Interest may be imposed even in the absence of stipulation in the contract.
We sustain the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that
it is proper to impose interest notwithstanding the absence of
stipulation in the contract. Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that "[i]nterest may, in the discretion of the court, be
allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract." In this case,
there is no question that petitioner is legally obligated to return the P3.5
million because of her failure to fulfill the obligation under the
Conditional Deed of Sale, despite demand. She has in fact admitted that
the conditions were not fulfilled and that she was willing to return the
full amount of P3.5 million but has not actually done so. Petitioner enjoyed the use of the money from the time it was given to her30 until now. Thus, she is already in default of her obligation from the date of demand, i.e., on September 27, 2000.
The interest at the rate of 12% is applicable in the instant case.
Anent the interest rate, the general rule is that the
applicable rate of interest "shall be computed in accordance with the
stipulation of the parties."31
Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate of interest shall be 12%
per annum "when the obligation arises out of a loan or a forbearance of
money, goods or credits. In other cases, it shall be six percent (6%)."32
In this case, the parties did not stipulate as to the applicable rate
of interest. The only question remaining therefore is whether the 6% as
provided under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, or 12% under Central Bank
Circular No. 416, is due.
The contract involved in this case is admittedly not a
loan but a Conditional Deed of Sale. However, the contract provides
that the seller (petitioner) must return the payment made by the buyer
(respondent-spouses) if the conditions are not fulfilled. There is no
question that they have in fact, not been fulfilled as the seller
(petitioner) has admitted this. Notwithstanding demand by the buyer
(respondent-spouses), the seller (petitioner) has failed to return the
money and
should be considered in default from the time that demand was made on September 27, 2000.
Even if the transaction involved a Conditional Deed
of Sale, can the stipulation governing the return of the money be
considered as a forbearance of money which required payment of interest
at the rate of 12%? We believe so.
In Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,33
"forbearance" was defined as a "contractual obligation of lender or
creditor to refrain during a given period of time, from requiring the
borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt then due and payable."
This definition describes a loan where a debtor is given a period
within which to pay a loan or debt. In such case, "forbearance of money,
goods or credits" will have no distinct definition from a loan. We
believe however, that the phrase "forbearance of money, goods or
credits" is meant to have a separate meaning from a loan, otherwise
there would have been no need to add that phrase as a loan is already
sufficiently defined in the Civil Code.34
Forbearance of money, goods or credits should therefore refer to
arrangements other than loan agreements, where a person acquiesces to
the temporary use of his money, goods or credits pending happening of
certain events or fulfillment of certain conditions. In this case, the
respondent-spouses parted with their money even before the conditions
were fulfilled. They have therefore allowed or granted forbearance to
the seller (petitioner) to use their money pending fulfillment of the
conditions. They were deprived of the use of their money for the period
pending fulfillment of the conditions and when those conditions were
breached, they are entitled not only to the return of the principal
amount paid, but also to compensation for the use of their money. And
the compensation for the use of their money, absent any stipulation,
should be the same rate of legal interest applicable to a loan since the
use or deprivation of funds is similar to a loan.
Petitioner’s unwarranted withholding of the money
which rightfully pertains to respondent-spouses amounts to forbearance
of money which can be considered as an involuntary loan. Thus, the
applicable rate of interest is 12% per annum. In Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35cited in Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,36 the Court suggested the following guidelines:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source,
i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
under Title XVIII on ‘Damages’ of the Civil Code govern in determining
the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest
in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest,
as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists
in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money,
the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed
from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6%
per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time
the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date
the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual
base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of
money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.37
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals38and its predecessor case, Reformina v. Tongol39
both involved torts cases and hence, there was no forbearance of money,
goods, or credits. Further, the amount claimed (i.e., damages) could
not be established with reasonable certainty at the time the claim was
made. Hence, we arrived at a different ruling in those cases.
Since the date of demand which is September 27, 2000
was satisfactorily established during trial, then the interest rate of
12% should be reckoned from said date of demand until the principal
amount and the interest thereon is fully satisfied.1âwphi1
The award of attorney’s fees is warranted.Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees may be recovered:
x x x x
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
x x x x
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just
and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, we
find respondent-spouses entitled to recover attorney’s fees. There is
no doubt that they were forced to litigate to protect their interest,
i.e., to recover their money. However, we find the amount of P50,000.00
more appropriate in line with the policy enunciated in Article 2208 of
the Civil Code that the award of attorney’s fees must always be
reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The May
12, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83123 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the rate of interest shall be twelve
percent (12%) per annum, computed from September 27, 2000 until fully
satisfied. The award of attorney’s fees is further reduced to P50,000.00.
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