FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review1 of the 21 June 2000 Decision2
and 14 December 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43129. The Court of Appeals set aside the 11 November 1996 decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81,4 affirming the 15 December 1995 decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31.6
The Antecedents
In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo ("Pajuyo") paid P400
to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in
Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of
light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house
from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra ("Guevarra") executed a Kasunduan
or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live
in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness
and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would
voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his
need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra
refused.
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 ("MTC").
In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no
valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands
because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No.
137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December
1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him.
Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. The dispositive portion of the MTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to:
A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the defendant or any other person or persons claiming any right under him;
B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) monthly as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises starting from the last demand;
C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
D) pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 ("RTC").
On 11 November 1996, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds no
reversible error in the decision appealed from, being in accord with the
law and evidence presented, and the same is hereby affirmed en toto.
SO ORDERED.8
Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November
1996. Guevarra had only until 14 December 1996 to file his appeal with
the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing his appeal with the Court of
Appeals, Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a "Motion for Extension
of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42" ("motion for
extension"). Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure questions of
law. The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion for
extension on 13 December 1996 or one day before the right to appeal
expired.
On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for review with the Supreme Court.
On 8 January 1997, the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution9
referring the motion for extension to the Court of Appeals which has
concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The case presented no special and
important matter for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of at the
first instance.
On 28 January 1997, the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution10 granting the motion for extension conditioned on the timeliness of the filing of the motion.
On 27 February 1997, the Court of Appeals ordered
Pajuyo to comment on Guevara’s petition for review. On 11 April 1997,
Pajuyo filed his Comment.
On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its
decision reversing the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and it is hereby declared that the ejectment case filed against defendant-appellant is without factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.11
Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. Pajuyo pointed out that the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed outright Guevarra’s petition for review because it was filed
out of time. Moreover, it was Guevarra’s counsel and not Guevarra who
signed the certification against forum-shopping.
On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution denying Pajuyo’s motion for reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.12
The Ruling of the MTC
The MTC ruled that the subject of the agreement
between Pajuyo and Guevarra is the house and not the lot. Pajuyo is the
owner of the house, and he allowed Guevarra to use the house only by
tolerance. Thus, Guevarra’s refusal to vacate the house on Pajuyo’s
demand made Guevarra’s continued possession of the house illegal.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC upheld the Kasunduan, which established the landlord and tenant relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra. The terms of the Kasunduan bound Guevarra to return possession of the house on demand.
The RTC rejected Guevarra’s claim of a better right
under Proclamation No. 137, the Revised National Government Center
Housing Project Code of Policies and other pertinent laws. In an
ejectment suit, the RTC has no power to decide Guevarra’s rights under
these laws. The RTC declared that in an ejectment case, the only issue
for resolution is material or physical possession, not ownership.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals declared that Pajuyo and
Guevarra are squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the
contested lot which the government owned.
Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his
rights, was also a squatter. Perez had no right or title over the lot
because it is public land. The assignment of rights between Perez and
Pajuyo, and the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not have any legal effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The court will leave them where they are.
The Court of Appeals reversed the MTC and RTC rulings, which held that the Kasunduan
between Pajuyo and Guevarra created a legal tie akin to that of a
landlord and tenant relationship. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Kasunduan is not a lease contract but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price certain.
Since Pajuyo admitted that he resurfaced only in 1994
to claim the property, the appellate court held that Guevarra has a
better right over the property under Proclamation No. 137. President
Corazon C. Aquino ("President Aquino") issued Proclamation No. 137 on 7
September 1987. At that time, Guevarra was in physical possession of the
property. Under Article VI of the Code of Policies Beneficiary
Selection and Disposition of Homelots and Structures in the National
Housing Project ("the Code"), the actual occupant or caretaker of the
lot shall have first priority as beneficiary of the project. The Court
of Appeals concluded that Guevarra is first in the hierarchy of
priority.
In denying Pajuyo’s motion for reconsideration, the
appellate court debunked Pajuyo’s claim that Guevarra filed his motion
for extension beyond the period to appeal.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that Guevarra’s
motion for extension filed before the Supreme Court was stamped "13
December 1996 at 4:09 PM" by the Supreme Court’s Receiving Clerk. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the motion for extension bore a date,
contrary to Pajuyo’s claim that the motion for extension was undated.
Guevarra filed the motion for extension on time on 13 December 1996
since he filed the motion one day before the expiration of the
reglementary period on 14 December 1996. Thus, the motion for extension
properly complied with the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals in
its 28 January 1997 Resolution. The Court of Appeals explained that the
thirty-day extension to file the petition for review was deemed granted
because of such compliance.
The Court of Appeals rejected Pajuyo’s argument that
the appellate court should have dismissed the petition for review
because it was Guevarra’s counsel and not Guevarra who signed the
certification against forum-shopping. The Court of Appeals pointed out
that Pajuyo did not raise this issue in his Comment. The Court of
Appeals held that Pajuyo could not now seek the dismissal of the case
after he had extensively argued on the merits of the case. This
technicality, the appellate court opined, was clearly an afterthought.
The Issues
Pajuyo raises the following issues for resolution:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION:
1) in GRANTING, instead of denying, Private
Respondent’s Motion for an Extension of thirty days to file petition for
review at the time when there was no more period to extend as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court had already become final and
executory.
2) in giving due course, instead of dismissing,
private respondent’s Petition for Review even though the certification
against forum-shopping was signed only by counsel instead of by
petitioner himself.
3) in ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by the parties was in fact a commodatum,
instead of a Contract of Lease as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court
and in holding that "the ejectment case filed against
defendant-appellant is without legal and factual basis".
4) in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 and in holding that
the parties are in pari delicto being both squatters, therefore, illegal occupants of the contested parcel of land.
5) in deciding the unlawful detainer case based on
the so-called Code of Policies of the National Government Center Housing
Project instead of deciding the same under the Kasunduan voluntarily executed by the parties, the terms and conditions of which are the laws between themselves.13
The Ruling of the Court
The procedural issues Pajuyo is raising are baseless.
However, we find merit in the substantive issues Pajuyo is submitting
for resolution.
Procedural Issues
Pajuyo insists that the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed outright Guevarra’s petition for review because the RTC
decision had already become final and executory when the appellate court
acted on Guevarra’s motion for extension to file the petition. Pajuyo
points out that Guevarra had only one day before the expiry of his
period to appeal the RTC decision. Instead of filing the petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with this Court an
undated motion for extension of 30 days to file a petition for review.
This Court merely referred the motion to the Court of Appeals. Pajuyo
believes that the filing of the motion for extension with this Court did
not toll the running of the period to perfect the appeal. Hence, when
the Court of Appeals received the motion, the period to appeal had
already expired.
We are not persuaded.
Decisions of the regional trial courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction are appealable to the Court of
Appeals by petition for review in cases involving questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law.14 Decisions of the regional
trial courts involving pure questions of law are appealable directly to
this Court by petition for review.15 These modes of appeal are now embodied in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Guevarra believed that his appeal of the RTC decision
involved only questions of law. Guevarra thus filed his motion for
extension to file petition for review before this Court on 14 December
1996. On 3 January 1997, Guevarra then filed his petition for review
with this Court. A perusal of Guevarra’s petition for review gives the
impression that the issues he raised were pure questions of law. There
is a question of law when the doubt or difference is on what the law is
on a certain state of facts.16 There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference is on the truth or falsity of the facts alleged.17
In his petition for review before this Court,
Guevarra no longer disputed the facts. Guevarra’s petition for review
raised these questions: (1) Do ejectment cases pertain only to
possession of a structure, and not the lot on which the structure
stands? (2) Does a suit by a squatter against a fellow squatter
constitute a valid case for ejectment? (3) Should a Presidential
Proclamation governing the lot on which a squatter’s structure stands be
considered in an ejectment suit filed by the owner of the structure?
These questions call for the evaluation of the rights
of the parties under the law on ejectment and the Presidential
Proclamation. At first glance, the questions Guevarra raised appeared
purely legal. However, some factual questions still have to be resolved
because they have a bearing on the legal questions raised in the
petition for review. These factual matters refer to the metes and bounds
of the disputed property and the application of Guevarra as beneficiary
of Proclamation No. 137.
The Court of Appeals has the power to grant an extension of time to file a petition for review. In Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court,18 we declared that the Court of Appeals could grant extension of time in appeals by petition for review. In Liboro v. Court of Appeals,19
we clarified that the prohibition against granting an extension of time
applies only in a case where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere
notice of appeal. The prohibition does not apply in a petition for
review where the pleading needs verification. A petition for review,
unlike an ordinary appeal, requires preparation and research to present a
persuasive position.20 The drafting of the petition for review entails more time and effort than filing a notice of appeal.21 Hence, the Court of Appeals may allow an extension of time to file a petition for review.
In the more recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,22 we held that Liboro’s clarification of Lacsamana
is consistent with the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91. They all allow an extension of time
for filing petitions for review with the Court of Appeals. The
extension, however, should be limited to only fifteen days save in
exceptionally meritorious cases where the Court of Appeals may grant a
longer period.
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation
of law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact on the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected.23 The RTC decision could not have gained finality because the Court of Appeals granted the 30-day extension to Guevarra.
The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it approved Guevarra’s motion for extension. The Court
of Appeals gave due course to the motion for extension because it
complied with the condition set by the appellate court in its resolution
dated 28 January 1997. The resolution stated that the Court of Appeals
would only give due course to the motion for extension if filed on time.
The motion for extension met this condition.
The material dates to consider in determining the
timeliness of the filing of the motion for extension are (1) the date of
receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the
petition, and (2) the date of filing of the motion for extension.24
It is the date of the filing of the motion or pleading, and not the
date of execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that
motion or pleading. Thus, even if the motion for extension bears no
date, the date of filing stamped on it is the reckoning point for
determining the timeliness of its filing.
Guevarra had until 14 December 1996 to file an appeal
from the RTC decision. Guevarra filed his motion for extension before
this Court on 13 December 1996, the date stamped by this Court’s
Receiving Clerk on the motion for extension. Clearly, Guevarra filed the
motion for extension exactly one day before the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal.
Assuming that the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed Guevarra’s appeal on technical grounds, Pajuyo did not ask the
appellate court to deny the motion for extension and dismiss the
petition for review at the earliest opportunity. Instead, Pajuyo
vigorously discussed the merits of the case. It was only when the Court
of Appeals ruled in Guevarra’s favor that Pajuyo raised the procedural
issues against Guevarra’s petition for review.
A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute
for resolution, receives an adverse decision on the merits, is estopped
from attacking the jurisdiction of the court.25 Estoppel sets
in not because the judgment of the court is a valid and conclusive
adjudication, but because the practice of attacking the court’s
jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public
policy.26
In his Comment before the Court of Appeals, Pajuyo
also failed to discuss Guevarra’s failure to sign the certification
against forum shopping. Instead, Pajuyo harped on Guevarra’s counsel
signing the verification, claiming that the counsel’s verification is
insufficient since it is based only on "mere information."
A party’s failure to sign the certification against
forum shopping is different from the party’s failure to sign personally
the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed
by the party, and not by counsel.27 The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.28
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite.29
It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in
the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination
or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith.30 The party need not sign the verification. A party’s
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of
the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.31
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue on
the certificate against forum shopping was merely an afterthought.
Pajuyo did not call the Court of Appeals’ attention to this defect at
the early stage of the proceedings. Pajuyo raised this procedural issue
too late in the proceedings.
Absence of Title over the Disputed Property will not Divest the Courts of Jurisdiction to Resolve the Issue of Possession
Settled is the rule that the defendant’s claim of
ownership of the disputed property will not divest the inferior court of
its jurisdiction over the ejectment case.32 Even if the
pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass on such issue
to determine only the question of possession, especially if the
ownership is inseparably linked with the possession.33 The
adjudication on the issue of ownership is only provisional and will not
bar an action between the same parties involving title to the land.34
This doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of the two
summary actions of ejectment, forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
where the only issue for adjudication is the physical or material
possession over the real property.35
In this case, what Guevarra raised before the courts
was that he and Pajuyo are not the owners of the contested property and
that they are mere squatters. Will the defense that the parties to the
ejectment case are not the owners of the disputed lot allow the courts
to renounce their jurisdiction over the case? The Court of Appeals
believed so and held that it would just leave the parties where they are
since they are in pari delicto.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.
Ownership or the right to possess arising from
ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of possession. The
parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal
possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary
to resolve the issue of physical possession.36 The same is
true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property.
The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the
courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.
The only question that the courts must resolve in
ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical possession of
the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.37 It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable,38
or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications
to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency.39
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the
party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong
hand, violence or terror.40 Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.41
Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor
prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to
remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully
ejects him.42 To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.
In Pitargue v. Sorilla,43
the government owned the land in dispute. The government did not
authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in the case of forcible
entry case to occupy the land. The plaintiff had prior possession and
had already introduced improvements on the public land. The plaintiff
had a pending application for the land with the Bureau of Lands when the
defendant ousted him from possession. The plaintiff filed the action of
forcible entry against the defendant. The government was not a party in
the case of forcible entry.
The defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the
courts to settle the issue of possession because while the application
of the plaintiff was still pending, title remained with the government,
and the Bureau of Public Lands had jurisdiction over the case. We
disagreed with the defendant. We ruled that courts have jurisdiction to
entertain ejectment suits even before the resolution of the application.
The plaintiff, by priority of his application and of his entry,
acquired prior physical possession over the public land applied for as
against other private claimants. That prior physical possession enjoys
legal protection against other private claimants because only a court
can take away such physical possession in an ejectment case.
While the Court did not brand the plaintiff and the defendant in Pitargue44
as squatters, strictly speaking, their entry into the disputed land was
illegal. Both the plaintiff and defendant entered the public land
without the owner’s permission. Title to the land remained with the
government because it had not awarded to anyone ownership of the
contested public land. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were in
effect squatting on government property. Yet, we upheld the courts’
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if the plaintiff
and the defendant in the ejectment case did not have any title over the
contested land.
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to
resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to
preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits
is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel
the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to
obtain what he claims is his.45 The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands.46
Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can
settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding
need to quell social disturbances.47
We further explained in Pitargue the greater interest that is at stake in actions for recovery of possession. We made the following pronouncements in Pitargue:
The question that is before this Court is: Are courts
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving
these public lands before final award is made by the Lands Department,
and before title is given any of the conflicting claimants? It is one of
utmost importance, as there are public lands everywhere and there are
thousands of settlers, especially in newly opened regions. It also
involves a matter of policy, as it requires the determination of the
respective authorities and functions of two coordinate branches of the
Government in connection with public land conflicts.
Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the
Civil Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country
before the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory
action, the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the physical
possession of real property, irrespective of the question as to who has
the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the accion
interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be brought within one year
from dispossession (Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil.
286, 291); and as early as October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we
implanted the common law action of forcible entry (section 80 of Act No.
190), the object of which has been stated by this Court to be "to
prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue
from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such
withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons
who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property,
resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate
action in the court to assert their claims." (Supia and Batioco
vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of
the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was
already available in the courts of the country. So the question to be
resolved is, Did the Legislature intend, when it vested the power and
authority to alienate and dispose of the public lands in the Lands
Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining the possessory
action of forcible entry between rival claimants or occupants of any
land before award thereof to any of the parties? Did Congress intend
that the lands applied for, or all public lands for that matter, be
removed from the jurisdiction of the judicial Branch of the Government,
so that any troubles arising therefrom, or any breaches of the peace or
disorders caused by rival claimants, could be inquired into only by the
Lands Department to the exclusion of the courts? The answer to this
question seems to us evident. The Lands Department does not have the
means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent
disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among
settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Then
its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation, and while it
may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the
settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court
herein has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual
possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of
the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not have been
intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or breaches
of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to the final
award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the
Government must continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the
limits of their respective functions. The vesting of the Lands
Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public
lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches
of the Government of the exercise of the respective functions or powers
thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of
the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take
jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving,
directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.
Our attention has been called to a principle
enunciated in American courts to the effect that courts have no
jurisdiction to determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and
that until the disposition of the land has passed from the control of
the Federal Government, the courts will not interfere with the
administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C. J. 1093-1094.) We
have no quarrel with this principle. The determination of the respective
rights of rival claimants to public lands is different from the
determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation
with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches
of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the
possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been
deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other
illegal manner, can never be "prejudicial interference" with the
disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if
courts were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of
possession, that threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace
committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of
lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants or
squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule.
It must be borne in mind that the action that would
be used to solve conflicts of possession between rivals or conflicting
applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible entry.
This action, both in England and the United States and in our
jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy whereby one in
peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession of which he has
been deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate
object being to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder.
(Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis
of the remedy is mere possession as a fact, of physical possession, not
a legal possession. (Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title
or right to possession is never in issue in an action of forcible entry;
as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is expressly banned, except to
prove the nature of the possession. (Second 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.)
With this nature of the action in mind, by no stretch of the
imagination can conclusion be arrived at that the use of the remedy in
the courts of justice would constitute an interference with the
alienation, disposition, and control of public lands. To limit ourselves
to the case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in
any way interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition of
the land contested? On the contrary, it would facilitate adjudication,
for the question of priority of possession having been decided in a
final manner by the courts, said question need no longer waste the time
of the land officers making the adjudication or award. (Emphasis ours)
The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases
The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this case.
Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code48 embody the principle of pari delicto. We explained the principle of pari delicto in these words:
The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo malo non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them.49
The application of the pari delicto principle is not
absolute, as there are exceptions to its application. One of these
exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would
violate well-established public policy.50
In Drilon v. Gaurana,51 we reiterated the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. We held that:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of
forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition
of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording
this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent
breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the
withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would
create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing
themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to
gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to
assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all
these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to
compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law
alone to obtain what he claims is his.52
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto
would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust
another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had
illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would
leave them where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the
ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is
precisely what ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession
seek to prevent.53 Even the owner who has title over the
disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain
possession of his property. The owner must go to court.
Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if
the parties to the ejectment suit are squatters. The determination of
priority and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent matter
that cannot be left to the squatters to decide. To do so would make
squatters receive better treatment under the law. The law restrains
property owners from taking the law into their own hands. However, the
principle of pari delicto as applied by the Court of Appeals
would give squatters free rein to dispossess fellow squatters or
violently retake possession of properties usurped from them. Courts
should not leave squatters to their own devices in cases involving
recovery of possession.
Possession is the only Issue for Resolution in an Ejectment Case
The case for review before the Court of Appeals was a
simple case of ejectment. The Court of Appeals refused to rule on the
issue of physical possession. Nevertheless, the appellate court held
that the pivotal issue in this case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra
has the "priority right as beneficiary of the contested land under
Proclamation No. 137."54 According to the Court of Appeals,
Guevarra enjoys preferential right under Proclamation No. 137 because
Article VI of the Code declares that the actual occupant or caretaker is
the one qualified to apply for socialized housing.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals has no factual and legal basis.
First. Guevarra did not present
evidence to show that the contested lot is part of a relocation site
under Proclamation No. 137. Proclamation No. 137 laid down the metes and
bounds of the land that it declared open for disposition to bona fide
residents.
The records do not show that the contested lot is
within the land specified by Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra had the
burden to prove that the disputed lot is within the coverage of
Proclamation No. 137. He failed to do so.
Second. The Court of Appeals should not
have given credence to Guevarra’s unsubstantiated claim that he is the
beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra merely alleged that in the
survey the project administrator conducted, he and not Pajuyo appeared
as the actual occupant of the lot.
There is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of
the benefits of Proclamation No. 137. Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to occupy
the disputed property in 1985. President Aquino signed Proclamation No.
137 into law on 11 March 1986. Pajuyo made his earliest demand for
Guevarra to vacate the property in September 1994.
During the time that Guevarra temporarily held the
property up to the time that Proclamation No. 137 allegedly segregated
the disputed lot, Guevarra never applied as beneficiary of Proclamation
No. 137. Even when Guevarra already knew that Pajuyo was reclaiming
possession of the property, Guevarra did not take any step to comply
with the requirements of Proclamation No. 137.
Third. Even assuming that the disputed
lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137 and Guevarra has a
pending application over the lot, courts should still assume
jurisdiction and resolve the issue of possession. However, the
jurisdiction of the courts would be limited to the issue of physical
possession only.
In Pitargue,55 we ruled that
courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public land
to determine the issue of physical possession. The determination of the
respective rights of rival claimants to public land is, however,
distinct from the determination of who has the actual physical
possession or who has a better right of physical possession.56 The administrative disposition and alienation of public lands should be threshed out in the proper government agency.57
The Court of Appeals’ determination of Pajuyo and
Guevarra’s rights under Proclamation No. 137 was premature. Pajuyo and
Guevarra were at most merely potential beneficiaries of the law. Courts
should not preempt the decision of the administrative agency mandated by
law to determine the qualifications of applicants for the acquisition
of public lands. Instead, courts should expeditiously resolve the issue
of physical possession in ejectment cases to prevent disorder and
breaches of peace.58
Pajuyo is Entitled to Physical Possession of the Disputed Property
Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyo’s prior possession
of the lot and ownership of the house built on it. Guevarra expressly
admitted the existence and due execution of the Kasunduan. The Kasunduan reads:
Ako, si COL[I]TO PAJUYO, may-ari ng bahay at lote sa
Bo. Payatas, Quezon City, ay nagbibigay pahintulot kay G. Eddie
Guevarra, na pansamantalang manirahan sa nasabing bahay at lote ng
"walang bayad." Kaugnay nito, kailangang panatilihin nila ang kalinisan
at kaayusan ng bahay at lote.
Sa sandaling kailangan na namin ang bahay at lote, sila’y kusang aalis ng walang reklamo.
Based on the Kasunduan, Pajuyo permitted
Guevarra to reside in the house and lot free of rent, but Guevarra was
under obligation to maintain the premises in good condition. Guevarra
promised to vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s demand but Guevarra broke
his promise and refused to heed Pajuyo’s demand to vacate.
These facts make out a case for unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involves the withholding by a person from another of
the possession of real property to which the latter is entitled after
the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under a contract, express or implied.59
Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his
property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing
which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.60 The defendant’s refusal to comply with the demand makes his continued possession of the property unlawful.61
The status of the defendant in such a case is similar to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continues by tolerance of the owner.62
This principle should apply with greater force in
cases where a contract embodies the permission or tolerance to use the
property. The Kasunduan expressly articulated Pajuyo’s
forbearance. Pajuyo did not require Guevarra to pay any rent but only to
maintain the house and lot in good condition. Guevarra expressly vowed
in the Kasunduan that he would vacate the property on demand.
Guevarra’s refusal to comply with Pajuyo’s demand to vacate made
Guevarra’s continued possession of the property unlawful.
We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals’ theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.
In a contract of commodatum, one of the
parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter
may use the same for a certain time and return it.63 An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period.64
Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until
after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of
the use for which the commodatum is constituted.65 If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use.66
If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can
demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual
relation is called a precarium.67 Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.68
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan
did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the
property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum.
Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as
one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal
of permission would result in the termination of the lease.69 The tenant’s withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum,
Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of
the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to
return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or
contracts of commission, administration and commodatum.70 These contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing received.71
Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on
the sole ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter. Squatters,
Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a contract involving the land
they illegally occupy. Guevarra insists that the contract is void.
Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it. The Kasunduan binds Guevarra.
The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of
determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a right to physical
possession of the contested property. The Kasunduan is the
undeniable evidence of Guevarra’s recognition of Pajuyo’s better right
of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad faith.
The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there
would still be an implied promise to vacate.
Guevarra contends that there is "a pernicious evil
that is sought to be avoided, and that is allowing an absentee squatter
who (sic) makes (sic) a profit out of his illegal act."72
Guevarra bases his argument on the preferential right given to the
actual occupant or caretaker under Proclamation No. 137 on socialized
housing.
We are not convinced.
Pajuyo did not profit from his arrangement with
Guevarra because Guevarra stayed in the property without paying any
rent. There is also no proof that Pajuyo is a professional squatter who
rents out usurped properties to other squatters. Moreover, it is for the
proper government agency to decide who between Pajuyo and Guevarra
qualifies for socialized housing. The only issue that we are addressing
is physical possession.
Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment.73 This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer.74
In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of
his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth. Thus, he must allege and prove prior possession.75
But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right to possess under any
contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession
is not required.76
Pajuyo’s withdrawal of his permission to Guevarra terminated the Kasunduan.
Guevarra’s transient right to possess the property ended as well.
Moreover, it was Pajuyo who was in actual possession of the property
because Guevarra had to seek Pajuyo’s permission to temporarily hold the
property and Guevarra had to follow the conditions set by Pajuyo in the
Kasunduan. Control over the property still rested with Pajuyo and this is evidence of actual possession.
Pajuyo’s absence did not affect his actual possession
of the disputed property. Possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before he is deemed in possession.77 One may acquire
possession not only by physical occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of one’s will.78 Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary.79
Ruling on Possession Does not Bind Title to the Land in Dispute
We are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we
declared that "squatters and intruders who clandestinely enter into
titled government property cannot, by such act, acquire any legal right
to said property."80 We made this declaration because the
person who had title or who had the right to legal possession over the
disputed property was a party in the ejectment suit and that party
instituted the case against squatters or usurpers.
In this case, the owner of the land, which is the
government, is not a party to the ejectment case. This case is between
squatters. Had the government participated in this case, the courts
could have evicted the contending squatters, Pajuyo and Guevarra.
Since the party that has title or a better right over
the property is not impleaded in this case, we cannot evict on our own
the parties. Such a ruling would discourage squatters from seeking the
aid of the courts in settling the issue of physical possession.
Stripping both the plaintiff and the defendant of possession just
because they are squatters would have the same dangerous implications as
the application of the principle of pari delicto. Squatters
would then rather settle the issue of physical possession among
themselves than seek relief from the courts if the plaintiff and
defendant in the ejectment case would both stand to lose possession of
the disputed property. This would subvert the policy underlying actions
for recovery of possession.
Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in
holding the property, he is entitled to remain on the property until a
person who has title or a better right lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is
certainly not that person. The ruling in this case, however, does not
preclude Pajuyo and Guevarra from introducing evidence and presenting
arguments before the proper administrative agency to establish any right
to which they may be entitled under the law.81
In no way should our ruling in this case be
interpreted to condone squatting. The ruling on the issue of physical
possession does not affect title to the property nor constitute a
binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of
ownership.82 The owner can still go to court to recover
lawfully the property from the person who holds the property without
legal title. Our ruling here does not diminish the power of government
agencies, including local governments, to condemn, abate, remove or
demolish illegal or unauthorized structures in accordance with existing
laws.
Attorney’s Fees and Rentals
The MTC and RTC failed to justify the award of P3,000
attorney’s fees to Pajuyo. Attorney’s fees as part of damages are
awarded only in the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.83 Thus, the award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule.84
Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.85 We therefore delete the attorney’s fees awarded to Pajuyo.
We sustain the P300 monthly rentals the MTC
and RTC assessed against Guevarra. Guevarra did not dispute this factual
finding of the two courts. We find the amount reasonable compensation
to Pajuyo. The P300 monthly rental is counted from the last demand to vacate, which was on 16 February 1995.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The
Decision dated 21 June 2000 and Resolution dated 14 December 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129 are SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 11 November 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 81 in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943, affirming the Decision
dated 15 December 1995 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 12432, is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The award of attorney’s fees is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.Footnotes
2 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Romeo
A. Brawner, concurring.
3 Penned by Judge Wenceslao I. Agnir.4 Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-26943.
5 Penned by Judge Mariano M. Singzon, Jr.
6 Docketed as Civil Case No. 12432.
7 Rollo, p. 41.
8 Ibid., p. 49.
9 Ibid., p. 221.
10 Ibid., p. 224.
11 Ibid., p. 60.
12 Ibid., p. 73.
13 Rollo, p. 134.
14 Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 245 (1998).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 227 Phil. 606 (1986).
19 G.R. No. 101132, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 193.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110003, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 436.
23 City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100626, 29 November 1991, 204 SCRA 362.
24 Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, Jr., 378 Phil. 1009 (1999).
25 Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982 (1996).
26 Ibid.
27 Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 703 (1998).
28 Ibid.
29 Buenaventura v. Uy, G.R. No. L-28156, 31 March 1987, 149 SCRA 220.
30 Ibid.
31 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, VOL.I, SIXTH REV. ED.,143.
32 Dizon v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 429 (1996).
33 Ibid.
34 De Luna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94490, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 276.
35 Ibid.
36 Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5 (1952);
Dizon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32; Section 16, Rule 70 of the
1997 Rules of Court.
37 Ibid.; Fige v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107951, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA 586; Oblea v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 804 (1995).
38 Dizon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.39 Supra note 36.
40 Drilon v. Gaurana, G.R. No. L-35482, 30 April 1987, 149 SCRA 342.
41 Rubio v. The Hon. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, 322 Phil. 179 (1996).
42 Ibid.
43 92 Phil. 5 (1952).
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.; Reynoso v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 49344, 23 February 1989, 170 SCRA 546; Aguilon v.
Bohol, G.R. No. L-27169, 20 October 1977, 79 SCRA 482.
46 Ibid.47 Ibid.
48 Art. 1411. When the nullity proceeds
from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act
constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they
shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of
effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or
the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the
parties is guilty; but the innocent one may claim what he has given, and
shall not be bound to comply with his promise.
Art.1412. If the act in which the unlawful or
forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the
following rule shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting
parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the
contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at
fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or
ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised to him. The other who
is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any
obligation to comply with his promise.
50 Silagan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 274 Phil. 182 (1991).
51 Supra note 40.
52 Ibid.
53 Dizon v. Concina, 141 Phil. 589 (1969); Cine Ligaya v. Labrador, 66 Phil. 659 (1938).
54 Rollo, p. 54.
55 Supra note 43.
56 Ibid.; Aguilon v. Bohol, supra note 45; Reynoso v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45.
57 Reynoso v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45.
58 Aguilon v. Bohol, supra note 45.
59 Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
60 Arcal v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 813 (1998).
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Art. 1933. By the contract of loan, one
of the parties delivers to another, either something not consumable so
that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in
which case the contract is called a commodatum; or money or other
consumable thing, upon the condition that the same amount of the same
kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply
called a loan or mutuum.
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.
In commodatum the bailor retains the ownership of the thing loaned, while in simple loan, ownership passes to the borrower.
64 Pascual v. Mina, 20 Phil. 202 (1911).
65 Art. 1946. The bailor cannot demand the
return of the thing loaned till after the expiration of the period
stipulated, or after the accomplishment of the use for which the
commodatum has been constituted. However, if in the meantime, he should
have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return or temporary
use.
In case of temporary use by the bailor, the contract
of commodatum is suspended while the thing is in the possession of the
bailor.
67 Art.1947. The bailor may demand the thing at will, and the contractual relation is called a precarium, in the following cases:
(1) If neither the duration of the contract nor the use to which the thing loaned should be devoted, has been stipulated; or
(2) If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the owner.
68 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. V, 448.
69 Arcal v. Court of Appeals, supra note
60; Dakudao v. Consolacion, 207 Phil. 750 (1983); Calubayan v. Pascual,
128 Phil. 160 (1967).
70 United States v. Camara, 28 Phil. 238 (1914).71 Ibid.
72 Rollo, p. 87.
73 Benitez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104828, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 242.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Dela Rosa v. Carlos, G.R. No. 147549, 23 October 2003.
78 Benitez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 73.
79 Ibid.
80 Caballero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
59888, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 56; Florendo, Jr. v. Coloma, G.R. No.
L-60544, 19 May 1984, 214 SCRA 268.
81 Florendo, Jr. v. Coloma, supra note 80.82 Dizon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32; Section 7, Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
83 Padillo v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 344 (2001).
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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