corre's cases

ISAIAS F. FABRIGAS AND MARCELINA R. FABRIGAS

VS. SAN FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, INC.

G.R. No. 152346, November 25, 2005

 FACTS:

Spouses Fabrigas(petitioner) and respondent San francisco Del Monte, Inc.(Del Monte) entered into an agreement, denominated as Contract to Sell No. 2482-V, whereby the latter agreed to sell to Spouses Fabrigas a parcel of residential land. The said lot was worth P109,200.00 and it was registered in the name of respondent Del Monte. The agreement stipulated that Spouses Fabrigas shall pay P30,000.00 as downpayment and the balance within ten years in monthly successive installments of P1,285.69. After paying P30,000.00, Spouses Fabrigas took possession of the property but failed to make any installment payments on the balance of the purchase price. Despite the demand letter made by Del Monte and the grace period given still the said Spouses did not comply with their obligations.

On January 21, 1985, petitioner Marcelina and Del Monte entered into another agreement denominated as Contract to Sell No. 2941-V, covering the same property but under restructed terms of payment. Under the second contract, the parties agreed on a new purchase price of P131,642.58, the amount of P26,328.52 as downpayment and the balance to be paid in monthly installments of P2,984.60 each. After the said deal, the petitioner made some delinquent installments paying less than the stated amount, to which Del Monte made a demand letter to the petitioners. And this time they ordered the cancellation of the Contract to Sell No. 2941-V

 ISSUE:

 Whether or not the Contract to Sell No. 2941-V was valid.

 HELD:

The Court quotes with approval the following factual observations of the trial court, which cannot be disturbed in this case, to wit: The Court notes that defendant, Marcelina Fabrigas, although she had to sign contract No. 2491-V, to avoid forfeiture of her downpayment, and her other monthly amortizations, was entirely free to refuse to accept the new contract. There was no clear case of intimidation or threat on the part of plaintiff in offering the new contract to her. At most, since she was of sufficient intelligence to discern the agreement she is entering into, her signing of Contract No. 2491-V is taken to be valid and binding. The fact that she has paid monthly amortizations subsequent to the execution of Contract to Sell No. 2491-V, is an indication that she had recognized the validity of such contract. . . .

In sum, Contract to Sell No. 2491-V is valid and binding. There is nothing to prevent respondent Del Monte from enforcing its contractual stipulations and pursuing the proper court action to hold petitioners liable for their breach thereof.

MYRNA RAMOS VS. SUSANA S. SARAO AND JONAS RAMOSG.R. NO. 149756, February 11, 2005

FACTS:

On February 21, 1991, Spouses Jonas Ramos and Myrna Ramos executed a contract over their conjugal house and lot in favor of Susana S. Sarao for and in consideration of P1,310,430. Entitled “DEED OF SALE UNDER PACTO DE RETRO,” the contract, inter alia, granted the Ramos spouses the option to repurchase the property within six months from February 21, 1991, for P1,310,430 plus an interest of 4.5 percent a month. It was further agreed that should the spouses fail to pay the monthly interest or to exercise the right to repurchase within the stipulated period, the conveyance would be deemed an absolute sale.On July 30, 1991, Myrna Ramos tendered to Sarao the amount of P1,633,034.20 in the form of two manager’s checks, which the latter refused to accept for being allegedly insufficient.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro was, and is in reality and under the law an equitable mortgage.

HELD: The pivotal issue in the instant case is whether the parties intended the contract to be a bona fide pacto de retro sale or an equitable mortgage. In a pacto de retro, ownership of the property sold is immediately transferred to the vendee a retro, subject only to the repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. The vendor a retro’s failure to exercise the right of repurchase within the agreed time vests upon the vendee a retro, by operation of law, absolute title to the property. Such title is not impaired even if the vendee a retro fails to consolidate title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, an equitable mortgage is a contract that --although lacking the formality, the form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute -- nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to burden a piece or pieces of real property as security for a debt. The essential requisites of such a contract are as follows: (1) the parties enter into what appears to be a contract of sale, but (2) their intention is to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. The nonpayment of the debt when due gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the loan obligation. There is no single conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. However, the law enumerates several instances that show when a contract is presumed to be an equitable mortgage, as follows:

Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

RIZALINO, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, JOSEFINA, ROLANDO AND FERNANDO, ERNESTO, LEONORA, BIBIANO, JR., LIBRADO AND ENRIQUETA, ALL SURNAMED OESMER VS. PARAISO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

[ G.R. NO. 157493, February 05, 2007 ]

FACTS:

Petitioners (Rizalino, Ernesto, Leonora, Bibiano, Jr., Librado, and Enriquita, all surnamed Oesmer, together with Adolfo Oesmer and Jesus Oesmer, are brothers and sisters, and the co-owners of undivided shares of two parcel of land. Respondent Paraiso Development Corporation bought from petitioners their respective share of the lot except the Adolfo and Jesus share. After the said meeting, a Contract to Sell was created between the parties, on which the petitioners affirming their signatures in the said contract.

Then the petitioner’s withdrew from the said contract and ask for the rescission to which they allege that they never sign the contract, the agent has no authority from the petitioners, that said petitioner was illiterate to sign the contract, etc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a perfected contract between petitioners and respondents.

HELD:

It is well-settled that contracts are perfected by mere consent, upon the acceptance by the offeree of the offer made by the offeror. From that moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. To produce a contract, the acceptance must not qualify the terms of the offer. However, the acceptance may be express or implied. For a contract to arise, the acceptance must be made known to the offeror. Accordingly, the acceptance can be withdrawn or revoked before it is made known to the offeror. In the case at bar, the Contract to Sell was perfected when the petitioners consented to the sale to the respondent of their shares in the subject parcels of land by affixing their signatures on the said contract. Such signatures show their acceptance of what has been stipulated in the Contract to Sell and such acceptance was made known to respondent corporation when the duplicate copy of the Contract to Sell was returned to the latter bearing petitioners' signatures.

CARLOS B. DE GUZMAN  VS. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC.

G.R. NO. 141480, November 29, 2006

FACTS:

On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab motor vehicle, 1996 model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment of P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an implied warranty.

 FACTS:

Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner's complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within six months from the delivery of the thing sold.^[7] Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his cause of action had become time-barred.

Petitioner contends that the subject motor vehicle comes within the context of Republic Act No. 7394. Thus, petitioner relies on Article 68 (f) (2) in relation to Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394. Article 4 (q) of the said law defines "consumer products and services" as goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 state: Art. 67. Applicable Law on Warranties. — The provisions of the Civil Code on conditions and warranties shall govern all contracts of sale with conditions and warranties. Art. 68. Additional Provisions on Warranties. — In addition to the Civil Code provisions on sale with warranties, the following provisions shall govern the sale of consumer products with warranty:e) Duration of warranty. The seller and the consumer may stipulate the period within which the express warranty shall be enforceable. If the implied warranty on merchantability accompanies an express warranty, both will be of equal duration.Any other implied warranty shall endure not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one (1) year following the sale of new consumer products. f) Breach of warranties.

NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC AND MIGUEL OLIVAN

G.R. No. 125835, July 30, 1998

FACTS:

Natalie Carpena Opulencia(petitioner) executed a contract to sell in favor of the respondents namely Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven a lot. Said respondents had already paid petitioner a downpayment worth P300,000.00. And said respondents brought an action for specific perfrormance to the petitioner. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Contract to Sell executed by the petitioner and private respondents without the requisite probate court approval is valid.

FACTS:

Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. Under the old Civil Code “Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that ‘the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted.’ And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs ‘becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided.’ xxx And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community.

Hence, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.”