1) Mr. X is an owner of a land fronting the Sulu Sea. By the action of the waves of the sea, sand and silt were deposited, increasing his land area to about 2,000 square meters. Mr. X then planted coconut trees on said land, and applied for registration of said land before the DENR. Questions: (1) What law shall govern this accretion caused by the action of the sea? (2) Per jurisprudence, what kind of “owner” is Mr. X with respect to the alluvial deposit? (3) Shall you consider X as the owner ipso facto of the accretion? (4) In essence, who owns the accretion? (5) Is there a possibility for X to own the accretion? Explain.
Answer:Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
2) Mr. Y owns a land bounded by Laguna de Bay. By the gradual action of the waves, his land area increased to three hectares. He planted some fruit trees therein, and built a house for his son. His occupation or possession has already lasted for more than thirty years.
Questions: (1) Is Y considered the owner of the accretion? (2) What law shall govern regarding this matter? (3) Can he own the land by prescription? (4) If Y’s registered land was bounded by the Manila Bay, will your answer be the same? Explain.
ANSWER: “unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority." Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard servicesX X X. Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.
3. (a) Is accretion a mode of acquiring property? (b) What are the requisites of accretion? (c) Distinguish accretion from alluvium (d) Can an alluvium be automatically registered in the name of the riparian owner?
Answer: .Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997]
4.Mr. B owns a property adjacent to the river. He is engaged in the sawmill business. He dumped some of his unused wood and saw dust in the river. Gradually, the area of his land increased. To further improve the land, he planted bakawan trees, for which after 10 years, the accretion increased to six hectares.
Questions: (1) Who owns the accretion of six hectares? (2) Can this accretion be registered in his own name considering that he is a riparian owner? Explain.
Answer: In Republic vs. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco vs. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. X X X The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. . Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private capacities, respondents. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 98045. June 26, 1996]
5. What is foreshore land? Is it capable of private ownership or registration?
"Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the 'highest ordinary depth' of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
‘. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides’
'The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.'
"As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains ‘falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources.’ Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to 'flux and reflux of tides' it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title" (at pp. 538-539).
8. By reason of the typhoon which caused the overflowing of the Cagayan River, a portion of the land of Jose Santos was separated from his estate. The river changed course and divided his land into two parts. The other part seemingly formed part of the estate of Mrs. Luisa Cruz, at the other side of the bank.
Question: Who owns the other half of the land which was created by the current of the river? Explain.
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.
"Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years."
"Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be “separated from the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river. EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, respondents. FIRST DIVISION[G.R. Nos. 66075-76. July 5, 1990]
9. It is a legal principle that accretions belong to the riparian owners upon whose land the alluvial deposits were made. What is the reason for this principle?
Answer: These accretions belong to the riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).[U1]
10. Mr. X is an agent of Real Estate Development Corporation. Jose Tayag bought Lot 9 with an area of 800 sq.m.. He was accompanied by Mr. X who, with his engineer, pointed to Mr. X, the location of Lot 9. Mr. X then built his house (worth 800t) on said lot. He resided on said lot for more than 10 years already.
Mr. D also bought Lot 10 which has an area of 600 sq. m.
When another relocation survey was made, it turned out that Lot 10 is actually the lot occupied by Mr. X.
Mr. D now demands, upon discovery of the error, that Mr. X should vacate and remove his house thereon.
Questions: (a) Is Mr. X a builder in good faith? (b) If you were the judge, how would you settle the rights of the parties?
Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously delivered by the owner’s agent, a builder in good faith? Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee’s good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO, respondents. THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 79688. February 1, 1996]
11. A, B and C are co-owners of a lot which has an area of 6,000 square meters. A used to work in America and comes back to his hometown to build a house on a lot co-owned with B and C. They executed a Deed of Partition giving each an equal share of 2,000 square meters. A and B became adjacent owners. After the survey, it was found out that the kitchen of B encroached upon the share of A, to an extent of 65 square meters.
A wants B to remove the encroaching kitchen as it will destroy the view of his new house.
Questions: (1) Is B considered a builder in good faith? (2) Before partition what law shall be applied? (3) After partition, what law shall be applied in that particular situation? (4) State the rights of A and B.
Answer: The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established.
Applying the afore-said provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiffs upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide. SPOUSES CONCEPCION FERNANDEZ DEL CAMPO and ESTANISLAO DEL CAMPO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. BERNARDA FERNANDEZ ABESIA, defendant-appellant. FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. L-49219. April 15, 1988]
"Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. [U2] The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."[U3]
12. . Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located at 27 Kamias Road, Quezon City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470. In its Decision, dated February 8, 1989, the RTC upheld the spouses’ title but declared that the four-door two-storey apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court, in its Decision dated May 25, 1993, in G.R. No. 105360 entitled Pecson v. Court of Appeals.On June 23, 1993, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment of the aforesaid decision in G.R. No. 105360, the Nuguids became the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter commercial lot.
As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building.
Questions: (1) Do the Nuguid spouses have such right? (2) Can the Nuguid spouses demand that the rentals of the apartment be now given to them? Explain.
ANSWER: Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.[U4]
While the law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership of the land and the improvements thereon in view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, it guards against unjust enrichment insofar as the good-faith builder’s improvements are concerned. The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate. In addition, as in this case, the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the builder-possessor in good faith. Otherwise, the security provided by law would be impaired. This is so because the right to the expenses and the right to the fruits both pertain to the possessor, making compensation juridically impossible; and one cannot be used to reduce the other.
As we earlier held, since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the apartment building, they could not benefit from the lot’s improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full, based on the current market value of the property. SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID AND ERLINDA T. NUGUID, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEDRO P. PECSON, respondents. FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 151815. February 23, 2005]
14. Depra and Dumlao are neighbors. Dumlao who has lots of money after winning the Lotto, built big mansion worth 20 million complete with a swimming pool and a garage. Depra also won the lotto and would like to build his 30 million mansion. He caused a relocation survey of his land. It was discovered that the garage of Dumlao encroached upon Depra’s property to an extent of 100 sq.m.Written demands were made for Dumlao to remove his garage, yet Dumlao did not take heed. Hence, a case for unlawful detainer was filed, inter alia praying that Dumlao should remove his encroachment.
Question: If you were the judge handling the case, what shall you determine to fully adjudicate the rights of the parties?
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property. After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on November 2, 1972, his mother, Beatriz Derla, after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6, 1973 against DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of Dumangas, docketed as Civil Case No. I. Said complaint was later amended to include DEPRA as a party plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment on September 29, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs, as lessors, and the defendants as lessees, over the disputed portion with an area of thirty four (34) square meters, the rent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month, payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first five (5) days of the month the rent is due; and the lease shall commence on the day that this decision shall have become final."
ANSWER: 1. The trial Court shall determine -
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter-area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the kitchen built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to appropriate the kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen, or the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of said area. The amounts to be respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice to the other party and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it;
b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is considerably more than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice of such rejection to DEPRA and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of DEPRA's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease, provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less than Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month, payable within the first five (5) days of each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since 1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced lease. DUMLAO shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the two-year period or upon default by DUMLAO in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive months, DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease[U5] , to recover his land, and to have the kitchen removed by DUMLAO or at the latter's expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to the Court for payment to DEPRA, and such tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the Court;
c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of DEPRA's land for the period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied the subject area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Decision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee. FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant. FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 57348. May 16, 1985]
15. What is a “forced lease”? Of what relevance is this under Art. 448 of the civil code? How is the fairness of Art. 448 explained by Manresa?
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:
"Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. [U6] (3 Manresa 213; Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050)."
16. Teofilo C. Villarico, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City, Metro Manila with an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds, same city.
His lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the government. As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo, had a building constructed on a portion of said government land. In November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by Andok’s Litson Corporation and Marites’ Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents. Eventually, the Sarmiento’s have caused the registration of said land in their names.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.
Because of the buildings constructed thereon, Teofilo’s right of way was blocked. It his only access toward the Highway. He now demands that the right of way be maintained.
Question: (1) Is Teofilo correct on this matter? (2) On the part of the Sarmiento’s will you consider them as owners of the land by reason of their registration titles? (3) Granting that the Sarmiento’s had already resided on said land for 40 years, can they be considered as owners thereto? Explain.
ANSWER: It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioner’s alleged “right of way” exists belongs to the state or property of public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:
“ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.”
Public use is “use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.”[6] Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.[7]
17. Public use is “use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.”[6] Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.[7]
18. Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public dominion, it can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he can not claim any right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:
“ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession.” TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner, vs. VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH DEL MUNDO, ANDOK’S LITSON CORPORATION and MARITES’ CARINDERIA, respondents. THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 136438. November 11, 2004
19. Morandarte filed an application for free patent, dated December 5, 1972, before the Bureau of Lands, Dipolog City District Land Office (BOL for brevity), covering a parcel of land located at Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City with an area of 4.5499 hectares and described as a portion of Lot 1038 of Dipolog Cadastre No. 85.[3]
On July 27, 1976, the District Land Officer of the BOL approved the free patent application of Morandarte and directed the issuance of a free patent in his favor.[4] Accordingly, Free Patent No. (IX-8) 785 for Lot No. 7, Csd-09-05-00078-D was issued in the name of Morandarte. On September 20, 1976, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte issued the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. (P-21972) 5954.[5]
Subsequently, Morandarte caused a subdivision survey of the lot, dividing the same into Lot No. 6781-A, with an area of 13,939 square meters, and Lot No. 6781-B, with an area of 32,819 square meters. As a result of the subdivision survey, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-1835 and T-1836 covering Lots 6781-A and 6781-B, respectively, were issued in favor of Morandarte on May 12, 1980 by the Registry of Deeds of Dipolog City.[6]
On May 22, 1981, Morandarte and his wife, Marina Febrera, executed a real estate mortgage over Lot 6781-B, subject of TCT No. 1836, in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Dipolog City branch (DBP for brevity), in consideration of a loan in the amount of P52,160.00.[7]
More than ten years after the issuance of the OCT in Morandarte’s name, or on March 19, 1987, respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic for brevity), represented by the Director of Lands, filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Reversion against the Morandarte spouses, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, the Register of Deeds of Dipolog City, and DBP, docketed as Civil Case No. 3890.[8]
The Republic alleged that the BOL found that the subject land includes a portion of the Miputak River which cannot be validly awarded as it is outside the commerce of man and beyond the authority of the BOL to dispose of. It claimed that the Morandarte spouses deliberately and intentionally concealed such fact in the application to ensure approval thereof. Considering that the Morandarte spouses are guilty of fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement of their title, the Republic stressed that their title is void.[9]
Questions: (1) Is Morandarte here guilty of fraud? (2) If he is guilty of fraud, does the State have the right to have the whole lot reverted to the State? (3) Can Morandarte say that his title cannot be anymore cancelled it being that after ten years the same has become indefeasible? Explain.
ANSWER: It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land or property illegally included.[48] Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.[49]
The present controversy involves a portion of the public domain that was merely erroneously included in the free patent. A different rule would apply where fraud is convincingly shown. The absence of clear evidence of fraud will not invalidate the entire title of the Morandarte spouses.
Accordingly, the 12,162-square meter portion traversed by the Miputak River and the 13,339-square meter portion covered by the fishpond lease agreement of the Lacaya spouses which were erroneously included in Free Patent No. (IX-8) 785 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-21972 should be reconveyed back to the State.
The Morandarte spouses cannot seek refuge in their claim that Antonio A. Morandarte, their predecessor-in-interest, was already the owner of that portion of Lot 1038 when the fishpond application of Aguido S. Realiza was approved in 1948 because Lot 1038 was still part of the public domain then. It was only in 1972, through Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1257, which was approved August 14, 1972, when Lot 1038 was declared alienable or disposable property of the State.[50]
It is a settled rule that unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence, Antonio A. Morandarte’s occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.[51]
The Morandarte spouses also unsuccessfully harp on the inapplicability of Article 462 of the Civil Code by claiming that the change of course of the Miputak River was due to a man-made cause and not by natural means. They offered no iota of evidence to substantiate this claim, other than the bare testimony of Beder Morandarte. Neither is there proof that the movement of the river was caused by accident or calamity, such as a typhoon, and not by the natural movements thereof. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs, are unavailing and cannot suffice. SPOUSES BEDER MORANDARTE and MARINA FEBRERA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and SPOUSES VIRGINIO B. LACAYA and NENITA LACAYA, respondents. SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 123586. August 12, 2004]
20. Miss Y worked in the U.S. for 20 years. She is very generous to her relatives in Davao City. She bought a city property worth 5 million with an area of 6,000 sq. m., and accommodated her cousin Mr. X to build his house thereon.
Mr. X built a house worth 300t. Before the house was built, Miss Y, had them agree in writing that any relative can use the land for free, build whatever structure they can afford and that they must maintain a good relationship, otherwise, they shall all be evicted from the land.
When Miss Y retired, she returned to the Philippines and lived in the house of Mr. X. Soon, disagreements arose, to an extent that their relationship turned sour and irreconciliable.
Miss Y then demanded that Mr. X vacate her land. Mr. X refused and will vacate only if he is reimbursed the present market value of his house which had already been assessed at 500t.
Questions: (1) In essence, what law governs their relationship? (2) Will you consider Mr. X as a builder in good faith? (3) Is Miss Y correct in evicting Mr. X from her land? (4) Is Mr. X correct in demanding that he will not vacate unless he is reimbursed the value of his house? Explain.
By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any damage to the same.
21. ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)
22. Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. Moralidad v. Pernes, GR 152809, 2ND DIVISION, Aug. 3, 2006
23. 1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they like;
2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another;
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof;
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own;
24. ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof. (Emphasis added)
The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a natural person, a corporation or association’s lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would then be perpetual. This is especially invidious in cases where the usufruct given to a corporation or association covers public land. Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977, or 28 years ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years left.
25. : A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner’s interests
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person, of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had been caused through his own fault.
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.[22] ]
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION and MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, INC., respondents. FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 148830. April 13, 2005]
26. The Court highlights that the options under Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the owner of the subject property. There is no basis for Tuatis’ demand that, since the value of the building she constructed is considerably higher than the subject property, she may choose between buying the subject property from Visminda and selling the building to Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is for Visminda, not Tuatis, to make. And, depending on Visminda’s choice, Tuatis’ rights as a builder under Article 448 are limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the building and subject property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the second option, a right not to be obliged to pay for the price of the subject property, if it is considerably higher than the value of the building, in which case, she can only be obliged to pay reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
27. Under the first option, Visminda may appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary and useful expenses the latter incurred for said building, as provided in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
It is worthy to mention that in Pecson v. Court of Appeals, the Court pronounced that the amount to be refunded to the builder under Article 546 of the Civil Code should be the current market value of the improvement, thus:
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717 (1920)] that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner. (Emphasis ours.)
Until Visminda appropriately indemnifies Tuatis for the building constructed by the latter, Tuatis may retain possession of the building and the subject property.
Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair value of the land. The P10,000.00 price of the subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment executed in November 1989, shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will then be statutory, and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject property herein, turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms. Tuatis v. Escol, G.R. 175399, 3rd Division, Oct. 27, 2009
27. Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986, petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners.
Questions: (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent valid?
Answer: Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, we held that without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent…
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera’s instance, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo the property is still conjugal, the transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the lot. Petitioners’ stance lacks merit. In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., a case involving the annulment of sale executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the same. Thus:
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall “prejudice” the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated, “[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430,” in which cases annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the wife… .
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. Article 1398 of the Civil Code provides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each other the things which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into.
Villanueva v. Chiong G.R. No. 159889, June 5, 2008
28. What are the effects of legal separation?
Answer: Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 176;
ANGELICA LEDESMA, petitioner, vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF CIPRIANO PEDROSA represented by Nelson Jimena, Honorable Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon in her capacity as Presiding Judge-Designate, Branch 51, RTC, Bacolod City, respondents. G.R. No. 102126 March 12, 1993
29. In their Complaint, [respondents] claim that they are the owners of the various parcels of real property that form part of Lot No. 666, (plan II-5121 Amd.2) situated in Mandaue City, Cebu, which lot allegedly belonged originally to Claudio Ermac. Upon the latter’s death, the said Lot No. 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children, namely, Esteban, Pedro and Balbina. Siblings Pedro and Balbina requested their brother Esteban to have their title over the property registered. Esteban, however, was unable to do so, and the task of registration fell to his son, Clemente. Clemente applied for registration of the title, but did so in his own name, and did not include his father’s brother and sister, nor his cousins. Despite having registered the lot in his name, Clemente did not disturb or claim ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle, aunt and cousins even up to the time of his death.
Questions: (1) Is the registration of the lot in Clemente’s name make him the sole owner of the property? (2) Clemente posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), the certificate of title issued in his favor, became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its issuance, hence, it can no longer be challenged.Is he correct? (3) He further asserts that the ownership claimed by his cousins is barred by prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. Is he correct ?
ANSWER: Indefeasibility and Incontrovertibility of Title
Petitioners posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), the certificate of title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Clemente Ermac, became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its issuance. Hence, it can no longer be challenged.
We clarify. While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.
Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
Ownership of the Disputed Lot
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.
We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court’s findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.
Prescription and Laches
Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. We disagree.
When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.
Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC, namely: IRENEA E. SENO, LIBRADA E. MALINAO, INES E. MIÑOZA, SOLEDAD E. CENIZA, RODULFO ERMAC and AMELITA E. BASUBAS, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC, namely: BENJAMIN, VIRGINIA, PRECIOSA, DANILO, as HEIRS OF URBANO ADOLFO; BERNARDINO, CLIMACO, CESAR, ELSA, FLORAME and FE, all surnamed ERMAC, as HEIRS OF CLIMACO ERMAC, ESTELITA ERMAC, ESTANESLAO DIONSON, VICENTE DIONSON, EUFEMIA LIGARAY, EMIGDIO BUSTILLO and LIZA PARAJELE, LUISA DEL CASTILLO,* respondents. THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 149679. May 30, 2003]
[U1]REASON FOR ACCRETION
[U2]Exception: the builder is not obliged to buy the land if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the structure.
[U3]Rights of the owner of the land as against the builder in good faith: (1) to appropriate as his own the work, after payment of indemnity (2) OR to oblige the builder to pay the price of his land.
[U4]OPTIONS OF THE LANDOWNER WHO IS A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH
[U5]WHAT IS A FORCED LEASE?
[U6]PRINCIPLE BEHIND ARTICLE 448
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