Liyao vs Liyao GR No 138961 Mar 7 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the late
William Liyao against herein respondents, the legitimate wife and
children of the deceased.
Corazon
is legally married but living separately from her husband allegedly for
more than ten years at the time of the institution of this civil case.
She cohabited with the late William until his death. Petitioner alleged
that he “was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the
child of said William Liyao,” having been “recognized and acknowledged
as such child by the decedent during his lifetime and presented
witnesses and evidence to prove his allegations. On the other hand,
respondents painted a different picture of the story.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner.
CA
reversed the ruling of RTC, favoured the presumption of legitimacy of
the child and gave weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the
respondents that Corazon and her husband were seen together during the
period she cohabited with the deceased.
ISSUE: WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel recognition by respondents can prosper.
WON petitioner’s action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.
RULING: No.
It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.(Art 167,FC)
No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only
the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn
the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child,
then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to
be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the
presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the
paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. (Art
170-171, FC)
Malilin vs Castillo GR No 136803 Jun 16 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent, both legally married and with children but
separated from their respective spouses, cohabited in 1979 while their
respective marriages still subsisted. During their union,
they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with
petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and
respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and
petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which
were registered solely in respondent’s name. In 1992, due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded
from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent
refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her
name.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties
registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have
subsisting relationship when they started living together.
HELD:
The
Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated
to marry each other and were living together could not have owned
properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or
industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other.
Furthermore,
when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of
due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed
properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since
both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for
partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and
Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.
The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
Eceta vs Eceta GR No 157307 May 20 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner and his husband acquired several properties, among which is
the disputed property. They begot a son who sired an illegitimate
daughter, herein respondent. Upon his death, petitioner and respondent
are his compulsory heirs. Respondent filed a case before RTC for
Partition and Accounting with Damages against petitioner alleging that
by virtue of his father’s death she became petitioner’s co-heir and and
co-owner of the disputed property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that
the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her
exclusively.
RTC rendered judgement in favour of respondent and declared ¼ undivided share as her rightful share.
CA affirmed with modification, reducing respondent’s share to 1/8.
ISSUE:
WON the admission made by petitioner that the respondent is her
granddaughter is enough to prove her filiation with the only son of the
petitioner.
RULING: The
filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and
no further court action is required.In fact, any authentic writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed in toto.
Docena vs Lapesura GR No 140153 Mar 28 2001
FACTS:
On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint
for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial.
RTC
rendered judgement in favour of petitioners. CA reversed the decision
and ordering petitioners to vacate the land they have leased excluding
the portions reclaimed by petitioners and which form part of the
seashore. Pursuant to the Resolution, the public respondent sheriff
issued an alias Writ of Demolition. The petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside or Defer the Implementation of Writ of Demolition. Motion
denied. A Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent
judge. Petition for Ceriorari and Prohibition before the CA was also
denied for reasons, among others, that the certification of non-forum
shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON the signing of one of the spouses in a certificate of non-forum
shopping is sufficient compliance with the requirements for Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.
RULING:
Yes. It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum
shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a
case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. In
the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone should
be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However,
unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require
that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of
the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family
Code.
Petition granted. CA resolution set aside. Case remanded to CA.
Erlinda Agapay vs Carlina Palang, Herminia Palang Delacruz
FACTS:
Petitioner and Miguel Palang contracted a bigamous marriage when
Petitioner was still 19 y/old and Miguel 63 y/old. 2 months before their
cohabitation, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land. A
house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by petitioner as the sole
vendee. A son was produced during their cohabitation. Both
were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Prior to the
case, Miguel and Carlina executed a compromise agreement to donate their
conjugal property to their only child, Herminia, also a respondent. 2
yrs later, Miguel died. Respondents instituted an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of property with damages against petitioner.
RTC dismissed the complaint, confirmed ownership of petitioner over the disputed properties and adjudicated ½ of agricultural land to the son as his inheritance to his deceased father.
CA reversed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES: 1. WON petitioner has a valid claim of ownership of said properties.
2.
WON a compromise agreement in effect partakes the nature of judicial
confirmation of the separation of property between the spouses and the
termination of their conjugal property, as adopted by the RTC.
3. WON the son’s claim of status as an illegitimate son and heir can be adjudicated in the case at bar.
RULING: SC affirmed CA’s decision and found RTC gravely erred in all its decisions.
Under
Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required
by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts
in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Petitioner failed to prove her contributions.
The
transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover,
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
Furthermore,
it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate
their conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975.
Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when
there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The
judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not
specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be
so inferred.
Questions
as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter
and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or
in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be
adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery
of ownership and possession.
Petition denied.
Manalo vs CA GR No 129242 16 January 2001
FACTS: Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children who are all of legal age. At
the time of his death he left several real properties located in Manila
and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and
style Manalo’s Machine Shop in Manila and QC. Eight (8) of his children
filed a petition with respondent RTC for the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of
their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. RTC set the
hearing. Herein petitioners, the mother and three other children,
opposed the petition, contending that such petition is actually an
ordinary civil action involving members of the same family and that
there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of
the same family.
Motion denied by RTC. Petition for certiorari denied by CA. Motion for reconsideration likewise dismissed.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned
orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the
outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate
despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest
efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have
been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have
failed.
RULING:
NO. It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are
not being sued for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was
impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein
seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Private
respondents herein merely seek to establish the fact of death of their
father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the
said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.
Art 151 of FC which prohibits suit between members of the family absent a compromise, is not applicable in the case at bar for such is only a special proceeding and not an ordinary civil action.
Petition denied for lack of merit.
Uy vs CA GR No 109557 November 29, 2000
FACTS:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent)
on the one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and
brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein
petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro
Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Respondent
wife filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of his husband
and assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties,
and authorization to sell one piece of real properties.
RTC
granted said petition. Respondent opposed and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration contending that such petition is essentially a petition
for guardianship of the person and properties of Jardeleza Sr and that a
summary proceedings was irregularly applied.
RTC
denied the motion. CA reversed RTC’s decision for lack of due process
on the part of the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show
cause why the petition should not be granted.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their
conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration
of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and
dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos,
with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her
co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight
million pesos.
RULING: NO. “ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
“In
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors..”
Art
124 does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. The situation contemplated
in Art 124 is that one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact
or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained. . Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting
spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case,
the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who
was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell
real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of
judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
Court affirmed in toto CA’s decision.
Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz 130 Phil 324
FACTS:
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City on
February 1, 1938. Six children were born to them. During their coverture
they acquired seven parcels of land which are all registered under
their names. They are also engaged in varied business ventures. The
spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank and the Development
Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained, to secure which they
mortgaged the Philippine Texboard Factory, the Silay hacienda, their
conjugal house, and all their parcels of land located in Bacolod City.
The
plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22, 1958 with
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, alleging in essence
that her husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only
abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership
properties, and praying for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly
support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of
P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.
Defendant
argued that he did not abandon his wife but admitted they live
separately when he transferred his sleeping quarters to his office, his
intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife and
children, but only to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and
extremely jealous of every woman. From
the time he started living separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of
the complaint, the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care
of his laundry, and that he never maintained a mistress. He has also
never failed to give them financial support.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of plaintiff.
ISSUES:
1. Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute
abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal
partnership properties? (2)Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal to
inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an
abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to
warrant a division of the matrimonial assets?
RULING: 1. No. The
fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and
children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal
abode and resume his marital duties and rights.
2.
No. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an
act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he
commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result
of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful
and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the
latter. 7 If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and
nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode,
but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the
same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation,
and religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case
at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation
of property.
Decree on separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside.
BA Finance vs CA GR No. 61464 May 28, 1998
FACTS:
On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from
the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory
note he signed in his own behalf and as representative of the A & L
Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an alleged special power of
attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A &
L Industries and under whose name the said business is registered,
purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure the loan and sign the
promissory note. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto
Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned
their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable,
Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same. By virtue of a trial court order,
petitioner caused the attachment of the properties of A& L
Industries. RTC dismissed the petition. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries could be held liable for the obligations contracted by Augusto Yulo, as administrator of the partnership.
RULING:
No. There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established
during the marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and therefore the same is
presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of
only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. However,
for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by
the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case,
the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the
conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was
undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at
the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family
and had left their conjugal home.
BPI vs Posadas 56 Phil 215
FACTS:
The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in
the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada on January 14, 1913. During the following five years
the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company, and
in 1918 the policy was transferred to the London branch. The record
shows that the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the
plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano on January 16, 1914. Bank
of the Philippine Islands, was appointed administrator of the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order dated March 24,
1928, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. On July 13,
1928, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in
Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival
at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance
policy on the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On
the same date Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to
said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's
estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate,
and then returned the money to said widow. The
present complaint seeks to recover from the defendant Juan Posadas,
Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the amount of P1,209 paid by the
plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of administrator of the estate
of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, as inheritance tax upon the sum of
P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance policy on the deceased's
life, wherein his own estate was named the beneficiary.
ISSUE: WON the proceeds of a life-insurance policy is subject to inheritance tax.
RULING: By
virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the
proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute
community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other
half to the wife, exclusively; (2) that if the premiums were paid partly
with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise
in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)
that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's
estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under
probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to
the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it
is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or
outside.
CA
decision is reversed. Defendant is ordered to return ½ of the tax
collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the
insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after
deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.
Ayala Investments cs CA GR No. 118305 February 12, 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching,
Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on
December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and
severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus,
on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then CFI of Rizal entitled
“Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming
Mills and Alfredo Ching,”
ISSUE: Is
a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer considered ‘for the benefit of the
family’, thus chargeable to the conjugal property?
RULING:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract,
i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for
his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the
term “x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands
to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply
stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B)
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person
or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the
context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract
of surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Petition denied.
Concepcion vs CA GR No 123450 August 3` 2005
FACTS:
Gerardo and Ma Theresa was married, lived with Theresa’s family and
delivered a baby named Jose Gerardo a year later. However, their
relationship turned out to be short-lived. A year after, Gerardo filed a
petition for annulment on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 yrs
before he married Ma Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, whose
marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario is still
alive and residing in the same city.
RTC
declared Ma Theresa and Mario’s marriage still subsisting and Jose
Gerardo an illegitimate child. Gerardo granted visitorial rights. Ma
Theresa moved for the change of her son’s surname to her maiden name and
no visitation rights to the putative father. Motion for Reconsideration
denied.
CA declared Jose Gerardo to be the legitimate child of Mario Gopiao.
ISSUE: WON Jose Gerardo is the illegitimate child of Gerardo.
RULING:
No. First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo
is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with
Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that
her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed
by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid
marriage.
Second,
even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there
was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with
Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All
she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling
is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the
time material to Jose Gerardo’s conception and birth. Far
from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to
each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third,
to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate
unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper
case, his heirs. A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose
Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Finally,
for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say
that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is
illegitimate.
“The
child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.”
Thus,
implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be
deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the
mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In
fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or
illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever
be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the
minor can change his status for the information contained therein are
merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
