tolentino's case digest

BENJAMIN DY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO MANALO AND PARAMOUNT DEVELOPMENT BANK, RESPONDENTS. 

Facts:

Bienvenido Manalo purchased Lot 2 and Lot 3 from Paramount Development Bank, the herein other respondent. The Deed of Absolute Sale ^]was duly registered and TCT No. 61529 in the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City was issued in the name of Manalo.

When he went to occupy the said lots pursuant to the above-mentioned contracts, he found that they had been fenced by Benjamin Dy, who claimed to be the owner of the properties.  Manalo then demanded from Paramount that it eject Dy pursuant to its express warranty under the Deed of Absolute Sale. The bank having failed to comply with Manalo's demand, the latter filed a complaint against it in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City.  Manalo demanded that the defendant make good its warranty under the Deed of Absolute Sale. The trial court held that Paramount  was bound to place Manalo in peaceful possession of Lot 2. In regard to Lot 3, Manalo has the right to suspend the nalance because Paramount violated Article 1461 of the Civil Code. As for Dy, the trial court said that his evidence of ownership was insufficient, consisting as it did only of the two receipts and the deed of sale from his father.  No deed of sale from the Doña Agripina Subdivision was submitted. The intervenor then filed this petition for review with this Court.

Issues:

Whether or not Manalo was in bad faith when he purchased the lots from the Bank because he knew that petitioner had already purchased the lots from the subdivision?

Ruling:

The doctrine that knowledge of the unregistered sale is equivalent to registration is not present here.

The Court has carefully reviewed the transcript of stenographic notes and has found nothing to substantiate the petitioner's gratuitous conclusions.  On the contrary, Manalo testified that he was not aware that there were occupants of the lots when he entered into the contracts with Planters, and that it was only when he went to clear the properties that he came to know of Dy's adverse claim. The trial court believed him, and so do we, relying on its factual finding.  We agree that as Manalo came to know about the petitioner's possession and claim of ownership over the two lots only after he had already bought the land, he cannot be considered a purchaser in bad faith.

It is clear to the Court that the challenged decision is not flawed by reversible error but, on the contrary, conforms to the evidence of record and the applicable law and jurisprudence.

Petition Denied.

JERRY T. MOLES, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND MARIANO M. DIOLOSA, RESPONDENTS. 

Facts:

Petitioner bought from the private respondent a linotype printing machine for his printing business, the LM Press at Bacolod City. Private respondent informed that the machine was a secondhand but it is functional. On November 29, 1977, petitioner wrote private respondent that the machine was not functioning properly as it needed a new distributor bar. Petitioner filed a suit for rescission of contract against the private respondent. The CA reversed the decision in the trial court, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an implied warranties on secondhand items?

Ruling:

We find merit in petitioner's cause.

Now, when an article is sold as a secondhand item, a question arises as to whether there is an implied warranty of its quality or fitness.  It is generally held that in the sale of a designated and specific article sold as secondhand, there is no implied warranty as to its quality or fitness for the purpose intended, at least where it is subject to inspection at the time of the sale.  On the other hand, there is also authority to the effect that in a sale of secondhand articles there may be, under some circumstances, an implied warranty of fitness for the ordinary purpose of the article sold or for the particular purpose of the buyer.

There is no implied warranty in the sale of secondhand articles.

Said general rule, however, is not without exceptions.  Article 1562 of our Civil Code, which was taken from the Uniform Sales Act, provides:

"Art. 1562.  In a sale of goods, there is an implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness of the goods, as follows:

(1)     Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are acquired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose;"

WHEREFORE, the judgment of dismissal of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the court a quo is hereby REINSTATED.