858, 865-866.

^[43] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 236, 244 (1999).

^[44] TSN, May 11, 1988, p. 15.

^[45] Id. at 15-16; TSN, August 10, 1988, p. 11.

^[46] TSN, May 11, 1988, p. 19.

^[47] Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722, 742 (1966).

^[48] Records, p. 152.

^[49] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2232.

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