G.R. No. L-28050 March 13, 1928
FEDERICO VALERA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL VELASCO, defendant-appellee.
Jose Martinez San Agustin for appellant.
Vicente O. Romualdez, Crispulo T. Manubay and Placido P. Reyes for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FEDERICO VALERA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL VELASCO, defendant-appellee.
Jose Martinez San Agustin for appellant.
Vicente O. Romualdez, Crispulo T. Manubay and Placido P. Reyes for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Federico Valera from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing his
complaint against Miguel Velasco, on the ground that he has not
satisfactorily proven his right of action.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the
following alleged as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to
wit: (1) The lower court erred in holding that one of the ways of
terminating an agency is by the express or tacit renunciation of the
agent; (2) the lower court erred in holding that the institution of a
civil action and the execution of the judgment obtained by the agent
against his principal is but renunciation of the powers conferred on the
agent; (3) the lower erred in holding that, even if the sale by Eduardo
Hernandez to the plaintiff Federico Valera be declared void, such a
declaration could not prevail over the rights of the defendant Miguel
Velasco inasmuch as the right redemption was exercised by neither
Eduardo Hernandez nor the plaintiff Federico Valera; (4) the lower court
erred in not finding that the defendant Miguel Velasco was, and at
present is, an authorized representative of the plaintiff Federico
Valera; (5) the lower court erred in not annulling the sale made by the
sheriff at public auction to defendant Miguel Velasco, Exhibit K; (6)
the lower court erred in failing to annul the sale executed by Eduardo
Hernandez to the plaintiff Federico Valera, Exhibit C; (7) the lower
court erred in not annulling Exhibit L, that is, the sale at public
auction of the right to repurchase the land in question to Salvador
Vallejo; (8) the lower court erred in not declaring Exhibit M null and
void, which is the sale by Salvador Vallejo to defendant Miguel Velasco;
(9) the lower court erred in not ordering the defendant Miguel Velasco
to liquidate his accounts as agent of the plaintiff Federico Valera;
(10) the lower court erred in not awarding plaintiff the P5,000 damages
prayed for.
The pertinent facts necessary for the solution of the
questions raised by the above quoted assignments of error are contained
in the decision appealed from and are as follows:
By virtue of the powers of attorney, Exhibits X and
Z, executed by the plaintiff on April 11, 1919, and on August 8, 1922,
the defendant was appointed attorney-in-fact of the said plaintiff with
authority to manage his property in the Philippines, consisting of the
usufruct of a real property located of Echague Street, City of Manila.
The defendant accepted both powers of attorney,
managed plaintiff's property, reported his operations, and rendered
accounts of his administration; and on March 31, 1923 presented exhibit F
to plaintiff, which is the final account of his administration for said
month, wherein it appears that there is a balance of P3,058.33 in favor
of the plaintiff.
The liquidation of accounts revealed that the
plaintiff owed the defendant P1,100, and as misunderstanding arose
between them, the defendant brought suit against the plaintiff, civil
case No. 23447 of this court. Judgment was rendered in his favor on
March 28, 1923, and after the writ of execution was issued, the sheriff
levied upon the plaintiff's right of usufruct, sold it at public auction
and adjudicated it to the defendant in payment of all of his claim.
Subsequently, on May 11, 1923, the plaintiff sold his
right of redemption to one Eduardo Hernandez, for the sum of P200
(Exhibit A). On September 4, 1923, this purchaser conveyed the same
right of redemption, for the sum of P200, to the plaintiff himself,
Federico Valera (Exhibit C).
After the plaintiff had recovered his right of
redemption, one Salvador Vallejo, who had an execution upon a judgment
against the plaintiff rendered in a civil case against the latter,
levied upon said right of redemption, which was sold by the sheriff at
public auction to Salvador Vallejo for P250 and was definitely
adjudicated to him. Later, he transferred said right of redemption to
the defendant Velasco. This is how the title to the right of usufruct to
the aforementioned property later came to vest the said defendant.
As the first two assignments of error are very closely related to each other, we will consider them jointly.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
Art. 1732. Agency is terminated:
1. By revocation;
2. By the withdrawal of the agent;
3. By the death, interdiction, bankruptcy, or insolvency of the principal or of the agent.
And article 1736 of the same Code provides that:
Art. 1736. An agent may withdraw from the agency by
giving notice to the principal. Should the latter suffer any damage
through the withdrawal, the agent must indemnify him therefore, unless
the agent's reason for his withdrawal should be the impossibility of
continuing to act as such without serious detriment to himself.
In the case of De la Peña vs. Hidalgo (16 Phil., 450), this court said laid down the following rule:
1. AGENCY; ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY; IMPLIED
AGENCY. — When the agent and administrator of property informs his
principal by letter that for reasons of health and medical treatment he
is about to depart from the place where he is executing his trust and
wherein the said property is situated, and abandons the property, turns
it over to a third party, renders accounts of its revenues up to the
date on which he ceases to hold his position and transmits to his
principal statement which summarizes and embraces all the balances of
his accounts since he began the administration to the date of the
termination of his trust, and, without stating when he may return to
take charge of the administration of the said property, asks his
principal to execute a power of attorney in due form in favor of a
transmit the same to another person who took charge of the
administration of the said property, it is but reasonable and just to
conclude that the said agent had expressly and definitely renounced his
agency and that such agency duly terminated, in accordance with the
provisions of article 1732 of the Civil Code, and, although the agent in
his aforementioned letter did not use the words "renouncing the
agency," yet such words, were undoubtedly so understood and accepted by
the principal, because of the lapse of nearly nine years up to the time
of the latter's death, without his having interrogated either the
renouncing agent, disapproving what he had done, or the person who
substituted the latter.
The misunderstanding between the plaintiff and the
defendant over the payment of the balance of P1,000 due the latter, as a
result of the liquidation of the accounts between them arising from the
collections by virtue of the former's usufructuary right, who was the
principal, made by the latter as his agent, and the fact that the said
defendant brought suit against the said principal on March 28, 1928 for
the payment of said balance, more than prove the breach of the juridical
relation between them; for, although the agent has not expressly told
his principal that he renounced the agency, yet neither dignity nor
decorum permits the latter to continue representing a person who has
adopted such an antagonistic attitude towards him. When the agent filed a
complaint against his principal for recovery of a sum of money arising
from the liquidation of the accounts between them in connection with the
agency, Federico Valera could not have understood otherwise than that
Miguel Velasco renounced the agency; because his act was more expressive
than words and could not have caused any doubt. (2 C. J., 543.) In
order to terminate their relations by virtue of the agency the
defendant, as agent, rendered his final account on March 31, 1923 to the
plaintiff, as principal.
Briefly, then, the fact that an agent institutes an
action against his principal for the recovery of the balance in his
favor resulting from the liquidation of the accounts between them
arising from the agency, and renders and final account of his
operations, is equivalent to an express renunciation of the agency, and
terminates the juridical relation between them.
If, as we have found, the defendant-appellee Miguel
Velasco, in adopting a hostile attitude towards his principal, suing him
for the collection of the balance in his favor, resulting from the
liquidation of the agency accounts, ceased ipso facto to be the
agent of the plaintiff-appellant, said agent's purchase of the aforesaid
principal's right of usufruct at public auction held by virtue of an
execution issued upon the judgment rendered in favor of the former and
against the latter, is valid and legal, and the lower court did not
commit the fourth and fifth assignments of error attributed to it by the
plaintiff-appellant.
In regard to the third assignment of error, it is
deemed unnecessary to discuss the validity of the sale made by Federico
Valera to Eduardo Hernandez of his right of redemption in the sale of
his usufructuary right made by the sheriff by virtue of the execution of
the judgment in favor of Miguel Velasco and against the said Federico
Valera; and the same thing is true as to the validity of the resale of
the same right of redemption made by Eduardo Hernandez to Federico
Valera; inasmuch as Miguel Velasco's purchase at public auction held by
virtue of an execution of Federico Valera's usufructuary right is valid
and legal, and as neither the latter nor Eduardo Hernandez exercised his
right of redemption within the legal period, the purchaser's title
became absolute.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee, Miguel Velasco,
having acquired Federico Valera's right of redemption from Salvador
Vallejo, who had acquired it at public auction by virtue of a writ of
execution issued upon the judgment obtained by the said Vallejo against
the said Valera, the latter lost all right to said usufruct.
And even supposing that Eduardo Hernandez had been
tricked by Miguel Velasco into selling Federico Valera's right of
repurchase to the latter so that Salvador Vallejo might levy an
execution on it, and even supposing that said resale was null for lack
of consideration, yet, inasmuch as Eduardo Hernandez did not present a
third party claim when the right was levied upon for the execution of
the judgment obtained by Vallejo against Federico Vallera, nor did he
file a complaint to recover said right before the period of redemption
expired, said Eduardo Hernandez, and much less Federico Valera, cannot
now contest the validity of said resale, for the reason that the
one-year period of redemption has already elapsed.
Neither did the trial court err in not ordering
Miguel Velasco to render a liquidation of accounts from March 31, 1923,
inasmuch as he had acquired the rights of the plaintiff by purchase at
the execution sale, and as purchaser, he was entitled to receive the
rents from the date of the sale until the date of the repurchase,
considering them as part of the redemption price; but not having
exercised the right repurchase during the legal period, and the title of
the repurchaser having become absolute, the latter did not have to
account for said rents.
Summarizing, the conclusion is reached that the
disagreements between an agent and his principal with respect to the
agency, and the filing of a civil action by the former against the
latter for the collection of the balance in favor of the agent,
resulting from a liquidation of the agency accounts, are facts showing a
rupture of relations, and the complaint is equivalent to an express
renunciation of the agency, and is more expressive than if the agent had
merely said, "I renounce the agency."
By virtue of the foregoing, and finding no error in
the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its
parts, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
No comments:
Post a Comment