1.What is a disposition captatoria? Is it valid? Why?
ANSWER: It is a disposition made upon the condition that the heir shall make provisions in his will in favor of the testator or of any person (Art. 875, NCC). It is void, because it makes the making of a will contractual or with a consideration. Basically, a will is an act of pure liberality.
2.ABC Corporation entered into a contract of loan with PBTC which is secured by a chattel mortgage. When ABC Corporation failed to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage, but it was objected to by the debtor contending that there was a novation of the contract when it executed a real estate mortgage when an extension of the loan was granted by the bank. Is the contention of ABC Corporation correct? Why?
ANSWER: No. Novation takes place where the object or principal condition of an obligation is changed or altered. Novation is never presumed; it must be explicitly stated or there must be manifest incompatibility between the old and the new obligations in every aspect. There is no incompatibility between the two contracts especially so that the new contract was executed as an additional security to the chattel mortgage (PBTC v. Sybel’s Inc. Aug. 11, 1989).
3. X lent his car to Y with the undertaking to return it on or before January 31, 1992. Instead of returning it to X, Y sold and delivered the car to Z. One week after, X and Y entered into a contract whereby X sold the car to Y who, AFTER acquiring ownership, went to Z seeking to recover the car from the latter. Will Y’s action prosper? Why?
ANSWER: No, because he is bound by the principle of estoppel. Under the law, when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee (Art. 1434, NCC).
4. A, a Filipino citizen wrote B, a brother, authorizing him to sell a parcel of land belonging to him located in Ilocos Norte. On the strength of such letter-authority, B sold the land belonging to his brother. Is the sale valid? Why?
ANSWER: Yes. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing, otherwise, the sale shall be void (ART. 1874). The letter was sufficient authority for B to sell the land. The authority need not be in a public instrument or participated in by a notary public. It is sufficient that it be in writing.
5. May the thing pledged be acquired by prescription? Explain.
ANSWER: No, because the pledge does not possess the thing pledged in the concept of an owner, but of a mere holder of the security. His possession cannot therefore, ripen into ownership. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Thus, possession with a juridical title, such as by a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, agent or a pledge, not being in the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party.
6. Can moral damages be awarded in favor of a corporation?
ANSWER: No. Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. A corporation being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, griefs of life, all of which cannot be suffered by an artificial being. (LBC v. CA, G.R. No. 108670, Sept. 21, 1994).
7. A, a Filipina, is married to B, an American. During their marriage, A purchased with conjugal funds a piece of real property and placed it under the name “A married to B”. Without B’s consent, A sold the land, hence, B wants now to annul the sale because it was done without his consent, contending that he is also an owner. Is the action proper? Why?
ANSWER: No, because B never acquired ownership over the land even if conjugal funds were used in acquiring the same. This is so because as an alien, he is disqualified from acquiring residential land in the Philippines (Cheeseman v. IAC, G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991).
8.X and Y secured a loan from ABC Bank secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by a title. They failed to pay their taxes during the existence of the loan, hence, the city treasurer levied on the land and scheduled it for auction sale. The city treasurer did not send a notice to the bank. At the scheduled auction sale, it was sold to the highest bidder. X and Y did not redeem the land after one year so the treasurer executed a final deed of sale. When the bidder (buyer) filed a petition to require X and Y or the bank to surrender the title so that a new title can be issued, the bank learned of the levy and asked the court to annul the sale, especially so that it was scandalously sold for only P2,871.00 compared to the mortgage of P290,000. Had the bank been notified, it could have easily paid the tax delinquency.
QUESTIONS: (1) Rule on the motion. (2) Is a mortgagee entitled as a matter of right to a personal service of notice to the delinquent taxpayer? (3) Will the inadequacy of the price vitiate the sale? Explain.
ANSWER: The bank is not correct. (1) The mortgagee is not entitled as a matter of right to a personal service of notice to the delinquent taxpayer; otherwise, it would vitiate the sale. This is because the sale does not operate to cancel or extinguish the pre-existing lien. The new title to be issued in the name of Francisco must have an annotation of said mortgage lien.(2) Neither will the inadequacy of the price vitiate the sale. While in ordinary sales, for reasons of equity, the transaction may be invalidated due to the inadequacy of price as to shock one’s conscience, such does not follow when the law give the owner the right to redeem, as when a sale is made at public auction upon the theory that the lesser price, the easier it is for the owner to effect the redemption. So, while the bank is not entitled to notice as to give it a chance to pay the delinquent taxes, it does not lose its lien on the property as to give it a chance to get back what it has lent, together with interest (Tiongco v. Phil. Veterans’ Bank, 212 SCRA 176).
9.Marita was the owner of a parcel of land. In 1917, she sold a portion to Carlos who then constructed his house. Since the houses of Maria and Carlos adjoined each other, and they could not reach the main road, they agreed to maintain a four-meter road right of way. There were several transfers later on of the properties, until Badong bought the land belonging to Carlos. In all the transfers, the right of way was annotated on the titles. Badong demolished his house in 1941 to pay the way for the construction of an apartment, but it was discontinued due to the war. In 1946, Manny, the buyer of Marita’s property, tried to fence the passageway, believing that, when Badong demolished his house, he gained access to the road and that the easement has already been extinguished for its non-use for 10 years. Badong claimed that the easement was perpetual. Is he correct? Why?
ANSWER: Yes. When the easement in this case was established the parties unequivocally made provision for its observance by all who, in the future, might succeed them in dominion. So, it is permanent in character, which was annotated on each and all of the transfer certificates of title.
Even assuming that with the demolition of the house by Badong, the necessity for the passageway ceased, still such fact does not detract from its permanency as a property right which survives the termination of necessity (Benedicto v. CA, 25 SCRA 145).
10. A, a minor, executed a last will and testament. He died at the age of 21, after which his will was submitted to probate. If you were the judge, would you approve it? Why?
ANSWER: No, because the will is void. Under the law, a person who is a minor cannot execute a will. His supervening capacity cannot validate a void will (ART. 801, NCC).
11.A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the Tarlac side of the boundary between Tarlac and Pangasinan. His brother B, owned the adjoining parcel of unregistered land on the Pangasinan side.
A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of sale executed as a public instrument by A and X. After X paid in full the price of the sale, X took possession of the Pangasinan parcel in the belief that it was the Tarlac parcel covered by the deed of sale executed by A and X.
After 12 years, a controversy arose between B and X on the issue of the ownership of the Pangasinan parcel.
B claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel because B never sold that parcel to X or to anyone else.
On the other hand, X claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive prescription, because X possessed this parcel for over ten years under a claim of ownership.
QUESTIONS: (1) Will the claim of X prosper? (2) What is acquisitive prescription? (3) In order to ripen into ownership, what kind of possession must it be?
Decide on these claims. Give your reasons.
ANSWER: The claim of X will not prosper because there was no acquisitive prescription as the possession was without just title. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted (Lubos v. Galupo, G.R. No. 139136, Jan. 16, 2002).
12. A and B are the parties in a contract of lease which is to expire on December 31, 1993. Sometime in November 1993, they started negotiating for a new contract. A sent a draft of his proposed contract to B.
B also sent a letter asking A to include three proposed terms and placed therein a cover letter that if A would be agreeable to the three terms the contract would be considered signed and perfected. A agreed and later sent the contract already signed by him to B for his signature. Suppose B would not sign, can you consider the contract signed and perfected? Why?
ANSWER: Yes, because the consent can be derived from the communications between A and B. Consent can be manifested in any form, like a series of communications or though a marginal note or through an acceptance of down payment (Topacio v. CA, July 3, 1992; RMAF v. CA, Jan. 17, 1985; NGA v. IAC, March 8, 1989).
13. If “A” buys a car from “B” and issues a check which when presented for payment is dishonored, is “B” considered a person unlawfully deprived within the meaning of Art. 559 of the Civil Code? Why?
ANSWER: No, because the subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure of consideration which does not render the contract of sale void but merely allows the aggrieved party to sue for specific performance or rescission (Ledesma v. CA, Sept. 1, 1992).
14. Moises Pascua was 26 years old when he was stabbed to death by his enemy, who was convicted for murder. He is a motorcab driver, who, based on the testimony of his wife earns an average daily income of P200/day. Compute the loss of income capacity due to the heirs of Moises Padua.
ANSWER: Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income (G.A.I.) less Living expenses (50% G.A.I.)]where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of the deceased )
Since Moises Pascua was 26 years old at the time of his death, his life expectancy is 36 years. Considering that his average daily income was P200.00 a day, his Gross Annual Income would be P48,000.00. Using the above formula, the victim’s unearned income would thus be P864,000.00. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONILO VILLARBA y BAUTISTA, WILFREDO MAGGAY SAQUING, and PETER MAGGAY Y FLORDELIZ, accused-appellants. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 132784. October 30, 2000])
15. In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (“Pajuyo”) paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra (“Guevarra”) executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused.
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 (“MTC”).
In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
QUESTIONS: (1) In your judgment, who has the better right of possession to the land in question? (2) In essence what kind of civil law contract was entered between the parties? (3) One of the defenses made by Guevarra is pari delicto, what is pari delicto? (4) Is pari delicto applicable in ejectment cases? (5) What is a precarium?
ANSWER: (1) Pajuyo has the better right to possession by virtue of the agreement. (2) It is not a commodatom, it is more of a landlord-tenancy relationship (3) Pari Delicto is not applicable in ejectment cases (5) Precarium is a tolerated use of a property. COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004], the SC decided as follows:”We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals’ theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called a precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease. The tenant’s withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration and commodatum. These contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing received. X x x The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases
The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this case.
Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code embody the principle of pari delicto. We explained the principle of pari delicto in these words:
The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo malo non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them.
The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established public policy.
In Drilon v. Gaurana, we reiterated the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. We held that:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent. Even the owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to court.
16. What is the meaning of the “captain of the ship doctrine”? In one case, it was made as a defense in a medical negligence case that it has long been abandoned by U.S. jurisprudence, and hence the Philippines must abandon that too. Will this defense be valid? Are we bound by American case law?
ANSWER: The Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine was discussed in McConnell v. Williams (65 A 2d 243 [1949]), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that under this doctrine, a surgeon is likened to a captain of the ship, in that it is his duty to control everything going on in the operating room. That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 124354. April 11, 2002]
17.Francisco is a 76 year old man, single and lives in his house with Cirila, who took care of him until he died at the age of 90. Evidence showed that Cirila is not only a household help, but also “sleeps” with Francisco, though they never had a child of their own. On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,” in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of “the faithful services that Cirila had rendered over the past ten (10) years.” The deed was notarized by Atty. Juan Luna and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
Questions: (1) Is the “donation inter vivos” valid? (2) If in case it is valid, how shall said property be distributed? Explain.
ANSWER: “Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code”. The property therefore must be distributed pursuant to law in favor of Francisco’s heirs, his sister and his niece. (CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001])
18. Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986, petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On July 5, 1991, Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4383. On February 12, 1992, petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4460. Upon proper motion, the RTC consolidated these two cases.
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners.
On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. The RTC likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 4460, but ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the consideration of the sale with interest from May 13, 1992. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
For Civil Case No. 4383, (a) annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Florentino Chiong in favor of Walter Villanueva, dated May 13, 1992 (Exhibit “2”); ordering defendant Walter Villanueva to vacate the entire land in question and to remove all buildings therein, subject to [i]ndemnity of whatever damages he may incur by virtue of the removal of such buildings, within a period of 60 days from the finality of this decision; award of damages is hereby denied for lack of proof.
In Civil Case No. 4460, complaint is hereby dismissed, but defendant Florentino Chiong, having received the amount of P8,000.00 as consideration of the sale of the land subject of the controversy, the sale being annulled by this Court, is ordered to return the said amount to [the] spouses Villanueva, with interest to be computed from the date of the annulled deed of sale, until the same is fully paid, within the period of 60 days from finality of this judgment. Until such amount is returned, together with the interest, [the] spouses Villanueva may continue to occupy the premises in question.
Question: Is the decision of the RTC Judge correct? Explain.
ANSWER: Anent the first issue, petitioners’ contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents’ separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera’s interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.
Likewise, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Petitioners’ mere insistence as to the lot’s supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against all the evidence for respondents.
On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that the lot was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property since it was registered “in the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age, married to Elisera Chiong… .” But Elisera also presented a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In addition, Florentino and Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property. Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot.
Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, we held that without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent…
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera’s instance, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo the property is still conjugal, the transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the lot. Petitioners’ stance lacks merit. In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., a case involving the annulment of sale executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the same. Thus:
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall “prejudice” the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated, “[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430,” in which cases annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the wife… .
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. Article 1398 of the Civil Code provides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each other the things which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into.
Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return to respondents the land with its fruits and respondent Florentino should return to petitioners the sum of P8,000, which he received as the price of the land, together with interest thereon.
On the matter of fruits and interests, we take into consideration that petitioners have been using the land and have derived benefit from it just as respondent Florentino has used the price of the land in the sum of P8,000. Hence, if, as ordered by the lower court, Florentino is to pay a reasonable amount or legal interest for the use of the money then petitioners should also be required to pay a reasonable amount for the use of the land. Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, it would be equitable to consider the two amounts as offsetting each other. Hence, the award of the trial court for the payment of interest should be deleted. (Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. 159889, June 5, 2008 )
19. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
Questions: (1) Is the OSG contention correct? (2) State the twin elements for the application of par. 2 Art 26 of the Family Code? (3) Is Cipriano legally allowed to remarry under the circumstances at bar?
ANSWER: The OSG IS WRONG.In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005]
20. (1) What is a “quasi-contract”?(2) What are the bases for quasi-contracts? Give at least two examples of quasi-contracts and define each.
ANSWER: Quasi-contracts are lawful, voluntary, and unilateral acts which generally require a person to reimburse or compensate another with the principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another (ART. 2142). The bases are(a) no one must unjustly enrich himself at another’s expense (b) if one benefits, he must reimburse (c) justice and equity; examples are negotiorum gestio (officious management) and solution indebiti (undue payment).
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