NOTES ON THE HOMESTEAD LAW

SEC. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before patent is issued the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with his homestead, through no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then the applicant, with the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a homestead, and immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead application to the land so acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader in his rights and obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said application of the purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may not agan apply for a new homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent. (C. A. 141).

SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patentor homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crop on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (Id.).

The legislative policy or intent is to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired under the Public Land Law, as above stated, for him and his heirs. The legislative policy is so strong and consistent that the original period of five years from the issuance of the patent, within which period conveyance or sale thereof by the homesteader or his heirs was prohibited (section 116 of Act No. 2874) is now extended to 25 years if no approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is secured. (Sec. 118, par. 2, C. a. No. 141, as amended by C. A. No. 456.) Provision has also been inserted authorizing the repurchase of the homestead when properly sold by the homesteader within five years from the date of the sale. (Sec. 119, C. A. No. 141.) This legislative intent and policy is also sought to be carried out in Section 20, as may be seen from the fact that transfer of homestead rights from a homesteader can only be justified upon proof satisfactory to the Director of Lands that the homesteader cannot continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. This is not the only requirement; a previous permission of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce should first be obtained, as it is also expressly provided that any transfer made without such previous approval is null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent." (C. A. 141). As the conveyances now in question are claimed to have been and were evidently made under the provisions of section 20 of the Public Land Act, the important question to be determined is whether said conveyances satisfy requirements of said section 20 of the Act.

The stipulation of facts on this point is as follows:

That the heirs of Sergio Nicolas executed in or about 1947 a transfer of homestead rights over the land in question in favor of the defendants, which transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948; that with the approval of said transger of homestead rights, the defendants caused the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor, the title being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 of the land records of Nueva Ecija.

The above stipulation does not state expressly that the Director of Lands had, after investigation, been satisfied that the applicant or homesteader "has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with the homestead through no fault of his own." Furthermore, according to the stipulation, the transfer was made in 1947 and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1948 so that the conveyances were not made without the  previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. So neither of the requirements of section 20 has been complied with.

But it is suggested that in accordance with the presumption of regularity of official acts the Director of Lands must have recommended the approval of the transfer. Admitting arguendo that such is the case, the conveyances still suffer from at least one fatal defect in that it does not appear that they had to be made because the homesteader could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. We may not and cannot indulge in presumptions on this necessary requirements, because the order for the issuance of the patent states just the opposite. The order for the issuance of the patent states expressly that the homesteader had already complied with all the requirements of the law with respect to cultivation, possession and otherwise, thus:

(5) That an investigation for the purpose of verifying the statements contained in the final proof papers was conducted by a representative of the Bureau of Lands, who found that the applicant has fully complied with the residence and cultivation requirements of the law; and

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. . ., the undersigned is of the opinion that the applicant has complied with the requirements of law preliminary to the issuance of patent to the land applied for and already surveyed." (Exhibit A.).

The order for the issuance of a patent as well as the statements of fact therein contained, as above-quoted, conclusively disprove the existence of the requirement that the homesteader could not continue with the homestead through no fault of his own.

In a legal sense, furthermore, when the Director of Lands issues the order for the issuance of a patent, after the approval of the final proof, the right of the homesteader to the patent becomes absolute and then it becomes the ministerial duty of the corresponding officials of the Government to issue said patent. To all intents and purposes the order for the issuance of a patent is the same in effect as the issuance of a patent itself (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 499). And if the law (section 118, C. A. No. 114) prohibits the sale or conveyance of a homestead after the issuance of a patent, the prohibition should be extended, in view of the apparent policy of the law, to the date on which the order for the issuance of the patent is issued, which in this case is June 13, 1943.

Resuming what we have stated above, we find that the conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the defendants heren in the year 1947 do not comply with the first requirements of section 20 of the Public Land Act that the Director of Lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he (homesteader) could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and with the second that a conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; that from the date of an order for the issuance of a patent for a homestead the homesteader to all intents and purposes is considered as having the patent actually issued to himself, in so far as the prohibition contained in section 118 of the Public Land Act, otherwise the intent and policy of the law may be avoided by the homesteader by postponing the getting of his patent.

In accordance herewith the conveyances executed by the plaintiffs to the defendants are hereby declared null and void, the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the defendants (P-558 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija) ordered cancelled, and the possession of the land returned to the plaintiffs upon return to the defendants of the amounts received as price for the sale. No damages or costs. So ordered.

NIEVES TINIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.GREGORIO FRANCES, ET AL., defendants and appellees. EN BANC G.R. No. L-7747 ,November 29, 1955

 


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Question:

1. What is the effect of a homestead patent sold within the five year prohibitory period?

It appears that the patent covering the tract of land which includes the portion now disputed in this appeal was issued to the late Julio Sarabillo on December 9, 1938, and the sale of the portion of two hectares to the Roman Catholic Church took place on December 31, 1940. This shows that the sale was made before the expiration of the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent and as such is null and void it being in contravention of section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The fact that it was expressly stipulated in the deed of sale that it was subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the approval was sought and obtained on March 26, 1949, or more than ten years after the date of the issuance of the patent, or the fact that the deed of sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds only on March 29, 1950, and was annotated on the back of the title on that date, cannot have the effect of validating the sale for the reason that the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources does not have any valid curative effect. That approval is merely a formality which the law requires if the sale is effected after the term of five years but before the expiration of a period of 25 years for the purpose of testing the validity of the sale on constitutional grounds. But, as was ruled by this Court, the absence of such formality will not render the transaction null and void (Evangelista vs. Montaño,¹ G.R. No. L-5567).

 What is important is the period within which the sale is executed. The provision of the law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant of the patent is mandatory. This cannot be obviated even if official approval is granted beyond the expiration of that period, because the purpose of the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to him." [Pascua vs. Talens,² 45 Off. Gaz., No. 9, (Supplement) 413.]

CATALINA DE LOS SANTOS, in her capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decased Julio Sarabillo, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MIDSAYAP, Most Rev. LUIS DEL ROSARIO and Rev. GERARD MONGEAU, defendants-appellants.EN BANC G.R. No. L-6088   February 25, 1954

The claim that the sale can be validated because it was made with the avowed aim that the property would be dedicated solely to educational and charitable purposes is likewise unmeritorious even considering the law invoked by counsel for appellants in favor of its validity. It is true that under section 121, Commonwealth Act No. 141, a corporation, association, or partnership may acquire any land granted as homestead if the sale is done with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and is solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious, or charitable purposes, or for a right of way, and apparently there is no limitation therein as to the time within which such acquisition may be made. But this provision should be interpreted as a mere authority granted to a corporation, association or partnership to acquire a portion of the public land and not as an unbridled license to acquire without restriction for such would be giving an advantage to an entity over an individual which finds no legal justification. It is our opinion that the authority granted by section 121 should be interpreted as subject to the condition prescribed in section 118, namely, that the acquisition should be after the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent.

But appellants now contend that even if it be declared that the sale made to them by the homesteader is null and void yet its immediate effect would be not the return of the land to appellee but rather its reversion to the State wherein the Government is the interested party. (Section 124 of the Public Land Act). Appellants further claim that the present action cannot be maintained by the appellee under the principle of pari delicto.

The principles thus invoked by appellants are correct and cannot be disputed. They are recognized not only be our law but by our jurisprudence. Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any acquisition, conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of its provisions shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the reversion of the property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has been applied by this Court in a number of cases wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to be guilty of having effected the transaction with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. (Bough & Bough vs. Cantiveros & Hanopol, 40 Phil., 210, 216; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun,³ G.R. No. L-1411; Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan vs. Uy Hoo, et al.,⁴ G.R. No. L-2207; Caoile vs. Yu Chiao Peng,⁵ G.R. No. L-4068; Talento, et al. vs. Makiki, et al.,⁶ G.R. No. L-3529.) But we doubt if these principles can now be invoked considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as known here and in the United States is not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application runs counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa case, "This doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction." (Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hu, supra.)

The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality (8 Manresa 4th ed., pp. 717-718), but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated (Pascua vs. Talens, supra). This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve" (Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Pantaleon de las Ama, et al., 74 Phil., 3). We are, therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law.

As regards the contention that because the immediate effect of the nullification of the sale is the reversion of the property to the State appellee is not the proper party to institute it but the State itself, that is a point which we do not have, and do not propose, to decide. That is a matter between the State and the Grantee of the homestead, or his heirs. What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants. Their right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee during and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the State. (See Castro vs. Orpiano, G.R. No. L-4094, November 29, 1951.)

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 It is important to keep in mind in this connection that the warrant of approval of the sales by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources did not, in our opinion, invalidate the sales. Upon the facts upon the instant case, the required approval may be regarded as directory. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act. No. 141, as amended, specifically enjoins that the approval by the Department Secretary "shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds." There being no allegation that there were constitutional or legal impediments to the sales, and no pretense that if the sales had been submitted to the Secretary concerned they would have been disapproved, approval was a ministerial duty, to be had as a matter of course and demandable if refused. For this reason, and if necessary, approval may not be applied for and its effect will be to ratify and adopt the transaction as if they had been previously authorized. 

JUAN EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs.GUILLERMO MONTAÑO, FLORENCIO TAYTAY, and TITO PAZ, respondenTEN BANC G.R. No. L-5567             May 29, 1953

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  In several cases¹ the doctrine has been set that the requirement for the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources prescribed in Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Lands law) is merely directory and its absence does not invalidate any alienation, transfer or conveyance of the of the homestead after 5 years and before 25 years from the issuance of the title. Upon the other hand, we find no provision of law, and none has been cited, which prohibits the encumbrance of the homestead by the purchaser thereof during the statutory period of 5 years within which the vendor-homesteader may repurchase the same as provided in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141. The prohibition against such encumbrance or alienation, as prescribed in Section 118 of the same law, refers to those constituted by the homesteader himself within the term of 5 years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant. In the present case, the Original Certificate of Title obtained by Rosillosa as homesteader was issued in 1933 long before he sold the land in 1944 and the encumbrance thereof by the purchaser Abel in 1947. It must be observed, of course, that such encumbrance or alienation, is subject to the right of the homesteader to repurchase the land within 5 years from the date of conveyance. 


MERCEDES RAFFIÑAN, petitioner-appellee, vs.FELIPE L. ABEL, defendant, and FORTUNATO ROSILLOSA, defendant-appellant.EN BANC,G.R. No. L-17082 ,April 30, 1962

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