QUESTIONS IN CIVIL LAW WITH ANSWERS

1. What are the different types of donations?  Explain each.

ANSWER:

Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity.⁸ This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt.⁹ A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given.¹⁰ Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.¹¹

2.PROBLEM: On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only.This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation.

Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location.

When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in court. On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 21. In its Decision dated 20 August 1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit

QUESTION: Is the decision of the RTC  correct? Explain.

3. PROBLEM: Eligio Herrera, Sr., was the owner of two parcels of land located at Barangay San Andres, Cainta, Rizal.

On January 3, 1991, petitioner bought from said landowner the first parcel, covered by TD No. 01-00495, for the price of P1,000,000, paid in installments from November 30, 1990 to August 10, 1991.

On March 12, 1991, petitioner bought the second parcel covered by TD No. 01-00497, for P750,000.

Contending that the contract price for the two parcels of land was grossly inadequate, the children of Eligio, Sr., namely, Josefina Cavestany, Eligio Herrera, Jr., and respondent Pastor Herrera, tried to negotiate with petitioner to increase the purchase price. When petitioner refused, herein respondent then filed a complaint for annulment of sale, with the RTC of Antipolo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2267. In his complaint, respondent claimed ownership over the second parcel, which is the lot covered by TD No. 01-00497, allegedly by virtue of a sale in his favor since 1973. He likewise claimed that the first parcel, the lot covered by TD No. 01-00495, was subject to the co-ownership of the surviving heirs of Francisca A. Herrera, the wife of Eligio, Sr., considering that she died intestate on April 2, 1990, before the alleged sale to petitioner. Finally, respondent also alleged that the sale of the two lots was null and void on the ground that at the time of sale, Eligio, Sr. was already incapacitated to give consent to a contract because he was already afflicted with senile dementia, characterized by deteriorating mental and physical condition including loss of memory.

In his answer, petitioner as defendant below alleged that respondent was estopped from assailing the sale of the lots. Petitioner contended that respondent had effectively ratified both contracts of sales, by receiving the consideration offered in each transaction.

On November 14, 1994, the Regional Trial Court handed down its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this court hereby orders that:

1. The deeds of sale of the properties covered by Tax Dec. Nos. 01-00495 and 01-00497 are declared null and void;

2. The defendant is to return the lots in question including all improvements thereon to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is ordered to simultaneously return to the defendant the purchase price of the lots sold totalling to P750,000.00 for lot covered by TD 01-00497 and P1,000,000.00 covered by TD 01-00495;

3. The court also orders the defendant to pay the cost of the suit.

QUESTION: is the ruling of the RTC correct?

ANSWER:  NO. The contract is only voidable. The acceptance of the money as payment ratifies a voidable contract.

4. PROBLEM.On July 18, 1990, petitioner entrusted for repair his Nissan pick-up car 1988 model to private respondent - which is engaged in the sale, distribution and repair of motor vehicles. Private respondent undertook to return the vehicle on July 21, 1990 fully serviced and supplied in accordance with the job contract. After petitioner paid in full the repair bill in the amount of P1,397.00, private respondent issued to him a gate pass for the release of the vehicle on said date. But came July 21, 1990, the latter could not use the vehicle as its battery was weak and was not yet replaced. Left with no option, petitioner himself bought a new battery nearby and delivered it to private respondent for installation on the same day. However, the battery was not installed and the delivery of the car was rescheduled to July 24, 1990 or three (3) days later. When petitioner sought to reclaim his car in the afternoon of July 24, 1990, he was told that it was carnapped earlier that morning while being road-tested by private respondent’s employee along Pedro Gil and Perez Streets in Paco, Manila. Private respondent said that the incident was reported to the police. Having failed to recover his car and its accessories or the value thereof, petitioner filed a suit for damages against private respondent anchoring his claim on the latter’s alleged negligence. For its part, private respondent contended that it has no liability because the car was lost as a result of a fortuitous event - the carnapping.

Questions: (a) Is carnapping a fortuitous event? (b) Can the repair shop be made liable for the value of the car and pay damages? (c) What do you understand by “the assumption of risk”? (d) Is this principle applicable in the case at bar?

Answer: It is a not a defense for a repair shop of motor vehicles to escape liability simply because the damage or loss of a thing lawfully placed in its possession was due to carnapping. Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another’s rightful possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as such, carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking of another’s property. It must be proved and established that the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and that neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has any participation.^[9] In accordance with the Rules of evidence, the burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it^[10]- which in this case is the private respondent. However, other than the police report of the alleged carnapping incident, no other evidence was presented by private respondent to the effect that the incident was not due to its fault. A police report of an alleged crime, to which only private respondent is privy, does not suffice to established the carnapping. Neither does it prove that there was no fault on the part of private respondent notwithstanding the parties’ agreement at the pre-trial that the car was carnapped. Carnapping does not foreclose the possibility of fault or negligence on the part of private respondent.

Even assuming arguendo that carnapping was duly established as a fortuitous event, still private respondent cannot escape liability. Article 1165^[11] of the New Civil Code makes an obligor who is guilty of delay responsible even for a fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery. In this case, private respondent was already in delay as it was supposed to deliver petitioner’s car three (3) days before it was lost. Petitioner’s agreement to the rescheduled delivery does not defeat his claim as private respondent had already breached its obligation. Moreover, such accession cannot be construed as waiver of petitioner’s right to hold private respondent liable because the car was unusable and thus, petitioner had no option but to leave it.

Assuming further that there was no delay, still working against private respondent is the legal presumption under Article 1265 that its possession of the thing at the time it was lost was due to its fault.^[12] This presumption is reasonable since he who has the custody and care of the thing can easily explain the circumstances of the loss. The vehicle owner has no duty to show that the repair shop was at fault. All that petitioner needs to prove, as claimant, is the simple fact that private respondent was in possession of the vehicle at the time it was lost. In this case, private respondent’s possession at the time of the loss is undisputed. Consequently, the burden shifts to the possessor who needs to present controverting evidence sufficient enough to overcome that presumption. Moreover, the exempting circumstances - earthquake, flood, storm or other natural calamity - when the presumption of fault is not applicable^[13] do not concur in this case. Accordingly, having failed to rebut the presumption and since the case does not fall under the exceptions, private respondent is answerable for the loss.

It must likewise be emphasized that pursuant to Articles 1174 and 1262 of the New Civil Code, liability attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event if “the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk”.^[14] Carnapping is a normal business risk for those engaged in the repair of motor vehicles. For just as the owner is exposed to that risk so is the repair shop since the car was entrusted to it. That is why, repair shops are required to first register with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)^[15] and to secure an insurance policy for the “shop covering the property entrusted by its customer for repair, service or maintenance” as a pre-requisite for such registration/accreditation.^[16] Violation of this statutory duty constitutes negligence per se.^[17] Having taken custody of the vehicle, private respondent is obliged not only to repair the vehicle but must also provide the customer with some form of security for his property over which he loses immediate control. An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) juses or attributes of ownership – the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits -^[18] is a crippled owner. Failure of the repair shop to provide security to a motor vehicle owner would leave the latter at the mercy of the former. Moreover, on the assumption that private respondent’s repair business is duly registered, it presupposes that its shop is covered by insurance from which it may recover the loss. If private respondent can recover from its insurer, then it would be unjustly enriched if it will not compensate petitioner to whom no fault can be attributed. Otherwise, if the shop is not registered, then the presumption of negligence applies.

5. In case a passenger dies by reason of the negligence of the driver what are the four possible damages that may be recovered by the heirs of the victim?

Answer: ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos ( now fifty thousand pesos), even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

6.What is the effect if the lessor refuses to pay the lessee one-half of the value of the useful improvements introduced to a land leased?

Answer: The refusal of the lessor to pay the lessee one-half of the value of the useful improvements gives rise to the right of removal.

7. Sometime in 1956, Francisca Cardente, for and on behalf of her grandson, petitioner Ignacio Cardente, who was then a minor, and now married to his co-petitioner, purchased from Isidro Palanay one hectare of land. The property purchased is a part of a 9.2656-hectare parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T., for short) No. P-1380 in Palanay's name. Immediately after the purchase, the Cardentes took possession of the land and planted various crops and trees thereon. They have been in continuous possession ever since, adverse to the whole world. Unfortunately, however, the private document evidencing the sale of the one-hectare lot to petitioner Ignacio Cardente was lost and never found despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the same.

Some four years later, on August 18, 1960, Isidro Palanay sold the entire property covered by O.C.T. No. P-1380, including the one-hectare portion already sold to Cardente, this time to the private respondents, Ruperto Rubin and his wife. The deed of sale was registered and a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T., for short) No. 1173, was issued in favor of the Rubin spouses. Notwithstanding the second sale, or because of it, Isidro Palanay, with the written conforme of his wife, Josepha de Palanay, on December 9, 1972, executed a public document in favor of petitioner Ignacio Cardente confirming the sale to him (Cardente) in 1956 of the one hectare portion. The deed of confirmation likewise states that the subsequent vendee, respondent Ruperto Rubin, was informed by Palanay of the first sale of the one-hectare portion to Cardente.

By virtue of having the property titled in the name of Ruperto Rubin, he now claims that he is the owner of the whole property in question. Question: (a) Is the claim of Rubin correct? (b) Is this a case of double sale? (c) In case it is, what principle of law will you apply regarding double sale? Explain.

Answer: Admittedly, this case involves a double sale. While the private respondents allegedly bought from Isidro Palanay on August 18, 1960 the entire property comprising 9.2656 hectares and covered by O.C.T. No. P-1380, the petitioners, on the other hand, lay claim to one hectare thereof which they undeniably purchased from the same vendor earlier, in 1956. The conflict, therefore, falls under, and can be resolved by, Article 1544 of the Civil Code which sets the rules on double sales.

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

It is undisputed that the private respondents, the second vendees, registered the sale in their favor whereas the petitioners, the first buyers, did not. But mere registration of the sale is not enough. Good faith must concur with the registration. Bad faith renders the registration nothing but an exercise in futility. The law and jurisprudence are very clear on this score.

The heart of the problem is whether or not the private respondents acted in good faith when they registered the deed of sale dated August 18, 1960 more than six months later, on March 7, 1961. Inextricably, the inquiry must be directed on the knowledge, or lack of it, of the previous sale of the one-hectare portion on the part of the second buyers at the time of registration. The trial court found that the second vendees had such knowledge.

It is true that good faith is always presumed while bad faith must be proven by the party alleging it. In this case, however, viewed in the light of the circumstances obtaining, we have no doubt that the private respondents' presumed good faith has been sufficiently overcome and their bad faith amply established.

The "Confirmation Of A Deed Of Absolute Sale Of A Portion Of A Registered Agricultural Land" executed by the late Ignacio Palanay on December 9, 1972 and which was exhibited in the trial court below, admitted the sale of the one hectare portion to the petitioners sometime in 1956. The same deed likewise explicitly stated that the "fact of the previous sale, was well known and acknowledged by Mr. Ruperto Rubin (the private respondent)." These recitals were further buttressed by Concepcion Salubo, a daughter of Isidro Palanay, who testified that she knew of the previous sale of the one-hectare portion to petitioner Ignacio Cardente and that private respondent Ruperto Rubin was properly informed of the said sale. On this regard, no ill-motive had been attributed to the vendor Isidro Palanay and to his daughter Concepcion Salubo for testifying the way they did -- against the private respondents. They were disinterested persons who stood to gain nothing except, perhaps, the satisfaction of setting the record straight, or, in the words of the seller, "for the purpose of giving efficacy to the Deed of Sale I made to Ignacio Cardente which was made in a private document x x x."

Further, the notorious and continuous possession and full enjoyment by petitioners of the disputed one-hectare property long (four years) before the private respondents purchased the same from Palanay bolsters the petitioners' position. That possession would have been enough to arouse the suspicion of the private respondents as to the ownership of the entire area which they were about to purchase. Their failure to inquire and to investigate the basis of the petitioners' actual occupation of the land forming a substantial part of what they were buying militates against their posited lack of knowledge of the first sale. "A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor." We have warned time and again that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.

The private respondents' avowals that they had never known of the prior sale until the issues were joined at the trial court, for, before that, they merely tolerated the continued presence of the original occupants, Francisca and Eugenia Cardente, and Ignacio, in the premises, out of simple pity for the two old women, is too pat to be believed. For if these were so, the reason why the private respondents' continued to tolerate the occupation by the petitioners of the contested property even after the demise of the two old women escapes us. Rubin's allegation that this was because they were still in good terms with the petitioners is too lame an excuse to deserve even a scant consideration. The private respondents' total lack of action against the actual occupants of a good portion of the land described in their torrens title can only be construed as acceptance on their part of the existence of the prior sale and their resignation to the fact that they did not own the one-hectare portion occupied by the petitioners. Present these facts, the foisted ignorance of the respondents as to the first sale is an empty pretense. Their seventeen years of inaction and silence eloquently depict a realization of lack of right.

8. .X died in 1955 with a will. In her will, she devised one-half of a big parcel of land to her brothers, Y and Z. and the other half to the grandniece, A, subject to the condition that upon A’s death, whether before or after that of the testatrix, said one-half of the property devised to her shall be delivered to Y and Z, or their heirs should anyone of them die before X. After the will was admitted to probate, A demanded for the partition of the property. Y and Z, however, contended that since she is only a fiduciary heir or a usufructuary she cannot demand for the partition of the property. Is this contention tenable?

Answer: This contention is untenable. Art. 865 of the civil code provides that a fidiecomissary substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly either by giving it such a name or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to the second heir. The testamentary clause under consideration does not cal the institution a fidiecomissary heir nor does it contain a clear statement that A enjoys only usufructuary right, the naked ownership being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. The will, therefore, establishes only a simple or common substitution (substitution vulgar), the necessary result of which is that A upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of an undivided half of the property. Being a co-owner, she can therefore demand for a partition of the property (Crisologo v. Singson, 4 Scra 491).

9. A died in 1965 with a will. In the will, he devised a house and lot to B as fiduciary heir to the latter’s son, C, as fidiecomissary substitute, declaring that said property shall not be alienated for 100 years. B died in 1975. May C now validly alienate the property?

No. 3 of Art. 867 of the civil code provides that provisions which contain a perpetual prohibition to alienate and even a temporary one beyond the limit fixed in ART. 863 shall not take effect: except for the two limitations which are (a) that the substitution must no go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted and (b) that both the first heir and the second heir must be living at the time of the death of the testator. It is evident that in testamentary dispositions which contain a perpetual or temporary prohibition to alienate, neither one nor the other can possibly be violated. They only limitation which is violated is that provided in Art. 870 (i.e. the prohibition to alienate is good for 20 years. Beyond that, it is void.

In the instant problem, C must therefore still wait for 1985 before he can validly alienate the property.

10. X died in 1960 with a will wherein he instituted his mother, M, as universal heir. His estate consisted of properties valued at P80,000. In 1962, M died intestate will all of these properties still intact. There are now two claimants to these properties. They are A, maternal aunt of X and B, paternal uncle of X. (A) suppose that X had inherited all of these properties from his father, F, in 1955, to whom shall you adjudicate them? (b) suppose that one-half of these properties had been acquired by X through succession from his father, F, in 1955 and the other half through his own effort or industry from 1955 to 1960, to whom shall you adjudicate them?

(a) one-half undivided share of all the properties shall be adjudicated to A in accordance with the normal rules of intestate succession and the other half undivided share to B in accordance with art 891 of the civil code. The reason is that only one-half undivided portion of the properties in the instant case is reservable. Under ART. 891, the law requires that the ascendant-reservista should have inherited the property from the descendant-propositus “by operation of law”. In testamentary succession, “by operation of law” applies only to the transmission of the legitime and not to the free portion. Therefore, only ½ undivided portion in the properties, which is the legitime of M is reservable., while the other half which is the free portion is the free property. Consequently, when M died in 1962, the 1/2undivided portion of said properties which is reservable, passed automatically to B in accordance with Art. 891 while the other half which is free passed to A in accordance with the normal rules of intestate succession.

(b) when M the reservista died in 1962 only ½ undivided share of all the properties which X originally acquired from his father F by gratuitous title shall pass automatically and by operation of law to B in accordance with art. 891 while the other half undivided share of such properties as well as all of the properties which X originally acquired through his effort shall pass to A in accordance with the normal rules of intestate succession.

11. If “A” buys a car from “B” and issues a check which when presented for payment is dishonored, is “B” considered a person unlawfully deprived within the meaning of Art. 559 of the Civil Code? Why?

ANSWER: No, because the subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure of consideration which does not render the contract of sale void but merely allows the aggrieved party to sue for specific performance or rescission (Ledesma v. CA, Sept. 1, 1992).

12.PROBLEM. In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (“Pajuyo”) paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.

On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra (“Guevarra”) executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand.

In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused.

Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 (“MTC”).

In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.

QUESTIONS: (1) In your judgment, who has the better right of possession to the land in question? (2) In essence what kind of civil law contract was entered between the parties? (3) One of the defenses made by Guevarra is pari delicto, what is pari delicto? (4) Is pari delicto applicable in ejectment cases? (5) What is a precarium? 

ANSWER: (1) Pajuyo has the better right to possession by virtue of the agreement. (2) It is not a commodatom, it is more of a landlord-tenancy relationship (3) Pari Delicto is not applicable in ejectment cases (5) Precarium is a tolerated use of a property. COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004], the SC decided as follows:”We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals’ theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.

In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called a precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.

The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease. The tenant’s withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence.

Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration and commodatum. These contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing received. X x x The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases

The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this case.

Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code embody the principle of pari delicto. We explained the principle of pari delicto in these words:

The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo malo non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them.

The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established public policy.

In Drilon v. Gaurana, we reiterated the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. We held that:

It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.

Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.

Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent. Even the owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to court.

11. What is the meaning of the “captain of the ship doctrine”? In one case, it was made as a defense in a medical negligence case that it has long been abandoned by U.S. jurisprudence, and hence the Philippines must abandon that too. Will this defense be valid? Are we bound by American case law?

ANSWER: The Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine was discussed in McConnell v. Williams (65 A 2d 243 [1949]), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that under this doctrine, a surgeon is likened to a captain of the ship, in that it is his duty to control everything going on in the operating room. That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 124354. April 11, 2002]

13. Francisco is a 76 year old man, single and lives in his house with Cirila, who took care of him until he died at the age of 90. Evidence showed that Cirila is not only a household help, but also “sleeps” with Francisco, though they never had a child of their own. On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,” in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of “the faithful services that Cirila had rendered over the past ten (10) years.” The deed was notarized by Atty. Juan Luna and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

Questions: (1) Is the “donation inter vivos” valid? (2) If in case it is valid, how shall said property be distributed? Explain.

ANSWER: “Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code”. The property therefore must be distributed pursuant to law in favor of Francisco’s heirs, his sister and his niece. (CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001])

14. PROBLEM: What is the prescriptive period for reconveyance of registered property based on constructive trust?

ANSWER: Ten years.

‘An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have ‘no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.

“An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides:

‘In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, x x x.’

“This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which provides:

‘Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.’

“The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. In the present case, therefore, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 10235 was filed on June 4, 1975, it was well-within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of “Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 on September 17, 1970.”

(All Italics Supplied). ‘Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

1) Upon a written contract;

2) Upon an obligation created by law;

3) Upon a judgment;

PURITA SALVATIERRA, ELENITA SALVATIERRA NUNEZ, ANSELMO SALVATIERRA, JR., EMELITA SALVATIERRA, and ROMEL SALVATIERRA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LINO LONGALONG and PACIENCIA MARIANO, respondents. FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 107797. August 26, 1996]

15.PROBLEM The original owner of the property in dispute, Faustino Maningo, is the son-in-law of the original defendant, Jose Deguilmo. The former is married to Quirina Deguilmo, daughter of said defendant.

On September 21, 1948, Faustino Maningo sold by pacto de retro the subject property to spouses Pedro and Teresa Villamor (Exhibit 1).

After the sale, Faustino and Quirina Maningo left for Mindanao. Sometime in January, 1950, Faustino returned to Cebu because the Villamor spouses needed money. However, since Faustino had no money, he requested his father-in-law, Jose Deguilmo, to buy the land from the Villamors. On January 10, 1950, the Villamor spouses allegedly sold the land in dispute to defendant Jose Deguilmo in a private document of sale (Exhibit 2). Immediately thereafter, Jose Deguilmo took possession of the property, introduced improvements and paid taxes thereon.

Meantime, in 1953, Faustino Maningo abandoned his wife and lived with a concubine. His wife and their children had to return to Cebu where they lived and were supported by Jose Deguilmo. Faustino did not return to Cebu for more than twenty (20) years. A case for concubinage was filed against him but it was somehow dismissed.

In 1973, Faustino Maningo returned to Cebu and allegedly tried to forcibly take possession of the property from his father-in-law although he did not succeed. Nevertheless, Faustino proceeded to execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff (now petitioner) Marcelino Kiamco. The latter, a resident of Carmen, Cebu, allegedly knew, at the time of the sale, that defendant, Jose Deguilmo, had already been in possession of the disputed property for more than twenty (20) years. After the said sale, Marcelino Kiamco attempted to take possession of the property but was not successful because of defendant's refusal to give up the land. He, however, did not file yet any action for ejectment or unlawful detainer against the defendant. Seven (7) months after the execution of the alleged sale, Marcelino Kiamco filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Jose Deguilmo before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

The trial court ruled, among other things, that Faustino Maningo was still the owner of the subject property on October 2, 1973, when he executed the deed of sale in favor of Marcelino Kiamco; that the deed of sale executed by the Villamor spouses in favor of Jose Deguilmo is null and void; and that Jose Deguilmo had not acquired the subject property by acquisitive prescription.

Question: (1)Is the trial court correct?

(2) When did the New Civil Code take effect?

(3) Under the old code, what is the period of acquisitive prescription?

It is undisputed that after the Deed of Sale (Exh. 2) was executed on January 10, 1950, Jose Deguilmo immediately took possession of the property in dispute in the concept of an owner, exercised acts of dominion and introduced improvements thereon, and enjoyed the fruits thereof, continuously, peacefully, and adversely for more than twenty years. It is therefore, clear, that such adverse possession started on January 10, 1950, which is before the effectivity of the New Civil Code (August 30, 1950). Pursuant to Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code, which provides for transitional rules on prescription, and which reads: "Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should lapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required," the law to be applied is the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190). Inasmuch as here the prescription was already running before August 30, 1950, it follows that only ten (10) years would be required, because under the Code of Civil Procedure, regardless of good faith or bad faith, the period for acquiring land by prescription was only ten (10) years (Sec. 41, Act 190, Code of Civil Procedure; Osorio vs. Tan Jongko, 51 O.G. 6221). It therefore follows necessarily that in 1960, Jose Deguilmo had already acquired the subject property by acquisitive prescription. Thus, Marcelino Kiamco should have lost the case, unless of course, the land was covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title. As found by the respondent Court, the evidence shows that the land is not a titled property.

The period of ten (10) years must necessarily start from January, 1950, and not from August 1950, since here, the prescriptive period under the old law was shorter. Had the period under the old law been longer, it is the shorter period under the New Civil Code that should apply, but this time, the period should commence from the date of effectivity of the New Civil Code – August 30, 1950 – in view of the clause "but if since the time this Code took effect ..."

With the facts obtaining in the present case, it is immaterial whether the property in dispute was possessed by Jose Deguilmo in good or bad faith. His adverse possession for more than twenty years is more than sufficient for purposes of acquisitive prescription under the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, even if the alleged Deed of Sale executed on January 10, 1950 (Exh. 2) was void ab initio, as claimed by petitioner (because Faustino Maningo could still repurchase the property until 1951, thus the Villamor spouses were not yet the owners thereof), what is important is that Jose Deguilmo immediately took possession of the property and continuously and adversely possessed and enjoyed it for more than twenty years. Besides, as correctly found by the respondent court, if Faustino claims that the Deed of Sale of January 10, 1950 was not authentic and valid, why did he not disturb Jose Deguilmo from 1950 until 1973; “it is hardly the actuation of an owner for Faustino Maningo to do what he did for the last 24 years, if as the Villamor spouses said Faustino Maningo had already repurchased the property in 1949."

Jose Deguilmo (and now his heirs, the private respondents), no doubt, had already acquired ownership of the subject property on the basis of acquisitive prescription. MARCELINO KIAMCO, petitioner-movant, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUANA DEGUILMO­-GRAPE, QUIRINA DEGUILMO­-MANINGO, ANTONIA DEGUILMO, and JUAN DEGUILMO, respondents. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 96865. July 3, 1992]

16. Is an action for partition imprescriptible? Can it be barred by laches? Is there an exception to this?

An action for partition by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches x x x. The only exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an action for partition is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties sought to be partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-owner at which instance the remedy available to the aggrieved heirs lies not in action for partition but for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription

17.PROBLEM Miss Y worked in the U.S. for 20 years. She is very generous to her relatives in Davao City. She bought a city property worth 5 million with an area of 6,000 sq. m., and accommodated her cousin Mr. X to build his house thereon.

Mr. X built a house worth 300t. Before the house was built, Miss Y, had them agree in writing that any relative can use the land for free, build whatever structure they can afford and that they must maintain a good relationship, otherwise, they shall all be evicted from the land.

When Miss Y retired, she returned to the Philippines and lived in the house of Mr. X. Soon, disagreements arose, to an extent that their relationship turned sour and irreconciliable.

Miss Y then demanded that Mr. X vacate her land. Mr. X refused and will vacate only if he is reimbursed the present market value of his house which had already been assessed at 500t.

Questions: (1) In essence, what law governs their relationship? (2) Will you consider Mr. X as a builder in good faith? (3) Is Miss Y correct in evicting Mr. X from her land? (4) Is Mr. X correct in demanding that he will not vacate unless he is reimbursed the value of his house? Explain.

ANSWERS:

1. The Law on Usufruct particularly Article 579 of the NCC shall govern the relationship Miss Y and Mr. X.

“ Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property. (487) “

2. Mr. X cannot be considered a builder in good faith because he knew that has no title of ownership over the land where he built the house.

3. Yes, Miss Y is correct in evicting Mr. X because he violated the conditions of the usufruct.

4. No, Mr. X cannot demand for reimbursement of the value of the house because he is not a builder in good faith. Pursuant to Article 579 of the New Civil Code. The usufructuary shall have no right to be indemnified on the improvements on the property held in usufruct. He may however remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property.

17. Tuatis bought a 300 square meter land from Tuatis for P10,000 on installment basis. She paid only P4,000. The condition of the sale is that she will pay a down payment of P3,000 and the balance shall be paid on monthly installment until the whole consideration is paid.

Meanwhile, Tuatis built a P500,000 worth of house on said strip.

As Tuatis did not pay the whole amount, Visminda the owner of the lot, demanded that Tuatis should vacate the land, and remove her concrete house thereon.

Tuatis on the other hand, demanded that she will pay the balance price of P6,000 but Visminda refused to receive the amount, as another buyer is willing to buy the land at P300,000.

Accordingly, Vizminda has two options. What are these two options under the law? Discuss each option.

ANSWER:

Taking into consideration the provisions of the Deed of Sale by Installment and Article 448 of the Civil Code, Visminda has the following options:

Under the first option, Visminda may appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary and useful expenses the latter incurred for said building, as provided in Article 546 of the Civil Code.

Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair value of the land. The P10,000.00 price of the subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment , shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will then be statutory, and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under Article 448 of the Civil Code.

Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject property herein, turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms.

18. Mr. X is an owner of a land fronting the Sulu Sea. By the action of the waves of the sea, sand and silt were deposited, increasing his land area to about 2,000 square meters. Mr. X then planted coconut trees on said land, and applied for registration of said land before the DENR. Questions: (1) What law shall govern this accretion caused by the action of the sea? (2) Per jurisprudence, what kind of “owner” is Mr. X with respect to the alluvial deposit? (3) Shall you consider X as the owner ipso facto of the accretion? (4) In essence, who owns the accretion? (5) Is there a possibility for X to own the accretion? Explain.

ANSWERS:

1. The Spanish Law Of Waters of 1866 shall govern the accretion caused by the actions of the sea.

2. Per jurisprudence, Mr. X is considered as a littoral owner .

3. X cannot be considered as ipso facto owner of the accretion.

4. The accretion in this case is owned by the state because land added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain.

5. Yes, there could be a possibility for X to own the accretion. When the accretion are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

19. What is a “forced lease”? Of what relevance is this under Art. 448 of the civil code? How is the fairness of Art. 448 explained by Manresa?

ANSWER:

A “ forced lease” is a mandatory lease. It is a lease contract between parties created by operation of law where one is required to pay rent for a certain property owned by another.

Under article 448, if the value of the land is more than the value of the building, the builder in good faith cannot be forced by the owner to buy the land. The remedy is a forced lease.

The rationale of Article 448, NCC is that where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.

20. Is a provision in a foreigner’s wills to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law valid?

Problem No. 5. On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

21. Explain the latin maxim: Genus nunguan perit. What is the relevance of this latin maxim to the “obligation to deliver a generic thing”?

ANSWER: Under Article 1263 of the Civil Code, “[i]n an obligation to deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind does not extinguish the obligation.” If the obligation is generic in the sense that the object thereof is designated merely by its class or genus without any particular designation or physical segregation from all others of the same class, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind even without the debtor’s fault and before he has incurred in delay will not have the effect of extinguishing the obligation. This rule is based on the principle that the genus of a thing can never perish. Genus nunquan perit. An obligation to pay money is generic; therefore, it is not excused by fortuitous loss of any specific property of the debtor. (Gaisano Cagayan v. Insurance Company of North America,June 8, 2006)

22. “The plaintiff rented on March 22, 1985 the Safety Deposit Box No. 54 of the defendant bank at its Binondo Branch located at the Fookien Times Building, Soler St., Binondo, Manila wherein he placed his collection of stamps. The said safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff was at the bottom or at the lowest level of the safety deposit boxes of the defendant bank at its aforesaid Binondo Branch.

During the floods that took place in 1985 and 1986, floodwater entered into the defendant bank’s premises, seeped into the safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff and caused, according to the plaintiff, damage to his stamps collection. The defendant bank rejected the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for his damaged stamps collection, so, the plaintiff instituted an action for damages against the defendant bank.

The defendant bank denied liability for the damaged stamps collection of the plaintiff on the basis of the ‘Rules and Regulations Governing the Lease of Safe Deposit Boxes’ ( particularly paragraphs 9 and 13, which read:

‘9. The liability of the Bank, by reason of the lease, is limited to the exercise of the diligence to prevent the opening of the safe by any person other than the Renter, his authorized agent or legal representative;

x x x

13. The Bank is not a depository of the contents of the safe and it has neither the possession nor the control of the same. The Bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except as herein provided, and it assumes absolutely no liability in connection therewith.’

The defendant bank also contended that its contract with the plaintiff over safety deposit box No. 54 was one of lease and not of deposit and, therefore, governed by the lease agreement  which should be the applicable law; that the destruction of the plaintiff’s stamps collection was due to a calamity beyond its control; and that there was no obligation on its part to notify the plaintiff about the floodwaters that inundated its premises at Binondo branch which allegedly seeped into the safety deposit box leased to the plaintiff.

The bank contends further that it is not a depository of the contents of the Safe and it has neither the possession nor the control of the same. The Bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except as herein provided, and it assumes absolutely no liability in connection therewith,”are valid since said stipulations are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy; and there is no concrete evidence to show that SBTC failed to exercise the required diligence in maintaining the safety deposit box; what was proven was that the floods of 1985 and 1986, which were beyond the control of SBTC, caused the damage to the stamp collection; said floods were fortuitous events which SBTC should not be held liable for since it was not shown to have participated in the aggravation of the damage to the stamp collection; on the contrary, it offered its services to secure the assistance of an expert in order to save most of the stamps, but the appellee refused; appellee must then bear the loss under the principle of “res perit domino.”

Questions: (1) Is the bank liable to plaintiff for damages? (2) What kind of contract is the “rental of a safety deposit box”?  (3) what do you understand by res perit domino? (5) Is the argument of the bank that it cannot be held liable since the flood somehow is a fortuitous event, valid? Explain.

Answer: LUZAN SIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents. THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 102970. May 13, 1993]

23. Can the adopter rescind the adoption of the adopted? How about the adopted can it file an action to have his adoption rescinded? ON what grounds?

ANSWER: There is no more provision of law which allows the rescission of adoption by the. However the adopted may file a petition to rescind the adoption on grounds of

1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone counseling;

2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;

3) sexual assault or violence; or

4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.

24. Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children and finally, he had three illegitimate children.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The law of Texas did not provide for legitimes for illegitimate children.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Question: What law is applicable on the matter? Will you grant the shares for the illegitimate children?

ANSWER: It is basic that successional rights, amount of succession and intrinsic validity of the will shall be governed by the national law of the decedent, hence Texas law shall govern. There being no legitimes under Texas law, then the shares of the illegitimate children cannot be granted.

Problem No. 14. Is a provision in a foreigner’s wills to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law valid?

25. Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.

As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things.

QUESTIONS:

(a) Define psychological incapacity as contemplated in Art. 36

(b) What are the so called “Molina guidelines”?

(c) given the above premises, will you declare the marriage as null and void? Explain.

Psychological incapacity, which a ground for annulment of marriage (which is different from divorce), contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.

Among the grounds for annulment of marriage, psychological incapacity is the more (if not the most) commonly used. It is also one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code (Article 36). The guidelines (shortened here) in the interpretation and application of Article 36 were handed down by the Supreme Court in Molina:

1. The plaintiff (the spouse who filed the petition in court) has burden of showing the nullity of the marriage. Our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family, so any doubt is resolved in favor of the existence/continuation of the marriage.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

In Antonio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006), the Supreme Court sustained the nullity of the marriage based on the psychological incapacity of the wife (respondent). As concluded by the psychiatrist, the wife’s repeated lying is abnormal and pathological, and amounts to psychological incapacity

26. What is a prejudicial question? What are its elements? Is there an existence of a prejudicial question in the above-stated problem? Explain.

ANSWER: A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

There is no prejudicial question in the above-stated problem. The elements of parricide are not similar to declaration of nullity.

27. Can the adopter rescind the adoption of the adopted? How about the adopted can it file an action to have his adoption rescinded? ON what grounds?

ANSWER: There is no more provision of law which allows the rescission of adoption by the. However the adopted may file a petition to rescind the adoption on grounds of

1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone counseling;

2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;

3) sexual assault or violence; or

4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.

28. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children's parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under  RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioner's husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

Given the above facts, as judge will you grant the adoption? Explain.

ANSWER: The adoption shall not be granted. Under the law, adoption should be made JOINTLY by the husband and wife. IN this case, the husband only executed the affidavit of consent, which is not the JOINT ADOPTION contemplated by law.

29. Can the Sangguniang Bayan declare a property as nuisance per se and order its condemnation?

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

The provincial governor, district engineer or district health officer is not authorized to destroy private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a fishery constructed in navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a nuisance per accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by causing water to become stagnant. (Monteverde v. Generoso, supra).

While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.

[Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize the extra judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . . the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry . . . . If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial heating before a judicial tribunal. (Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47 [1913]).

Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.

For the precipitate demolition, therefore, petitioner should be entitled to just compensation, the amount of which is for the Trial Court to determine. We are not inclined to grant petitioner damages, however, as it simply ignored the demand to remove or relocate its quonset building.

G.R. No. 95279 July 25, 1991

ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO, herein represented by SILVESTRE F. TAN, Administrator, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR A. MEMORACION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan Province, Branch 2, MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, Basilan Province, herein represented by BENJAMIN VALENCIA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, Isabela, Basilan Province, ROGELIO L. IGOT, FELICISIMO PIOQUINTO, DANIEL PADINAS, ANTONIO CABANGON, FELIX ROXAS, BENJAMIN FERRER, GREGORIO TABADA, EFREN DELOS REYES, FLORENCIO HUGO, JESUS FRANCISCO, ALFREDO TUBILAG, PABLO ANDRES, respondents.

30. Compute the loss of earning capacity, if the victim is 41 years old, having a gross annual income of P74,940.

ANSWER:

The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity^.In this case, Liberty presented a certification from Tanod Publishing which showed that Melendres was a photo correspondent for Tanod Newspaper and that "his monthly salary ranges from P1,780 to P3,570 on per story basis^.Liberty presented another certification from Tanod Publishing which showed that Melendres received the total amount of P24,990 representing payment of honoraria and transportation allowance from 1 January to 31 July 2006. The Court notes that the defense did not object when the prosecution presented these documents before the trial court. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. It was also established that at the time of his death, Melendres was 41 years old.

Thus, Melendres’ net earning capacity can be derived from two sources: (1) his monthly salary and (2) his honorarium and transportation allowance.

Loss of earning capacity is computed as follows:

Net Earning
Capacity = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income – Living Expenses

= [2/3 (80 – age at death)] x GAI – [50% of GAI]

= [2/3 (80 – 41)] x P74,940¹⁷ – P37,470

= [2/3 (39)] x P37,470

= 26 x P37,470

Net Earning
Capacity = P974,220