G.R. No. L-21876 September 29, 1967

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT ENTERPRISES, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SOLEDAD NATIVIDAD and MARIANO NATIVIDAD, defendants-appellees.

xxxxx

First. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. So the Civil Code provides.³ But it is equally settled that, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, this power must be invoked judicially; it cannot be exercised solely on a party's own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the obligation.⁴ Hence, as there is nothing in the contract of lease empowering the defendants to rescind it without resort to the courts, the defendants' action in unilaterally terminating the contract is unjustified. As this Court said in Escueta v. Pando:⁵

The defendant could not, by himself alone and without judicial intervention, resolve or annul the agreement. Under article 1124 [now art. 1191] of the Civil Code, the right to resolve reciprocal obligations, in case one of the obligors shall fail to comply with that which is incumbent upon him, is deemed to be implied. But that right must be invoked judicially for the same article also provides: "The court shall decree the resolution demanded, unless there should be grounds which justify the allowance of a term for the performance of the obligation."

Second. Rescission will be ordered only where the breach complained of is substantial as to defeat the object of the parties in entering into the agreement. It will not be granted where the breach is slight or casual.⁶ The defendants asked the plaintiff to retrieve its phonograph, claiming that there were times when the coins dropped into the slot would get stuck, resulting in its failure to play the desired music. But apart from this bare statement, there is nothing in the evidence which shows the frequency with which the jukebox failed to function properly. The expression "there are times" connotes occasional failure of the phonograph to operate, not frequent enough to render it unsuitable and unserviceable. As a matter of fact, there is not even a claim that, as a result of unsatisfactory performance thereof, the income therefrom dropped to such a level that the defendants could not even pay the plaintiff its guaranteed share of P50 a week. On the contrary, the evidence (Stipulation of Facts, Annexes J, K, L, M, N, and O) shows that, during the period complained of, the operation of the jukebox was quite profitable to both parties.⁷

Third. We believe that the defendants actually bought a jukebox only in 1961 after they had signed the lease contract in question, although they might have expressed a desire to buy one the year before, for otherwise they would not have entered into a three-year lease. But certainly their decision to buy a jukebox and operate it themselves was made long before they ever complained in July, 1961 of any defect in the rented jukebox. To be sure, it is not shown when the rented phonograph supposedly developed trouble; presumably it was early in July, 1961, since the defendants' first letter of complaint was written on July 17. But if, as defendants admit, they began operating their own jukebox "sometime in July, 1961" (presumably on July 24, 1961 when they removed the rented jukebox from where it was installed), then the defendants' pretense that they decided to buy their own jukebox only after the rented one had failed to function properly becomes highly improbable. The jukebox which they ordered from the United States could not have arrived in so short a time as to enable them to operate it on July 24.

G.R. No. 176868 July 26, 2010

SOLAR HARVEST, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
DAVAO CORRUGATED CARTON CORPORATION, Respondent.

xxxxx

Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

The right to rescind a contract arises once the other party defaults in the performance of his obligation. In determining when default occurs, Art. 1191 should be taken in conjunction with Art. 1169 of the same law, which provides:

Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declares; or

(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or

(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.

In reciprocal obligations, as in a contract of sale, the general rule is that the fulfillment of the parties’ respective obligations should be simultaneous. Hence, no demand is generally necessary because, once a party fulfills his obligation and the other party does not fulfill his, the latter automatically incurs in delay. But when different dates for performance of the obligations are fixed, the default for each obligation must be determined by the rules given in the first paragraph of the present article,¹⁹ that is, the other party would incur in delay only from the moment the other party demands fulfillment of the former’s obligation. Thus, even in reciprocal obligations, if the period for the fulfillment of the obligation is fixed, demand upon the obligee is still necessary before the obligor can be considered in default and before a cause of action for rescission will accrue.

Evident from the records and even from the allegations in the complaint was the lack of demand by petitioner upon respondent to fulfill its obligation to manufacture and deliver the boxes. The Complaint only alleged that petitioner made a "follow-up" upon respondent, which, however, would not qualify as a demand for the fulfillment of the obligation. Petitioner’s witness also testified that they made a follow-up of the boxes, but not a demand. Note is taken of the fact that, with respect to their claim for reimbursement, the Complaint alleged and the witness testified that a demand letter was sent to respondent. Without a previous demand for the fulfillment of the obligation, petitioner would not have a cause of action for rescission against respondent as the latter would not yet be considered in breach of its contractual obligation.

Rescission under Article 1191

IS THE SUBSIDIARY AND EQUITABLE REMEDY OF RESCISSION AVAILABLE IN THE PRESENCE OF A REMEDY OF FORECLOSURE IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF ARTICLE 1383 OF THE CIVIL CODE THAT: 'THE ACTION FOR RESCISSION IS SUBSIDIARY; IT CANNOT BE INSTITUTED EXCEPT WHEN THE PARTY SUFFERING DAMAGE HAS NO OTHER LEGAL MEANS TO OBTAIN REPARATION FOR THE SAME?

xxxxx

The rescission on account of breach of stipulations is not predicated on injury to economic interests of the party plaintiff but on the breach of faith by the defendant, that violates the reciprocity between the parties. It is not a subsidiary action, and Article 1191 may be scanned without disclosing anywhere that the action for rescission thereunder is subordinated to anything other than the culpable breach of his obligations by the defendant. This rescission is a principal action retaliatory in character, it being unjust that a party be held bound to fulfill his promises when the other violates his. As expressed in the old Latin aphorism: "Non servanti fidem, non est fides servanda," Hence, the reparation of damages for the breach is purely secondary.

On the contrary, in the rescission by reason of lesion or economic prejudice, the cause of action is subordinated to the existence of that prejudice, because it is the raison d 'etre as well as the measure of the right to rescind. Hence, where the defendant makes good the damages caused, the action cannot be maintained or continued, as expressly provided in Articles 1383 and 1384. But the operation of these two articles is limited to the cases of rescission for lesion enumerated in Article 1381 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and does not apply to cases under Article 1191.

It is probable that the petitioner's confusion arose from the defective technique of the new Code that terms both instances as "rescission" without distinctions between them; unlike the previous Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that differentiated "resolution" for breach of stipulations from "rescission" by reason of lesion or damage. But the terminological vagueness does not justify confusing one case with the other, considering the patent difference in causes and results of either action.

According to the private respondents, the applicable law is Article 1191 of the Civil Code which provides:

The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfiument, if the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

G.R. No. 73893 June 30, 1987

MARGARITA SURIA AND GRACIA R. JOVEN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA (Presiding Judge of the RTC of Laguna, Branch XXIV, Biñan, Laguna), and SPOUSES HERMINIO A. CRISPIN and NATIVIDAD C. CRISPIN, respondents.

criminal law sample mcq's

1. Badong, with evident premeditation and treachery killed his father. What was the crime committed?

a. Murder
b. Parricide
c. Homicide
d. Qualified Homicide

2. PO3 Bagsik entered the dwelling of Totoy against the latter’s will on suspicion that Totoy keep unlicensed firearms in his home. What was the crime committed by PO3 Bagsik?

a. Trespass to Dwelling
b. Violation of Domicile
c. Usurpation Of Authority
d. Forcible Trespassing

3. Berung and Betang had been married for more than six months. They live together with the children of Betang from her first husband. Berung had sexual relationship with Bea, the 14 year old daughter of Betang. Bea love Berung very much. What was the crime committed by Berung, if any?

a. Simple Seduction
b. Qualified Seduction
c. Consented Abduction
d. Rape

4. Prof. Dabcat gave a failing grade to one of his students, Sixto. When the two met the following day, Sixto slapped Prof. Dabcat on the face. What was the crime committed by Sixto?

a. Corruption of Public Officials
b. Direct Assault
c. Slight Physical Injuries
d. Grave Coercion

5. A warrant of arrest was issued against Pekto for the killing of his parents. When PO2 Tapang tried to arrest him, Pekto gave him 1 million Pesos to set him free. PO2 Tapang refrained in arresting Pekto. What was the crime committed by PO2 Tapang?

a. Indirect Bribery
b. Direct Bribery
c. Corruption of Public Officials
d. Qualified Bribery

6. Exemption to the hearsay rule made under the consciousness of an impending death.

a. parol evidence b. ante mortem statement
c. suicide note d. dead man statute

7. The meaning of factum probans.

a. preponderance of evidence
b. ultimate fact
c. evidentiary fact
d. sufficiency of evidence

8. It refers to family history or descent transmitted from one generation to another.

a. inheritance
b. heritage
c. pedigree
d. culture

9. The authority of the court to take cognisance of the case in the first instance.

a. Appellate Jurisdiction
b. General Jurisdiction
c. Original Jurisdiction
d. Exclusive Jurisdiction

10. A person designated by the court to assist destitute litigants.

a. Counsel de officio
b. Attorney on record
c. Attorney at law
d. Special counsel

11. Which of the following is not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure?

a. Violation of rental laws
b. Violation of traffic laws
c. The penalty is more than six months of imprisonment
d. The penalty does not exceed 6 months imprisonment

12. It refers to a territorial unit where the power of the court is to be exercised.

a. jurisdiction b. jurisprudence
c. venue d. bench

13. The Anti-Bouncing Check Law.

a. RA 6425 b. RA 8353
c. BP 22 d. RA 6975

14. The taking of another person’s personal property, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation.

a. qualified theft b. robbery
c. theft d. malicious mischief

15. Felony committed when a person compels another by means of force, violence or intimidation to do something against his will, whether right or wrong.

a. grave threat b. grave coercion
c. direct assault d. slander by deed

16. Persons having no apparent means of subsistence but has the physical ability to work and neglects to apply himself or herself to lawful calling.

a. pimps b. prostitutes
c. gang members d. vagrants

17. A medley of discordant voices, a mock serenade of discordant noises designed to annoy and insult.

a. tumultuous b. charivari
c. sedition d. scandal

18. The unauthorized act of a public officer who compels another person to change his residence.

a. violation of domicile b. arbitrary detention
c. expulsion d. direct assault

19. The deprivation of a private person of the liberty of another person without legal grounds.

a. illegal detention b. arbitrary detention
c. forcible abduction d. forcible detention

20. An offense committed by a married woman through carnal knowledge with a man not her husband who knows her to be married, although the marriage be later declared void.

a. concubinage b. bigamy
c. adultery d. immorality

21. Age of absolute irresponsibility in the commission of a crime.

a. 15-18 years old b. 18-70 years old
c. 9 years old and below d. between 9 & 15 years old

22. Those who, not being principals cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

a. accomplices b. suspects
c. principal actors d. accessories

23. The loss or forfeiture of the right of the government to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time fixed by law.

a. prescription of crime
b. prescription of prosecution
c. prescription of judgement
d. prescription of penalty

24. A kind of executive clemency whereby the execution of penalty is suspended.

a. pardon b. commutation
c. amnesty d. reprieve

25. Infractions of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of the society.

a. mala prohibita b. mala in se
c. private crimes d. public crimes

26. Felony committed by a public officer who agrees to commit an act in consideration of a gift and this act is connected with the discharge of his public duties.

a. qualified bribery b. direct bribery
c. estafa d. indirect bribery

27. The wilful and corrupt assertion of falsehood under oath of affirmation, administered by authority of law on a material matter.

a. libel b. falsification
c. perjury d. slander

28. Deliberate planning of act before execution.

a. treachery b. evident premeditation
c. ignominy d. cruelty

29. Whenever more than 3 armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of a crime.

a. gang b. conspiracy
c. band d. piracy

30. The failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound to.

a. negligence b. imprudence
c. omission d. act

31. Ways and means are employed for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution of his criminal plan.

a. misfeasance b. entrapment
c. inducement d. instigation

32. Those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.

a. impossible crimes
b. aggravating circumstances
c. absolutory causes
d. complex crimes

33. An alternative circumstance.

a. insanity b. intoxication
c. passion or obfuscation d. evident premeditation

34. If the accused refuse to plead, or make conditional plea of guilty, what shall be entered for him?

a. a plea of not guilty b. a plea of guilty
c. a plea of mercy d.plea of surrender

35. At what time may the accused move to quash the complaint or information?

a. at any time before his arrest
b. only after entering his plea
c. any time before entering his plea
d. Monday morning

36. The process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition on the case subject to court approval.

a. arraignment b. plea bargaining
c. preliminary investigation d. trial

37. The security given for the release of a person in custody, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required under the conditions specified by law.

a. subpoena b. recognizance
c. bail d. warrant

38. The examination before a competent tribunal, according to the laws of the land, of the acts in issue in a case, for the purpose of determining such issue.

a. trial b. arraignment
b. pre-trial d. judgment

39. The adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused.

a. trial b. pre-trial
c. arraignment d. judgment

40. It is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that an offense has been committed and the offender is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

a. pre-trial b. arraignment
c. preliminary investigation d. plea bargaining

41. It is evidence of the same kind and to the same state of facts.

a. secondary evidence b. prima facie evidence
c. corroborative evidence d. best evidence

42. It is that which, standing alone, unexplained or uncontradicted is sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed.

a. secondary evidence b. prima facie evidence
c. corroborative evidence d. best evidence

43. A form of evidence supplied by written instruments or derived from conventional symbols, such as letters, by which ideas are represented on material substances.

a. documentary evidence b.testimonial evidence
c. material evidence d. real evidence

44. When the witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact.

a. positive evidence b.corroborative evidence
c. secondary evidence d. negative evidence

45. Personal property that can be subjects for search and seizure.

a. used or intended to be used as means in committing an offense
b. stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense
c. subject of the offense
d. all of the above

46. All persons who can perceive and perceiving, can make known their perception to others.

a. suspects b. witnesses
c. victims d. informers

47. The unlawful destruction, or the bringing forth prematurely, of human fetus before the natural time of birth which results in death.

a. abortion b. infanticide
c. murder d. parricide

48. Felony committed when a person is killed or wounded during the confusion attendant to a quarrel among several persons not organized into groups and the parties responsible cannot be ascertained.

a. alarm and scandal
b. mysterious homicide
c. death under exceptional circumstances
d. tumultuous affray

49. A question which arises in a case the resolution of which is the logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognisance of which pertains to another tribunal.

a. legal question b. juridical question
c. prejudicial question d. judicial question

50. The offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.

a. reiteracion b. recidivism
b. quasi-recidivism d. habitual delinquency

51. An act or omission which is a result of a misapprehension of facts that is voluntary but not intentional.

a. impossible crime b. mistake of facts
c. accidental crime d. complex crime

52. Infanticide is committed by killing a child not more than….

a. 36 hours b. 24 hours
c. 48 hours d. 72 hours

53. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

a. ignorantia legis non excusat b. parens patriae
c. res ipsa loquitur d. dura lex sed lex

54. An act which would be an offense against persons or property were if not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment.

a. compound crime b. impossible crime
c. complex crime d. accidental crime

55. The law which reimposed the death penalty.

a. RA 5425 b. RA 8553
c. RA 7659 d. RA 8551

56. One who is deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime.

a. discernment b. insanity
c. epilepsy d. imbecility

57. The quality by which an act may be subscribed to a person as its owner or author.

a. responsibility b. duty
c. guilt d. imputability

58. Something that happen outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some acts of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.

a. fortuitous event b. fate
c. accident d. destiny

59. A sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party , any peace officer or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated.

a. subpoena b. information
c. complaint d. writ

60. This right of the accused is founded on the principle of justice and is intended not to protect the guilty but to prevent as far as human agencies can, the conviction of an innocent person.

a. right to due process of law
b. presumption of innocence
c. right to remain silent
d. right against self-incrimination

61. Known in other countries as the body of principles, practices, usages and rules of action which are not recognized in our country.

a. penal laws b. special laws
c. common laws d. statutory laws

62. Circumstances wherein there is an absence in the agent of the crime any of all the conditions that would make an act voluntary and hence, though there is no criminal liability there is civil liability.

a. exempting b. alternative
c. justifying d. aggravating

63. Circumstances wherein the acts of the person are in accordance with the law, and hence, he incurs no criminal and civil liability.

a. exempting b. alternative
c. justifying d. aggravating

64. When the offender enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act.

a. ignominy b. cruelty
c. treachery d. masochism

65. One, who at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code.

a. recidivism b. habitual delinquency
c. reiteracion d. quasi-recidivism

66. Alevosia means

a. craft b. treachery
c. evident premeditation d. cruelty

67. The law hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry and render judgment after a fair trial.

a. ex post facto law
b. equal protection of the law
c. rule of law
d. due process of law

68. A person if within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of the said crimes a third time or oftener.

a. recidivist b. quasi-recidivist
c. habitual delinquent d. hardened criminal

69. A kind of evidence which cannot be rebutted or overcome.

a. Primary b. Best
c. Secondary d. Conclusive

70. A kind of evidence which cannot be rebutted or overcome.

a. Primary b. Best
c. Secondary d. Conclusive

71. These questions suggest to the witness the answers to which an examining party requires.

a. leading b. misleading
c. stupid d. hearsay

72. A method fixed by law for the apprehension and prosecution of persons alleged to have committed a crime, and for their punishment in case of conviction.

a. Criminal Law b. Criminal Evidence
c. Criminal Procedure d. Criminal Jurisprudence

73. The period of prescription of crimes punishable by death.

a. 20 years b. 15 years
c. 10 years d. 40 years

74. Persons who take direct part in the execution of a crime.

a. accomplices
b. accessories
c. instigators
d. principals

75. A crime against honor which is committed by performing any act which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person.

a. libel
b. slander by deed
c. incriminating innocent person
d. intriguing against honor

76. The improper performance of some act which might lawfully be done.

a. misfeasance
b. malfeasance
c. nonfeasance
d. dereliction

77. A sworn statement in writing, made upon oath before an authorized magistrate or officer.

a. subpoena
b. writ
c. warrant
d. affidavit

78. Any other name which a person publicly applies to himself without authority of law.

a. alias
b. common name
c. fictitious name
d. screen name

79. A special aggravating circumstance where a person, after having been convicted by final judgment, shall commit a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same.

a. quasi-recidivism
b. recidivism
c. reiteracion
d. charivari

80. Which of the following is not a person in authority.

a. Municipal mayor
b. Private School Teacher
c. Police Officer
d. Municipal Councilor

81. In its general sense, it is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.

a. Sedition
b. Rebellion
c. Treason
d. Coup d’etat

82. The length of validity of a search warrant from its date.

a. 30 days
b. 15 days
c. 10 days
d. 60 days

83. The detention of a person without legal grounds by a public officer or employee.

a. illegal detention
b. arbitrary detention
c. compulsory detention
d. unauthorized detention

84. A breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it.

a. treason
b. espionage
c. rebellion
d. coup d’etat

85. A building or structure, exclusively used for rest and comfort.
a. sanctuary
b. prison
c. jail
d. dwelling

86. The mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
a. treachery
b. premeditation
c. recidivism
d. discernment

87. Conspiracy to commit this felony is punishable under the law.
a. Estafa
b. Murder
c. Rebellion
d. Rape

88. It means that the resulting injury is greater than that which is intended.
a. Aberratio ictus
b. Error in personae
c. Dura Lex Sed lex
d. Praeter Intentionem

89. It means mistake in the blow.
a. Aberratio Ictus
b. Error in Personae
c. Dura lex sed lex
d. Praeter Intentionem

90. A stage of execution when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.
a. Attempted
b. Frustrated
c. Consummated
d. Accomplished

91. An act or omission which is the result of a misapprehension of facts that is voluntary but not intentional.
a. Absolutory Cause
b. Mistake of facts
c. Conspiracy
d. Felony

92. Crimes that have three stages of execution.
a. Material
b. Formal
c. Seasonal
d. Continuing

93. Felonies where the acts or omissions of the offender are malicious.
a. Culpable
b. Intentional
c. Deliberate
d. Inculpable

94. It indicates deficiency of perception.
a. Negligence
b. Diligence
c. Imprudence
d. Inference

95. Acts and omissions punishable by special penal laws.
a. Offenses
b. Misdemeanours
c. Felonies
d. Ordinances

96. A character of Criminal Law, making it binding upon all persons who live or sojourn in the Philippines.
a. General
b. Territorial
c. Prospective
d. Retroactive

97. A legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.
a. Bill of Attainder
b. Bill of Rights
c. Ex Post Facto Law
d. Penal Law

98. The taking of a person into custody in order that he may bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
a. Search
b. Seizure
c. Arrest
d. Detention

99. Pedro stole the cow of Juan. What was the crime committed?
a. Robbery
b. Farm Theft
c. Qualified Theft
d.Simple Theft

100. Pedro, a 19 year old man had sexual intercourse with her 11 year old girlfriend without threat, force or intimidation. What was the crime committed?
a. Child rape
b. Qualified Rape
c. Statutory Rape
d. None

101.) The Revised Penal Code may be enforced outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines when

A. one commits an offense on any ship or airship.
B. one introduces into the Philippines any counterfeit coin.
C. a public officer enters into a bigamous marriage.
D. one commits a crime against national security.

102.) A warrantless search is valid when the search is made by

A. a customs officers at the home of a known smuggler.
B. anti-drug enforcers.
C. policemen at a COMELEC checkpoint.
D. NBI agents looking for a bomb at a mall.

103.) A justifying circumstance is exemplified by

A. a retreat from aggression.
B. a pre-emptive blow.
C. a counter blow.
D. a good intention.

104.) A person walks into a police station and declares that he has committed a crime before the police could take him into custody. May his declaration be admitted against him?

A. No since he has not been forewarned of his rights to silence and to counsel.
B. Yes since he made his declaration before he could be taken into custody and investigated.
C. No since he has entered the police station and came within its jurisdiction.
D. Yes since he freely gave his declaration to the police.

105.) Rape is sexual intercourse with the use of

A. deceit
B. moral ascendance
C. intrigue
D. force or intimidation.

106.) The act of the police in placing the accused in a police line-up without his prior consent

A. violates his right against self-incrimination.
B. violates his right to counsel.
C. constitutes a valid police investigation procedure.
D. is valid conditioned on his being identified at the trial.

107.) A warrantless search is valid when it is made

A. by customs officers at the home of a known smuggler.
B. by anti-drug enforcers.
C. by policemen at a COMELEC checkpoint for illegal firearms.
D. by the NBI for a bomb at the mall.

108.) A qualifying circumstance cannot be presumed, but must be established by

A. proof beyond reasonable doubt
B. clear and convincing evidence
C. substantial evidence
D. preponderance of evidence

ANSWERS:
1. B 26. B 51. B 76. A

2. B 27. C 52. D 77. D

3. B 28. B 53. A 78. A

4. B 29. C 54. B 79. A

5. D 30. C 55. C 80. C

6. D 31. B 56. D 81. A

7. C 32. C 57. D 82. C

8. C 33. B 58. C 83. B

9. C 34. A 59. C 84. A

10. A 35. C 60. B 85. D

11. C 36. B 61. C 86. D

12. C 37. C 62. A 87. C

13. C 38. A 63. C 88. D

14. B 39. D 64. B 89. A

15. B 40. C 65. A 90. C

16. D 41. C 66. B 91. B

17. B 42. B 67. D 92. A

18. C 43. A 68. C 93. A

19. A 44. D 69. D 94. A

20. C 45. D 70. D 95. A

21. C 46. B 71. A 96. A

22. A 47. A 72. C 97. A

23. D 48. D 73. A 98. C

24. D 49. C 74. D 99. C

25. A 50. A 75. B 100. C 101. ) D 102.) C 103.) C 104.) B 105.) D 106.) C 107.) C 108.) B

1. The majority age begins at the age of

A. 21
B. 20
C. 18
D. 16

2. Who may solemnize marriage anywhere in the Philippines?

A. A Consul-general
B. A Court of Appeals justice
C. A ship captain
D. A military commander

3.To be enforceable, when must a contract comply with the Statute of Frauds? When by its terms it is to be performed beyond

A. a year from its making.
B. 5 years from its making.
C. a year from its ratification.
D. 5 years from its ratification.

4.) An uninterrupted possession for a statutory period of time without the need of just title and good faith are requisites for

A. laches.
B. prescription of actions.
C. ordinary acquisitive prescription.
D. extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

5.) Sonny, a Filipino citizen, obtained in a divorce in Canada from his wife, Lulu, also a Filipino citizen. Is the divorce valid and binding?

A. It is not since Philippine law binds Filipinos abroad and it does not permit divorce.
B. It is since Philippine law does not operate in Canada.
C. It is not since Philippine law is recognized in Canada.
D. It is since international law demands local recognition of foreign acts.

6.) In a case, a very old woman executed a will. A friend, a cousin, and a notary public came to witness the will. Due to old age she thumbmarked the will instead of signing it. The friend signed the pages on the right margin, thinking it looked better. The cousin did not see this because his eyes were on a painting that hanged on a nearby wall. Finally, the notary public notarized the will. The will is invalid because

A. the cousin looked away just as the friend was signing the will.
B. the testator failed to subscribe the will.
C. the friend signed at the right margin.
D. of lack of sufficient witnesses.

Answers: 1.) C 2.) B 3.) A 4.) D 5.) A 6.) D

Civil Law is the Legal body which is more present in our everyday life. Every private act is ruled by it and most of them need the assistance of professionals who will guide you for a better defense of your interests.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW FINAL EXAMINATION MCQ

CIVIL LAW REVIEW FINAL EXAMINATION


1. Where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood-
(A) all eleven were not entitled to the reversionary property
(b) they are entitled in equal shares
(c) the principles of intestacy are controlling
(d) the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half
(e) reserve troncal is not applicable.

2. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the
(a) third degree from the reservor
(b) third degree from the reservatarios
( c) third degree relatives
(d) third degree from reservista
(e) third degree from descendant
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

3. The reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the
(A)descendant (prepositus) excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (B) reservista (c) reservor (d) ascendant (prepositus) (e) descendant of the direct line

4. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to (a) one-half (b) 1/8 (c) 1/3 (d) ¼ (e) all of the inheritance .


5. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in (a) equal shares (b)nothing (c) ¼ per stirpes (d) ½ per capita (e) all the property.


6. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate as (a) a whole (b)only on-half of the estate (c) ¼ of the estate (d) one-third (e) only 1/3 of the estate.


7. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to (a) the entire (b) ½ (c) 1/3 (d) ¼ (e) 1/8 estate of the deceased


8. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, who shall inherit? (a) the other collateral relatives (b) the state (c) the uncles and aunts (d) the maternal parents (e) grandparents shall succeed to the estate of deceased.

9. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is (a) not a part of the estate of the reservista (b) he may not dispose of it by will (c) he returns it to the reservatarios existing (d) all of the above (e)none of the above.


10. Which of the following statements is NOT correct concerning the reservatarios? They-
(a) inherit from the reservista
(b) do not inherit from the reservista
(c) inherit from the descendant prepositus
(d) are the heirs mortis causa
(e) are subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista


11. Which statement is correct? (a) The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa (b) nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate (c) the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) (d) all of the above (e) none of the above


12. That which results from the designation of an heir, made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law is known as (a) testamentary succession (b) accretion (c) respresentation (d) collation (e) substitution

13. The words of a will are to be taken in their (a) ordinary sense (b) grammatical sense (c) technical sense (d) ordinary and grammatical sense (e) depends on the clear intention of the testator

14. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will (a) invalidate the other dispositions (b) does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions (c) invalidates only some (D) depends on the will of the testator (e) depends on the result of the probate

15. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law
(a) where he resides (b) where the will is made (c) in force at the time it is made (d) all of the above (e) none of the above


16. Which of the following cannot make a will? (a) a Filipino residing in the U.S. (B) a boy who just turned 18 (c) a woman who is sick with diabetes (d) a dying old man (e) a demented grandmother

17. “A” died without a will survived by (a) his widow “w” (b) his legitimate brothers, B and C and (c)his nephews E and F who are the children of a deceased sister D. The net remainder of the estate is P24,000.
Which of the following statement is correct? (a) W gets 4,000 (b) W gets 8,000 (c) E gets 2,000 (d) C gets 2,000 (e) F gets 4,000

18. Who can demand the partition of the decedent’s estate after his death? (a) any compulsory heir (b) a legatee (c) a devisee (d) a voluntary heir (d) a creditor (e) all of the above


19. Which of the statement is NOT correct? (a)Every will must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself (b) or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence (c) and by his express direction (d) and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another (e) to include a holographic will.


20. There can be no partition when (a)prohibited by the testator for more than 20 years (b) prohibited by the testator for 10 years (c) when the co-heirs agreed not to partition for 30 years (d) the law cannot prohibit partition (e) the heirs cannot agree


21. Can a thing or an entity which is neither a natural nor a juridical person inherit in a will? (a) yes they can generally (b) no they cannot as a general rule as it is prohited by law (c) no, and this applies to a religious organization (d) yes the “poor” as a class not being identified specifically cannot be heirs (e) no because a heir has to be living in order to inherit.

22. Every will must be acknowledged before a (a) judge (b) lawyer (c) notary public (d) at least three witness (e) a person authorized to administer oath by the testator and the witnesses.


23. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by (a) the lawyer who prepared the document (b) by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged (c) either of the two will do (d) a judge of the probate court (e) the Clerk of Court.

24. Which is CORRECT about a holographic will? (A) A person may execute a holographic will which must be written, dated by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to (b) it is subject to no other form, (b) must be made only in the Philippines (c) be witnessed by at least one person (d) acknowledged before a notary public (e) need not be probated if not contested.


25. Which is NOT correct about a holographic will? (a)In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator (b) If the will is contested, at least one of such witnesses shall be required (c) In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature (d) When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines (e) ) If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required
========================================================================
Problem 26: X died intestate survived by (1) A,B, C, D and E his legitimate children (2) F and G, legitimate children of C, a legitimate son of X who predeceased him (3) H and I legitimate children of D and (4) J and K, legitimate children of E. D, however is incapacitated to inherit from X because of an act of unworthiness, while E repudiated his inheritance. The net value of the estate is P120,000.
Questions 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 will be based on the above problem.

26. A by his right of accretion gets (a) P24,000 (b) 12,000 (c) 12,000 in his own right (d) 36,000 (e) 6,000 only.

27. By right of representation G gets (a) 12,000 (b) 24,000 (c) 6,000 (d) 4,000 (e) 36,000

28. IN totality who should get P36,000 (a) A only (b) B only (c) A and B (D) F and I (E) I only

29. Which of the following shares are rendered vacant? (a) C only (b) D only (c) E and C (d) C, D, and E (e) G

30. Which of the following statement is NOT correct (a) F and G can represent C (b) H and I can represent their father D (C) J and K cannot represent their father E (d) none of the above (e) all of the above.


==========================================================
Problem 31: X an employee of the Department of Foreign affairs died intestate in 1976 survived by his widow W, legitimate child A, and two illegitimate children B and C. The record shows that he failed to state in his GSIS application for membership the beneficiaries of his retirement benefits which amounted to P80,000. Questions 31, 32, 33 and 34 shall be based on the above problem.

31. “W” shall get (a) P20,000 (B) 40,000 (C) 10,000 (D) 5,000 (E) 4,000

32. C shall be entitled to (a) ½ (b) ¼ (c) 1/8 (d) 1/3 (e) 1/6

33. A shall be entitled to (a) 20,000 (b) 40,000 (c) 10,000 (d) 5,000 (e) 4,000

34. The free portion in this problem is actually (a) ½ (b) ¼ (c) 1/3 (d) 1/8 (e) 1/6 of the remaining estate.



==================================================================
35. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if (a) made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, (b) or according to the formalities observed in his country,(c) or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes (d) all of the above (e) none of the above


36. Which of the following is correct? (a) Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly (b) they can make a joint will but in another instrument (c) two persons cannot make a will for their reciprocal benefit (d) two persons can make a will for the benefit of a third person (e) Two persons can make a will for their joint benefit.


37. Which of the following CANNOT be a witness to a will? Any person of (a) sound mind (b) of the age of eighteen years or more, (c) not bind ( d) not deaf (e) a dumb person


38. Who of the following is disqualified to witness a holographic will? (a) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines (b)Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document (c) convicted of perjury (d) convicted of false testimony (e) none of the above.


39. A will may be revoked outside the Philippine (a) by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, (b) or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time (c) and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of the Code(d) all of the above (e) none of the above


40. A will shall be valid (a) even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, (b) or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, (c) and even though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed (d) all of the above (e) none of the above

41. Which of the following is NOT correct? (a) Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void (b) unless by some event or circumstance his identity becomes certain. (c) a disposition in favor of a definite class is invalid (d) a disposition to a group of persons shall be valid (e) a disposition to an unknown person may be validated.

42. Which of the following is CORRECT? The preterition
(A)or omission of a compulsory heir
(b) of an heir of the direct line
(c) of a voluntary heir of the direct line
(d) one or some of the compulsory heirs
(e) of a compulsory heir of the direct line

whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.


=============================================================
PROBLEM : The testator, an illegitimate person,is survived by (1) his parents by nature, F and M and (2) his widow “W”. The net value of his estate is P80,000. Questions No. 43, 44, and 45 shall be based on the above problem:

43. The legitimes of F and M shall be (a) 40,000 (b) P20,000 (c) ½ of the estate (d) 10,000 (e) not entitled at all

44. The free disposal shall be (a) P40,000 (b) 20,000 (c) 10,000 (d) 30,000 (e) none

45. The legitime of W is (a) 40,000 (b) P20,000 (c) ½ of the estate (d) 10,000 (e) not entitled at all


=============================================================
46. Which of the following statements is NOT correct?
(A)A voluntary heir who dies before the testator transmits nothing to his heirs. (B) The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother
(C) The legitime reserved for the legitimate parents shall be divided between them equally; if one of the parents should have died, the whole shall pass to the survivor
(D) If only one legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation, the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause for the same.
(E) If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to one-half of the hereditary estate which shall be taken from the free portion of the estate


47. Which of the following is CORRECT? (A) Illegitimate children who may survive with legitimate parents or ascendants of the deceased shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate to be taken from the portion at the free disposal of the testator (B) If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half (C) When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants and with illegitimate children, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate of the deceased which must be taken from the free portion, and the illegitimate children shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate which shall be taken also from the disposable portion. The testator may freely dispose of the remaining one-eighth of the estate (D) When the testator dies leaving illegitimate children and no other compulsory heirs, such illegitimate children shall have a right to one-fourth of the hereditary estate of the deceased. (E) Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified


48. (a) Representation (b) Accretion (c) Succession (d) collation (e)Reserva troncal is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which a person is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.


49. Which of the following statements is NOT correct? (a)Heirs who repudiate their share may not be represented (b)In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased (c)An illegitimate child can inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother (d) If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children (e) In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper.


50. (a) Representation (b) Reversion (c) Collation (d) Succession (e) Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his co-heirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees.

SAMPLER MCQ

Problem 26: X died intestate survived by (1) A,B, C, D and E his legitimate children (2) F and G, legitimate children of C, a legitimate son of X who predeceased him (3) A and I legitimate children of D and (4) J and K, legitimate children of E. D, however is incapacitated to inherit from X because of an act of unworthiness, while E repudiated his inheritance. The net value of the estate is P120,000.
Questions 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 will be based on the above problem.

26. A by his right of accretion gets (a) P24,000 (b) 12,000 (c) 12,000 in his own right (d) 36,000 (e) 6,000 only.
27. By right of representation G gets (a) 12,000 (b) 24,000 (c) 6,000 (d) 4,000 (e) 36,000
28. IN totality who should get P36,000 (a) A only (b) B only (c) A and B (D) F and I (E) I only
29. Which of the following shares are rendered vacant? (a) C only (b) D only (c) E and C (d) C, D, and E (e) G
30. Which of the following statement is NOT correct (a) F and G can represent C (b) H and I can represent their father D (C) J and K cannot represent their father D (d) none of the above (e) all of the above.

1. T made a will making A as his heir. T, then learned that A was dead, so he made another will instituting B as heir. If A turns out to be still alive who inherits? (p. 103)
2. In one case, a will was presented twelve years after the death of the testator. IT was claimed that the right to institute the proceedings already prescribed. Is the contention correct? (p. 129)
3. T has three sons, A, B, and C. T made a will instituting A, B, and a friend F. C was omitted. IF the estate is P90,000, how should the same be distributed? (p. 157)

4. T has three legitimate children, two of whom he instituted as heirs, and one of whom he preterited. A legacy of P10,000 from an estate of P100,000 was given to a friend. How much should the children receive? (p. 160)

5. Joseph C. Brimo’s will provided that even if he was a Turk, still he wanted his estate disposed of in accordance with Philippine laws; and that should any of his legatees oppose this intention of his, his or her legacy would be cancelled. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, did not want this disposition in accordance with Philippines laws, and so he opposed practically every move that would divide the estate in accordance with Philippines laws. Does Andre Brimo lose his legacy? (p. 196)

6. State who are the primary compulsory heirs? What makes them different from the secondary compulsory heirs? (p. 228)

7. A person claiming to be an illegitimate child wanted to intervene in the probate proceedings. She alleged that she enjoyed the status of a child of the deceased and that she had evidence indicating that the decedent was her father. Should she be allowed to intervene and thus inherit? (p. 229)

8. a) A will provided,” I will disinherit some of my children because of their disgraceful lives”. Is this a valid disinheritance? (B) T validly disinherited a child in his will, but he later revoked the will. Is this a valid disinheritance? (c) In his will T disinherited his child, and the said child should only get 2/3 of his legitime. Will the child inherit? How much if any? (d) T has a son A. In his will T said, “If A tries to kill me, I will disinherit him”. Later A really tried to kill T and was duly convicted therefor. T however never made any other will. Has A been validly disinherited? Will A inherit anything? Why? (e) The testator in his will said, “I hereby disinherit my child but if he reforms from his disgraceful life, this disinheritance will be void”. Is this a valid provision? (p. 297)

9. The estate is worth P120,000. A, B, and C are the legitimate children of D. X and Y are the legitimate children of A; W, the legitimate child of B; and Z, the legitimate child of C. (a) IF A, B, and C repudiate the inheritance, how will the estate be divided? How much does each get? (b) Suppose A, B, and C are all incapacitated, how will the grandchildren inherit? (c) Suppose A, B, and C all predeceased D, how will the grandchildren inherit? (p. 374).

10. A has a legitimate child B and an acknowledged natural child C. B has a legitimate child D, and an acknowledged natural child E. C has a legitimate child F, and an acknowledged natural child G. If B and C predecease A, and surviving are four grandchildren, will they inherit intestate from A? Explain your answer. (p. 398)

sample questions in civil law

1.What is the test in determining whether to grant the easement of right of way or not?

2.What are the distinctions between donations mortis causa and donation inter vivos?

3.What are the remedies against a public nuisance?

4.What is the effect of the sale of the dominant easement with respect to an easement?

5. (a)In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title?
(b)Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?


6.A donation was subject to a resolutory condition that the property should not be sold within a period of 100 years from the execution of the deed of donation; otherwise, a violation of such condition would render ipso facto nulls and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors. It was alleged that within the prohibitive period, petitioners executed a deed of sale over the properties, hence the action for rescission, nullification of the deed of donation, and eventual reconveyance of the properties. Will the action prosper? Why?

7. The late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the poblacion of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.
On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application.
Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view trough the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building permit to defendant. The case as against the members of the Municipal Council was subsequently dismissed with concurrence of plaintiff's council. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Romblon rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P12,500.00 by way of compensatory, exemplary, moral and moderate damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Romblon and enjoined defendant from constructing his building unless "he erects the same at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line of his property, in conformity with Article 673 of the New Civil Code."
So Juan Gargantos filed this petition for review of the appellate Court's decision. The focal issue herein is whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos.
Decide the issue.

8. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation — hereinafter referred to as the Director — seeks the review of an order of the Court of First Instances of Rizal directing the return of fifty-one (51) slot machines, and the paraphernalia thereof, to the owners thereof. The appeal is before us only questions of law being raised therein.
It appears that sometime before September 1, 1959, said slot machines and paraphernalia were being operated by the owners thereof in Pasay City pursuant to licenses issued by said City in conformity with its Ordinance No. 106. On the date adverted to above, the aforementioned machines and paraphernalia, together with other slot machines operated without said license, were seized under and by virtue of search warrants issued by a judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Said unlicensed slot machines were the subject matter of criminal cases Nos. 9571-I and 9569-I of the Municipal Court of Pasay City. However, the special prosecutor in charge of said cases opined that no criminal case should be filed against the owners of the fifty-one (51) slot machines involved in the case at bar, and accordingly, recommended that said machines and its paraphernalia be released and returned to the owners thereof. As a consequence, on September 2, 1959, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Director to release said slot machines to their respective owners. However, this order was subsequently suspended, the Director having invited attention to the fact that the court which issued the search warrants adverted to above might punish him for contempt if he released the machines without judicial authority therefore. This led to the filing of a motion by the owners of said machines praying that the same be ordered released and returned to them.
The Director objected to the motion upon the ground that the machines in question are intended to be used for the commission of in offense (gambling), and are a public nuisance, as well as illegal per se. After due hearing, the lower court overruled this opposition and granted said motion.
Is the ruling of the lower court correct? Why?


9. Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station.
Questions: (1) Is the act of the Sangguniang Bayan correct? Explain. (2) Is it within the power of the mayor now to close or transfer the gasoline station? (3) What are the two requisites for the validity of the exercise of police power ? (4) Is a gasoline station a nuisance per se? (5) Can it be closed summarily without judicial proceedings? Explain.


10. Given the following provisions below, decide whether it is “mortis causa” or “inter vivos”. Explain your answer.
(a) Where it was stated in the deed of donation that the donor wanted to give the donee something "to take effect after his death" and that "this donation shall produce effect only by and because of the death of the donor, the property herein donated to pass title after the donor's death"
(b) Where it was provided that the donated properties would be given to the donees after the expiration of thirty days from the donor's death, the grant was made in the future tense, and the word "inherit" was used .
(c) Where the donor has the right to dispose of all the donated properties and the products thereof.
(d) Where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation reveal that the donation could not have taken effect before the donor's death and the rights to dispose of the donated properties and to enjoy the fruits remained with the donor during her lifetime.
(e) The deed of donation provided that the donor was donating mortis causa certain properties as a reward for the donee's services to the donor and as a token of the donor's affection for him. The donation was made under the condition that "the donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor"; that the ' donee should cause to be held annually masses for the repose of the donor's soul, and that he should defray the expenses for the donor's funeral.

Esteban Jr. died single in 1976 and without any issue. He is survived by Celedonia, his maternal aunt, and Concordia his paternal aunt. Esteban inherited a good number of properties from his deceased mother. His father died when he was barely 10 months old.
When Esteban Jr. died, Concordia and Celedonia agreed to form a foundation out the properties left by Esteban Jr. The foundation aims to provide scholarships for the poor but deserving students. To facilitate the formation of the foundation, Celedonia filed a petition in Court to declare her as sole heir of Esteban Jr. Celedonia opposed this somehow, saying that she is also an heir of Esteban Jr.

Questions: (1) Does reserva troncal apply in this case? (2) How would you distribute the properties left by Esteban Jr.?

Answer:FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990 ]
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.

No court should interfere with the probate court

The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters lie within the exclusive competence of the probate court

Who are the parties to reserva troncal?

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
"1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) - the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
"2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios) -relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
"3. The propositus - the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law." (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
"ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
"ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
"Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate ‘without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,’ and is entitled to one half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate." (p. 57, Rollo)

Does the action to recover reservable property prescribe? If so, what is the period?

The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.

Is there a need to annotate the reservable property?

"The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special order of succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of succession. The fulfillment or non fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do with whether the reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any, due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective. x x x." (p. 292, ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
"Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he effect the fee simple, which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land in good faith, free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised not to buy the land he remarked, ‘Why, did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?’ Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does not signify that he had any knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son, but also from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised in regard thereto."
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another ascendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.

from whom does the reservista inherit?

*. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) * * *."

The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives

That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino[3], where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
"The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among then equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
"* * *.
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
"* * *.
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus) excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
"Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
"In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. * * *." (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) (See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):

Q & ANSWER for Miss Civil Law ABC

1.What is a disposition captatoria? Is it valid? Why?

ANSWER: It is a disposition made upon the condition that the heir shall make provisions in his will in favor of the testator or of any person (Art. 875, NCC). It is void, because it makes the making of a will contractual or with a consideration. Basically, a will is an act of pure liberality.

2.ABC Corporation entered into a contract of loan with PBTC which is secured by a chattel mortgage. When ABC Corporation failed to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage, but it was objected to by the debtor contending that there was a novation of the contract when it executed a real estate mortgage when an extension of the loan was granted by the bank. Is the contention of ABC Corporation correct? Why?

ANSWER: No. Novation takes place where the object or principal condition of an obligation is changed or altered. Novation is never presumed; it must be explicitly stated or there must be manifest incompatibility between the old and the new obligations in every aspect. There is no incompatibility between the two contracts especially so that the new contract was executed as an additional security to the chattel mortgage (PBTC v. Sybel’s Inc. Aug. 11, 1989).

3. X lent his car to Y with the undertaking to return it on or before January 31, 1992. Instead of returning it to X, Y sold and delivered the car to Z. One week after, X and Y entered into a contract whereby X sold the car to Y who, AFTER acquiring ownership, went to Z seeking to recover the car from the latter. Will Y’s action prosper? Why?

ANSWER: No, because he is bound by the principle of estoppel. Under the law, when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee (Art. 1434, NCC).

4. A, a Filipino citizen wrote B, a brother, authorizing him to sell a parcel of land belonging to him located in Ilocos Norte. On the strength of such letter-authority, B sold the land belonging to his brother. Is the sale valid? Why?

ANSWER: Yes. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing, otherwise, the sale shall be void (ART. 1874). The letter was sufficient authority for B to sell the land. The authority need not be in a public instrument or participated in by a notary public. It is sufficient that it be in writing.

5. May the thing pledged be acquired by prescription? Explain.

ANSWER: No, because the pledge does not possess the thing pledged in the concept of an owner, but of a mere holder of the security. His possession cannot therefore, ripen into ownership. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Thus, possession with a juridical title, such as by a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, agent or a pledge, not being in the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party.

6. Can moral damages be awarded in favor of a corporation?

ANSWER: No. Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. A corporation being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, griefs of life, all of which cannot be suffered by an artificial being. (LBC v. CA, G.R. No. 108670, Sept. 21, 1994).

7. A, a Filipina, is married to B, an American. During their marriage, A purchased with conjugal funds a piece of real property and placed it under the name “A married to B”. Without B’s consent, A sold the land, hence, B wants now to annul the sale because it was done without his consent, contending that he is also an owner. Is the action proper? Why?

ANSWER: No, because B never acquired ownership over the land even if conjugal funds were used in acquiring the same. This is so because as an alien, he is disqualified from acquiring residential land in the Philippines (Cheeseman v. IAC, G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991).

8.X and Y secured a loan from ABC Bank secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by a title. They failed to pay their taxes during the existence of the loan, hence, the city treasurer levied on the land and scheduled it for auction sale. The city treasurer did not send a notice to the bank. At the scheduled auction sale, it was sold to the highest bidder. X and Y did not redeem the land after one year so the treasurer executed a final deed of sale. When the bidder (buyer) filed a petition to require X and Y or the bank to surrender the title so that a new title can be issued, the bank learned of the levy and asked the court to annul the sale, especially so that it was scandalously sold for only P2,871.00 compared to the mortgage of P290,000. Had the bank been notified, it could have easily paid the tax delinquency.
QUESTIONS: (1) Rule on the motion. (2) Is a mortgagee entitled as a matter of right to a personal service of notice to the delinquent taxpayer? (3) Will the inadequacy of the price vitiate the sale? Explain.

ANSWER: The bank is not correct. (1) The mortgagee is not entitled as a matter of right to a personal service of notice to the delinquent taxpayer; otherwise, it would vitiate the sale. This is because the sale does not operate to cancel or extinguish the pre-existing lien. The new title to be issued in the name of Francisco must have an annotation of said mortgage lien.(2) Neither will the inadequacy of the price vitiate the sale. While in ordinary sales, for reasons of equity, the transaction may be invalidated due to the inadequacy of price as to shock one’s conscience, such does not follow when the law give the owner the right to redeem, as when a sale is made at public auction upon the theory that the lesser price, the easier it is for the owner to effect the redemption. So, while the bank is not entitled to notice as to give it a chance to pay the delinquent taxes, it does not lose its lien on the property as to give it a chance to get back what it has lent, together with interest (Tiongco v. Phil. Veterans’ Bank, 212 SCRA 176).

9.Marita was the owner of a parcel of land. In 1917, she sold a portion to Carlos who then constructed his house. Since the houses of Maria and Carlos adjoined each other, and they could not reach the main road, they agreed to maintain a four-meter road right of way. There were several transfers later on of the properties, until Badong bought the land belonging to Carlos. In all the transfers, the right of way was annotated on the titles. Badong demolished his house in 1941 to pay the way for the construction of an apartment, but it was discontinued due to the war. In 1946, Manny, the buyer of Marita’s property, tried to fence the passageway, believing that, when Badong demolished his house, he gained access to the road and that the easement has already been extinguished for its non-use for 10 years. Badong claimed that the easement was perpetual. Is he correct? Why?

ANSWER: Yes. When the easement in this case was established the parties unequivocally made provision for its observance by all who, in the future, might succeed them in dominion. So, it is permanent in character, which was annotated on each and all of the transfer certificates of title.
Even assuming that with the demolition of the house by Badong, the necessity for the passageway ceased, still such fact does not detract from its permanency as a property right which survives the termination of necessity (Benedicto v. CA, 25 SCRA 145).

10. A, a minor, executed a last will and testament. He died at the age of 21, after which his will was submitted to probate. If you were the judge, would you approve it? Why?

ANSWER: No, because the will is void. Under the law, a person who is a minor cannot execute a will. His supervening capacity cannot validate a void will (ART. 801, NCC).

11.A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the Tarlac side of the boundary between Tarlac and Pangasinan. His brother B, owned the adjoining parcel of unregistered land on the Pangasinan side.
A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of sale executed as a public instrument by A and X. After X paid in full the price of the sale, X took possession of the Pangasinan parcel in the belief that it was the Tarlac parcel covered by the deed of sale executed by A and X.
After 12 years, a controversy arose between B and X on the issue of the ownership of the Pangasinan parcel.
B claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel because B never sold that parcel to X or to anyone else.
On the other hand, X claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive prescription, because X possessed this parcel for over ten years under a claim of ownership.
QUESTIONS: (1) Will the claim of X prosper? (2) What is acquisitive prescription? (3) In order to ripen into ownership, what kind of possession must it be?
Decide on these claims. Give your reasons.

ANSWER: The claim of X will not prosper because there was no acquisitive prescription as the possession was without just title. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted (Lubos v. Galupo, G.R. No. 139136, Jan. 16, 2002).

12. A and B are the parties in a contract of lease which is to expire on December 31, 1993. Sometime in November 1993, they started negotiating for a new contract. A sent a draft of his proposed contract to B.
B also sent a letter asking A to include three proposed terms and placed therein a cover letter that if A would be agreeable to the three terms the contract would be considered signed and perfected. A agreed and later sent the contract already signed by him to B for his signature. Suppose B would not sign, can you consider the contract signed and perfected? Why?

ANSWER: Yes, because the consent can be derived from the communications between A and B. Consent can be manifested in any form, like a series of communications or though a marginal note or through an acceptance of down payment (Topacio v. CA, July 3, 1992; RMAF v. CA, Jan. 17, 1985; NGA v. IAC, March 8, 1989).

13. If “A” buys a car from “B” and issues a check which when presented for payment is dishonored, is “B” considered a person unlawfully deprived within the meaning of Art. 559 of the Civil Code? Why?

ANSWER: No, because the subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure of consideration which does not render the contract of sale void but merely allows the aggrieved party to sue for specific performance or rescission (Ledesma v. CA, Sept. 1, 1992).

14. Moises Pascua was 26 years old when he was stabbed to death by his enemy, who was convicted for murder. He is a motorcab driver, who, based on the testimony of his wife earns an average daily income of P200/day. Compute the loss of income capacity due to the heirs of Moises Padua.

ANSWER: Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income (G.A.I.) less Living expenses (50% G.A.I.)]where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of the deceased )
Since Moises Pascua was 26 years old at the time of his death, his life expectancy is 36 years. Considering that his average daily income was P200.00 a day, his Gross Annual Income would be P48,000.00. Using the above formula, the victim’s unearned income would thus be P864,000.00. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONILO VILLARBA y BAUTISTA, WILFREDO MAGGAY SAQUING, and PETER MAGGAY Y FLORDELIZ, accused-appellants. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 132784. October 30, 2000])

15. In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (“Pajuyo”) paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra (“Guevarra”) executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused.
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 (“MTC”).
In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
QUESTIONS: (1) In your judgment, who has the better right of possession to the land in question? (2) In essence what kind of civil law contract was entered between the parties? (3) One of the defenses made by Guevarra is pari delicto, what is pari delicto? (4) Is pari delicto applicable in ejectment cases? (5) What is a precarium?

ANSWER: (1) Pajuyo has the better right to possession by virtue of the agreement. (2) It is not a commodatom, it is more of a landlord-tenancy relationship (3) Pari Delicto is not applicable in ejectment cases (5) Precarium is a tolerated use of a property. COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004], the SC decided as follows:”We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals’ theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called a precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease. The tenant’s withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration and commodatum. These contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing received. X x x The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases
The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this case.
Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code embody the principle of pari delicto. We explained the principle of pari delicto in these words:
The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo malo non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them.
The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established public policy.
In Drilon v. Gaurana, we reiterated the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. We held that:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent. Even the owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to court.

16. What is the meaning of the “captain of the ship doctrine”? In one case, it was made as a defense in a medical negligence case that it has long been abandoned by U.S. jurisprudence, and hence the Philippines must abandon that too. Will this defense be valid? Are we bound by American case law?

ANSWER: The Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine was discussed in McConnell v. Williams (65 A 2d 243 [1949]), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that under this doctrine, a surgeon is likened to a captain of the ship, in that it is his duty to control everything going on in the operating room. That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 124354. April 11, 2002]

17.Francisco is a 76 year old man, single and lives in his house with Cirila, who took care of him until he died at the age of 90. Evidence showed that Cirila is not only a household help, but also “sleeps” with Francisco, though they never had a child of their own. On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,” in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of “the faithful services that Cirila had rendered over the past ten (10) years.” The deed was notarized by Atty. Juan Luna and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
Questions: (1) Is the “donation inter vivos” valid? (2) If in case it is valid, how shall said property be distributed? Explain.

ANSWER: “Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code”. The property therefore must be distributed pursuant to law in favor of Francisco’s heirs, his sister and his niece. (CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001])

18. Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986, petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On July 5, 1991, Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4383. On February 12, 1992, petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4460. Upon proper motion, the RTC consolidated these two cases.
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners.
On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. The RTC likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 4460, but ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the consideration of the sale with interest from May 13, 1992. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
For Civil Case No. 4383, (a) annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Florentino Chiong in favor of Walter Villanueva, dated May 13, 1992 (Exhibit “2”); ordering defendant Walter Villanueva to vacate the entire land in question and to remove all buildings therein, subject to [i]ndemnity of whatever damages he may incur by virtue of the removal of such buildings, within a period of 60 days from the finality of this decision; award of damages is hereby denied for lack of proof.
In Civil Case No. 4460, complaint is hereby dismissed, but defendant Florentino Chiong, having received the amount of P8,000.00 as consideration of the sale of the land subject of the controversy, the sale being annulled by this Court, is ordered to return the said amount to [the] spouses Villanueva, with interest to be computed from the date of the annulled deed of sale, until the same is fully paid, within the period of 60 days from finality of this judgment. Until such amount is returned, together with the interest, [the] spouses Villanueva may continue to occupy the premises in question.
Question: Is the decision of the RTC Judge correct? Explain.

ANSWER: Anent the first issue, petitioners’ contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents’ separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera’s interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.
Likewise, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Petitioners’ mere insistence as to the lot’s supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against all the evidence for respondents.
On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that the lot was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property since it was registered “in the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age, married to Elisera Chiong… .” But Elisera also presented a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In addition, Florentino and Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property. Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot.
Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, we held that without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent…
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera’s instance, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo the property is still conjugal, the transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the lot. Petitioners’ stance lacks merit. In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., a case involving the annulment of sale executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the same. Thus:
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall “prejudice” the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated, “[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430,” in which cases annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the wife… .
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. Article 1398 of the Civil Code provides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each other the things which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into.
Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return to respondents the land with its fruits and respondent Florentino should return to petitioners the sum of P8,000, which he received as the price of the land, together with interest thereon.
On the matter of fruits and interests, we take into consideration that petitioners have been using the land and have derived benefit from it just as respondent Florentino has used the price of the land in the sum of P8,000. Hence, if, as ordered by the lower court, Florentino is to pay a reasonable amount or legal interest for the use of the money then petitioners should also be required to pay a reasonable amount for the use of the land. Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, it would be equitable to consider the two amounts as offsetting each other. Hence, the award of the trial court for the payment of interest should be deleted. (Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. 159889, June 5, 2008 )


19. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
Questions: (1) Is the OSG contention correct? (2) State the twin elements for the application of par. 2 Art 26 of the Family Code? (3) Is Cipriano legally allowed to remarry under the circumstances at bar?

ANSWER: The OSG IS WRONG.In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005]

20. (1) What is a “quasi-contract”?(2) What are the bases for quasi-contracts? Give at least two examples of quasi-contracts and define each.

ANSWER: Quasi-contracts are lawful, voluntary, and unilateral acts which generally require a person to reimburse or compensate another with the principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another (ART. 2142). The bases are(a) no one must unjustly enrich himself at another’s expense (b) if one benefits, he must reimburse (c) justice and equity; examples are negotiorum gestio (officious management) and solution indebiti (undue payment).