Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
DREAMWORK G.R. No. 184861
CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR.,
NACHURA,
and
PERALTA,
JJ.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and Promulgated:
HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI,
Respondents. June 30, 2009
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D E C I
S I O N
VELASCO,
JR., J.:
The
Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction,
Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision[1] in
SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas
City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007[2]
and March 12, 2008[3] in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),
Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner,
through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance
and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5,
2004[4]
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33.
Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22
against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private
respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against
petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006[5] for
the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as
well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas
City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of
the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private
respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007[6] in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved
facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of
the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil
case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to
Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question[7] on
the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the
rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent
violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that
one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in this
case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated
October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned
that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission
of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without
consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22
must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused
did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for
suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution
rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).[8]
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,[9]
the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the
RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed
decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the
requirement of a “previously” filed civil case is intended merely to obviate
delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear
evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal
proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was
instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal
action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less
prejudicial in character.[10]
Hence, we have this petition under
Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT,
WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE
BASIS OF “PREJUDICIAL QUESTION” IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.[11]
The Court’s Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing
of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question
to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July
7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec.
5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question.
— The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous
cases[12]
that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted
provision and in Beltran v. People,[13] are:
The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was amended
by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner
interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be
established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the
criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the
situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related
to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On
the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be
decided before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which
the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the
provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the
phrase “before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed” must
be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action
is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the
pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an
apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in
that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question
even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory
construction that a “change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law
indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that
it originally had.”[14]
In the instant case, the phrase, “previously instituted,” was inserted to
qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in
relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by
the insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term criminal action. There
is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena[15]
that:
Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural
lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did
not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying
their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final
judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend
shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. -
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under
the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is
closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in
Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in
statutory construction that “a statute should be construed not only to be
consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same
subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.”[16]
This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes
as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[17]
In other words, every effort must be
made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is
impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the
Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase
“previously instituted civil action” in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded
and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause “before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed” in Art. 36 of the Civil
Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the
criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the
court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize
Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but
also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the
situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the
preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend
shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests.
Thus, under the principles of
statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code
that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of
law.
It bears pointing out that the
circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil
action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of
the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted
to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,[18] we
found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as
the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore,
the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the
civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner
filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges
against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to
delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.[19]
Here,
the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal
complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was
instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that private respondent
allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason.
More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction
agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from
the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently,
as in Sabandal, the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil
action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed
for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec.
7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent’s
positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal
Action
In any event, even if the civil case
here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial
question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a
prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second
element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present
controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand,
claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null
and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such
contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a
criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the
elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1)
the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
(2)
the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there
are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[20]
Undeniably, the fact that there
exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or
that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the
elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases[21]
that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant
to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,[22] we
ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of
the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the
check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued,
or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith
the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear
intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals[23] is even more poignant. In that case,
we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of
checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to
the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was
issued on account or for value.
Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have
held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable
consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given,
suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to
do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified
that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange
for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said
account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That
there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the
part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private
complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with
Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier
discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his
relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At
any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is
to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.[24] (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in
the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void
for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent
in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed
issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is
this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the
second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution
of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action
may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC,
Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March
12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61
with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 88-90. Penned by Judge Salvador V. Timbang.
[2] Id. at 65-67.
[3] Id. at 75-76.
[4] Id. at 23-27.
[5] Id. at 28-41.
[6] Id. at 42-45.
[7] Id. at 46-48.
[9] Id. at 75-76.
[10] Id. at 90.
[11] Id. at 11.
[12] Carlos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
109887, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 25, 33; Tuanda
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 17, 1995, 249 SCRA 342, 351; Apa v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 112381, March
30, 1995, 242 SCRA 509, 512; Yap v. Paras,
G.R. No.101236, January 30, 1994, 205 SCRA 625, 629; Umali v. IAC, G.R. No. 63198, June 21, 1990, 186 SCRA 680, 685.
[13] G.R.
No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.
[14] R.E.
Agpalo, Statutory Construction 97
(4th ed., 1998).
[15] G.R.
No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509.
[16] R.E.
Agpalo, supra note 14, at 269-270.
[17] Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the
City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 81, 98; Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666, 680-81; Bañares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA 36,
49; Cabada v. Alunan III, G.R. No.
119645, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 838, 848; Republic
v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 211; Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
97356, September 30, 1992, 214 SCRA 378, 392.
[18]
G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001, 366 SCRA 567.
[19] Id. at 572.
[20] Mejia v. People, G.R. No. 149937, June
21, 2007, 525 SCRA 209, 213-214.
[21] Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887,
November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 451, 461; Narte
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 336, 341; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
105461, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 723, 726-727, citing People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79,
84-85 and Que v. People, Nos. L-75217-18,
September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 161, 165.
[22] Supra
note 20, at 214-215.
[23] G.R.
No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455.
[24] Id. at 474-475.
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