solivio v. ca (1990) reserva troncal

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990 ]

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: 

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant: 
"a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the ‘Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;’ 
"b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff; 
"c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs." 
"SO ORDERED. " (pp. 42-43, Rollo)

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated: 

"4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other." (p. 234, Record; italics supplied.)

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17, 1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto. Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues: 

1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court; 
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud; 
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and 
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de  Javellana Foundation," and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.

I. The question of jurisdiction —
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratrix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted below: 

"2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of this proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977. 
"During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime. 

"xxx xxx xxx 

"2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City. 
"The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated." (pp. 14-16, Record)

In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Caledonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court, We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. 

"The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled. x x x The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. x x x To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical." (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388) 
"A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action." (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364) 
“A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper." (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)

In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother: 

"The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilla, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of." (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines,  L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil, 455, 460-461; italics supplied)

In Litam, et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs?appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition." (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters lie within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud —
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time. 

"Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud ‘which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of.’ (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971)," (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Vilanueva, et al., 95 Phil. 248) 
"A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant ‘outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. x x x The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.’" (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)

The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged: 

"6. x x x for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff." [although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh. 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978: 

"x x x. The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. x x x. 
"Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law, despite which the present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right." (p. 22, Record)

The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows: 

"Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in rem, no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack." (Bedwell v. Dean, 132 So. 20)

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co­heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud. 

"Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment." (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149).

It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal —
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows: 

"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."

The persons involved in reserva troncal are: 

"1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) — the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants. 
"2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios) — relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came. 
"3. The propositus — the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law." (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide: 

"ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. 
"ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. 
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that: 

"Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate ‘without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,’ and is entitled to one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate." (p. 57, Rollo)

IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share —
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540: 

"4. That x x x prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for [sic] each other." (p. 234, Record; italics supplied)

she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug, 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R. 70091, Dec, 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not, even testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation” was established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes: 

"1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the University of the Philippines in the Visayas, both located in Iloilo City. 
“2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorists Community for a deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a priest. 
“3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions. 
"4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs. 
"5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this Foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be offered every February and October and Requiem masses every February 25th and October 11th, their death anniversaries, as part of this provision. 
"6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation. 
“7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and description or any interest herein. 
"8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular." (pp. 9-10, Rollo)

As alleged without contradiction in the petition for review: 

"The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding student teacher. 
"The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI. 
"The Foundation has a Special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award. 
"Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multipurpose Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious, civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst others." (p. 10, Rollo)

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administrstrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

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chua v. de la torre (1977) reserva troncal

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. L-29901, August 31, 1977 ]

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA AND REMEDIOS CHUA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V AND SUSANA DE LA TORRE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CONSO­LACION DE LA TORRE, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

MARTIN, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre."

It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio, he sired three children, namely:  Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua.  When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanito Frias Chua.  Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue.  Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage.  In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931^[1] adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua' s widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo Frias Chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias Chua, his sons of the first marriage.  By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483)^[2] dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue.  After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indiviso share of Lot No. 399.  In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name.  Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo^[3] (subsequently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (½) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias Chua but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserva troncal pursuant to Article 891 of the New Civil Code.  Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of Consolacion de la Torre and the heirs of the latter traversed individually the complaint of petitioners.^[4]

On July 29, 1968, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioners.  Hence this instant petition.

The pertinent provision on reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:

"ART. 891.  The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came."

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit:  (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.^[5] In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present.  Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre by operation of law.  When Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree.  These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisite of reserva troncal - whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father, Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not.  In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:

"It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and costs and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court.  As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail."

We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code.  It is.  As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator,^[6] "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.  It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which states in express terms:

"2. - Se adjudicada por el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hijo, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residentes de San Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F., como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:

14483

La parcela de terreno conocida por Lote No. 399 del Catastro de la Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la obligacion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3,971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300 de este Jusgado."

But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No. 4816 dated January 15, 1931.  As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous.  It does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20.  This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him.  As far as the deceased Jose Frais Chua is concerned the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous.  This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code.

It is contended that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua.  But petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated.  The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer.^[7] There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No.  4816 nor in the private respondents' brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated.  With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves.  The very will itself could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a son of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.

According to the records, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue.  After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399.  This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came.  These relatives are the petitioners herein.

It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966.  We do not believe so.  It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees of the property in question and their cause of action as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolation de la Torre, died in March 1966.  When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside.  The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Exh. D, pp. 8-14, Folder of Exhibits.

^[2] Exh. C, p. 6, Ibid.

^[3] pp. 3-7, Record on Appeal.

^[4] p. 8-16, Record on Appeal.

^[5] Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. III, p. 300 (1973).

^[6] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 294, citing 6 Manresa 399.

^[7] p. 15, R.A.

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tioco v. tongko (1986) reserva troncal

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986 ]

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO AND JANUARIO PAPA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO AND GODOFREDO CAMACHO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, J.:

This case which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":

"1.  They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisca Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.

2.  They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.  The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this stipulation.

3.  They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-1', and 'B-2'.

4.  They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.

5.  They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon.  In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-1', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.

6.  They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-1'.

7.  They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land above-mentioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8.  They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9.  The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (½) of all the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10.  Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11.  The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

12.  In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' share in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties."^[1]

On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:

"x x x.  Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action.  Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their claims against each other for damages including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila.  The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in question.

SO ORDERED."^[2]

Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:

"Art. 891.  The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.  (811)",

or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.

That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino^[3], where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares.  This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code.  Said the Court:

"The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows:  In a case of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among then equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

"xxx                      xxx                      xxx.
                             The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject.  After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct.  The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).

"xxx                      xxx                      xxx.
                             The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin.  But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application.  In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession.  In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus) excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905).  And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).

"Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote.  The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came.  Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

"In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came.  x x x." (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) (See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood.  If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.  This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.  As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):

"x x x creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesion, en aquellos extremos no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se crea."

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980)."

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter.  To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris^[4] where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:

"Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.  This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:

"Art. 1001.  Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."

"Art. 1004.  Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares."

"Art. 1005.  Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes."

"Art. 1009.  Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate."

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.  This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386).  Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:

"Art. 952.  In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased."

"Art. 954.  Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among than by reason of the whole blood."

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow.  The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals."

"xxx                      xxx                      xxx.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. x x x"

This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:

"x x x.  It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237).  The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.  (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) x x x."

To the same effect is Cano vs. Director of Lands^[5], where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal identifies the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:

"The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista.  This is not true.  The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime.  The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.  As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter.  x x x."

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession.  There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva"^[6]; i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant -- thereby giving rise to the reservation -- before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., (Chairman), no part.

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^[1] Record on Appeal, pp. 66-71.

^[2] Id., pp. 74-75.

^[3] G.R. No. L-11960, Dec. 27, 1958 (unreported); see 104 Phil. 1065.

^[4] 122 Phil. 319, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.

^[5] 105 Phil. 1, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.

^[6] Padura v. Baldovino, G.R. No. L-11960, Dec. 27, 1958, supra; footnote 3.

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gonzales v. legarda (1981) reserva troncal

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981 ]

BEATRIZ L. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VAL­DES, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LE­GARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALE­JANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBRE­GAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBRE­GAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGAR­DA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, AND THE ESTATE OF DOÑA FILOMENA ROCES DE LE­GARDA, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO, J.:

Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserva troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Roces inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335).  The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933.  He was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children:  four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were repre­sented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943.  Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. De Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda.  The said properties consist of the following:

(a)   Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.

(b)   1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.

(c)   1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael described in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);

1/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero);

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of the registry of deeds of Tayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case.  As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces suc­ceeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two hand­written identical documents wherein she disposed of the pro­perties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all).  The document reads:

"A mis hijos:

"Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos, hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria 'La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Valdes Legarda.

"De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un lote de terreno que yo he donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit.

"La casa No. 181 San Rafael, la cedo a mi hijo Mandu, solo la casa; porque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Roces.

"(Sgd.) Filomena Roces Legarda

"6 Marzo 1953"

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967.  Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.  The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzalez, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30, 1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the pro­perties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda.  That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez.  In this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena Legarda in exchange for her con­jugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzalez waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzalez' petition for review is a closed matter.  This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts.  Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal, that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be re­solved in this appeal.  As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression.  It was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480.  Before discussing the applica­bility to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief dis­course on the nature of reserva troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserva troncal, which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in owner­ship caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest.  More­over, the reservas, insofar as they penalize legitimate rela­tionship, is considered unjust and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserva troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobeñas, has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads:

"ART. 811.  El ascendiente que heredare de su descen­diente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrativo de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a re­servar los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que esten dentro del tercer grado y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden."

"ART. 891.  The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."

In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said pro­perty came.

So, three transmissions are involved:  (1) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmission of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascen­dant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobeñas, Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva.  Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins.  The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista), the other ascen­dant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412).  Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras", or "impedir que, por un azar de la vida, personas extrañas a una familia puedan ad­quirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella" (6 Castan Tobeñas, Derecho Civil, Part 1, 6th Ed., 1960, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295.  In that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victoriano.  Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue.  His mother, Marcelina Edroso, in­herited from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina.  The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus.  Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906.  Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac.  When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children.  It was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and maternal aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac, 114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gu­tierrez vs. Balcita, 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Ber­nardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.  He is called the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villa­nueva, 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo.  When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo.  In his hands, the property was reservable property.  Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees.  They cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation.  But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship.  Illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmis­sion wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as dona­tion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the re­servable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the re­servee.  The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property.  He may alienate it subject to the reservation.  The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor.  The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the re­servor but become indefeasible when the reservees prede­cease the reservor.  (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacto de retro sale or to a fideicomiso condicional.

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the trans­feree of the property should deliver it to the reservees.  If there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute.  (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono vs. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right.  His expectant right would dis­appear if he predeceased the reservor.  It would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reservee.

The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally.  The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the re­servor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).

"The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and acciden­tally strayed during the reservista's lifetime.  The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property." (J. J.B.L. Reyes in Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)

"Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reserva­tarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

"This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista.  It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).

"The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista." (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.  Undoubtedly, she was a reservor.  The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or rela­tives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons.

As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191).  The reservor can­not make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda.  She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamen­tary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891.  That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled:

"Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legi­time, for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of a reservatario" (reservee).

In the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Floren­tino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III.  These two inherited properties from their father.  Upon Apolonio III’s death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908.  In her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the de­ceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III, which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only.  That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was en­titled, as a reservee, to one-seventh of the properties.  The other six-sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Floren­tino case.  That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor' s lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus, regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its reservable character.  The property should go to the nearest reservees.  The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reservee to whom the reserv­able property should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied:  "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reservee it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the re­servable property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in ques­tion even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda.  The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the re­servees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Roces lines.

That holding is erroneous.  The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death.  Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character.  The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will.  The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate (Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside.  It is hereby adjudged that the properties inheri­ted by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees.  The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs.  Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Guerrero*, Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

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* Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.

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Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: January 14, 2010
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