1. A contract of sale of real property, without
consideration, and executed by a person of low intelligence is (a) void (b) voidable (c) rescissible (d) valid because there is consent and sale is consensual.
2. Which
of the following is NOT a characteristic
of a contract of sale? (a) onerous (b) bilateral (c) cumulative (d) nominate.
3. When the object of the contract of sale is
delivered and the price is paid, the contract is said to be (a) generated (b)
negotiated (c) perfected (d) consummated.
4.
Which is a natural element of sale ? (a)
consent or meeting of the minds (b) price certain in money (c) determinate
subject matter (d)
warranty against hidden defects.
5. If
during the 5-year period when a homestead cannot be sold, it is promised to be
sold (in a compromise agreement), this
promise is (a) valid when the sale is
actually made after the 5-year period (b) void even if the sale is actually made after the 5-year
period (c) valid if the sale is approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture (d) voidable when consent is
finally given.
6. Nemo dat quod none habet literally means (a) one cannot sell what he
does not possess (b) no one can dispose what he cannot own (c) no one can give
more than what he has (d) no one can sell what he does not own.
7. Maria
owes me P200,000. If I accept Maria’s offer to take her car as payment, what
contract is generated? (a) a contract of sale because it is as if she sold her
car to me for P200,000 (b) a contract of barter or exchange (c) dacion en pago
(d) a contract of cession since she ceded the car to me in payment of her
obligation.
8.
Which of the following is considered as
illicit per accidens? (a) sale of human flesh (b) sale of land to a balikbayan (c) sale of shabu (d) sale of illegal
lottery tickets.
9. A
mortgaged his land to B, but sold the land to C. Which of the following is true
or valid? (a) A cannot sell the property since it is still mortgaged (b) A,
being the owner, can sell the land to C, who after delivery became the owner,
subject to B’s right of redemption (c) the land sold is always subject to B’s right to foreclose
the mortgage upon the non-payment of the mortgage credit (d) the
sale here is voidable.
10.
Which of the following is NOT correct under
the Maceda law? (a) in case where less than 2 years of installments were paid,
the seller shall give the buyer the grace period of not less than 60 days (b)
the buyer shall have the right to sell his rights or assign the same to another
person (c) the buyer shall have the
right to pay in advance any installment (d) the law gives the buyer
if he has already paid at least two installments.
PART II. (10% each)Essay Type.
Answer the following problems. Always explain your answer. A mere yes or no
answer earns no points.
1. A parcel of land measuring
81,524 square meters (“Subject Land”) in Barrio Culis, Mabiga, Hermosa, Bataan
is the subject of controversy in this case. The registered owners of the
Subject Land were petitioner spouses, Godofredo Alfredo (“Godofredo”) and
Carmen Limon Alfredo (“Carmen”). The
Subject Land is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 284 (“OCT No.
284”) issued to Godofredo and Carmen under Homestead Patent No. V-69196.
On 7 March
1994, the private respondents, spouses Armando Borras (“Armando”) and Adelia
Lobaton Borras (“Adelia”), filed a complaint for specific performance against
Godofredo and Carmen before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
DH-256-94.
Armando and Adelia alleged in
their complaint that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land for P7,000.00
with the Development Bank of the Philippines (“DBP”). To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold
the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay
the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, and the balance to be paid in cash
to the sellers.
Armando and
Adelia gave Godofredo and Carmen the money to pay the loan to DBP which signed
the release of mortgage and returned the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284
to Godofredo and Carmen. Armando and
Adelia subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price of the Subject Land
for which Carmen issued a receipt dated 11 March 1970. Godofredo and Carmen then delivered to Adelia
the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, with the document of cancellation of
mortgage, official receipts of realty tax payments, and tax declaration in the
name of Godofredo. Godofredo and Carmen
introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land, to the
Natanawans, the old tenants of the Subject Land. Armando and Adelia then took possession of
the Subject Land.
In January
1994, Armando and Adelia learned that hired persons had entered the Subject
Land and were cutting trees under instructions of allegedly new owners of the
Subject Land. Subsequently, Armando and
Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the Subject
Land to several persons.
On 8
February 1994, Armando and Adelia filed an adverse claim with the Register of
Deeds of Bataan. Armando and Adelia
discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had secured an owner’s duplicate copy of
OCT No. 284 after filing a petition in court for the issuance of a new
copy. Godofredo and Carmen claimed in
their petition that they lost their owner’s duplicate copy. Armando and Adelia wrote Godofredo and Carmen
complaining about their acts, but the latter did not reply. Thus, Armando and
Adelia filed a complaint for specific performance.
On 28 March
1994, Armando and Adelia amended their complaint to include the following
persons as additional defendants: the spouses Arnulfo Savellano and Editha B.
Savellano, Danton D. Matawaran, the spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela
S. Espiritu, and Elizabeth Tuazon (“Subsequent Buyers”). The Subsequent Buyers, who are also
petitioners in this case, purchased from Godofredo and Carmen the subdivided
portions of the Subject Land. The
Register of Deeds of Bataan issued to the Subsequent Buyers transfer
certificates of title to the lots they purchased.
In their
answer, Godofredo and Carmen and the Subsequent Buyers (collectively “petitioners”) argued that the action is unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds. Petitioners
pointed out that there is no written instrument evidencing the alleged contract
of sale over the Subject Land in favor of Armando and Adelia. Petitioners objected to whatever parole
evidence Armando and Adelia introduced or offered on the alleged sale unless
the same was in writing and subscribed by Godofredo. Petitioners asserted that the Subsequent Buyers were buyers
in good faith and for value. As counterclaim, petitioners sought
payment of attorney’s fees and incidental expenses.
Questions:
(1) Is there
a perfected contract of sale between the
spouses “Armando and Adelia “ and the Spouses “ Godofredo and Carmen “?
Explain.
(2) Whether the alleged sale of the Subject Land in favor
of Armando and Adelia is valid and enforceable, where (a) it was orally entered
into and not in writing; (b) Carmen did not obtain the consent and authority of
her husband, Godofredo, who was the sole owner of the Subject Land in whose
name the title thereto (OCT No. 284) was issued; and (c) it was entered into
during the 25-year prohibitive period for alienating the Subject Land without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
(3)Whether the action to
enforce the alleged oral contract of sale brought after 24 years from its
alleged perfection had been barred by prescription and by laches.
(4)Whether the deeds of
absolute sale and the transfer certificates of title over the portions of the
Subject Land issued to the Subsequent Buyers, innocent purchasers in good faith
and for value whose individual titles to their respective lots are absolute and
indefeasible, are valid.
Answer:
(1) All the characteristics and elements of sale being present, thus the
contract is perfected. (2) (a) enforceable, because the Statute of Frauds does
not apply here, it being that the contract is already executed or consummated
(b) valid, since the sale was entered before Aug. 3, 1988 (c) still
enforceable, the consent of the Sec. is not really applicable in the case at
bar. (3) Not barred by prescription or laches. Laches is a remedy in equity
which is not applicable here, and the action has not prescribed yet (4) The
indefeasibility of title as a principle applies only when there is no fraud
involved.
(REFER to: Alfredo v. Borras
(2003) below
2. What is the
effect if at the time the contract of sale is perfected the object of the
contract has been entirely lost? If part of it is only lost, what are the
rights of the vendee?
Art. 1493. If at the time the contract of
sale is perfected, the thing which is the object of the contract has been
entirely lost, the contract shall be without any effect.
But if the thing should have been lost in
part only, the vendee may choose between withdrawing from the contract and
demanding the remaining part, paying its price in proportion to the total sum
agreed upon. (1460a)
3.When is ownership of the thing sold transferred to
the vendee? Can there be other stipulations possible?
Art.
1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment
it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501,
or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
4.Art. 1465. Things subject to a resolutory condition may be the object
of the contract of sale. Give at least two examples of things which are subject
to a resolutory condition.
ANSWER: PACTO DE RETRO
SALE; RESERVA TRUNCAL
5.
Generally, when is the thing sold understood as “delivered”? What if the object
of the sale is (a) movable and (b)
immovable?
Art. 1497. The thing sold shall be
understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the
vendee. (1462a)
Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of
the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
With regard to movable property, its
delivery may also be made by the delivery of the keys of the place or
depository where it is stored or kept. (1463a)
Art. 1499. The delivery of movable property
may likewise be made by the mere consent or agreement of the contracting
parties, if the thing sold cannot be transferred to the possession of the
vendee at the time of the sale, or if the latter already had it in his
possession for any other reason. (1463a)
Art. 1500. There may also be tradition constitutum
possessorium. (n)
Art. 1501. With respect to incorporeal
property, the provisions of the first paragraph of article 1498 shall govern.
In any other case wherein said provisions are not applicable, the placing of
the titles of ownership in the possession of the vendee or the use by the
vendee of his rights, with the vendor's consent, shall be understood as a
delivery. (1464)
END OF THE
EXAMINATION
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No.
144225. June 17, 2003]
SPOUSES GODOFREDO
ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO, SPOUSES ARNULFO SAVELLANO and EDITHA B.
SAVELLANO, DANTON D. MATAWARAN, SPOUSES DELFIN F. ESPIRITU, JR. and ESTELA S.
ESPIRITU and ELIZABETH TUAZON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS and
ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a
petition for review assailing the Decision[1][1]
of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 1999 affirming the decision[2][2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4, in Civil Case No.
DH-256-94. Petitioners also question the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 July 2000 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent
Facts
A parcel of land
measuring 81,524 square meters (“Subject Land”) in Barrio Culis, Mabiga,
Hermosa, Bataan is the subject of controversy in this case. The registered
owners of the Subject Land were petitioner spouses, Godofredo Alfredo
(“Godofredo”) and Carmen Limon Alfredo (“Carmen”). The Subject Land is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 284 (“OCT No. 284”) issued to Godofredo and Carmen
under Homestead Patent No. V-69196.
On 7 March 1994,
the private respondents, spouses Armando Borras (“Armando”) and Adelia Lobaton
Borras (“Adelia”), filed a complaint for specific performance against Godofredo
and Carmen before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
DH-256-94.
Armando and Adelia
alleged in their complaint that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land
for P7,000.00 with the Development Bank of the Philippines (“DBP”). To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold
the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay
the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, and the balance to be paid in cash
to the sellers.
Armando and Adelia
gave Godofredo and Carmen the money to pay the loan to DBP which signed the
release of mortgage and returned the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284 to
Godofredo and Carmen. Armando and Adelia
subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price of the Subject Land for
which Carmen issued a receipt dated 11 March 1970. Godofredo and Carmen then delivered to Adelia
the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, with the document of cancellation of
mortgage, official receipts of realty tax payments, and tax declaration in the
name of Godofredo. Godofredo and Carmen
introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land, to the
Natanawans, the old tenants of the Subject Land. Armando and Adelia then took possession of
the Subject Land.
In January 1994,
Armando and Adelia learned that hired persons had entered the Subject Land and
were cutting trees under instructions of allegedly new owners of the Subject
Land. Subsequently, Armando and Adelia
discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the Subject Land
to several persons.
On 8 February 1994,
Armando and Adelia filed an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of
Bataan. Armando and Adelia discovered
that Godofredo and Carmen had secured an owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284
after filing a petition in court for the issuance of a new copy. Godofredo and Carmen claimed in their
petition that they lost their owner’s duplicate copy. Armando and Adelia wrote Godofredo and Carmen
complaining about their acts, but the latter did not reply. Thus, Armando and
Adelia filed a complaint for specific performance.
On 28 March 1994,
Armando and Adelia amended their complaint to include the following persons as
additional defendants: the spouses Arnulfo Savellano and Editha B. Savellano,
Danton D. Matawaran, the spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S.
Espiritu, and Elizabeth Tuazon (“Subsequent Buyers”). The Subsequent Buyers, who are also
petitioners in this case, purchased from Godofredo and Carmen the subdivided
portions of the Subject Land. The
Register of Deeds of Bataan issued to the Subsequent Buyers transfer
certificates of title to the lots they purchased.
In their answer,
Godofredo and Carmen and the Subsequent Buyers
(collectively “petitioners”) argued that the action is unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds. Petitioners
pointed out that there is no written instrument evidencing the alleged contract
of sale over the Subject Land in favor of Armando and Adelia. Petitioners objected to whatever parole
evidence Armando and Adelia introduced or offered on the alleged sale unless
the same was in writing and subscribed by Godofredo. Petitioners asserted that
the Subsequent Buyers were buyers in good faith and for value. As counterclaim,
petitioners sought payment of attorney’s fees and incidental expenses.
Trial then
followed. Armando and Adelia presented
the following witnesses: Adelia, Jesus Lobaton, Roberto Lopez, Apolinario
Natanawan, Rolando Natanawan, Tomas Natanawan, and Mildred Lobaton. Petitioners presented two witnesses,
Godofredo and Constancia Calonso.
On 7 June 1996, the
trial court rendered its decision in favor of Armando and Adelia. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs, the spouses
Adelia Lobaton Borras and Armando F. Borras, and against the defendant-spouses
Godofredo Alfredo and Carmen Limon Alfredo, spouses Arnulfo Sabellano and
Editha B. Sabellano, spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu,
Danton D. Matawaran and Elizabeth Tuazon, as follows:
1. Declaring the Deeds of Absolute
Sale of the disputed parcel of land (covered by OCT No. 284) executed by the
spouses Godofredo Alfredo and Camen Limon Alfredo in favor of spouses Arnulfo
Sabellano and Editha B. Sabellano, spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Danton D.
Matawaran and Elizabeth Tuazon, as null and void;
2. Declaring the Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-163266 and T-163267 in the names of spouses Arnulfo Sabellano
and Editha B. Sabellano; Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-163268 and
163272 in the names of spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu;
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-163269 and T-163271 in the name of Danton
D. Matawaran; and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-163270 in the name of Elizabeth Tuazon, as null and void and
that the Register of Deeds of Bataan is hereby ordered to cancel said titles;
3. Ordering the defendant-spouses
Godofredo Alfredo and Carmen Limon Alfredo to execute and deliver a good and
valid Deed of Absolute Sale of the disputed parcel of land (covered by OCT No.
284) in favor of the spouses Adelia Lobaton Borras and Armando F. Borras within
a period of ten (10) days from the finality of this decision;
4. Ordering defendant-spouses
Godofredo Alfredo and Carmen Limon Alfredo to surrender their owner’s duplicate
copy of OCT No. 284 issued to them by virtue of the Order dated May 20, 1992 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Dinalupihan Branch, to the Registry of
Deeds of Bataan within ten (10) days from the finality of this decision, who,
in turn, is directed to cancel the same as there exists in the possession of
herein plaintiffs of the owner’s duplicate copy of said OCT No. 284 and, to
restore and/or reinstate OCT No. 284 of the Register of Deeds of Bataan to its
full force and effect;
5. Ordering the defendant-spouses
Godofredo Alfredo and Carmen Limon Alfredo to restitute and/or return the
amount of the respective purchase prices and/or consideration of sale of the
disputed parcels of land they sold to their co-defendants within ten (10) days
from the finality of this decision with legal interest thereon from date of the
sale;
6. Ordering the defendants, jointly
and severally, to pay plaintiff-spouses the sum of P20,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and
7. Ordering defendants to pay the
costs of suit.
Defendants’
counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3][3]
Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 26 November
1999, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the decision of the
trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appealed decision in Civil Case No. DH-256-94 is hereby
AFFIRMED in its entirety. Treble costs
against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[4][4]
On 26 July 2000,
the Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Ruling of the
Trial Court
The trial court
ruled that there was a perfected contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo
and Carmen and the spouses Armando and Adelia.
The trial court found that all the elements of a contract of sale were present
in this case. The object of the sale was
specifically identified as the 81,524-square meter lot in Barrio Culis,
Mabigas, Hermosa, Bataan, covered by OCT No. 284 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Bataan. The purchase price was
fixed at P15,000.00, with the buyers assuming to pay the sellers’ P7,000.00
DBP mortgage loan including its accumulated interest. The balance of the purchase price was to be
paid in cash to the sellers. The last
payment of P2,524.00 constituted the full settlement of the purchase
price and this was paid on 11 March 1970 as evidenced by the receipt issued by
Carmen.
The trial court
found the following facts as proof of a perfected contract of sale: (1)
Godofredo and Carmen delivered to Armando and Adelia the Subject Land; (2)
Armando and Adelia treated as their own tenants the tenants of Godofredo and
Carmen; (3) Godofredo and Carmen turned over to Armando and Adelia documents
such as the owner’s duplicate copy of the title of the Subject Land, tax
declaration, and the receipts of realty tax payments in the name of Godofredo;
and (4) the DBP cancelled the mortgage
on the Subject Property upon payment of the loan of Godofredo and Carmen. Moreover, the receipt of payment issued by
Carmen served as an acknowledgment, if not a ratification, of the verbal sale
between the sellers and the buyers. The trial court ruled that the Statute of
Frauds is not applicable because in this case the sale was perfected.
The trial court
concluded that the Subsequent Buyers were not innocent purchasers. Not one of the Subsequent Buyers testified in
court on how they purchased their respective lots. The Subsequent Buyers totally depended on the
testimony of Constancia Calonso (“Calonso”) to explain the subsequent sale. Calonso, a broker, negotiated with Godofredo
and Carmen the sale of the Subject Land which Godofredo and Carmen subdivided
so they could sell anew portions to the Subsequent Buyers.
Calonso admitted
that the Subject Land was adjacent to her own lot. The trial court pointed out that Calonso did
not inquire on the nature of the tenancy of the Natanawans and on who owned the
Subject Land. Instead, she bought out
the tenants for P150,000.00. The buy out was embodied in a Kasunduan.
Apolinario Natanawan (“Apolinario”) testified that he and his wife accepted the
money and signed the Kasunduan because Calonso and the Subsequent Buyers
threatened them with forcible ejectment.
Calonso brought Apolinario to the Agrarian Reform Office where he was
asked to produce the documents showing that Adelia is the owner of the Subject
Land. Since Apolinario could not produce
the documents, the agrarian officer told him that he would lose the case. Thus, Apolinario was constrained to sign the
Kasunduan and accept the P150,000.00.
Another indication
of Calonso’s bad faith was her own admission that she saw an adverse claim on
the title of the Subject Land when she registered the deeds of sale in the
names of the Subsequent Buyers. Calonso ignored the adverse claim and proceeded
with the registration of the deeds of sale.
The trial court
awarded P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees to Armando and Adelia. In justifying the award of attorney’s fees,
the trial court invoked Article 2208 (2) of the Civil Code which allows a court
to award attorney’s fees, including litigation expenses, when it is just and
equitable to award the same. The trial
court ruled that Armando and Adelia are entitled to attorney’s fees since they
were compelled to file this case due to petitioners’ refusal to heed their just
and valid demand.
The Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
The Court of
Appeals found the factual findings of the trial court well supported by the
evidence. Based on these findings, the
Court of Appeals also concluded that there was a perfected contract of sale and
the Subsequent Buyers were not innocent purchasers.
The Court of
Appeals ruled that the handwritten receipt dated 11 March 1970 is sufficient
proof that Godofredo and Carmen sold the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia
upon payment of the balance of the purchase price. The Court of Appeals found the recitals in
the receipt as “sufficient to serve as the memorandum or note as a writing
under the Statute of Frauds.”[5][5]
The Court of Appeals then reiterated the ruling of the trial court that the
Statute of Frauds does not apply in this case.
The Court of Appeals
gave credence to the testimony of a witness of Armando and Adelia, Mildred
Lobaton, who explained why the title to the Subject Land was not in the name of
Armando and Adelia. Lobaton testified
that Godofredo was then busy preparing to leave for Davao. Godofredo promised that he would sign all the
papers once they were ready. Since
Armando and Adelia were close to the family of Carmen, they trusted Godofredo
and Carmen to honor their commitment.
Armando and Adelia had no reason to believe that their contract of sale
was not perfected or validly executed considering that they had received the
duplicate copy of OCT No. 284 and other relevant documents. Moreover, they had taken physical possession
of the Subject Land.
The Court of
Appeals held that the contract of sale is not void even if only Carmen signed
the receipt dated 11 March 1970. Citing Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon,[6][6]
the appellate court ruled that a contract of sale made by the wife without the
husband’s consent is not void but merely voidable. The Court of Appeals further declared that
the sale in this case binds the conjugal partnership even if only the wife
signed the receipt because the proceeds of the sale were used for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. The
appellate court based this conclusion on Article 161[7][7] of the
Civil Code.
The Subsequent
Buyers of the Subject Land cannot claim that they are buyers in good faith
because they had constructive notice of the adverse claim of Armando and
Adelia. Calonso, who brokered the
subsequent sale, testified that when she registered the subsequent deeds of
sale, the adverse claim of Armando and Adelia was already annotated on the
title of the Subject Land. The Court of
Appeals believed that the act of Calonso and the Subsequent Buyers in forcibly
ejecting the Natanawans from the Subject Land buttresses the conclusion that
the second sale was tainted with bad faith from the very beginning.
Finally, the Court
of Appeals noted that the issue of prescription was not raised in the Answer.
Nonetheless, the appellate court explained that since this action is actually
based on fraud, the prescriptive period is four years, with the period starting
to run only from the date of the discovery of the fraud. Armando and Adelia discovered the fraudulent
sale of the Subject Land only in January 1994.
Armando and Adelia lost no time in writing a letter to Godofredo and
Carmen on 2 February 1994 and filed this case on 7 March 1994. Plainly, Armando and Adelia did not sleep on
their rights or lose their rights by prescription.
The Court of
Appeals sustained the award of attorney’s fees and imposed treble costs on
petitioners.
The Issues
Petitioners raise
the following issues:
I
Whether the alleged
sale of the Subject Land in favor of Armando and Adelia is valid and
enforceable, where (1) it was orally entered into and not in writing; (2)
Carmen did not obtain the consent and authority of her husband, Godofredo, who
was the sole owner of the Subject Land in whose name the title thereto (OCT No.
284) was issued; and (3) it was entered into during the 25-year prohibitive
period for alienating the Subject Land without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
II
Whether the action
to enforce the alleged oral contract of sale brought after 24 years from its
alleged perfection had been barred by prescription and by laches.
III
Whether the deeds
of absolute sale and the transfer certificates of title over the portions of
the Subject Land issued to the Subsequent Buyers, innocent purchasers in good
faith and for value whose individual titles to their respective lots are
absolute and indefeasible, are valid.
IV
Whether petitioners
are liable to pay Armando and Adelia P20,0000.00 as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses and the treble costs, where the claim of Armando and Adelia
is clearly unfounded and baseless.
V
Whether petitioners
are entitled to the counterclaim for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
where they have sustained such expenses by reason of institution of a clearly
malicious and unfounded action by Armando and Adelia.[8][8]
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is
without merit.
In a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and
not errors of facts.[9][9]
The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this
Court.[10][10]
This applies with greater force when both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual findings.[11][11]
In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower
courts. The facts relied upon by the
trial and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the conclusions drawn by the
lower courts from these facts.
Validity and
Enforceability of the Sale
The contract of
sale between the spouses Godofredo and Carmen and the spouses Armando and
Adelia was a perfected contract. A
contract is perfected once there is consent of the contracting parties on the
object certain and on the cause of the obligation.[12][12] In the
instant case, the object of the sale is the Subject Land, and the price certain
is P15,000.00. The trial and
appellate courts found that there was a meeting of the minds on the sale of the
Subject Land and on the purchase price of P15,000.00. This is a finding of fact that is binding on
this Court. We find no reason to disturb
this finding since it is supported by substantial evidence.
The contract of
sale of the Subject Land has also been consummated because the sellers and
buyers have performed their respective obligations under the contract. In a contract of sale, the seller obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to deliver
the same, to the buyer who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the
seller.[13][13]
In the instant case, Godofredo and Carmen delivered the Subject Land to Armando
and Adelia, placing the latter in actual physical possession of the Subject
Land. This physical delivery of the
Subject Land also constituted a transfer of ownership of the Subject Land to
Armando and Adelia.[14][14]
Ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon its actual or
constructive delivery.[15][15]
Godofredo and Carmen also turned over to Armando and Adelia the documents of
ownership to the Subject Land, namely the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No.
284, the tax declaration and the receipts of realty tax payments.
On the other hand,
Armando and Adelia paid the full purchase price as evidenced by the receipt
dated 11 March 1970 issued by Carmen.
Armando and Adelia fulfilled their obligation to provide the P7,000.00
to pay the DBP loan of Godofredo and Carmen, and to pay the latter the balance
of P8,000.00 in cash. The P2,524.00
paid under the receipt dated 11 March 1970 was the last installment to settle
fully the purchase price. Indeed, upon
payment to DBP of the P7,000.00 and the accumulated interests, the DBP
cancelled the mortgage on the Subject Land and returned the owner’s duplicate
copy of OCT No. 284 to Godofredo and Carmen.
The trial and
appellate courts correctly refused to apply the Statute of Frauds to this case.
The Statute of Frauds[16][16]
provides that a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable
unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing and
subscribed by the party charged or his agent.
The existence of the receipt dated 11 March 1970, which is a memorandum
of the sale, removes the transaction from the provisions of the Statute of
Frauds.
The Statute of
Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts either
partially or totally performed.[17][17]
Thus, where one party has performed one’s obligation, oral evidence will be
admitted to prove the agreement.[18][18]
In the instant case, the parties have consummated the sale of the Subject Land,
with both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations under the
contract of sale. In addition, a
contract that violates the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of
benefits under the contract.[19][19]
Godofredo and Carmen benefited from the contract because they paid their DBP
loan and secured the cancellation of their mortgage using the money given by
Armando and Adelia. Godofredo and Carmen
also accepted payment of the balance of the purchase price.
Godofredo and
Carmen cannot invoke the Statute of Frauds to deny the existence of the verbal
contract of sale because they have performed their obligations, and have
accepted benefits, under the verbal contract. [20][20] Armando
and Adelia have also performed their obligations under the verbal contract. Clearly, both the sellers and the buyers have
consummated the verbal contract of sale of the Subject Land. The Statute of Frauds was enacted to prevent
fraud.[21][21]
This law cannot be used to advance the very evil the law seeks to prevent.
Godofredo and
Carmen also claim that the sale of the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia is
void on two grounds. First, Carmen sold
the Subject Land without the marital consent of Godofredo. Second, the sale was made during the 25-year
period that the law prohibits the alienation of land grants without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
These arguments are
without basis.
The Family Code,
which took effect on 3 August 1988, provides that any alienation or encumbrance
made by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of
the wife is void. However, when the sale
is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the
Civil Code.[22][22]
Article 173 of the
Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the
wife’s consent is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 reads:
The wife may,
during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of
the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
In Felipe v. Aldon,[23][23] we
applied Article 173 in a case where the wife sold some parcels of land
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband. We ruled that the contract of sale was
voidable subject to annulment by the husband.
Following petitioners’ argument that Carmen sold the land to Armando and
Adelia without the consent of Carmen’s husband, the sale would only be voidable
and not void.
However, Godofredo
can no longer question the sale. Voidable contracts are susceptible of
ratification.[24][24]
Godofredo ratified the sale when he introduced Armando and Adelia to his
tenants as the new owners of the Subject Land.
The trial court noted that Godofredo failed to deny categorically on the
witness stand the claim of the complainants’ witnesses that Godofredo
introduced Armando and Adelia as the new landlords of the tenants.[25][25]
That Godofredo and Carmen allowed Armando and Adelia to enjoy possession of the
Subject Land for 24 years is formidable proof of Godofredo’s acquiescence to
the sale. If the sale was truly
unauthorized, then Godofredo should have filed an action to annul the sale. He
did not. The prescriptive period to annul the sale has long lapsed. Godofredo’s conduct belies his claim that his
wife sold the Subject Land without his consent.
Moreover, Godofredo
and Carmen used most of the proceeds of the sale to pay their debt with the
DBP. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the sale redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Article 161 of the Civil Code provides that
the conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted
by the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, even if Carmen
sold the land without the consent of her husband, the sale still binds the
conjugal partnership.
Petitioners contend
that Godofredo and Carmen did not deliver the title of the Subject Land to
Armando and Adelia as shown by this portion of Adelia’s testimony on
cross-examination:
Q -- No title was
delivered to you by Godofredo Alfredo?
A -- I got the title from Julie Limon because
my sister told me.[26][26]
Petitioners raise
this factual issue for the first time.
The Court of Appeals could have passed upon this issue had petitioners
raised this earlier. At any rate, the
cited testimony of Adelia does not convincingly prove that Godofredo and Carmen
did not deliver the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia. Adelia’s cited testimony must be examined in
context not only with her entire testimony but also with the other
circumstances.
Adelia stated
during cross-examination that she obtained the title of the Subject Land from
Julie Limon (“Julie”), her classmate in college and the sister of Carmen. Earlier, Adelia’s own sister had secured the
title from the father of Carmen.
However, Adelia’s sister, who was about to leave for the United States,
gave the title to Julie because of the absence of the other documents. Adelia’s sister told Adelia to secure the
title from Julie, and this was how Adelia obtained the title from Julie.
It is not necessary
that the seller himself deliver the title of the property to the buyer because
the thing sold is understood as delivered when it is placed in the control and
possession of the vendee.[27][27]
To repeat, Godofredo and Carmen themselves introduced the Natanawans, their
tenants, to Armando and Adelia as the new owners of the Subject Land. From then on, Armando and Adelia acted as the
landlords of the Natanawans. Obviously,
Godofredo and Carmen themselves placed control and possession of the Subject
Land in the hands of Armando and Adelia.
Petitioners invoke
the absence of approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to nullify the sale.
Petitioners never raised this issue before the trial court or the Court
of Appeals. Litigants cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process.[28][28]
However, we will address this new issue to finally put an end to this case.
The sale of the
Subject Land cannot be annulled on the ground that the Secretary did not
approve the sale, which was made within 25 years from the issuance of the
homestead title. Section 118 of the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) reads as follows:
SEC. 118. Except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions or legally
constituted banking corporation, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of
the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of the issuance of the patent or grant.
xxx
No alienation,
transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after 5 years and before twenty-five
years after the issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied
except on constitutional and legal grounds.
A grantee or
homesteader is prohibited from alienating to a private individual a land grant
within five years from the time that the patent or grant is issued.[29][29]
A violation of this prohibition renders a sale void.[30][30] This
prohibition, however, expires on the fifth year. From then on until the next 20 years[31][31]
the land grant may be alienated provided the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources approves the alienation.
The Secretary is required to approve the alienation unless there are
“constitutional and legal grounds” to deny the approval. In this case, there are no apparent
constitutional or legal grounds for the Secretary to disapprove the sale of the
Subject Land.
The failure to
secure the approval of the Secretary does not ipso facto make a sale void.[32][32]
The absence of approval by the Secretary does not nullify a sale made after the
expiration of the 5-year period, for in such event the requirement of Section
118 of the Public Land Act becomes merely directory[33][33] or a
formality.[34][34]
The approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying and
adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authorized.[35][35]
As held in Evangelista v. Montano:[36][36]
Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, specifically enjoins that the approval by
the Department Secretary "shall not be denied except on constitutional and
legal grounds." There being no allegation that there were constitutional
or legal impediments to the sales, and no pretense that if the sales had been
submitted to the Secretary concerned they would have been disapproved, approval
was a ministerial duty, to be had as
a matter of course and demandable if refused. For this reason, and if
necessary, approval may now be applied for and its effect will be to ratify and
adopt the transactions as if they had been previously authorized. (Emphasis supplied)
Action Not Barred
by Prescription and Laches
Petitioners insist
that prescription and laches have set in.
We disagree.
The Amended
Complaint filed by Armando and Adelia with the trial court is captioned as one
for Specific Performance. In reality, the ultimate relief sought by Armando and
Adelia is the reconveyance to them of the Subject Land. An action for
reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by
another, to its rightful and legal owner.[37][37] The
body of the pleading or complaint determines the nature of an action, not its
title or heading.[38][38]
Thus, the present action should be treated as one for reconveyance.[39][39]
Article 1456 of the
Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes by
operation of law a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. The presence of fraud in this case created an implied
trust in favor of Armando and Adelia.
This gives Armando and Adelia the right to seek reconveyance of the
property from the Subsequent Buyers.[40][40]
To determine when
the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff’s
possession of the disputed property is material. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years.[41][41] The
ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.[42][42]
However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and
possession of the property does not run against him.[43][43] In such
a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[44][44]
In this case, the
appellate court resolved the issue of prescription by ruling that the action
should prescribe four years from discovery of the fraud. We must correct this erroneous application of
the four-year prescriptive period. In Caro v. Court of Appeals,[45][45]
we explained why an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust should
prescribe in ten years. In that case, the
appellate court also erroneously applied the four-year prescriptive
period. We declared in Caro:
We disagree. The
case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261, September
30, 1987,154 SCRA 396 illuminated what used to be a gray area on the
prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to real property and,
corollarily, its point of reference:
xxx It must be remembered that before August 30,
1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within
the following periods after the right of action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Within four years: xxx An action
for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, under
the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust
is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding
obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true
owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil
Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
x x x x x x x x x
(Emphasis
supplied).
An action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and
of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin
vs. Medalla which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action
is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous
reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on
June 25,1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil
Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must
be stressed, at this juncture, that article 1144 and article 1456, are new
provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code
of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the
four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real
property acquired under false pretenses.
An action for
reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, which provides:
In all cases of
registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on
the original petition or application, xxx
This provision
should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
The law thereby
creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title
thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article
1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra,
the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real
property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title xxx (Emphasis supplied)[46][46]
Following Caro, we have consistently held that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years.[47][47]
We went further by specifying the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive
period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the
title.[48][48]
Had Armando and
Adelia remained in possession of the Subject Land, their action for
reconveyance, in effect an action to quiet title to property, would not be
subject to prescription. Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in
actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action
to vindicate his right.[49][49]
His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his title.[50][50]
Armando and Adelia
lost possession of the Subject Land when the Subsequent Buyers forcibly drove
away from the Subject Land the Natanawans, the tenants of Armando and Adelia.[51][51]
This created an actual need for Armando and Adelia to seek reconveyance of the
Subject Land. The statute of limitation becomes relevant in this case. The ten-year prescriptive period started to
run from the date the Subsequent Buyers registered their deeds of sale with the
Register of Deeds.
The Subsequent
Buyers bought the subdivided portions of the Subject Land on 22 February 1994,
the date of execution of their deeds of sale. The Register of Deeds issued the
transfer certificates of title to the Subsequent Buyers on 24 February
1994. Armando and Adelia filed the Complaint
on 7 March 1994. Clearly, prescription
could not have set in since the case was filed at the early stage of the
ten-year prescriptive period.
Neither is the
action barred by laches. We have defined
laches as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable time, to do that which,
by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.[52][52]
It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.[53][53]
Armando and Adelia discovered in January 1994 the subsequent sale of the
Subject Land and they filed this case on 7 March 1994. Plainly, Armando and Adelia did not sleep on
their rights.
Validity of
Subsequent Sale of Portions of the Subject Land
Petitioners
maintain that the subsequent sale must be upheld because the Subsequent Buyers,
the co-petitioners of Godofredo and Carmen, purchased and registered the
Subject Land in good faith. Petitioners
argue that the testimony of Calonso, the person who brokered the second sale,
should not prejudice the Subsequent Buyers.
There is no evidence that Calonso was the agent of the Subsequent Buyers
and that she communicated to them what she knew about the adverse claim and the
prior sale. Petitioners assert that the
adverse claim registered by Armando and Adelia has no legal basis to render
defective the transfer of title to the Subsequent Buyers.
We are not
persuaded. Godofredo and Carmen had
already sold the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia. The settled rule is when ownership or title
passes to the buyer, the seller ceases to have any title to transfer to any
third person.[54][54]
If the seller sells the same land to another, the second buyer who has actual
or constructive knowledge of the prior sale cannot be a registrant in good
faith.[55][55]
Such second buyer cannot defeat the first buyer’s title.[56][56] In case
a title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of
the property subject of the sale.[57][57]
Thus, to merit
protection under the second paragraph of Article 1544[58][58] of the
Civil Code, the second buyer must act in good faith in registering the deed.[59][59]
In this case, the Subsequent Buyers’ good faith hinges on whether they had
knowledge of the previous sale.
Petitioners do not dispute that Armando and Adelia registered their
adverse claim with the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on 8 February 1994. The Subsequent Buyers purchased their
respective lots only on 22 February 1994 as shown by the date of their deeds of
sale. Consequently, the adverse claim
registered prior to the second sale charged the Subsequent Buyers with
constructive notice of the defect in the title of the sellers,[60][60]
Godofredo and Carmen.
It is immaterial
whether Calonso, the broker of the second sale, communicated to the Subsequent
Buyers the existence of the adverse claim. The registration of the adverse
claim on 8 February 1994 constituted, by operation of law, notice to the whole
world.[61][61]
From that date onwards, the Subsequent Buyers were deemed to have constructive
notice of the adverse claim of Armando and Adelia. When the Subsequent Buyers purchased portions
of the Subject Land on 22 February 1994, they already had constructive notice
of the adverse claim registered earlier.[62][62] Thus,
the Subsequent Buyers were not buyers in good faith when they purchased their
lots on 22 February 1994. They were also
not registrants in good faith when they registered their deeds of sale with the
Registry of Deeds on 24 February 1994.
The Subsequent
Buyers’ individual titles to their respective lots are not absolutely
indefeasible. The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not
extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw
in his title.[63][63] The
principle of indefeasibility of title does not apply where fraud attended the
issuance of the titles as in this case.[64][64]
Attorney’s Fees and
Costs
We sustain the
award of attorney’s fees. The decision
of the court must state the grounds for the award of attorney’s fees. The trial court complied with this
requirement.[65][65]
We agree with the trial court that if it were not for petitioners’ unjustified
refusal to heed the just and valid demands of Armando and Adelia, the latter
would not have been compelled to file this action.
The Court of
Appeals echoed the trial court’s condemnation of petitioners’ fraudulent
maneuverings in securing the second sale of the Subject Land to the Subsequent
Buyers. We will also not turn a blind
eye on petitioners’ brazen tactics.
Thus, we uphold the treble costs imposed by the Court of Appeals on
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED. Treble costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1][1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez and Romeo A. Brawner, concurring, Sixth
Division.
[2][2] Penned by Judge Pedro B. Villafuerte.
[3][3] Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[5][5] Rollo, p. 55.
[6][6] 205 Phil. 537 (1982).
[7][7] Article 161 of the Civil Code provides as
follows: “The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for
the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
x x x.”
[8][8] Rollo, pp. 106-107.
[9][9] W-Red
Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122648,
17 August 2000, 338 SCRA 341.
[10][10] Ibid.
[11][11] Ibid.
[16][16] Article 1403, Civil Code.
[17][17] Article 1497 of the Civil Code. See also The
Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125602, 29 April 1999, 325 SCRA 694.
[18][18] Ibid.
[19][19] Article 1405, Civil Code.
[20][20] Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 1046 (1996).
[21][21] Ibid.
[22][22] Spouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil.
578 (1998).
[23][23] Supra, see
note 6.
[24][24] Article 1390 of the Civil Code.
[25][25] Rollo, p. 47.
[26][26] Ibid.,
p. 18.
[27][27] Article 1497 of the Civil Code. See also The
Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125602, 29
April 1999, 325 SCRA 694.
[28][28] Sumbad v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 52
(1999).
[29][29] Jacinto v. Jacinto, 105 Phil. 1218 (1959).
[30][30] Ibid.
[31][31] Ibid.
[32][32] Ibid.
[33][33] Ibid.; Evangelista
v. Montano, 93 Phil. 275 (1953); Flores v. Plasina, 94 Phil. 327 (1954).
[35][35] Ibid.
[36][36] 93 Phil. 275 (1953).
[37][37] Ibid.
[39][39] Ibid.
[40][40] Ibid. See
also Heirs of Olviga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104813, 21 October 1993, 227
SCRA 330.
[41][41] Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 335
Phil. 19 (1997).
[42][42] Ibid.
[43][43] Supra,
see note 38.
[44][44] Ibid.
[46][46] Ibid.
[47][47] Development
Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 129471, 28 April 2000, 331 SCRA 267;
David v. Malay, supra, see note 38;
Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, supra, see note 41.
[48][48] Supra,
see note 38.
[50][50] Supra, see note 38.
[51][51] Rollo, p. 59; TSN, 8 March 1995, pp. 336-337
(Rolando Natanawan); TSN, 23
November 1994, p. 262 (Adelia Lobaton).
[52][52] Coronel v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 294
(1996).
[53][53] Ibid.
[54][54] Ibid.
[55][55] Ibid.
[56][56] Ibid.
[57][57] Ibid.
[58][58] Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides as
follows: “If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred
to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong
to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain
to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.”
[60][60] See Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil.
858 (1996); Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97442, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA
551.
[61][61] Section 52 of the Property Registration
Decree (PD No. 1529) provides as follows: “Constructive notice upon registration. — Every x x x lien, x x x
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where
the land to which it relates lies, be constructive
notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or
entering.” See also Caviles
v. Bautista, G.R. No. 102648, 24 November 1999, 319 SCRA 24; DBP v. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, UDK No. 7671, 23 June 1988, 162 SCRA 450.
[62][62] Gardner v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-59952, 31 August 1984, 131 SCRA 584; PNB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-30831 & L-31176, 21 November 1979, 94 SCRA 357.
[63][63] Supra,
see note 41.
[65][65] Cipriano v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 1019
(1996).
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