sample questions in civil law

1.What is the test in determining whether to grant the easement of right of way or not?

2.What are the distinctions between donations mortis causa and donation inter vivos?

3.What are the remedies against a public nuisance?

4.What is the effect of the sale of the dominant easement with respect to an easement?

5. (a)In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title?
(b)Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?


6.A donation was subject to a resolutory condition that the property should not be sold within a period of 100 years from the execution of the deed of donation; otherwise, a violation of such condition would render ipso facto nulls and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors. It was alleged that within the prohibitive period, petitioners executed a deed of sale over the properties, hence the action for rescission, nullification of the deed of donation, and eventual reconveyance of the properties. Will the action prosper? Why?

7. The late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the poblacion of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.
On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application.
Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view trough the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building permit to defendant. The case as against the members of the Municipal Council was subsequently dismissed with concurrence of plaintiff's council. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Romblon rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P12,500.00 by way of compensatory, exemplary, moral and moderate damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Romblon and enjoined defendant from constructing his building unless "he erects the same at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line of his property, in conformity with Article 673 of the New Civil Code."
So Juan Gargantos filed this petition for review of the appellate Court's decision. The focal issue herein is whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos.
Decide the issue.

8. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation — hereinafter referred to as the Director — seeks the review of an order of the Court of First Instances of Rizal directing the return of fifty-one (51) slot machines, and the paraphernalia thereof, to the owners thereof. The appeal is before us only questions of law being raised therein.
It appears that sometime before September 1, 1959, said slot machines and paraphernalia were being operated by the owners thereof in Pasay City pursuant to licenses issued by said City in conformity with its Ordinance No. 106. On the date adverted to above, the aforementioned machines and paraphernalia, together with other slot machines operated without said license, were seized under and by virtue of search warrants issued by a judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Said unlicensed slot machines were the subject matter of criminal cases Nos. 9571-I and 9569-I of the Municipal Court of Pasay City. However, the special prosecutor in charge of said cases opined that no criminal case should be filed against the owners of the fifty-one (51) slot machines involved in the case at bar, and accordingly, recommended that said machines and its paraphernalia be released and returned to the owners thereof. As a consequence, on September 2, 1959, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Director to release said slot machines to their respective owners. However, this order was subsequently suspended, the Director having invited attention to the fact that the court which issued the search warrants adverted to above might punish him for contempt if he released the machines without judicial authority therefore. This led to the filing of a motion by the owners of said machines praying that the same be ordered released and returned to them.
The Director objected to the motion upon the ground that the machines in question are intended to be used for the commission of in offense (gambling), and are a public nuisance, as well as illegal per se. After due hearing, the lower court overruled this opposition and granted said motion.
Is the ruling of the lower court correct? Why?


9. Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station.
Questions: (1) Is the act of the Sangguniang Bayan correct? Explain. (2) Is it within the power of the mayor now to close or transfer the gasoline station? (3) What are the two requisites for the validity of the exercise of police power ? (4) Is a gasoline station a nuisance per se? (5) Can it be closed summarily without judicial proceedings? Explain.


10. Given the following provisions below, decide whether it is “mortis causa” or “inter vivos”. Explain your answer.
(a) Where it was stated in the deed of donation that the donor wanted to give the donee something "to take effect after his death" and that "this donation shall produce effect only by and because of the death of the donor, the property herein donated to pass title after the donor's death"
(b) Where it was provided that the donated properties would be given to the donees after the expiration of thirty days from the donor's death, the grant was made in the future tense, and the word "inherit" was used .
(c) Where the donor has the right to dispose of all the donated properties and the products thereof.
(d) Where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation reveal that the donation could not have taken effect before the donor's death and the rights to dispose of the donated properties and to enjoy the fruits remained with the donor during her lifetime.
(e) The deed of donation provided that the donor was donating mortis causa certain properties as a reward for the donee's services to the donor and as a token of the donor's affection for him. The donation was made under the condition that "the donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor"; that the ' donee should cause to be held annually masses for the repose of the donor's soul, and that he should defray the expenses for the donor's funeral.