G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
Herman D. Coloma for petitioner.
Glicerio S. Ferrer for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Sought to be reversed in this petition is the
Decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals' First Division, setting
aside the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos
Norte, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby set aside and another
rendered in its stead whereby defendant is hereby sentenced to pay
plaintiffs actual damages of P30,229.45; compensatory damages of
P50,000.00; exemplary damages of P10,000.00; attorney's fees of
P3,000.00; plus the costs of suit in both instances. (p. 27 Rollo)
Basically,
this case involves a clash of evidence whereby both patties strive for
the recognition of their respective versions of the scenario from which
the disputed claims originate. The respondent Court of Appeals (CA)
summarized the evidence of the parties as follows:
From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that in the evening of June
28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code
name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy
rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on
June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters
were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called
Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes,
on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards
the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner
and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have
been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was
followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also
owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at
the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda
walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the
deceased, Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the
water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from
doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in
the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the
house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at
four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was
grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes
at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his
mother-in law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife
Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City
Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant
Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current.
Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater
was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that
the electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his
boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body was recovered about
two meters from an electric post.
In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful
date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the
National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed
certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such
abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and
6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the
way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were
hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO
lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on
Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As he turned right at the intersection
of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long
strung across the street "and the other end was seeming to play with the
current of the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding the Office
of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned
to the NPC Compound.
At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the
compound again on another inspection trip. Having learned of the death
of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner
of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been
taken. Using the resuscitator which was a standard equipment in his jeep
and employing the skill he acquired from an in service training on
resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His efforts proved
futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the
deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to the INELCO
Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them about the grounded
lines of the INELCO In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third
inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. The dangling
wire he saw on Guerrero early in the morning of June 29, 1967 was no
longer there.
Many people came to the house at the corner of
Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar after learning that the deceased had been
electrocuted. Among the sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal
Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of the
relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body at about 8:00
A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance,
cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the
doctor found an "electrically charged wound" (Exh. C-1: p. 101, TSN,
Nov. 28, 1972) or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on
the left hand was a burned wound. (Exh. C-2, pp. 102-103, Ibid.)
The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of'
death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution" (Exh. I; p. 103, Ibid.).
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the
testimonies of its officers and employees, namely, Conrado Asis,
electric engineer; Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero,
lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO Through the
testimonies of these witnesses, defendant sought to prove that on and
even before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in
the whole franchise area, including Area No. 9 which covered the
residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero Street, did not suffer
from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. The
service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had
been newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a public service
operator and in line with its business of supplying electric current to
the public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid
injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities
such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had 12 linesmen
charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas
respectively assigned to them.
Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon
struck the province of Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting to streets
of Laoag City under water, only a few known places in Laoag were
reported to have suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the
southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which was washed away and where
the INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the eastern part near the
residence of the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in the far north near the
defendant's power plant at the corner of Segundo and Castro Streets,
Laoag City and at the far northwest side, near the premises of the
Ilocos Norte National High School. Fabico Abijero, testified that in the
early morning before 6 o'clock on June 29, 1967 he passed by the
intersection of Rizal and Guerrero Streets to switch off the street
lights in Area No. 9. He did not see any cut or broken wires in or near
the vicinity. What he saw were many people fishing out the body of
Isabel Lao Juan.
A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was
presented by the defense to show that the deceased could not have died
of electrocution Substantially, the testimony of the doctor is as
follows: Without an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not
even a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real cause of death.
Cyanosis could not have been found in the body of the deceased three
hours after her death, because cyanosis which means lack of oxygen
circulating in the blood and rendering the color of the skin purplish,
appears only in a live person. The presence of the elongated burn in the
left palm of the deceased (Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is not sufficient to
establish her death by electrocution; since burns caused by electricity
are more or less round in shape and with points of entry and exit. Had
the deceased held the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her
palm would have been bigger and the injury more massive. (CA Decision,
pp. 18-21, Rollo)
An
action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted
by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In
its Answer (Vide, Record on Appeal, p. 55, Rollo), petitioner advanced
the theory, as a special defense, that the deceased could have died
simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence
attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it
was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge,
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from
the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus,
charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.
Petitioner then conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent
must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when
she tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29, 1967. After
due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and dismissed
the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and
attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which issued
the controverted decision.
In this petition for review the petitioner assigns the following errors committed by the respondent CA:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
and error in considering the purely hearsay alleged declarations of
Ernesto de la Cruz as part of the res gestae.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion and error in holding that the strong typhoon
"Gening" which struck Laoag City and Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967 and
the flood and deluge it brought in its wake were not fortuitous events
and did not exonerate petitioner-company from liability for the death of
Isabel Lao Juan.
3. The respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion and erred in not applying the legal principle of
"assumption of risk" in the present case to bar private respondents from
collecting damages from petitioner company.
4. That the respondent Court of Appeals gravely
erred and abused its discretion in completely reversing the findings of
fact of the trial court.
5. The findings of fact of the respondent Court of Appeals are reversible under the recognized exceptions.
6. The trial court did not err in awarding moral
damages and attorney's fees to defendant corporation, now petitioner
company.
7. Assuming arguendo that petitioner company
may be held liable from the death of the late Isabel Lao Juan, the
damages granted by respondent Court of Appeals are improper and
exhorbitant. (Petitioners Memorandum, p. 133, Rollo)
Basically,
three main issues are apparent: (1) whether or not the deceased died of
electrocution; (2) whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the
deceased's death; and (3) whether or not the respondent CA's
substitution of the trial court's factual findings for its own was
proper.
In considering the first issue, it is Our view that
the same be resolved in the affirmative. By a preponderance of evidence,
private respondents were able to show that the deceased died of
electrocution, a conclusion which can be primarily derived from the
photographed burnt wounds (Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2") on the left palm
of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the
deceased had clutched a live wire of the petitioner. This was
corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually
examined the body of the deceased a few hours after the death and
described the said burnt wounds as a "first degree burn" (p. 144, TSN,
December 11, 1972) and that they were "electrically charged" (p. 102,
TSN, November 28, 1972). Furthermore, witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo
and Aida Bulong added that after the deceased screamed "Ay" and sank
into the water, they tried to render some help but were overcome with
fear by the sight of an electric wire dangling from an electric post,
moving in the water in a snake-like fashion (supra). The
foregoing therefore justifies the respondent CA in concluding that
"(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them
can lead to no other conclusion than that they were "burns," and there
was nothing else in the street where the victim was wading thru which
could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of defendant company"
(CA Decision, p. 22, Rollo).
But in order to escape liability, petitioner ventures
into the theory that the deceased was electrocuted, if such was really
the case when she tried to open her steel gate, which was electrically
charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install to serve as a
burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to said burglar
alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not backed up with
evidence. As required by the Rules, "each party must prove his own
affirmative allegations." (Rule 131, Sec. 1). Nevertheless, the CA
significantly noted that "during the trial, this theory was abandoned"
by the petitioner (CA Decision, p. 23, Rollo).
Furthermore the CA properly applied the principle of res gestae. The CA said:
Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller, and Aida Bulong, a salesgirl,
were with the deceased during that fateful morning of June 29, 1967.
This Court has not been offered any sufficient reason to discredit the
testimonies of these two young ladies. They were one in the affirmation
that the deceased, while wading in the waist-deep flood on Guerrero
Street five or six meters ahead of them, suddenly screamed "Ay" and
quickly sank into the water. When they approached the deceased to help,
they were stopped by the sight of an electric wire dangling from a post
and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz also
tried to approach the deceased, but he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.
These bits of evidence carry much weight. For the subject of the
testimonies was a startling occurrence, and the declarations may be
considered part of the res gestae. (CA Decision, p. 21, Rollo)
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; (3) that the statements made
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances (People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151; People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA
959). We do not find any abuse of discretion on the CA' part in view of
the satisfaction of said requisites in the case at bar.
The statements made relative to the startling
occurrence are admitted in evidence precisely as an exception to the
hearsay rule on the grounds of trustworthiness and necessity.
"Trustworthiness" because the statements are made instinctively (Wesley
vs. State, 53 Ala. 182), and "necessity" because such natural and
spontaneous utterances are more convincing than the testimony of the
same person on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31). Therefore, the
fact that the declarant, Ernesto de la Cruz, was not presented to
testify does not make the testimony of Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida
Bulong hearsay since the said declaration is part of the res gestae. Similarly, We considered part of the res gestae
a conversation between two accused immediately after commission of the
crime as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs. Reyes, 82 Phil.
563).
While it may be true that, as petitioner argues (vide
petitioner's Memorandum, p. 135, Rollo), Ernesto de la Cruz was not an
actual witness to the instant when the deceased sank into the waist-deep
water, he acted upon the call of help of Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo
Estavillo with the knowledge of, and immediately after, the sinking of
the deceased. In fact the startling event had not yet ceased when
Ernesto de la Cruz entered the scene considering that the victim
remained submerged. Under such a circumstance, it is undeniable that a
state of mind characterized by nervous excitement had been triggered in
Ernesto de la Cruz's being as anybody under the same contingency could
have experienced. As such, We cannot honestly exclude his shouts that
the water was grounded from the res gestae just because he did not actually see the sinking of the deceased nor hear her scream "Ay."
Neither can We dismiss the said declaration as a mere
opinion of Ernesto de la Cruz. While We concede to the submission that
the statement must be one of facts rather than opinion, We cannot agree
to the proposition that the one made by him was a mere opinion. On the
contrary, his shout was a translation of an actuality as perceived by
him through his sense of touch.
Finally, We do not agree that the taking of Ernesto
de la Cruz' testimony was suppressed by the private respondents, thus,
is presumed to be adverse to them pursuant to Section 5(e), Rule 131.
For the application of said Rule as against a party to a case, it is
necessary that the evidence alleged to be suppressed is available only
to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18 May 1955, 97 Phil. 953).
The presumption does not operate if the evidence in question is equally
available to both parties (StaplesHowe Printing Co. vs. Bldg. and Loan
Assn., 36 Phil. 421). It is clear from the records that petitioner could
have called Ernesto de la Cruz to the witness stand. This, precisely,
was Linda Alonzo Estavillo's suggestion to petitioner's counsel when she
testified on cross examination:
Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how far did he reach from the gate of the house?
A. Well, you can ask that matter from him sir because he is here. (TSN, p. 30, 26 Sept. 1972)
The
foregoing shows that petitioner had the opportunity to verify the
declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz which, if truly adverse to private
respondent, would have helped its case. However, due to reasons known
only to petitioner, the opportunity was not taken.
Coming now to the second issue, We tip the scales in
the private respondents' favor. The respondent CA acted correctly in
disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability
since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that
typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may
be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused
the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's
negligence that death took place. We subscribe to the conclusions of the
respondent CA when it found:
On the issue whether or not the defendant incurred liability for the
electrocution and consequent death of the late Isabel Lao Juan,
defendant called to the witness-stand its electrical engineer, chief
lineman, and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence and to
negate the charge of negligence. The witnesses testified in a general
way about their duties and the measures which defendant usually
adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. From these testimonies, the
lower court found "that the electric lines and other equipment of
defendant corporation were properly maintained by a well-trained team of
lineman, technicians and engineers working around the clock to insure
that these equipments were in excellent condition at all times." (P. 40,
Record on Appeal) The finding of the lower court, however, was based on
what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what they
actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon.
The lower court made a mistake in assuming that
defendant's employees worked around the clock during the occurrence of
the typhoon on the night of June 28 and until the early morning of June
29, 1967, Engr. Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation affirmed
that when he first set out on an inspection trip between 6:00 and 6:30
A.M. on June 29, 1967, he saw grounded and disconnected electric lines
of the defendant but he saw no INELCO lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on Rizal Street was still closed.
(pp. 63-64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Even the witnesses of defendant
contradict the finding of the lower court. Conrado Asis, defendant's
electrical engineer, testified that he conducted a general inspection of
the franchise area of the INELCO only on June 30, 1967, the day
following the typhoon. The reason he gave for the delay was that all
their vehicles were submerged. (p. 337, TSN, July 20, 1973) According to
Asis, he arrived at his office at 8:00 A.M. on June 30 and after briefing his men on what to do they started out. (p. 338, lbid)
One or two days after the typhoon, the INELCO people heard "rumors that
someone was electrocuted" so he sent one of his men to the place but
his man reported back that there was no damaged wire. (p. 385, Id.)
Loreto Abijero, chief lineman of defendant, corroborated Engr. Juan. He
testified that at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 Engr. Juan came to
the INELCO plant and asked the INELCO people to inspect their lines. He
went with Engr. Juan and their inspection lasted from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
noon. (pp. 460, 465, TSN, Jan. 28, 1975) Fabico Abijero lineman of
defendant, testified that at about 6:00 on June 29, 1967 the typhoon
ceased. At that time, he was at the main building of the Divine Word
College of Laoag where he had taken his family for refuge. (pp. 510-511,
Ibid.)
In times of calamities such as the one which
occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of
June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to
prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb.
The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary,
evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise)
policing the area, nor even manning its office. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25,
Rollo)
Indeed,
under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing
to it that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care
required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of
diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to
be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of
petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from
liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a
fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is
liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied
upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the
deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding
typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept.
1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept. 1972), the deceased,
accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery
store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We
punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the
floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed
the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a
person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in
peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue
his endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little,
Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand
as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with
an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without
regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred
from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's
negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166).
But petitioner assails the CA for having abused its
discretion in completely reversing the trial court's findings of fact,
pointing to the testimonies of three of its employees its electrical
engineer, collector-inspector, lineman, and president-manager to the
effect that it had exercised the degree of diligence required of it in
keeping its electric lines free from defects that may imperil life and
limb. Likewise, the said employees of petitioner categorically disowned
the fatal wires as they appear in two photographs taken on the afternoon
of June 29, 1967 (Exhs. "D" and "E"), suggesting that said wires were
just hooked to the electric post (petitioner's Memorandum, p. 170,
Rollo). However, as the CA properly held, "(t)he finding of the lower
court ... was based on what the defendant's employees were supposed to
do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the occasion of the emergency situation
brought about by the typhoon" (CA Decision, p. 25, Rollo). And as found
by the CA, which We have already reiterated above, petitioner was in
fact negligent. In a like manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of
the several wires cannot stand the logical conclusion reached by the CA
when it held that "(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the
witnesses who saw them can lead to no other conclusion than that they
were 'burns', and there was nothing else in the street where the victim
was wading thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire
of defendant company" (supra).
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the
wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken
lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that when
Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the
early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded
and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see
any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office (vide,
CA Decision, supra). The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty
to exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not
observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner. To aggravate matters,
the CA found:
. . .even before June
28 the people in Laoag were already alerted about the impending
typhoon, through radio announcements. Even the fire department of the
city announced the coming of the big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN, March 13,
1975) At the INELCO irregularities in the flow of electric current were
noted because "amperes of the switch volts were moving". And yet,
despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to
request that defendant's switch be cut off but the harm was done. Asked
why the delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he "was not the machine
tender of the electric plant to switch off the current." (pp. 467-468, Ibid.) How very characteristic of gross inefficiency! (CA Decision, p. 26, Rollo)
From
the preceding, We find that the CA did not abuse its discretion in
reversing the trial court's findings but tediously considered the
factual circumstances at hand pursuant to its power to review questions
of fact raised from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, formerly
the Court of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129).
In considering the liability of petitioner, the
respondent CA awarded the following in private respondent's favor:
P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and
P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages,
computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit
case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of
the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and
costs of suit. Except for the award of P12,000 as compensation for the
victim's death, We affirm the respondent CA's award for damages and
attorney's fees. Pusuant to recent jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil,
132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), We increase the said
award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total actual damages
to P48,229.45.
The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's fees
awarded by the lower court was properly made by the respondent CA, the
charge of malice and bad faith on the part of respondents in instituting
his case being a mere product of wishful thinking and speculation.
Award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was
filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the right to
litigate (Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage results from a
person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110).
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent,
except for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to
P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
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