FIRST
DIVISION
[G.R.
No. L-28032. September 24, 1986]
FRANCISCA
TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
D
E C I S I O N
NARVASA,
J.:
This
case which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the
parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial
Compromise":
"1.
They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs,
Francisca Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate
relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
2.
They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho have as
a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of
Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.
The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto
as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this stipulation.
3.
They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four
(4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of
plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-1',
and 'B-2'.
4.
They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the
afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children
in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5.
They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-1', were adjudicated
as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her
father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
6.
They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without
issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels
of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate
heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was
subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B',
'B-2', 'C' and 'C-1'.
7.
They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her
rights and interests in the parcels of land above-mentioned were inherited by
her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the
usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8.
They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived
his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9.
The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half
(½) of all the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned as her inheritance
from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other
half of the said seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned by virtue of the
reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the
laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon
legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of
the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the
said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.
11.
The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the
legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs,
as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with
said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited
by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths
(3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven
(7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals
collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes
corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12.
In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted
upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore
and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their
claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs'
share in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to award),
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the
respective parties."
On
the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven
parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as
follows:
"*
* *. Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties,
the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco
are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this
action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8)
of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco
Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or
real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and
inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their claims against each other
for damages including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the
legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court renders judgment
adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165,
T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The
defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of
all rents received by her on the properties involved in this action for the
purpose of determining the legal interests which should be paid to the
plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in question.
Not
satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The
issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by
the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third
degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable
property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in
Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"Art.
891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
(811)",
or,
as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are
subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That
question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, where the reservatario
was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line
of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also
made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles
of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole
blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and
nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code.
Said the Court:
"The
issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva
troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista,
and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus),
but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole
blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among then equally,
or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of
the nephews of the half blood?
"*
* *.
The
case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the
subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of
the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special
rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant (reservista).
"*
* *.
The
stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to
the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations
between one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call
for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in
the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the
jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death
of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to
all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to
the descendant (prepositus) excluding those reservatarios of more
remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894;
Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third
degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
"Following
the order prescribed by law in
legitimate succession, when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be
alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable
property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person
from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the
fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
"In
spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part
of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property
came. * * *." (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) (See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41
Phil. 915)
Proximity
of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood
brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios
inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of
nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals
of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In
other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within
that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession, since Art.
891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the
circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application
should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the
law. As expressed by Manresa
in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
"*
* * creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse,
sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion
mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y
aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de
sucesion, en aquellos extremos no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan
fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se crea."
The
restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil
Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified
by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal
of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980)."
Reversion
of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as
aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they
are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as
the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris where Arts. 1001,
1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
"Nevertheless,
the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts
and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This
is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines,
that provide as follows:
"Art.
1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
"Art.
1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares."
"Art.
1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes."
"Art.
1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate."
Under
the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more
clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately
preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and
954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
"Art.
952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased."
"Art.
954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The
latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among than by
reason of the whole blood."
It
will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the
surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or
widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the
spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased,
but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other
collaterals."
"*
* *.
We,
therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession,
a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so
long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed. * * *"
This
conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra,
that as to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit
from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
"*
* *. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil.
237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista,
but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are
the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) * * *."
To
the same effect is Cano vs. Director of Lands, where it was ruled
that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are
not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of
title in the name of the reservista over property subject to reserva
troncal identifies the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter's rights as such:
"The
contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the
reservable property from the reservista. This is not true.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa
nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario
receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus),
said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's
lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios
that survive the reservista, the matter must be deemed to have enjoyed
no more than a life interest in the reservable property.
It
is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista,
the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this
case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the
latter. * * *."
Had
the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is
no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the
defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate
succession.
There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because
"the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva"; i.e., the property
took a "detour" through an ascendant -- thereby giving rise to the
reservation -- before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon
the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the
lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with
costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO
ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera,
Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., (Chairman), no part.
Supreme Court E-Library Search
FIRST DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
Petitioner,
- versus
-
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA
YU-LEE,
Respondents.
|
|
G.R. No. 158230
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 16, 2008
|
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 12 July 2002 and the Resolution dated 9 May
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53890.
The Facts
In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese
citizen, bought Lot No. 398 from Vicenta Arcenas, Francisco,
Carmen Ramon, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose,
and Manuel, all surnamed Dinglasan. Lot No. 398,
with an area of 1,574 square meters, is located at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street in Roxas City. In February 1944, Lee Liong died intestate
and was survived by his widow Ang Chia, and his sons
Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. On 30 June
1947, the surviving heirs of Lee Liong extrajudicially settled the
estate of the deceased and partitioned among themselves Lot
No. 398. When Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No.
398 was transferred by succession
to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee (Elizabeth)
and Pacita Yu-Lee (Pacita).
In the 1956 case of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, involving Lot No. 398,
the Court held that even if the sale of the property was null and void for
violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien, still
the doctrine of in pari delicto barred the
sellers from recovering the title to the property. Eleven years later, in
the case of Lee Bun Ting v. Judge Aligaen, the Court ordered the trial court to dismiss the complaint of the
Dinglasans for the recovery of Lot No. 398.
Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the Court held
that the case was a mere relitigation of the same
issues previously adjudged with finality in the Dinglasan case, involving
the same parties or their privies and concerning the same subject matter.
On 7 September 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita (private
respondents) filed a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398
because the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. On 3
October 2001, the Court held that the trial court’s order of
reconstitution was void for lack of factual support because it was based merely
on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration
Authority.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 1995, petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City a
Complaint for Reversion of Title against private respondents and the
Register of Deeds of Roxas City, praying
that (1) the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be set aside
for being null and void ab initio; and (2) Lot
No. 398 be reverted to the public domain for the State’s disposal in accordance
with law.
In their Answer, private respondents invoked as affirmative defenses: (1)
prescription; (2) private ownership of Lot No. 398; and (3) Lee Liong’s being a buyer
in good faith and for value. Furthermore, private respondents claimed
that as Filipino citizens, they are qualified to acquire Lot No. 398 by succession.
The Register of Deeds of Roxas City did not
file an answer.
On 7 May 1996, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the reversion of
Lot No. 398 to the State.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated 12 July 2002,
reversing the trial court’s decision and declaring private respondents as the
absolute and lawful owners of Lot No. 398. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 9 May 2003.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ordered the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. The
trial court held that private respondents could not have acquired a valid title
over Lot No. 398 because the sale of the lot to their predecessor-in-interest
Lee Liong was null and void. Being an innocent
purchaser in good faith and for value did not cure Lee Liong’s
disqualification as an alien who is prohibited from acquiring land under the
Constitution. The trial court further held that prescription cannot be invoked
against the State as regards an action for reversion or reconveyance of land to the
State.
The Ruling of the Court of
Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the State is not
barred by prescription. However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
erred in ordering the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. Although the sale
of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong violated the
constitutional prohibition on aliens acquiring land, the Court of Appeals noted
that Lot No. 398 had already been acquired by private respondents through succession. The transfer of Lot No. 398 to
private respondents, who are Filipino citizens qualified to acquire
lands, can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial
transfer. The flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is deemed valid considering that the objective of the
constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep
our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the lone issue that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE APPEALED
DECISION AND DECLARED PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THE ABSOLUTE AND LAWFUL OWNERS AND
POSSESSORS OF LOT NO. 398 OF ROXAS CITY CADASTRE CONSIDERING THAT LEE LIONG,
WHO IS AN ALIEN, AND THUS, CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED TO OWN REAL PROPERTY IN
THE PHILIPPINES, ACQUIRED NO RIGHT OR TITLE OVER SUBJECT LOT WHICH HE COULD
HAVE TRANSMITTED BY SUCCESSION TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS’ PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner argues that since the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong was void, Lot
No. 398 never became part of the deceased Lee Liong’s estate. Hence, Lot
No. 398 could not be transmitted by succession
to Lee Liong’s surviving heirs and eventually
to private respondents.
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s
position. The
circumstances of this case are similar to the case of De Castro v. Teng Queen Tan, wherein a residential
lot was sold to a Chinese citizen. Upon the death of the alien vendee, his heirs
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased and the
subject land was transferred to a son who was a naturalized Filipino.
Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a suit for annulment of sale for
alleged violation of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto, the Court
sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of
the sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino
citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.
Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a
Chinese citizen, his widow and two sons extrajudicially settled his
estate, including Lot No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by
succession to their respective spouses,
herein private respondents who are Filipino citizens.
We now discuss whether reversion proceedings is still viable considering that
Lot No. 398 has already been transfered to Filipino
citizens. In the reconstitution case of Lee v. Republic of the
Philippines involving Lot No.
398, this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an
action for reversion or escheat of
lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands under the
Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it was already
transferred to Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings, thus:
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because
of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an
action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other
defenses, as hereafter set forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings
because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee
Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and
subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein [Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu Lee].
Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not
dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or
private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of
non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy
violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and
own such land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid.” Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos
may no longer be impugned on the basis of invalidity of the initial transfer.
The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40
years from the promulgation of the case of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, where the Court held
that the sale of Lot No. 398 was null and void for violating the constitutional
prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If petitioner had commenced
reversion proceedings when Lot No. 398 was still in the hands of the original
vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, then reversion of the
land to the State would undoubtedly be allowed. However, this is not the case
here. When petitioner instituted the action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot
No. 398 had already been transferred by succession
to private respondents who are Filipino citizens.
Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the
flaw in the original transaction is considered cured. As held in Chavez
v. Public Estates Authority:
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land
to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first
transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the
alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale
was validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land
ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the
constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is
subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a
qualified party. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private respondents
who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer
be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper since the land
is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 12 July
2002 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 53890.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices Godardo A.
Jacinto and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
99 Phil. 427 (1956).
167 Phil. 164 (1977).
Lee v. Republic of the Philippines,
418 Phil. 793 (2001).
Records, pp. 1-4.
Halili v. CA,
350 Phil. 906 (1998); United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,
No. L-34672, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 446.
Supreme Court E-Library SearchTHIRD
DIVISION
[G.R.
NO. 117246. August 21, 1995]
BENIGNO
MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL,
ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA
MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON.
NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
VITUG,
J.:
The
property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the
inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any
surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners,
the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling,
initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an
extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship,
Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his
wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively,
06 August 1960, 05 February 1981, and 04 November 1976.
Juan
Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel
of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate
of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and
Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by
Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child
of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take
private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as
their own "daughter."
On
03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a
one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel
died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February
1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On
05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land
covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of
Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication
with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles (OCT P-20594, OCT
P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new
titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the
name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in
favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and
Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered
by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently
did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
The
case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a
quo for summary judgment.
The
trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed
the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato
of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real
parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered
to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay (a) respondent Modesta
Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary
damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation expenses and
(b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for
exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
The
petition before us raises the following contentions: That -
"1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS)
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS
THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE
992 OF THE SAME CODE.
“2 THE LOWER COURT,
IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY,
RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR
TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT
THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.
“3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT
WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG."
Petitioners
argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate
(while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the
provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing
thusly:
"Art.
994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be
succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire
estate.
"If
the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the
other half." (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondents,
in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992
of the Civil Code, which reads:
"Art.
992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child." (Underscoring supplied.)
Article
992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the "principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family." The doctrine rejects succession
ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives,
on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does
not totally disavow such succession
in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of
the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
This
"barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate
family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. His thesis:
"What
is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,
as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted
that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the
illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear
that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as
the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters,
cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law
speaks of 'brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an
illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as
to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and
sisters." (Emphasis supplied)
The
Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain,"
firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. In Diaz, we have said:
"Article
992 of the New Civil Code x x x prohibits absolutely
a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may
have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes
of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in
life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment."
The
rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other
cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers
who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot
succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession
is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered
inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part
as to produce a harmonious whole.
In
passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of
preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz:
|
|
Order of Preference
|
|
Order of Concurrence
|
|
(a)
|
Legitimate Children and Descendants
|
(a)
|
Legitimate Children and Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse
|
|
(b)
|
Legitimate Parents and Ascendants
|
(b)
|
Legitimate Parents and Ascendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse
|
|
(c)
|
Illegitimate Children and Descendants
(in the absence of ICDs and LPAs, the Illegitimate Parents)
|
(c)
|
Illegitimate Children and Descendants and Surviving
Spouse
|
|
(d)
|
Surviving Spouse
|
(d)
|
Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
|
|
(e)
|
Brothers and Sisters/Nephews and
Nieces
|
(e)
|
Brothers and Sisters/Nephews and
Nieces
and Surviving Spouse
|
|
(f)
|
Other Collateral Relatives (within the
fifth civil degree)
|
(f)
|
Alone
|
|
(g)
|
State
|
(g)
|
Alone
|
In
her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not
an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon),
without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor
a legal heir.
We
must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity
of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's
issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor
of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest” in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to
initiate the complaint.
The
Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An
adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily
so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as
it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby
DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO
ORDERED.
Feliciano,
Acting Chief Justice, (Chairman), Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.
Rollo, pp. 7-8.
Desiderio Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence
on Succession,
8th ed., 1991, pp. 423-424.
40 O.G. (First S) No. 3, p. 196 citing 7 Manresa 110.
150 SCRA 645.
181 SCRA 861.
Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567.
Cacho v. Udan, 13 SCRA 693.
Llorente v. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Allarde v.
Abaya, 57 Phil. 909.
Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29.
Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890.
Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042.
Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688; Araneta v. Concepcion,
99 Phil. 709.
Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69679, 18
October 1988.
A real-party-in-interest plaintiff is one who has a legal right
while a real-party-in-interest defendant is one who has a correlative
obligations whose acts or omission violates the legal right of the former (Gan
Hock v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 223 [1991]). Necessarily, a
party in interest in a civil case is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to avail of the
suit. (Salonga v. Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil 125;
Lanzar v. Guerrero, 29 SCRA 107).
Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488; Tiu v.
Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 51.
Supreme Court E-Library SearchSECOND
DIVISION
[G.R.
No. 66574. June 17, 1987]
ANSELMA
DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners,
and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
PARAS,
J.:
Private
respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero", praying among
other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her
favor and that she be appointed as special administratrix of the properties of
the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It
is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2)
that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4)
that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero
and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo
Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976' 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time
of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor
natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge
Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before
the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4
- is the Petition for for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate
of Pablo Santero;
"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5
- is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of
Pascual Santero;
"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7
- is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent
Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
"e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21
- is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero."
Felisa
Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was
allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual
Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner
Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and
Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further
taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero
and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta
Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation
of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti,
filed by Anselma Diaz.
On
May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin
"from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate
estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not
an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
After
her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated
November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14,
1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of
which reads -
"WHEREFORE,
finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law
applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the
Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere
in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
"Costs
against the oppositors-appellees."
The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein)
was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984
hence, the present petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT
OF ERRORS
I.
The Decision erred
in ignoring the right to intestate succession
of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art.
978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering
a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II.
The Decision erred
in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero to
represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession
to the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero (Art. 982);
III.
The Decision erred
in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo
Santero, her son and father of the petitioners grandchildren Santero;
IV.
The Decision erred
in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece
and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are
her direct descendants and/or grand children;
V.
The Decision erred
in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable provisions
of law on intestate
succession; and
VI.
The Decision erred
in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are
provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.
The
real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows- who are the legal
heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero- her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The
dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein)
as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Now
then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in
their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on
the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies
the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of
representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents,
but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code
which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their
deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother, (Simona
Pamuti)"
Petitioners'
contention holds no water. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to
the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate
mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART.
992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child. (943a)
Pablo
Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the
other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero.
Article
992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and
the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon
by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Thus,
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the latter to the intestate
estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the
barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In
answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the
Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are
reproducing herewith the Reflections of the illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
"In
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code
prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil
Code of the Philippines
apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the
Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent
articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of
a legitimate child from representing him in the
intestate succession
of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either
that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article
and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in
accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections
on the Reform of Hereditary succession,
JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume
4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It
is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the
kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only
parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not
commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir
to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Lastly,
petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in
ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976
and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without
merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held
that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and
hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the
heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently,
Judge Jose Raval issued an Order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said
Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a
perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and
executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower
court to decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a
judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. The
respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a
quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin as intestate heir
of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal
of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void."
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
Fernan,
(Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Padilla,
J., took no part; principal counsel of petitioners is related to me.
Bidin,
J., no part.
RA pp. 30-35
RA pp. 35-38
R.A. p. 87
Penned by Justice Marcelino R. Veloso and concurred in by Justices
Porfirio V. Sison, Abdulwahid A. Bidin and Desiderio P. Jurado.
Motion for Reconsideration - pp. 78-79, Rollo.
F. Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fabie 40 O.G. (First
S) No. 3, p. 196).
Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing, p. 2862, Bouvier's Law
Dictionary vol. II, Third Revision, Eight Edition.
Supreme Court E-Library Search
FIRST
DIVISION
ALONZO Q.
ANCHETA,
G.R. No. 139868
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J. (Chairperson)
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-
DALAYGON,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 8, 2006
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D
E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years.
They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29,
1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate
to Richard, who was also designated as executor. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland,
U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation
of his appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as
ancillary administrator.
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12,
1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1)
Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili
Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati
property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97;
and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed
his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or
any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as
ancillary administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888. Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on
July 24, 1986.
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding
No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided
interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48
from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the
Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in
cash.
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court
in its Order dated February 12, 1988. The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing
the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard
and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey
(¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary
of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the
Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary
administrator for distribution to the heirs.
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No.
155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding
No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5
of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s
three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under
the law of the State of Maryland,
“a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property subject of the legacy.” Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his
entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
property should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and
in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition
insofar as it affects the Makati
property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided
interest in the Makati
property to respondent.
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial court’s Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No.
9625. Respondent
contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he
disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland
on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will.
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then
the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾
thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s
allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in submitting
the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625,
as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s
laws on testate and intestate succession.
Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the “best interests of the surviving
children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just
shares.” Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled
are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision
annulling the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988,
in Special Proceeding No. 9625. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998
and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is
entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey
O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the
name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA
per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that:
A)
THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO.
9625 “IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED
AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR”, ARE VALID AND
BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED
AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B)
THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD,
EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID
ORDERS.
Petitioner reiterates his
arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is
“conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment
or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the
parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined,” and
the same has already been executed.
Petitioner also contends that
that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project
of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the
partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also
imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of
Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of
the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.
Respondent argues that
petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s
estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner
was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of
knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior
partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant
laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any
opposition to the project of partition because she was not a party thereto and
she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her estate
to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special
Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.
A decree of
distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a
timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any
other judgment in rem. However,
in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set
aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon
v. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that
a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October
20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the
applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based
on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the
judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, and must be brought
within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as
basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that
petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s
declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that
is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in
accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner
was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws
in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had
already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware
of the terms of Audrey’s will, and the complaint was
filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of
immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s
acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only
after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in
Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard
that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery
of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the
terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud
complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland
that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been
committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be
counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of
partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial
court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were
all done in 1991. Respondent
cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since
it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend
the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no
other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case.
Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet
prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that
“man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes
to fool the unwary.”
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par.
(2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not
pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words,
extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the
litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where
the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away
from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at
his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit
may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case
for a new and fair hearing.
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged
is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate.
As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is
required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the
performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the
safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree
of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and
ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by
which his conduct is to be judged.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution
of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the
applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision
annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be
upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen
domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.
During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown,
among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the
Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament
dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the
Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said
court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on
September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of
Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s
will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her
national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided
in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and
testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession
is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that
“capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.”
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court
on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of
Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will
is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such
will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of
as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them; however,
petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence
the law of the State of Maryland
on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is
the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession.
Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally
disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there
was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws
was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s
protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws
apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in
1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled
in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a
senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a “big legal staff and a large
library.” He had
all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent
upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable
diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully.
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the
fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued
the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring
Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according
to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually
prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional
right to the Makati
property.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc., the Court held that
when the rule that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance
and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a
particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice
require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. The CA
likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his
concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati
property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities,
defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle
which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam
vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of
evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57
Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing
principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that
his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the
subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes
without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent
laws of Maryland
on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the
national law of Audrey O’Neill Guersey during the
proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good
faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine
laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as
indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
x
x x
It
would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey
O’Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit
the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s
action appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator
of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot
be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary
nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration
of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is
tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the
procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues
involved in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse
of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioner’s
abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not
rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under
the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was
thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property
through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond
her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of
petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse
consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of
justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to
provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special
Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public
General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, “all property of a decedent
shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass
directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for
administration and distribution,” while Section 4-408 expressly provides that
“unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes
to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the
subject of the legacy”. Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other
hand, declares that “a personal representative is a fiduciary” and as such he
is “under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent
in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as
expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances”.
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate,
consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the
cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G
Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on
to Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will,
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard
subsequently died, the entire Makati
property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course,
assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows “a legacy to pass to
the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the
subject of the legacy,” was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No.
9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of
the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan. Therein, the Court
took judicial notice of the law of Nevada
despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the
court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the
motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the
foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in
evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp.
77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again
said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the
Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator,
do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the
above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice
of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the
project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before
the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took
note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s
estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that
matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s
and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills,
and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner.
Consequently, the entire Makati
property belongs to respondent.
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions
have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the
testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of
mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in
the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished
to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument,
permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testator's having meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably
distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes.
As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:
x x x whatever public policy
or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Before
concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real property in
the Philippines, although
records do not show when and how the Guerseys
acquired the Makati
property.
Under
Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to
acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of
the Philippines,
and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned
or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha, the Court clarified
that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens
and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public
domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation
of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of
private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article
XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary
succession and when the transfer was
made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article
XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986
Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title
to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession
or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land
is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. In this case,
since the Makati property had already passed on to
respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the
acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of
the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and
the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of
his duties as an official of the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On
leave)
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
*
On leave.
CA rollo, pp. 84-88.
Id. at
89-91.
Id. at 92.
Supra, note 2.
CA rollo, pp. 93-94.
Id. at
95-98.
Id. at
99-100.
Id. at 101.
Id. at
102-103.
Id. at
104-106.
Id. at 107.
Id. at
108-109.
Id. at
114-116.
RTC Order dated December 6, 1991, CA rollo,
p. 48.
Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr.
(retired), and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr. (now Associate Justice of this Court) and Mariano M. Umali
(retired).
United Church Board of World Ministries v. Sebastian, No. L-34672, March
30, 1988, 159 SCRA 446; Halili v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 906
(1998); Lee v. Republic, 418 Phil. 793 (2001).
Supreme Court E-Library SearchTHIRD DIVISION
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, petitioner, vs. PASTORA PIEDAD, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to
intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City.
Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad,
petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the
entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were
tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the
notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and
irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the
administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting
petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought
the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal
only involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in that argument, the
appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving
nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and
consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the
distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact, thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there
is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact when the query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances, and their relation to each other and to the whole and the
probabilities of the situation."
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court,
ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention
considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest
over the case, (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties
was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and
(3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated, were issues which
did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within
the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus:
"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their
resolution are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that
intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of
Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H.
Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the estate of
Augusto H. Piedad; that the notice of hearing was published for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no
order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court;
and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of
the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.
"These facts are undisputed.
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to
the truth or falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether
intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree,
has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her
intervention; the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing
made in this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over
the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings has
already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer
of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence
of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and
interpretation of the proper law. There is doubt as to what law is applicable
on a certain undisputed state of facts.
"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of
the evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence and
relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the issues
may be had even without going to examination of facts on record."
Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate
court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate
court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take
on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a
collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a
collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated, does the
rule of proximity in intestate succession
find application among collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a
third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a
first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
The various provisions of the Civil Code
on succession
embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation
of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his
death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in
isolation of, the system set out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in
degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to
the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962
of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when
it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares,
subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full
and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between
the paternal and maternal lines."
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent
is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of
relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The
representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and
succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person
represented would have succeeded.
"ART.
970. Representation
is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited."
"ART. 971.
The representative is called to the succession
by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would
have succeeded."
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the
descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the
right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their
uncles or aunts.
"ART.
972. The right of
representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half
blood."
"ART.
974. Whenever there is
succession by representation, the
division of the estate shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that
the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the
person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit."
"ART. 975.
When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they
shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their
uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions."
The right of representation does not apply to "other
collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both
petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly,
the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate
children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly,
the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among
collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the
decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule.
In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent,
Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. x x x
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and
then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be
made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from
his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so
forth."
Accordingly –
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late
Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from
succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code –
"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters
nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall
not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral
line." -
invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law
means only that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of
succession), no preference or
distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by
the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a
paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a
first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree
relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of
relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority
in succession
to a fifth-degree relative.
WHEREFORE, the
instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Supreme Court E-Library SearchFIRST
DIVISION
[G.R.
No. 109972. April 29, 1996]
ZOSIMA
VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C.
ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES,
ELENA ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW;
SUCCESSION; RIGHT TO REDEEM PROPERTY AS
LEGAL HEIR OF HUSBAND, PART OF WHOSE ESTATE IS A SHARE IN HIS MOTHER’S
INHERITANCE. - The thrust of the petition before us is the alleged
incapacity of private respondent Socorro C. Rosales to redeem the property, she
being merely the spouse of David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a
co-heir herself in the intestate estate of Macaria. Socorro’s right to
the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria’s
estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of
whose estate is a share in his mother’s inheritance. David Rosales,
incontrovertibly, survived his mother’s death. When Macaria died her
estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who
thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself
later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over
the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her
co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David
Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally
descended from Macaria.
2.
ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; WRITTEN NOTICE OF SALE, MANDATORY. - When their interest in
the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption
arose in favor of private respondents. This right of redemption was
timely exercised by private respondents. Concededly, no written notice of
the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required
under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. The thirty-day period of redemption
had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the
right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from
the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was
initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court. The written notice
of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to
a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties
about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
APPEARANCES
OF COUNSEL
Jessie
C. Ligan for petitioner.
Federico
A. Calo for private respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
VITUG,
J.:
The
petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot
(identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, located along
Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City). Private
respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal
redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria
Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During
her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos
and the second, following the latter’s death, with Canuto Rosales. At the
time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her
grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first
marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales,
Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro
Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after Macaria’s
death, died intestate without an issue.
In
an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his
widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to
petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for
the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November
1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only
P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended merely
to save on the tax on capital gains.
Socorro
discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City Treasurer’s
Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa
of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the property. She
tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept
the amount for being much less than the lot’s current value of P80,000.00.
No settlement having been reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private
respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated against petitioner an action for
“Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction” before the Regional Trial
Court of
Butuan City.
On
29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court handed down
its decision holding, in fine, that private respondents’ right to redeem the
property had already lapsed.
An
appeal to the Court of Appeals was interposed by private respondents. the
appellate court, in its decision of 22 April 1993, reversed the court a quo;
thus:
“WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new
one is accordingly entered declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C. Rosales,
entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art. 1088, NCC) or pro indiviso
share (Art. 1620, NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of
the Butuan Cadastre, within the remaining ELEVEN (11) DAYS from finality
hereon, unless written notice of the sale and its terms are received in the
interim, under the same terms and conditions appearing under Exhibit ‘J’ and
after returning the purchase price of P23,000.00 within the foregoing period.
No cost.”
In
her recourse to this Court, petitioner assigned the following “errors:” That –
”The
Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring Socorro C. Rosales is entitled to
redeem the inheritance rights (Article 1088, NCC) or pro-indiviso share
(Article 1620, NCC) of the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the
Butuan Cadastre, for being contrary to law and evidence.
“The
Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the peculiar circumstance, in
that, the respondents’ actual knowledge, as a factor in the delay constitutes
laches.
“The
Honorable Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Socorro C. Rosales, in
effect, timely exercised the right of legal redemption when referral to
Barangay by respondent signifies bonafide intention to redeem and; that,
redemption is properly made even if there is no offer of redemption in legal
tender.
“The
Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the running of the statutory
redemption period is stayed upon commencement of Barangay proceedings.”
Still,
the thrust of the petition before us is the alleged incapacity of private
respondent Socorro C. Rosales to redeem the property, she being merely the
spouse of David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir herself in
the intestate estate of Macaria.
We
rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that
matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her
parents-in-law; however, Socorro’ s
right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in
Macaria’s estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales,
part of whose estate is a share in his mother’s inheritance.
David
Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother’s death. When Macaria died on 08
March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David
Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David
Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest
over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and
her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
“ART.
995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate
children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the
rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
Article 1001.
“xxx
xxx
xxx
“ART.
1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”
Socorro
and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales,
thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended
from Macaria.
When
their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a
right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
“ART.
1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing
by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership
is transmitted by onerous title.”
“ART.
1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.”
We
hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents.
Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs
(vendors) to the co-owners required under Article
1623 of the Civil Code –
”ART.
1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor,
or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.”
Hence,
the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent
Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day
after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan
City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial
court.
The
written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the
rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still
entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy
and status.
Even
in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, relied upon by
petitioner in contending that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a
written notice of sale, the Court made it clear that it was not reversing the
prevailing jurisprudence; said the Court:
“We
realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the
strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it
had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the
above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we
ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What
we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case.”
In
Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, notjust
days or months, after the consummation of the contracts of sale. The
complaint for legal redemption itself was there filed more than thirteen years
after the sales were concluded.
Relative
to the question posed by petitioner on private respondents’ tender of payment,
it is enough that we quote, with approval, the appellate court; viz:
“In
contrast, records clearly show that an amount was offered, as required in
Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 1 and Daza vs. Tomacruz, 58
Phil. 414, by the redemptioner-appellant during the barangay conciliation
proceedings (Answer, par. 8) but was flatly rejected by the appellee, not on
the ground that it was not the purchase price (though it appeared on the face
of the deed of sale, Exh. ‘J-1’), nor that it was offered as partial payment thereof,
but rather that it was ‘unconscionable’ based upon its ‘present value.’
(Answer, par. 8).”
All
given, we find no error in the appellate court’s finding that private
respondents are entitled to the redemption of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
Padilla
(Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Rollo, p. 49.
Rollo, p. 23.
Supreme Court E-Library Search
THIRD
DIVISION
BLANQUITA
E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA M. MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA
M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M. ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO,
JOSELITO M. ADRIANO, ROGELIO M. ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M.
ADRIANO, CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO, petitioners,
vs. JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent.
D
E C I S I O N
PURISIMA,
J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated October 17, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41283, which reversed the
decision, dated June 10, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 67, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 59705.
The
facts of the case are, as follows:
On
March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced
died intestate, without issue. She left five (5) parcels of land situated
in Orambo, Pasig City.
At
the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs, viz:
(1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother ; (2)
Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of Rosa de la
Merced-Platon (a sister who died in 1943) ; and (3) the legitimate
children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another sister of Evarista who
died in 1965), namely: Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio, Wilfredo, Victor and
Constantino, all surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-Ongoco and Jasmin
Adriano-Mendoza.
Almost
a year later or on March 19, 1988, to be precise, Francisco (Evarista’s
brother) died. He was survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their three legitimate children, namely,
Luisito E. dela Merced,
Blanquita M. Macatangay and Ma. Olivia M. Paredes.
On
April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, Evarista M. dela
Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs of Francisco; (2) Teresita
P. Rupisan and (3) the nine [9] legitimate children of Eugenia, executed
an extrajudicial settlement, entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate
of the Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced” adjudicating the properties of
Evarista to them, each set with a share of one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso.
On
July 26 ,1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced ,
illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a “Petition for
Annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Evarista M. Dela Merced with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order”,
alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made
by petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation to the late
Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent Joselito
prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the
one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased Evarista,
corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
On
August 3, 1990, the trial court issued the temporary restraining order prayed
for by private respondent Joselito, enjoining the sale of any of the real
properties of the deceased Evarista.
After
trial, however, or on June 10, 1992, to be definite, the trial court
dismissed the petition, lifted the temporary restraining order earlier issued,
and cancelled the notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering
the real properties of the deceased Evarista.
In
dismissing the petition, the trial court stated:
“The
factual setting of the instant motion after considering the circumstances of
the entire case and the other evidentiary facts and documents presented by the
herein parties points only to one issue which goes into the very skeleton of
the controversy, to wit: “Whether or not the plaintiff may participate in
the intestate estate of the late Evarista M. Dela Merced in his capacity as
representative of his alleged father, Francisdo Dela Merced, brother of the deceased, whose
succession is under consideration.
x
x
x
x x x
x x x
It
is to be noted that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of the herein
plaintiff, is a legitimate child, not an illegitimate. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, is admittedly an illegitimate child of the late Francisco
Dela Merced. Hence, as such, he cannot represent his alleged father in the succession of the latter in the intestate
estate of the late Evarista Dela Merced, because of the barrier in Art. 992 of
the New Civil Code which states that:
‘An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.’
The
application of Art. 992 cannot be ignored in the instant case, it is clearly
worded in such a way that there can be no room for any doubts and ambiguities.
This provision of the law imposes a barrier between the illegitimate and the
legitimate family. x x x” (Rollo, p. 87-88)
Not
satisfied with the dismissal of his petition, the private respondent appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
In
its Decision of October 17,1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court of origin and ordered the petitioners to execute an
amendatory agreement which shall form part of the original settlement, so
as to include private respondent Joselito as a co-heir to the estate of
Francisco, which estate includes one-third (1/3) pro indiviso of the latter’s
inheritance from the deceased Evarista.
The
relevant and dispositive part of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, reads:
“x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
It
is a basic principle embodied in Article 777, New Civil Code that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent, so that Francisco dela Merced inherited 1/3 of his sister’s estate
at the moment of the latter’s death. Said 1/3 of Evarista’s estate formed
part of Francisco’s estate which was subsequently transmitted upon his death on
March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among whom is appellant as his illegitimate
child. Appellant became entitled to his share in Francisco’s estate
from the time of the latter’s death in 1987. The extrajudicial settlement
therefore is void insofar as it deprives plaintiff-appellant of his share in
the estate of Francisco M. dela Merced.
As a consequence, the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
is not in order because the property is directly affected. Appellant
has the right to demand a partition of his father’s estate which includes 1/3
of the property inherited from Evarista dela Merced.
“WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to execute an amendatory
agreement/settlement to include herein plaintiff-appellant Joselito dela Merced as co-heir to the estate of Francisco dela Merced which includes 1/3 of the estate subject of the
questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Evarista M. dela Merced dated April 20,
1989. The amendatory agreement/settlement shall form part of the original
Extrajudicial Settlement. With costs against defendants-appellees.
SO
ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 41)
In
the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist that being an illegitimate
child, private respondent Joselito is barred from inheriting from
Evarista because of the provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code, which
lays down an impassable barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate
families.
The
Petition is devoid of merit.
Article
992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not a
situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a
legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid
provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child
inherits from his father, the latter’s share in or portion
of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister,
Evarista.
As
opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is
Article 777 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent.
Since
Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of
the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when
Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and
the private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his
(Francisco’s) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing
that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of
representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late
Francisco, in the latter’s share (or portion thereof) in the estate of
Evarista.
Petitioners
argue that if Joselito desires to assert successional rights to the intestate
estate of his father, the proper forum should be in the settlement of his own
father’s intestate estate, as this Court held in the case of Gutierrez vs.
Macandog (150 SCRA 422 [1987])
Petitioners’
reliance on the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog (supra) is
misplaced. The said case involved a claim for support
filed by one Elpedia Gutierrez against the estate of the decedent, Agustin
Gutierrez, Sr., when she was not even an heir to the estate in question,
at the time, and the decedent had no obligation whatsoever to give her support.
Thus, this Court ruled that Elpedia should have asked for support pendente lite
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in which court her husband
(one of the legal heirs of the decedent) had instituted a case for legal
separation against her on the ground of an attempt against his life. When
Mauricio (her husband) died, she should have commenced an action for the
settlement of the estate of her husband, in which case she could receive
whatever allowance the intestate court would grant her.
The
present case, however, relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir
to the share of his late father in the estate of the decedent Evarista,
ownership of which had been transmitted to his father upon the death of
Evarista. There is no legal obstacle for private respondent
Joselito, admittedly the son of the late Francisco, to inherit in his own right
as an heir to his father’s estate, which estate includes a one-third
(1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the
Petition is hereby DENIED and the Appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO
ORDERED.
Romero
(Chairman), Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug,
J., on official business abroad.
Supreme Court E-Library SearchSECOND
DIVISION
HEIRS
OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES,
BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO,
ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A. SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C.
SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C.
SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A.
SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO, respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO,
J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 30 March 1994
Decision and 21 December 1994 Resolution of respondent Court
of Appeals which upheld the right
of private respondents as heirs of Lourdes Sampayo to demand
partition under Art. 494 of the Civil Code.
Lourdes
Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of the
property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City,
covered by TCT No. T–15374, with a house erected thereon. On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue. Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents Josefina S.
Reyes, Bernardita S. Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo,
Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico A. Sampayo, Carlos A. Sampayo, Generoso C.
Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia A.
Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A.
Sampayo, all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita
A. Sampayo acting also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A.
Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes
Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before RTC–Br. 54, Lucena
City.
The
spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground
that private respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were
the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was substituted as
party-defendant by his children Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros, Joselito,
Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.
At
the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo
to prove that they were the collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo
and therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner of the subject
lot. Bringing with her the original copy of
her certificate of live birth showing
that her father was Inocentes Reyes
and her mother was Josefina Sampayo, Lydia Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one of the nieces of
Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the only living
sibling of Lourdes. Lydia
also testified that Lourdes
had another sister named Remedios J. Sampayo who died in 1948, and two
brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960,
respectively. To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel
were siblings of Lourdes,
their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of the birth certificate
of Manuel Sampayo were offered in evidence. These documents showed
that their father and mother, like Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and
Brigida Jaraza.
The
certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia Sampayo
Reyes were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that
all data therein written were in accordance with the church records, hence, the
lower left portion of the documents bearing the seal of the church with the
notation as to where the documents were logged in particular. The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the birth
certificates because the repository of those documents, the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Lucena City, had
been razed by fire on two separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30 August
1983, thus all civil registration records were totally burned. On the other hand, a photocopy of Manuel's birth
certificate dated 25 October 1919 (Exh. "I") showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena,
Tayabas (now Lucena
City).
Adelaida
Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her husband Manuel
was the brother of the deceased Lourdes, and
with the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the only living sibling of Lourdes was Josefina.
To
rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot, petitioners
presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosa Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo
Espineli. Rosario
testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband
Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had been
staying in the subject property since 1937. In fact, she said
that her late husband Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate taxes and spent for the
necessary repairs and improvements thereon because by agreement
Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them.
However,
as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary or
holographic, was presented by petitioners to substantiate
this claim. Rosario
also disclosed that when Lourdes died her remains were taken by her
relatives from their house. When cross examined
on who those relatives were, she replied that the only one she remembered was
Josefina since there were many relatives who came. When asked who
Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall.
Likewise, when asked who the parents of Lourdes
were, Rosario
denied having ever known them.
Another
witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she used to be the neighbor and
hairdresser of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who told her that upon her death
her share would go to Ignacio Conti whom she considered as her brother since
both of them were "adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel
Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord, although she admitted
that she did not know whether Lourdes had other relatives.
According
to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures of the tombs bearing the
tombstones of Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as well
as that of Lourdes Sampayo who was supposed to have been interred beside her
"adoptive" parents. However, as revealed by Rosario
during her direct examination, Lourdes
was not in fact interred there because her relatives took her remains.
On
4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respondents as the rightful heirs
of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private respondents and
petitioners to submit a project of partition
of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the court.
Petitioners
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the
trial court erred in finding that private respondents were the
heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were entitled to the partition of the
lot and the improvements thereon.
In
the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and
establish by preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of
deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore the lower court did not err in ordering
herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] and defendants [now petitioners] to
submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot owned in common
by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by
the court x x x x Considering our earlier finding that the lower
court did not err in declaring herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] as
heirs of deceased Sampayo and therefore entitled to inherit her property, the
argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now
private respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of merit (insertions
in [ ] supplied).
Respondent
court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua and Marabilles
v. Quito, that a prior and
separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary and that private
respondents became the co-owners of the portion of the property owned and
registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and, consequently,
entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of
ownership as provided for by law including the right to
demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil
Code, and Ilustre v.
Alaras Frondosa holding that the
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, as
completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death.
The appellate court subsequently
denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the probative value of the
documentary and testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted
petitioners for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she
was a vital witness in the case. Hence, petitioners
pursued this case arguing that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed
share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the
latter's estate and compliance with all legal requirements, especially
publication, and private respondents were not able to prove by competent
evidence their relationship with the deceased.
There
is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is
not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally
pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud -
Claro
Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present
plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that
they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that
any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of
Claro Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this
action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the
Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned
by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs.
Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the
claims of administration and the property may be
taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this
does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the
intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some
showing that a judicial administrator
had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of
Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is
established.
Conformably
with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil Code,
from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which
is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership,
were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition
private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the
decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners'
theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the
action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were
dealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the
summary settlement of estates of small value. But what private
respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited
from her through intestate succession.
This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. The
applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court -
Sec.
1. Complaint in an action for
partition of real estate. - A person having the
right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed,
setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property.
A
cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required
as erroneously maintained by petitioners. There are two (2)
simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First,
whether the plaintiff is indeed a
co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and second, if
answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e.,
what portion should go to which co-owner. Thus, in this case,
we must determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence,
have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late
Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a
niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial
court as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioners
however insist that there was no such proof of filiation
because: (a) mere photocopies of
birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b) certifications on
non-availability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal
certificates do not prove filiation of alleged collateral relatives of the
deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter of
Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and
Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was made to testify on events which happened
before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters merely narrated to her.
We
are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence
submitted are competent and adequate proofs that private respondents are
collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private respondents assert
that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the subject
property by way of legal or intestate succession.
Succession
is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law. Legal or intestate
succession takes place if a person dies
without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its
validity. If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. It was established during
the trial that Lourdes
died intestate and without issue. Private respondents as sister,
nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Under
Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of
legitimate children shall be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of
birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or
private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of
one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. By
analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be
utilized in the instant case.
Public
documents are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines,
or of a foreign country. The baptismal
certificates presented in evidence by private respondents are public
documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of
the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of
certificates, of the entries contained therein.
The
admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes,
absent the testimony of the officiating
priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S.
v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]), thus -
x
x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in
the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception
to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its
transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book
of the church during the course of its business.
It
may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the
administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4)
baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina,
Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein.
Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the
demise of Lourdes
and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was
Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary
weight to prove filiation.
Petitioners'
objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was
properly discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court of
Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of
Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself except when the
original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the
original certificate of birth of Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City
to the effect that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November
1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence thereof, all civil
registration records were totally burned.
Apparently,
there seems to be some merit in petitioners’ contention that the testimony of
Adelaida Sampayo cannot prove filiation for being hearsay considering that
there was no declaration ante litem motam as required by the rules,
i.e., that the declaration relating to pedigree was made before the controversy
occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no move to dispute her
testimony in open court when she was mentioning who the brothers and sisters of
Lourdes
were. As correctly observed by the trial court in explicit terms,
"the documentary and testimonial evidence were not disputed by
defendants" (now petitioners). Notably, when
Rosario Cuario Conti took the witness stand, she admitted that she was not
aware of the identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly,
this runs counter to the relationship akin to filial bonding which
she professed she had enjoyed with the decedent. As wife
of Ignacio Conti, she was supposedly a
"sister-in-law" of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who regarded
Ignacio as a brother. However, in sum, we rule that all the pieces
of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right of
private respondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent
any reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, this petition for review on certiorari will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 March 1994 and Resolution
dated 21 December 1994 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
Mendoza, and Martinez JJ., concur.
Decision penned by Judge Jaime D. Discaya, RTC-Br. 54, Lucena City,
Original Records, pp. 180-181.
Id.,
p. 180.
Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 87-37; id., pp. 1-6.
Answer filed 10 June 1987; id., p. 26.
Order dated 8 December 1987 by then Presiding Judge Rodolfo G.
Palattao; id., pp. 57-58.
Exh. “A”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
Exhs. “C”, “E”, “G”, and “J;” Id., pp. 3, 5, 7,
and 11.
Exhs. "B," "D," "F," "H,"
and "K;" Id.,
pp. 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.
Id.,
p. 9.
Decision penned by Judge Jaime D. Discaya, RTC
– Br. 54, Lucena City; Original Records, pp. 180-184.
Decision penned by Justice Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.,
with the concurrence of Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Alfredo J.
Lagamon; Rollo, pp. 29-32.
Art. 777. The rights to
the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Resolution penned by Justice Quirino Abad Santos,
Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Serafin V. C.
Guingona; Rollo, pp. 35-37.
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Art. 254 of the Family Code
of the Philippines,
which took effect on 3 August 1988, expressly repealed Title VIII on Paternity
and Filiation (Arts. 255-289) of the New Civil Code. While the
complaint for partition was filed in 1987, or prior to the Family Code,
nonetheless the latter law is applicable to the case at bar in view of Art. 256
which explicitly provides that "(t)his code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
76873, 26 October 1989, 178 SCRA 684, 689; Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 86302, 24 September 1991, 201 SCRA 675, 684.
Supreme Court E-Library Search
SECOND
DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF
THE INTESTATE
G.R. No.
155733
ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA
DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE
DE LA ROSA and
other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely,
HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO
VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA
DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON
DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO
CAMPO-MADARANG,
Petitioners,
Present :
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s
-
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
HEIRS OF
MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN;
HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO
R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL
R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO,
VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA,
LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;[1] and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,[2]
January 27, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
In this
petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,[4] in SP Case
No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its
decision[5] dated October
24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case
concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.[6] The
main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners
and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is
attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants
to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and
full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,[7] his nephews
and nieces,[8] his
illegitimate child,[9] and the de
facto adopted child[10] (ampun-ampunan)
of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased
Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa[11] Delgado by
one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the
couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed
Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa
and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio
Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him
was Ramon Osorio[12] with whom
Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo
which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question
of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights
fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal
intestate succession
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.[13] If
Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child
Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and
therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs
would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis
Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s
intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners
allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In
support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish
it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged
marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname
Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got
married, his Partida de Casamiento[14] stated that he
was “hijo natural de Felisa Delgado” (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),[15] significantly
omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.[16] Nevertheless,
oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged
marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado
died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia
and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on
June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed
an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining
properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado
Sometime in
1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado[17] but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the
two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To
prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate
naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as “Señorita” or
unmarried woman.
The oppositors
(respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919
and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa
on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following
pieces of evidence:
1.
Certificate of Identity No. 9592
dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United
States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2.
Philippine Passport No. 4767
issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3.
Veterans Application for
Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active
Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form
526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by
Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his
marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;[18]
4.
Titles to real properties in
the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of
their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia
and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were
what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his
life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child,[19] the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.
According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own
flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status
from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa
Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card
from the University
of Santo Tomas identified
Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.[20]
Oppositors (respondents
here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate
estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an
illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot
claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the
authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.[21]
On January 7,
1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia
filed a petition for the adoption[22] of their ampun-ampunan
Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath “[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal
fiction.”[23] The petition
was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa
Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his
sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by
the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina
Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia,
Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.[24]
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8,
1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed
the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of
the “spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia” with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55.[25] This petition
was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;[26] (2) the heirs
of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan
Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law
from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of
1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was
granted.
On April 3,
1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state
that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had
merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24,
1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in
the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The
motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the
other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon
submission of evidence.
On March 14,
1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister,
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11,
1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.[27] The
dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the
estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated
elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the
said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8,
1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with
the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S.
Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent,
to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the
estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15,
1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not
as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated
in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is
both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as
administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in
relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA
is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the
subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed
administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets
of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual
administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[28]
On May 20,
1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record
on appeal was not filed on time.[29] They then
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus[30] which was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.[31]
However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.[32]
In a petition
for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal
within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the
appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal.
The pertinent portion of our decision[33] read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain
acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay
in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out
the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating
to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to
the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but
were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical
ground of late filing.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In this instance, private respondents’
intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have
been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration
proceedings.
xxx
xxx
xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is
needed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS
the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on Appeal
and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May
11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the
appeal, the Court of Appeals[34] partially set
aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,[35] the Court of
Appeals amended its earlier decision.[36] The
dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed
decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate
estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate
estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in
this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance
with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee
Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his
or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia
Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of
the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in
question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to
such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of
her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the
administrator’s qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit
of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the
shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this
recourse.
The issues for
our resolution are:
1.
whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2.
who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
are;
3.
who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption
is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into
presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in
turn, either conclusive or disputable.[37]
Rule 131,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec.
3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(aa)
That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx
xxx
xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.
Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as
husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to
them as “spouses.”
Yet,
petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of
the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness[38] attesting that
they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa
Delgado as “Señorita” or unmarried woman.[39]
We are not
persuaded.
First, although a
marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is
not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.[40] Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage
but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here,
the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,[41] the passport
issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,[42] the declaration
under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado[43] and the titles
to the properties in the name of “Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,”
more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are
public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.[44] No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda.
de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had “lived together as
husband and wife.” This again could not but strengthen the presumption of
marriage.
Third, the
baptismal certificate[45] was
conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized
the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein,[46] such as the
alleged single or unmarried (“Señorita”) civil status of Josefa Delgado
who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners
failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in
society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.[47]
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa
Delgado
To determine
who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation
of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned
earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that
no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.[48] On the other
hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can
be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was
said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1)
the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname
Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de
Casamiento[49] identifying
Luis as “hijo natural de Felisa Delgado” (the natural child
of Felisa Delgado).[50]
All things
considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon
Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado,[51] were her
natural children.[52]
Pertinent to
this matter is the following observation:
Suppose,
however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y
would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship.
Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits
reciprocal succession
between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even
though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former,
would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this,
however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are
only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not
apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis
the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives.
There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of
the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand
on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood
relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules
regarding succession
of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full
blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of
half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of
the half-blood, they shall share equally.[53]
Here, the
above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all
illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note,
however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the
right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot
be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.[54] Therefore,
the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of
her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who
were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972.
They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.[55] The
records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to
determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of
Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,[56] they are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code:[57]
Art.
1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa
Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole
heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
– If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If
there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo
Rustia
Intervenor
(now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child[58] of Guillermo
Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.[59] She,
however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which
time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under
the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate
children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was,
however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional
rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first
recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new
law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.[60] Recognition
is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1)
in cases of rape, abduction or
seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of
the conception;
(2)
when the child is in continuous
possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)[61] by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3)
when the child was conceived
during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
On the other hand, voluntary
recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing.[63]
Intervenor
Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition
through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was
apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from
her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However,
this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she
could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.[64] Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual
limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.[65] On the
death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.[66] In this case,
intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon
the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of
voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo
Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted
by the father to be his.[67] Did
intervenor’s report card from the University
of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings
under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor
Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his
name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had
no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that
it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa
Delgado which was published in the Sunday
Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not
the authentic writing contemplated by the
law. What could have been admitted as
an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal
to intervenor’s claim.
The same
misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was
never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was
filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the
latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and
therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We
quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in
rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of
natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish
the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.[68]
Premises
considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan
Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under
Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs
of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,[69] nieces and
nephews.[70]
Entitlement To Letters Of
Administration
An
administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate
estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an
order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
– If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a)
To the surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b)
If such surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration
or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;
(c)
If there is no such creditor
competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
In the
appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed.[71] The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of
co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates,[72] a situation
which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators,
in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of
the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The
assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the following modifications:
1.
Guillermo
Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2.
the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate
of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and
half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of
Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also
surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial
court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3.
Guillermo
Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall
be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
(whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose
respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4.
Letters
of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint
administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in
such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
W E C O N C U R:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
Chairman
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
Chairman, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s
Attestation, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1]
Oppositors in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch 55.
[2]
Intervenor in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch 55.
[3]
In the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners, the oppositors
were identified as “oppositors-respondents,” while intervenor was identified as
“intervenor-respondent.” For clarity, we shall refer to them collectively
as “respondents” in this decision. The Court of Appeals was also
impleaded as public respondent but this was not necessary since this is a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[4]
Judge Hermogenes Liwag, Rollo, pp. 92-106.
[5]
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate
Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pestaño of the former 15th
Division, Rollo, pp. 75-90.
[6]
The original action was a petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado, Rollo, p. 92.
[7]
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz, both deceased
and now substituted by their respective heirs.
[8]
The children of Guillermo Rustia’s deceased brother Roman Rustia, Sr.
[9]
Intervenor Guillerma Rustia.
[10]
Oppositor
Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
[11]
In some
pleadings, this was spelled as “Feliza.”
[12]
In some pleadings,
this was spelled as “Osario” and in others, “Oscorro.”
[13]
Art. 992,
new Civil Code. An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
[14]
Rollo, p.
1262.
[15]
Id.,
pp. 1200-1201.
[16]
In relation,
the Civil Code of Spain (the old Civil Code) provided that when the
acknowledgment was made separately by either parent, the name of the other
parent shall not be revealed. Nor shall any circumstance be mentioned by
which such person might be recognized (Article 132). This showed the intent of
the said Code to protect the identity of the non-acknowledging parent.
[17]
One of the
children of Felisa Delgado with Lucio Campo.
[18]
CA decision,
Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[19]
Under the
old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of Guillerma Rustia’s birth in
1920, she was an illegitimate child, not a natural child, since she was
born of parents who at the time of conception were disqualified to marry each
other.
[20]
Rollo, p. 920.
[21]
Law in
effect at the time of the death of Guillermo Rustia.
[22]
Filed before
the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
[23]
Rollo, p. 1149.
[24]
Most of the
respondents herein.
[25]
Filed on
behalf of the surviving brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado.
[26]
Now
represented by their heirs as respondents.
[27]
Id.
[28]
Rollo, pp.
105-106.
[29]
Dated
September 25, 1990.
[30]
This
petition was initially filed with the Supreme Court but was referred to the
Court of Appeals, the latter having concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court over the petition.
[31]
Penned by
Associate Justice Artemon Luna, and concurred in by Associate Justices Serafin
Camilon and Celso Magsino of the Seventh Division, dated March 20, 1991, Rollo,
pp. 627-644.
[32]
Resolution
dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 656-671.
[33]
De la
Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 678 (1997).
[34]
Decision
penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate
Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pestaño of the 15th
Division, dated January 31, 2002, Rollo, pp. 46-63.
[35]
Both the
petitioner and the oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration of the January
31, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals.
[36]
Dated
October 24, 2002.
[37]
II Florenz
D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium
672 (9th rev. ed. 2001).
[38]
Elisa vda.
de Anson.
[39]
Rollo, p.
1266.
[40]
Balogbog
v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 252 (1997).
[41]
Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the
United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
[42]
Philippine
Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947.
[43]
Veterans
Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service
in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No.
C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the
United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia himself stated under oath to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on
June 3, 1919.
[44]
Rule 132, Section
23, Rules of Court.
[45]
Josefa
Delgado stood as sponsor in the baptism of Luisa Delgado on September 14, 1919,
Rollo, p. 1266. In 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao filed a
petition for letters of administration for the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado; supra, note 25.
[46]
Acebedo
v. Arquero, 447 Phil. 76 (2003).
[47]
Vda. de
Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693 (1999), citing Perido v. Perido,
No. L-28248, 12 March 1975, 63 SCRA 97.
[48]
Ricardo
Francisco, Evidence 400 (3rd
ed. 1996).
[49]
Rollo, p.
1262.
[50]
Id.,
pp. 1200-1201.
1.
To bear the surname of the person acknowledging it.
2.
To receive support from such person, in accordance with article 143.
3.
To receive the hereditary portion, if available, determined by this
Code.
[52]
The records
do not indicate the dates of birth of Felisa Delgado’s children. The dates when
Felisa Delgado cohabited with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo were likewise not
stated. From the limited facts of the case on this issue, it is safe to assume
that they were all born during the effectivity of the old Civil Code. Under the
said Code, children born out of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception, could have married, were natural children.
[53]
III Arturo
M. Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 493-494 (1979
ed.) citing 7 Manresa 139.
[55]
In case the
surviving collateral relatives are already deceased at the time of execution of
this judgment, their shares in the inheritance of Josefa Delgado shall accrue
to their respective estates.
[56]
Then
surviving spouse, now represented by his intestate estate.
[57]
Law in
effect at the time of the death of Josefa Delgado.
[58]
Under the
old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of Guillerma Rustia’s birth in
1920, she is an illegitimate child, not a natural child, since she was
born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each
other.
[60]
I Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines 577 (1985 ed.).
[61]
Art. 284 of
the new Civil Code provided that the mother is obliged to recognize her natural
child in any of the cases referred to in Art. 283.
[64]
Supra, note
60, at 283.
[65]
This was provided
in Article 285 of the new Civil Code and carried over to Article 175 of the
Family Code. While there are exceptions to this rule, Guillerma’s case
does not fall within the exceptions.
[66]
Subject to
exceptions provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 285 of the new Civil
Code.
[67]
I Tolentino,
supra note 60, at 585-586.
[68]
RTC
decision, Rollo, p. 104.
[69]
Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz, represented by their
heirs in this
petition.
[70]
Children of
his predeceased brother Roman Rustia, Sr.
[72]
Gabriel
et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 413.
Supreme Court E-Library SearchSECOND
DIVISION
[G.R.
No. 149751. March 11, 2005]
PURIFICACION
BALILO-MONTERO and JOVENCIO* BALILO, petitioners,
vs. EUGENIA SEPTIMO, CONSUELO ROBLES and PLACIDO ROBLES, respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
Jose
Balilo was the owner of a parcel of land, with an area of 7.7837 hectares,
located in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, covered by Homestead Patent No. 46784
issued on February 21, 1938. Based on the said patent, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3014 was issued to and under his name by the
Register of Deeds.[1]
On
August 12, 1943, Jose Balilo died intestate.[2]
Sometime in 1948, Niniana Balilo, the sister of Jose Balilo, filed a petition
in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga, for the guardianship of the
property and the person of Jovencio Balilo whom she alleged to be the son of
her brother, Jose Balilo; hence, her nephew. The case was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 262. Niniana filed a motion in the said case, for
authority to execute, for and in behalf of her ward, a deed of absolute sale
over the property covered by OCT No. 3014 in favor of Jose Septimo for P750.00.
The CFI granted the motion. Niniana executed the deed of absolute sale
over the property in favor of Jose Septimo who, thereafter, declared the
property in his name for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes thereon.
However,
Jose Septimo failed to register the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds
and, consequently, to secure a torrens title over the property in his
name. The guardianship case was terminated on September 24, 1951 per the
Order of the CFI of even date.[3]
Thereafter,
on October 12, 1963, Jovencio Balilo filed a complaint against Jose Septimo in
the CFI of Occidental Mindoro, to compel the latter to resell the property to
him. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-159. Jovencio
alleged therein that he was the only legitimate child of the spouses Jose
Balilo and Juana Villarama, and that the latter died on August 30, 1946.
He prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
WHEREFORE,
it is most respectfully prayed that an order be issued requiring the Defendant
to resell the said Lot No. 1649, Pls-33, situated in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, to the herein Plaintiff upon tender to the herein Defendant the sum of
SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY (P750.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, or any such
sum as this Honorable Court finds just and fair, and requiring said Defendant
to deliver possession of said homestead land to the herein Plaintiff.
Plaintiff
further prays for other relief as may be deemed just and proper in the
premises.[4]
Jovencio
amended the complaint and impleaded Placido Robles as party-defendant, on his
claim that the latter purchased a five-hectare portion of the property before
the complaint was filed. On November 8, 1966, the CFI rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint. The CFI ruled that Jovencio had no right to
repurchase the property, the five-year period under Section 119 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 having long expired. Jovencio failed to appeal the decision.[5]
On
March 3, 1987, Purificacion Balilo-Montero filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, against the
respondents, Eugenia Septimo, the surviving spouse of Jose Septimo, and the
spouses Placido Robles and Consuelo Robles, for recovery of possession of the
said property. However, despite the allegation in his complaint in Civil
Case No. R-159 that he was the only legitimate child of Jose Balilo, she
impleaded Jovencio Balilo as party-plaintiff.
The
complaint alleged, inter alia, that the parties were the children and
only legal heirs of the late Jose Balilo who, before his death, was the owner
of Lot No. 1649 covered by OCT No. 3014 located in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro; only a year before the complaint was filed, Purificacion learned that
she was one of the co-owners of the property; that the respondents claimed
ownership over the property and installed tenants thereon; and despite their
demands, the respondents and their tenants refused to do so.
Jovencio
and Purificacion prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in
their favor:
WHEREFORE,
it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered for
the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
1.
Restoring possession of the landholdings in question unto the plaintiffs;
2.
Ordering defendants to reimburse plaintiffs the rentals on the landholdings to
be determined by this Honorable Court;
3.
Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;
4.
Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit; and
5.
Extending unto the plaintiffs such other reliefs to which they may be entitled
in law and equity.[6]
The
summons and complaint were served on respondents Eugenia Septimo and Consuelo
Robles. As per the return of the sheriff, Placido Robles was already
dead.
In
her answer to the complaint, respondent Eugenia Septimo alleged that her late
husband Jose Septimo had purchased the property from Jovencio Balilo, through
his guardian, and that the sale was approved by the CFI of Pampanga in Special
Proceeding No. 262. She specifically denied, for lack of information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, the allegation of
Purificacion Montero that she was one of Jose Balilo’s children and one of his
heirs. Consuelo Robles was declared in default for her failure to file
her answer to the complaint.[7]
On
October 15, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Jovencio and
Purificacion. The fallo of the decision reads:
Premises
thoroughly and fairly considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Ordering defendant Eugenia Septimo as successor-in-interest of decedent Jose
Septimo to recovery (sic) to plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero
one-half of the parcel of agricultural land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 3014;
2.
Denying claim for damages; and
3.
Dismissing counterclaim.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
Only
respondent Eugenia Septimo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA),
where she alleged the following:
I.
That the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff Purificacion
Balilo-Montero did not lost (sic) her right to recover the property from
the defendants, because she was not a party to the sale and for not having
actual knowledge on the guardianship proceedings.
II.
That the trial court erred in ruling that the sale of the land by the legal
guardian of Jovencio Balilo duly authorized and approved by the Court which (sic)
the guardianship proceedings was being held did not affect the share of
plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero because the sale was not registered.
III.
The trial court erred in ordering defendant Eugenia Septimo to reconvey 1/2 of
the property in question covered by TCT No. T-3014 to plaintiff Purificacion
Balilo-Montero.[9]
In
a Decision dated April 11, 2001, the CA affirmed with modification the decision
of the trial court. The CA applied the Old Civil Code on testate
succession, and ruled that the property
was registered in the name of Jose Balilo whose civil status was stated as
single. Considering that he was survived by Purificacion Montero, his
wife Juana Villarama and their son Jovencio Balilo when he died in 1943; and when
Juana Villarama died intestate, was, in turn, survived by her son Jovencio
Balilo and Purificacion Montero, Jovencio was entitled to two-thirds undivided
portion of the property, while Purificacion Montero was entitled to one-third
undivided portion of the property. Respondent Eugenia Septimo did not
file any motion for the reconsideration of the decision. However,
Purificacion Montero filed a motion for the partial reconsideration of the
decision, alleging that, applying the provisions of the Old Civil Code on intestate
succession, she was entitled to an
undivided one-half portion of the property. The CA, however, denied the
said motion.
Purificacion
Montero, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review, contending
that:
THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED ONLY
TO ONE-THIRD (1/3) SHARE OF THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE RECOVERED HEREIN, SAID
ADJUDICATION FINDING NO LEGAL SUPPORT UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN WHICH WAS
THE LAW THEN PREVAILING.[10]
The
petitioner maintains that the CA should have applied the provisions of the Old
Civil Code on intestate succession
because Jose Balilo died intestate in 1943 before the New Civil Code took
effect. She posits that she and Jovencio Balilo were entitled to inherit
the property from Jose Balilo in equal shares, because there is no competent
evidence on record to prove that Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama, the mother of
Jovencio, were married.
The
petition is granted.
We
agree with the contention of the petitioner that there is no evidence on record
that Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama were married, or that they cohabited with
each other as husband and wife. Even Jovencio Balilo opted not to
testify. Neither was Jose Balilo survived by any ascendants.
However, we agree with the ruling of the CA that Jose Balilo and Gertrudes
Nicdao were not, likewise, married.
The
contention of the petitioner that the CA erred in applying the law on testate
succession under the Old Civil Code is,
likewise, correct. The appellate court should have applied the provisions
of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession
considering that Jose Balilo died intestate in 1943, before the effectivity of
the New Civil Code.
Article
931 of the Old Civil Code provides that when a person dies intestate, his
legitimate children and their descendants succeed him, without distinction of
sex, or age, even though they spring from different marriages. Article
932 of the same Code provides that the children of the deceased shall always
inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal
shares. Moreover, under Article 939 of the Old Civil Code, in the absence
of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the natural children legally
acknowledged and those legitimated by royal succession
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
When
Jose Balilo died intestate on August 12, 1943, he was survived by his daughter,
the petitioner herein, his son Jovencio Balilo, and Gertrudes Nicdao and Juana
Villarama. Conformably to Article 939 of the Old Civil Code, only the
petitioner and Jovencio Balilo inherited the property in equal shares, to the
exclusion of Juana Villarama and Gertrudes Nicdao. Neither of them was
the lawful wife of Jose Balilo. Besides, under Article 946 of the Old
Civil Code, the surviving spouse shall inherit only in default of the persons
enumerated “in the three sections next preceding.”
Consequently,
when Jovencio Balilo, through his guardian Niniana Balilo, executed the deed of
absolute sale over the entire property on May 26, 1948 in favor of Jose
Septimo, the latter did not acquire title over the entire property, but only to
an undivided one-half portion thereof which Jovencio Balilo had inherited from
Jose Balilo. Jose Septimo could not have purchased and acquired the other
half of the property from Jovencio Balilo because the latter was not the owner
thereof. Hence, the CA erred in holding that Jovencio Balilo inherited an
undivided two-thirds portion of the property, and that Jose Septimo acquired
title over the said two-thirds undivided portion.
IN
LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
(Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
* “Ovencio” in
the records.
[1] Records, p. 106.
[2] Id. at 168.
[3] Id. at 166.
[4] Id. at 166-167.
[5] Id. at 175.
[6] Id. at 2.
[7] Id. at 33.
[8] Id. at 226.
[9] CA Rollo, p. 28.
[10] Rollo, p. 20.
Supreme Court E-Library SearchEN BANC
NENG “KAGUI KADIGUIA” MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON,
Presiding Judge of 5th Shari’a District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD
ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA
MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and MABAY GANAP
MALANG, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari
is the issue of whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior
to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(hereafter, “P.D. 1083” or “Muslim Code”). The question is raised in connection
with the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband.
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday)
Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael
Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang
was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aida’s dowry (mahr or
majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato.
Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for the second
time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan,
Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji Abdula’s second
marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth
child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were
childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai
(Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon they had a
daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in
that place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of buying and
selling of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after,
Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai
but he eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married
petitioner Neng “Kagui Kadiguia” Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives
he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were
childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of
buying and selling of agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast
tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were
cultivated by tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut
Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato
City, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner
filed with the Shari’a District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the
settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued
in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji
Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula,
Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five
(5) of which are titled in Hadji Abdula’s name “married to Neng P. Malang,” and
a pick-up jeepney.
On February 7, 1994, the Shari’a District Court ordered the publication
of the petition. After such publication or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis
Malang (“Hadji Mohammad”, for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed
his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters that his
father’s surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving
spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang,
surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e)
oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as “Teng Abdula,”
son; (f) Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known as “Keto Abdula,” son, (g)
Fatima Malang, also known as “Kueng Malang,” daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son,
and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang
alleged that since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had
helped their father in his business, then they were more competent to be
administrators of his estate.
On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang,
Fatima Malang, Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an
opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of
Hadji Mohammad.
On April 7, 1994, the Shari’a District Court issued an Order appointing
Hadji Mohammad administrator of his father’s properties outside Cotabato
City. The same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang
as joint administrators of the estate in Cotabato City. Each
administrator was required to post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. On April 13, 1994, letters of administration
were issued to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the required bond. He
took his oath on the same day. The following day, Hadji Ismael and
petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and hence, they were allowed
to take their oath as administrators.
On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions
informing the court that Hadji Abdula had outstanding deposits with nine (9)
major banks. Petitioner prayed that the managers of each
of those banks be ordered to submit a bank statement of the outstanding deposit
of Hadji Abdula. The Shari’a
District Court having granted the motions, Assistant Vice President Rockman O. Sampuha
of United Coconut Planters Bank informed the court that as of April 24, 1994,
the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula amounted to one million five hundred
twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-eight centavos (P1,520,400.48). The Senior Manager of the Cotabato branch of
Metrobank also certified that as of December 18, 1993, “Hadji Abdula Malang or
Malindatu Malang” had on savings deposit the balance of three hundred
seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three pesos and 32/100 centavos
(P378,493.32). PCIB likewise issued a certification that
Hadji Abdula had a balance of eight hundred fifty pesos (P850.00) in his
current account as of August 11, 1994.
During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart
failure that required immediate medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she
filed a motion praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to
withdraw from UCPB the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00)
that shall constitute her advance share in the estate of Hadji Abdula. After due hearing, the Sharia District Court
allowed petitioner to withdraw the sum of two hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P250,000.00).
On May 12, 1994, the Shari’a District Court required petitioner and
Hadji Ismael as joint administrators to submit an inventory and appraisal of
all properties of Hadji Abdula. In compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael
submitted an inventory showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had seven
(7) residential lots with assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00,
an agricultural land with assessed value of P860.00, three (3) one-storey
residential buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential building. All these properties were declared for
taxation purposes in Hadji Abdula’s name.
For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji
Abdula “married to Neng Malang” had seven (7) residential lots with a total
assessed value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up jeepney valued
at P30,000.00 and bank deposits.
In the Memorandum that she filed with the Shari’a District Court,
petitioner asserted that all the properties located in Cotabato City, including
the vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with
Article 160 of the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while
properties located outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the
decedent.
On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that
all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties for
various reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with
petitioner because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different
Muslim women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a monogamous
marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a
bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship. Second, the decedent
adopted a “complete separation of property regime” in his marital relations;
while his wives Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal
and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis
contributed to the decedent’s properties, there is no evidence that
petitioner had contributed funds for the acquisition of such properties.
Third, the presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are
conjugal properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the
properties, the decedent was married to four (4) women. Fourth, the
properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these
properties were titled in the name of the decedent “married to Neng Malang”
because such description is not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the
property. Furthermore, because petitioner admitted in her verified
petition that the properties belonged “to the estate of decedent,” she was
estopped from claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties
were conjugal in nature just because some of the properties were titled in
Hadji Abdula’s name “married to Neng Malang.” Fifth, if it is true that the
properties were conjugal properties, then these should have been registered in
the names of both petitioner and the decedent.
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Shari’a District Court
presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no conjugal partnership
of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter
married eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership
cannot be applied if there is more than one wife because “conjugal partnership
presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law
relationship.” The court further found that the decedent was “the chief, if not
the sole, breadwinner of his families” and that petitioner did not contribute
to the properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay.
The description “married to Neng Malang” in the titles to the real properties
is no more than that –-- the description of the relationship between petitioner
and the decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties
belong to the conjugal partnership of gains. The court stated:
In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired
the properties in question. To sustain the contention of the petitioner
that the properties are her conjugal property with the decedent is doing
violence to the provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the
time of the marriage of the petitioner with the decedent, there were already
three (3) existing marriages. Assuming for the moment that petitioner and
the decedent had agreed that the property regime between them will be governed
by the regime of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is null and void
for it is against the law, public policy, public order, good moral(s) and
customs.
Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete
separation of property, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in
the marriage settlements or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083).
There being no evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court
concludes as it had begun, that the properties in question, both real and
personal, are not conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent.
Thus, the Shari’a District Court held that the Islamic law should
be applied in the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula and accordingly
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following:
1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the
funeral expenses in the amount of P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the
amount of P2,040.80;
2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties,
located in Talayan, Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be
distributed and adjudicated as follows:
a) Jubaida Kado Malang
------------------------- 2/64 of the estate
b) Nayo Omar
Malang
------------------------- 2/64 - do -
c) Mabai Aziz
Malang
------------------------- 2/64 - do -
d) Neng “Kagui Kadiguia” Malang -------------------
2/64 - do -
e) Mohammad Ulyssis
Malang-------------------------14/64 - do -
f) Ismael Malindatu
Malang---------------------------14/64 - do
-
g) Datulna
Malang
------------------------- 14/64 - do -
h) Lawanbai
Malang
------------------------- 7/64 - do -
i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang
------------------------- 7/64 - do -
Total------------------------ 64/64
3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng “Kagui Kadiguia” Malang
by way of advance be charged against her share and if her share is not
sufficient, to return the excess; and
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their
Project of Partition for approval, not later than three (3) months from receipt
of this order.
SO ORDERED.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of
that Order. The oppositors objected to that motion. On January 10,
1995, the Shari’a District Court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal. However, on January 19, 1995, she filed a
manifestation withdrawing the notice of appeal on the strength of the following
provisions of P.D. No. 1083:
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions – The decisions of the
Shari’a District Courts whether on appeal from the Shari’a Circuit Court
or not shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing “an
original action of certiorari with the Supreme Court.”
On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. She contends that
the Shari’a District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she
married Hadji Abdula Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with
Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore the
properties acquired during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and
(b) holding that said properties are not conjugal because under Islamic Law,
the regime of relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence
of stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other
contract.
As petitioner sees it, “the law applicable on issues of marriage and
property regime is the New Civil Code”, under which all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The
Shari’a Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal
partnership as incompatible with plural marriage, which is permitted under
Muslim law, and held the applicable property regime to be complete separation
of property under P.D. 1083.
Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the
case is one of first impression --- this is a singular situation where the
issue on what law governs the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated
prior to the passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Shari’a court
for the Court’s resolution --- the Court decided to solicit the opinions of two
amici curiae, Justice Ricardo C. Puno and former Congressman Michael O. Mastura.
The Court extends its warmest
thanks to the amici curiae for their valuable inputs in their written
memoranda and in the hearing of June 27, 2000.
Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that
very few of the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce are established
by the record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not register
acts, events or judicial decrees affecting civil status. It also explains why the evidence in the
instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of
eight marriages, counting the three which terminated in divorce; all eight
marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before
the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives --- namely,
Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai --- all divorces of which took place before the
enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993,
after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four wives
(Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he begot with
Aida and one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws were in
force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil
Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394 (“R.A. 394”),
authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13,
1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and the Family Code,
effective August 3, 1988.
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record
of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and
complete resolution of the petition. To our mind, any attempt at this
point to dispense with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence
before us could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well
as cast profound implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously
situated to the parties herein. Justice and accountability dictate a
remand; trial must reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in
Congressman Mastura’s words, “missing links”, that would be the bases for
judgment and accordingly, allow respondent court to resolve the instant
case. In ordering thus, however, we take it as an imperative on our part
to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and application of
pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court.
It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition
--- concerning the property regime applicable to two Muslims married prior to
the effectivity of the Muslim Code --- was interposed in relation to the
settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of
estates of Muslims whose civil acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code
may easily result in the application of the Civil Code and other personal laws,
thus convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go beyond the issue
squarely presented and identify such collateral issues as are required to be
resolved in a settlement of estate case. As amicus curiae
Congressman Mastura puts it, the Court does not often come by a case as the one
herein, and jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by a discussion of the
“watershed of collateral issues” that this case presents.
The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we
hereby present in question form: (1) What law governs the validity of a Muslim
marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of the Muslim
Code? (2) Are multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the
Muslim Code valid? (3) How do the Court’s pronouncements in People vs.
Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246
(1935), affect Muslim marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim
Code? (4) What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple
marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the
succession to the estate of a Muslim who
died after the Muslim Code and the Family Code took effect? (6) What laws apply
to the dissolution of property regimes in the cases of multiple marriages
entered into before the Muslim Code but dissolved (by the husband’s death)
after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim divorces effected
before the enactment of the Muslim Code valid?
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus
curiae Justice Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for the reference of
respondent court, and for the direction of the bench and bar:
First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim
Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were
celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code
which, accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil
Code recognized the
right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs and
rites, by providing that ---
Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian
provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be
necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged
to comply with article 92.
However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages
performed between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration,
may at any time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any
of said provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of
any of the non-Christian provinces.
Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which
Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the Civil
Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of
the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of
Article 78 of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between Muslims
thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in
accordance with said Code.
Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple
Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano
and People vs. Dumpo
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this
jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages. It is also not to be disputed that the only
law in force governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950.
The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification of Muslim personal laws, also provides in
respect of acts that transpired prior to its enactment:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts
executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in
force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to
extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws
operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be
resolved against the retroactive opertion of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively,
and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law,
specifically, the Civil Code --- in respect of civil acts that took place
before the Muslim Code’s enactment.
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the
provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage.
“Bigamous or polygamous marriages” are considered void and inexistent from the
time of their performance. The Family Code
which superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a
subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment
declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void.
These provisions illustrate
that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is
monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others
while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced.
Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the
enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court
applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage can
exist at any given time.
In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the
accused of homicide, not parricide, since ---
(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano,
father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three wives and that
the deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of
polygamy is approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy, however,
is not sanctioned by the Marriage Law, which merely recognizes tribal marriage
rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the
defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime of parricide.
In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for
bigamy when, legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second
marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that
it was not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential
requisites to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. As it appears that the consent of the bride’s father is an
indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim marriage, and as Mora
Dumpo’s father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent to her
union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such union could not be a
marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and
resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy.
The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact
that the second marriage contained all the essential requisites to make it
valid, a conviction for bigamy would have prospered.
Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim
Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In
keeping with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case
is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that
determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case,
for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question
the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property
relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the
Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property
relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property
acquired from and after August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place;
(2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and
how the subject properties were acquired.
Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as
well as all property she acquires during the marriage, in accordance with
article 148, is paraphernal.
Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal
property.
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is
owned in common by the husband and wife.
The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership
provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Situating these rulings to the instant case,
therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code
cannot apply to Hadji Abdula’s marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and
legally existing marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji
Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives in such marriages
are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their cohabitation
with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively. Absent such proof, however, the presumption
is that property acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage --- and in
the Civil Code, there can only be one validly existing marriage at any given
time --- is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage.
With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following
provisions of the said Code are pertinent:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor
of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all
of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the
parties “live together as husband and wife” the Family Code in Article 147
specifies that they “live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife.” Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted
by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in
cases of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid
marriage, provided that the parties prove their “actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry” and only to the extent of their proportionate
interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306,
Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related cases are embodied in
the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the share of the party
validly married to another shall accrue to the property regime of such existing
marriage.
Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s)
on Succession
and Dissolution of Property Regimes
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the
Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order
of intestate
succession and the respective shares of
the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the
individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will
depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage
rite.
The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the
law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If
the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of
the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point.
Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to
be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that
of the physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in
such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.
If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance
of the Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji
Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of
filiation is established by the evidence of valid marriage between the father
and the mother at the time of the conception of the child.
Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---
(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be
legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must
prove his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of
marriage or within two years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be
presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of physical impossibility of access between the
parents at or about the time of the conception of the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the
marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the
expiration of her ‘idda, the child born within six months from the
dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived
during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.
Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the
dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is pregnant by her former
husband, she shall, within thirty days from the time she became aware of her
pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The
husband or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation
of birth.
Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the
foregoing provisions, the provisions on legal succession
in the Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code, the
sharers to an inheritance include:
(a) The husband, the wife;
(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;
(c) The daughter and the son’s daughter in the direct line;
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the
uterine brother.
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the
decedent’s son, she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the
absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the estate.
The respective shares of the
other sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in
Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.
Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the
Muslim Code
R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in
non-Christian provinces, in accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20
years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969. Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is
valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.
From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four
corollary issues as to further situate the points of controversy in the instant
case for the guidance of the lower court. Thus:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally
existing at the time of the opening of the succession
of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The validly and legally
existing marriage would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time when
there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce
or by death. This is because all of the marriages were celebrated during
the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time.
Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce
depends upon the time frame and the applicable law. A Muslim divorce
under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13,
1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969.
2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the
oppositors as regards the heirship of the children begotten from different
marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are
illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a validly existing
marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are legitimate. The
fact and time of conception or birth may be determined by proof or presumption
depending upon the time frame and the applicable law.
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at
the time of his death on December 18, 1993? The estate of Hadji
Abdula consists of the following:
a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as
determined by the first corollary issue are conjugal properties and should be
liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, this being
the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdula’s death.
b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article
144 of the Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are
conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses
under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as
determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective evidence
to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively.
c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code during the period from and after August 3, 1988
are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the
preceding paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji
Abdula are his exclusive properties.
4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their
shares in intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdula’s legal heirs:
(a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the
children, as determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim
Code, which was already in force at the time of Hadji Abdula’s death, will
govern the determination of their respective shares.
As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate
to resolve in its entirety the main, collateral and corollary issues herein
presented and a remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly,
evidence should be received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact
dates of the marriages performed in accordance with Muslim rites or practices;
(2) the exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or
by divorce in accordance with Muslim rites and practices, thus indicating which
marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria prescribed by
the first, second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary issue;
(3) the exact periods of actual cohabitation (“common life” under a “common
roof”) of each of the marriages during which time the parties lived together;
(4) the identification of specific properties acquired during each of the
periods of cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source
of acquisition, indicating joint or individual effort, thus showing the asset
as owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of
the children (legitimate or illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the
dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and
2 above, thereby indicating their status as lawful heirs.
Amicus curiae
Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of petitioner to decedent
took place in 1972 the Civil Code is the law applicable on the issue of
marriage settlement, but espouses that customs or established
practices among Muslims in Mindanao must also be applied with the force of law
to the instant case. Congressman Mastura’s disquisition has
proven extremely helpful in impressing upon us the background in which Islamic
law and the Muslim Code need to be interpreted, particularly the
interconnectedness of law and religion for Muslims and the impracticability of a strict
application of the Civil Code to plural marriages recognized under Muslim law. Regrettably, the Court is duty-bound to
resolve the instant case applying such laws and rights as are in existence at
the time the pertinent civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are unable
to supplant governing law with customs, albeit how widely observed. In
the same manner, we cannot supply a perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning
the distribution of property between divorced spouses upon one of the spouses’
death.51
WHEREFORE, the
decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Shari’a District Court of
Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE, and the instant
petition is REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence and the
resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Record, p. 14.
Exhs. C-1, D-1 & E-1.
Record, p. 20.
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid., pp. 32-36.
Ibid., pp. 37-49.
These banks were allegedly: (1) United Coconut Planters Bank; (2)
Solidbank; (3) Far East Bank and Trust Company; (4) Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank; (5) Bank of the Philippine Islands; (6) Metrobank; (7)
Philippine National Bank; (8) Land Bank of the Philippines, and (9) Development
Bank of the Philippines.
Record, pp. 50 & 59.
Ibid., p. 52 & 61.
Ibid., p. 220 (Exh. CC).
Ibid, p. 219 (Exh. BB).
Ibid., p. 221 (Exh. DD).
Ibid., pp. 62-63.
Ibid., p. 102-103.
Ibid., p. 97.
Ibid., pp. 123-126.
Ibid., p. 108.
Ibid., pp. 229-232.
Ibid., pp. 222-228.
Order of September 26, 1994, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 25-56.
Ibid., pp. 280-281.
Ibid., p. 282.
Ibid., p. 284.
Petition, pp. 5 & 10.
Retired Justice of the Court of Appeals and former Minister of
Justice, author, noted civil law professor, and law practitioner. He was
also a member of the Family Code Revision Committee.
Former Congressman, law practitioner, and member of the
Presidential Code Commission which reviewed P.D. 1083.
Justice Puno’s Compliance by Amicus Curiae was submitted on June
27, 2000 while Congressman Mastura’s Memorandum was submitted on March 29,
2000.
The registration of marriages, divorces, revocations of divorce
and conversions into Islam is now required under Title VI (Civil Registry) of
P.D. 1083.
TSN, Oral Argument of July 27, 2000, p. 26.
As amended by Republic Act No. 6268, which was approved on June
19, 1971 and was made to take effect as of June 18, 1969.
Article 27 of P.D. 1083 now provides: “Notwithstanding the rule of
Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have more than one wife but not more than
four at a time, no Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal
with them with equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic
law and only in exceptional cases.”
The Explanatory Note to the Draft Muslim Code states: “This (Code)
is the first fundamental concept that the Muslim legal system breathes into the
Philippine legal system which has recognized to the present only the
application of jural rules of mainly non-Muslim origin.”
Includes all laws on personal status, marriage and divorce,
matrimonial and family relations, succession
and inheritance, and property relations between spouses. Muslim Code,
Art. 7, par. (i).
Commisioner vs. Lingayen Gulf E;ectric Power Co., 164 SCRA 27;
Castro vs.. Collector of Internal Revenue, 6 Scar 886; Ichiong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 220.
Civil Code, Art. 80, par. 4.
Family Code, Arts. 52, 53.
The Marriage Law, approved on December 4, 1929, preceded the Civil
Code of 1950 and was the governing law when People vs. Subano was
promulgated.
This is significantly changed by the enactment of P.D. 1083,
Article 180 of which provides: “The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person married in
accordance with the provisions of this (Muslim) Code or, before its
effectivity, under Muslim law. ”
Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124118, March 27,
2000; Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 303; Juaniza vs.
Jose, 89 SCRA 306; Camporodendo vs. Aznar, 102 Phil. 1055; Osmeña vs.
Rodriguez, 54 O.G. 5526; Malajacan vs. Rubi, 42 O.G. 5576.
In Osmeña vs. Rodriguez, supra, the Court ruled that
a parcel of land acquired in the subsistence of a prior valid marriage did not
belong to the conjugal estate of such marriage, in the face of evidence
submitted by the common-law wife that such land was her exclusive property.
Civil Code, Art. 160; Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, supra;
Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
Art. 112, Muslim Code.
The 20-year period expired on June 13, 1969,
considering that there were five leap years (1952, 1956, 1960, 1964 and 1968)
since the approval of R.A. 394 in 1949.
Divorce provisions are now embodied in Articles 45
to 55 of the Muslim Code. Under Article 13 of the same Code, the
provisions on divorce apply to marriages “wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.”
Ibid., pp. 9, 27, 35-37, 42.
Congressman Mastura particularly suggests that the Court take judicial notice
of the principle of sa-pancharian on property acquired through the joint
efforts of the husband and wife, judicially recognized by the Muslim courts of
Malaysia and Singapore and also allegedly practiced as custom by Muslims in
Mindanao.
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